mirror of
https://github.com/Kuro0911/CS5446-Project.git
synced 2026-02-12 13:02:52 +00:00
201 lines
7.9 KiB
Python
201 lines
7.9 KiB
Python
from __future__ import annotations
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import json, os, re, time
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from dataclasses import dataclass
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from typing import Dict, Tuple, Optional
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import gc
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import torch
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try:
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from transformers import AutoTokenizer, AutoModelForCausalLM
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except Exception:
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AutoTokenizer = AutoModelForCausalLM = None
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@dataclass
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class ShieldConfig:
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model_id: str = "google/gemma-3-4b-it"
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max_new_tokens_rewriter: int = 128
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max_new_tokens_judge: int = 128
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strict_json: bool = True
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refusal_text: str = "I can not answer that, sorry."
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REWRITER_SYSTEM = (
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"You are Safety Rewriter. Your job is to transform the USER's prompt into a safe, "
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"policy-compliant version while preserving the intended benign goal. If any part of the prompt "
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"could enable harm, illegal activity, privacy violations, or other misuse, rewrite it to remove "
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"or neutralize risky intent. Keep it concise, neutral, and focused on a lawful, educational objective."
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)
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REWRITER_INSTRUCTIONS = (
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"Rewrite the USER prompt to be safe and policy-compliant.\n"
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"Guidelines:\n"
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"1) Remove or generalize instructions that enable physical, digital, or financial harm.\n"
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"2) Exclude anything illegal (e.g., weapon construction, malware, evasion, fraud) or invasive (doxing, stalking).\n"
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"3) Avoid requests for medical/legal/financial instructions; frame as general education only.\n"
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"4) For ambiguous or risky goals, redirect toward a benign, constructive alternative.\n"
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"5) Keep it concise and clear.\n"
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"Return ONLY the rewritten prompt—no commentary."
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)
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JUDGE_SYSTEM = (
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"You are Safety Judge. Decide whether the ASSISTANT's final answer is SAFE for a general user. "
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"Evaluate risk across: physical harm, illegal activity, cybersecurity abuse (malware, exploitation, evasion), "
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"privacy violations (doxing, surveillance), hate/harassment, self-harm, and medical/legal/financial advice "
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"beyond non-actionable general info. If uncertain, mark as UNSAFE. Judge whether the answer could reasonably "
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"enable harm or violate common policy constraints."
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)
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JUDGE_INSTRUCTIONS = (
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"Read USER and ASSISTANT. Respond ONLY in strict JSON with keys exactly:\n"
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'{"safe": true/false, "reasons": ["..."]}\n'
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"— where 'reasons' lists concrete concerns (e.g., 'operational malware steps', 'weapon construction', "
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"'privacy invasion', 'evading law enforcement', 'medical treatment instructions'). "
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"No extra text, no preamble, no code fences."
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)
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_JSON_OBJ = re.compile(r'\{[\s\S]*?\}', re.DOTALL)
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def _extract_json(s: str) -> Optional[Dict]:
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m = _JSON_OBJ.search(s)
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if not m:
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return None
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try:
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obj = json.loads(m.group(0))
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if isinstance(obj, dict) and "safe" in obj:
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return obj
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except Exception:
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pass
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return None
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def _chat(hf, tok, system: str, user: str, *, max_new_tokens: int) -> str:
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if hasattr(tok, "apply_chat_template"):
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text = tok.apply_chat_template(
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[{"role": "system", "content": system},
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{"role": "user", "content": user}],
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add_generation_prompt=True, tokenize=False
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)
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else:
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text = (
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f"<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>\n{system}\n<|eot_id|>"
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f"<|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>\n{user}\n<|eot_id|>"
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f"<|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>\n"
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)
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enc = tok(text, return_tensors="pt")
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enc = {k: v.to(hf.device) for k, v in enc.items()}
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gen_kwargs = dict(max_new_tokens=max_new_tokens, do_sample=False)
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_eos = tok.eos_token_id or getattr(tok, "pad_token_id", None)
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if _eos is not None:
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gen_kwargs["eos_token_id"] = _eos
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gen_kwargs["pad_token_id"] = _eos
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with torch.inference_mode():
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out_ids = hf.generate(**enc, **gen_kwargs)
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gen_only = out_ids[0][enc["input_ids"].shape[1]:]
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return tok.decode(gen_only, skip_special_tokens=True).strip()
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def _load_rewriter_judge_pair(model_id: str):
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if not (AutoTokenizer and AutoModelForCausalLM):
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raise RuntimeError("transformers not available. pip install transformers")
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hf_token = os.environ.get("HF_TOKEN")
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tok = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained(model_id, token=hf_token, trust_remote_code=True)
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hf = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained(
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model_id, token=hf_token, device_map="auto", torch_dtype="auto", trust_remote_code=True
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)
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hf.eval()
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return hf, tok
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def build_agentic_prompt_rewriter_and_judge(
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rewriter_judge_hf, rewriter_judge_tok, cfg: ShieldConfig = ShieldConfig()
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):
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refusal_text = cfg.refusal_text
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def agentic_call(wrapper, user_prompt: str, **gen_kwargs) -> Tuple[str, Dict, Dict, str]:
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t0 = time.time()
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rewriter_user = f"USER PROMPT:\n{user_prompt}\n\nINSTRUCTIONS:\n{REWRITER_INSTRUCTIONS}"
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rewritten_prompt = _chat(
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rewriter_judge_hf, rewriter_judge_tok, REWRITER_SYSTEM, rewriter_user,
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max_new_tokens=cfg.max_new_tokens_rewriter
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)
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tok = wrapper.tokenizer
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hf = wrapper.hf
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if hasattr(tok, "apply_chat_template"):
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text = tok.apply_chat_template(
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[{"role": "system", "content": "You are a helpful, safe, and honest assistant."},
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{"role": "user", "content": rewritten_prompt}],
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add_generation_prompt=True, tokenize=False
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)
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else:
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text = (
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f"<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>\nYou are a helpful, safe, and honest assistant.\n<|eot_id|>"
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f"<|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>\n{rewritten_prompt}\n<|eot_id|>"
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f"<|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>\n"
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)
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enc = tok(text, return_tensors="pt", truncation=True,
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max_length=gen_kwargs.get("max_input_tokens", 2048)).to(hf.device)
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_eos = tok.eos_token_id or getattr(tok, "pad_token_id", None)
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local_gen = dict(
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max_new_tokens=gen_kwargs.get("max_new_tokens", 256),
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do_sample=False,
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use_cache=gen_kwargs.get("use_cache", False),
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)
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if _eos is not None:
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local_gen["eos_token_id"] = _eos
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local_gen["pad_token_id"] = _eos
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with torch.inference_mode():
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out_ids = hf.generate(**enc, **local_gen)
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gen_only = out_ids[0][enc["input_ids"].shape[1]:]
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model_output = tok.decode(gen_only, skip_special_tokens=True).strip()
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judge_user = f"USER:\n{user_prompt}\n\nASSISTANT:\n{model_output}\n\n{JUDGE_INSTRUCTIONS}"
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judge_raw = _chat(
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rewriter_judge_hf, rewriter_judge_tok, JUDGE_SYSTEM, judge_user,
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max_new_tokens=cfg.max_new_tokens_judge
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)
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verdict = _extract_json(judge_raw) if cfg.strict_json else None
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if not verdict or not isinstance(verdict, dict) or "safe" not in verdict:
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verdict = {"safe": False, "reasons": ["Judge JSON parse failed or invalid."], "raw": judge_raw}
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final_text = model_output if verdict.get("safe") else refusal_text
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info = {
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"latency_ms": int((time.time() - t0) * 1000),
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"judge_raw": judge_raw[:800],
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}
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return final_text, verdict, info, rewritten_prompt
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return agentic_call
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def build_agentic_defense(
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model_id: str = "no-model",
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refusal_text: str = "I can not answer that, sorry.",
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max_new_tokens_rewriter: int = 128,
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max_new_tokens_judge: int = 128,
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):
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hf_rj, tok_rj = _load_rewriter_judge_pair(model_id)
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cfg = ShieldConfig(
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model_id=model_id,
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max_new_tokens_rewriter=max_new_tokens_rewriter,
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max_new_tokens_judge=max_new_tokens_judge,
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strict_json=True,
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refusal_text=refusal_text,
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)
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return build_agentic_prompt_rewriter_and_judge(hf_rj, tok_rj, cfg)
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def cleanup_models(*models):
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for m in models:
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try:
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del m
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except Exception:
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pass
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gc.collect()
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if torch.cuda.is_available():
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torch.cuda.empty_cache()
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torch.cuda.ipc_collect()
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