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CS5446-Project/domain_specific_proposed.py
2025-11-05 14:20:01 +08:00

201 lines
7.9 KiB
Python

from __future__ import annotations
import json, os, re, time
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Dict, Tuple, Optional
import gc
import torch
try:
from transformers import AutoTokenizer, AutoModelForCausalLM
except Exception:
AutoTokenizer = AutoModelForCausalLM = None
@dataclass
class ShieldConfig:
model_id: str = "google/gemma-3-4b-it"
max_new_tokens_rewriter: int = 128
max_new_tokens_judge: int = 128
strict_json: bool = True
refusal_text: str = "I can not answer that, sorry."
REWRITER_SYSTEM = (
"You are Safety Rewriter. Your job is to transform the USER's prompt into a safe, "
"policy-compliant version while preserving the intended benign goal. If any part of the prompt "
"could enable harm, illegal activity, privacy violations, or other misuse, rewrite it to remove "
"or neutralize risky intent. Keep it concise, neutral, and focused on a lawful, educational objective."
)
REWRITER_INSTRUCTIONS = (
"Rewrite the USER prompt to be safe and policy-compliant.\n"
"Guidelines:\n"
"1) Remove or generalize instructions that enable physical, digital, or financial harm.\n"
"2) Exclude anything illegal (e.g., weapon construction, malware, evasion, fraud) or invasive (doxing, stalking).\n"
"3) Avoid requests for medical/legal/financial instructions; frame as general education only.\n"
"4) For ambiguous or risky goals, redirect toward a benign, constructive alternative.\n"
"5) Keep it concise and clear.\n"
"Return ONLY the rewritten prompt—no commentary."
)
JUDGE_SYSTEM = (
"You are Safety Judge. Decide whether the ASSISTANT's final answer is SAFE for a general user. "
"Evaluate risk across: physical harm, illegal activity, cybersecurity abuse (malware, exploitation, evasion), "
"privacy violations (doxing, surveillance), hate/harassment, self-harm, and medical/legal/financial advice "
"beyond non-actionable general info. If uncertain, mark as UNSAFE. Judge whether the answer could reasonably "
"enable harm or violate common policy constraints."
)
JUDGE_INSTRUCTIONS = (
"Read USER and ASSISTANT. Respond ONLY in strict JSON with keys exactly:\n"
'{"safe": true/false, "reasons": ["..."]}\n'
"— where 'reasons' lists concrete concerns (e.g., 'operational malware steps', 'weapon construction', "
"'privacy invasion', 'evading law enforcement', 'medical treatment instructions'). "
"No extra text, no preamble, no code fences."
)
_JSON_OBJ = re.compile(r'\{[\s\S]*?\}', re.DOTALL)
def _extract_json(s: str) -> Optional[Dict]:
m = _JSON_OBJ.search(s)
if not m:
return None
try:
obj = json.loads(m.group(0))
if isinstance(obj, dict) and "safe" in obj:
return obj
except Exception:
pass
return None
def _chat(hf, tok, system: str, user: str, *, max_new_tokens: int) -> str:
if hasattr(tok, "apply_chat_template"):
text = tok.apply_chat_template(
[{"role": "system", "content": system},
{"role": "user", "content": user}],
add_generation_prompt=True, tokenize=False
)
else:
text = (
f"<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>\n{system}\n<|eot_id|>"
f"<|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>\n{user}\n<|eot_id|>"
f"<|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>\n"
)
enc = tok(text, return_tensors="pt")
enc = {k: v.to(hf.device) for k, v in enc.items()}
gen_kwargs = dict(max_new_tokens=max_new_tokens, do_sample=False)
_eos = tok.eos_token_id or getattr(tok, "pad_token_id", None)
if _eos is not None:
gen_kwargs["eos_token_id"] = _eos
gen_kwargs["pad_token_id"] = _eos
with torch.inference_mode():
out_ids = hf.generate(**enc, **gen_kwargs)
gen_only = out_ids[0][enc["input_ids"].shape[1]:]
return tok.decode(gen_only, skip_special_tokens=True).strip()
def _load_rewriter_judge_pair(model_id: str):
if not (AutoTokenizer and AutoModelForCausalLM):
raise RuntimeError("transformers not available. pip install transformers")
hf_token = os.environ.get("HF_TOKEN")
tok = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained(model_id, token=hf_token, trust_remote_code=True)
hf = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained(
model_id, token=hf_token, device_map="auto", torch_dtype="auto", trust_remote_code=True
)
hf.eval()
return hf, tok
def build_agentic_prompt_rewriter_and_judge(
rewriter_judge_hf, rewriter_judge_tok, cfg: ShieldConfig = ShieldConfig()
):
refusal_text = cfg.refusal_text
def agentic_call(wrapper, user_prompt: str, **gen_kwargs) -> Tuple[str, Dict, Dict, str]:
t0 = time.time()
rewriter_user = f"USER PROMPT:\n{user_prompt}\n\nINSTRUCTIONS:\n{REWRITER_INSTRUCTIONS}"
rewritten_prompt = _chat(
rewriter_judge_hf, rewriter_judge_tok, REWRITER_SYSTEM, rewriter_user,
max_new_tokens=cfg.max_new_tokens_rewriter
)
tok = wrapper.tokenizer
hf = wrapper.hf
if hasattr(tok, "apply_chat_template"):
text = tok.apply_chat_template(
[{"role": "system", "content": "You are a helpful, safe, and honest assistant."},
{"role": "user", "content": rewritten_prompt}],
add_generation_prompt=True, tokenize=False
)
else:
text = (
f"<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>\nYou are a helpful, safe, and honest assistant.\n<|eot_id|>"
f"<|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>\n{rewritten_prompt}\n<|eot_id|>"
f"<|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>\n"
)
enc = tok(text, return_tensors="pt", truncation=True,
max_length=gen_kwargs.get("max_input_tokens", 2048)).to(hf.device)
_eos = tok.eos_token_id or getattr(tok, "pad_token_id", None)
local_gen = dict(
max_new_tokens=gen_kwargs.get("max_new_tokens", 256),
do_sample=False,
use_cache=gen_kwargs.get("use_cache", False),
)
if _eos is not None:
local_gen["eos_token_id"] = _eos
local_gen["pad_token_id"] = _eos
with torch.inference_mode():
out_ids = hf.generate(**enc, **local_gen)
gen_only = out_ids[0][enc["input_ids"].shape[1]:]
model_output = tok.decode(gen_only, skip_special_tokens=True).strip()
judge_user = f"USER:\n{user_prompt}\n\nASSISTANT:\n{model_output}\n\n{JUDGE_INSTRUCTIONS}"
judge_raw = _chat(
rewriter_judge_hf, rewriter_judge_tok, JUDGE_SYSTEM, judge_user,
max_new_tokens=cfg.max_new_tokens_judge
)
verdict = _extract_json(judge_raw) if cfg.strict_json else None
if not verdict or not isinstance(verdict, dict) or "safe" not in verdict:
verdict = {"safe": False, "reasons": ["Judge JSON parse failed or invalid."], "raw": judge_raw}
final_text = model_output if verdict.get("safe") else refusal_text
info = {
"latency_ms": int((time.time() - t0) * 1000),
"judge_raw": judge_raw[:800],
}
return final_text, verdict, info, rewritten_prompt
return agentic_call
def build_agentic_defense(
model_id: str = "no-model",
refusal_text: str = "I can not answer that, sorry.",
max_new_tokens_rewriter: int = 128,
max_new_tokens_judge: int = 128,
):
hf_rj, tok_rj = _load_rewriter_judge_pair(model_id)
cfg = ShieldConfig(
model_id=model_id,
max_new_tokens_rewriter=max_new_tokens_rewriter,
max_new_tokens_judge=max_new_tokens_judge,
strict_json=True,
refusal_text=refusal_text,
)
return build_agentic_prompt_rewriter_and_judge(hf_rj, tok_rj, cfg)
def cleanup_models(*models):
for m in models:
try:
del m
except Exception:
pass
gc.collect()
if torch.cuda.is_available():
torch.cuda.empty_cache()
torch.cuda.ipc_collect()