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公明
2026-07-10 18:50:57 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent 49d2175872
commit a145687508
13 changed files with 777 additions and 66 deletions
+61 -14
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
@@ -16,6 +17,7 @@ import (
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/agent"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/audit"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/authctx"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/c2"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/config"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/database"
@@ -123,6 +125,7 @@ func New(cfg *config.Config, log *logger.Logger, configPath string) (*App, error
// 创建MCP服务器(带数据库持久化)
mcpServer := mcp.NewServerWithStorage(log.Logger, db)
mcpServer.SetToolAuthorizer(mcpToolAuthorizer(db))
mcpServer.ConfigureHTTPToolCallTimeoutFromAgentMinutes(cfg.Agent.ToolTimeoutMinutes)
// 创建安全工具执行器
@@ -146,6 +149,7 @@ func New(cfg *config.Config, log *logger.Logger, configPath string) (*App, error
// 创建外部MCP管理器(使用与内部MCP服务器相同的存储)
externalMCPMgr := mcp.NewExternalMCPManagerWithStorage(log.Logger, db)
externalMCPMgr.SetToolAuthorizer(externalMCPToolAuthorizer())
if cfg.ExternalMCP.Servers != nil {
externalMCPMgr.LoadConfigs(&cfg.ExternalMCP)
// 启动所有启用的外部MCP客户端
@@ -372,7 +376,7 @@ func New(cfg *config.Config, log *logger.Logger, configPath string) (*App, error
vulnerabilityHandler.SetAudit(auditSvc)
webshellHandler := handler.NewWebShellHandler(log.Logger, db)
webshellHandler.SetAudit(auditSvc)
chatUploadsHandler := handler.NewChatUploadsHandler(log.Logger)
chatUploadsHandler := handler.NewChatUploadsHandler(log.Logger, db)
chatUploadsHandler.SetAudit(auditSvc)
registerWebshellTools(mcpServer, db, webshellHandler, log.Logger)
registerWebshellManagementTools(mcpServer, db, webshellHandler, log.Logger)
@@ -541,6 +545,7 @@ func New(cfg *config.Config, log *logger.Logger, configPath string) (*App, error
terminalHandler,
app.c2Handler,
auditHandler,
auditSvc,
rbacHandler,
mcpServer,
authManager,
@@ -554,17 +559,30 @@ func New(cfg *config.Config, log *logger.Logger, configPath string) (*App, error
// mcpHandlerWithAuth 在鉴权通过后转发到 MCP 处理;若配置了 auth_header 则校验请求头,否则直接放行
func (a *App) mcpHandlerWithAuth(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
cfg := a.config.MCP
if cfg.AuthHeader != "" {
actual := []byte(r.Header.Get(cfg.AuthHeader))
expected := []byte(cfg.AuthHeaderValue)
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(actual, expected) != 1 {
a.logger.Logger.Debug("MCP 鉴权失败:header 缺失或值不匹配", zap.String("header", cfg.AuthHeader))
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"unauthorized"}`))
if authHeader := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("Authorization")); len(authHeader) > 7 && strings.EqualFold(authHeader[:7], "Bearer ") {
if session, ok := a.auth.ValidateToken(strings.TrimSpace(authHeader[7:])); ok && session.Permissions["mcp:execute"] {
principal := authctx.NewPrincipalWithScopes(session.UserID, session.Username, session.Scope, session.Permissions, session.PermissionScopes)
a.mcpServer.HandleHTTP(w, r.WithContext(authctx.WithPrincipal(r.Context(), principal)))
return
}
}
if !cfg.AllowGlobalAccess || strings.TrimSpace(cfg.AuthHeader) == "" || strings.TrimSpace(cfg.AuthHeaderValue) == "" {
http.Error(w, "use an authorized user bearer token; global MCP service access is disabled", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(r.Header.Get(cfg.AuthHeader)), []byte(cfg.AuthHeaderValue)) != 1 {
a.logger.Logger.Debug("MCP 鉴权失败:header 缺失或值不匹配", zap.String("header", cfg.AuthHeader))
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"unauthorized"}`))
return
}
permissions := make(map[string]bool, len(security.PermissionCatalog))
for permission := range security.PermissionCatalog {
permissions[permission] = true
}
principal := authctx.NewPrincipal("service:mcp", "mcp-service", database.RBACScopeAll, permissions)
r = r.WithContext(authctx.WithPrincipal(r.Context(), principal))
a.mcpServer.HandleHTTP(w, r)
}
@@ -825,6 +843,7 @@ func setupRoutes(
terminalHandler *handler.TerminalHandler,
c2Handler *handler.C2Handler,
auditHandler *handler.AuditHandler,
auditSvc *audit.Service,
rbacHandler *handler.RBACHandler,
mcpServer *mcp.Server,
authManager *security.AuthManager,
@@ -835,8 +854,9 @@ func setupRoutes(
// 认证相关路由
authRoutes := api.Group("/auth")
loginRL := security.NewRateLimiter(10, 1*time.Minute)
{
authRoutes.POST("/login", authHandler.Login)
authRoutes.POST("/login", security.RateLimitMiddleware(loginRL), authHandler.Login)
authRoutes.POST("/logout", security.AuthMiddleware(authManager), authHandler.Logout)
authRoutes.POST("/change-password", security.AuthMiddleware(authManager), security.RequirePermission("auth:self"), authHandler.ChangePassword)
authRoutes.GET("/validate", security.AuthMiddleware(authManager), authHandler.Validate)
@@ -856,7 +876,15 @@ func setupRoutes(
protected := api.Group("")
protected.Use(security.AuthMiddleware(authManager))
protected.Use(security.RBACMiddleware(app.db))
protected.Use(security.RBACMiddlewareWithDenyHook(app.db, func(c *gin.Context, reason, permission string) {
if auditSvc != nil {
auditSvc.Record(c, audit.Entry{
Level: "warn", Category: "rbac", Action: "access_denied", Result: "failure",
Message: "RBAC 拒绝访问", ResourceType: "route", ResourceID: c.FullPath(),
Detail: map[string]interface{}{"reason": reason, "permission": permission, "method": c.Request.Method},
})
}
}))
{
protected.GET("/rbac/me", rbacHandler.Me)
protected.GET("/rbac/metadata", rbacHandler.Metadata)
@@ -1490,7 +1518,13 @@ func registerWebshellManagementTools(mcpServer *mcp.Server, db *database.DB, web
},
}
listHandler := func(ctx context.Context, args map[string]interface{}) (*mcp.ToolResult, error) {
connections, err := db.ListWebshellConnections()
connections := []database.WebShellConnection{}
var err error
if principal, ok := authctx.PrincipalFromContext(ctx); ok {
connections, err = db.ListWebshellConnectionsForAccess(principal.UserID, principal.ScopeFor("webshell:read"))
} else {
return &mcp.ToolResult{Content: []mcp.Content{{Type: "text", Text: "缺少认证身份"}}, IsError: true}, nil
}
if err != nil {
return &mcp.ToolResult{
Content: []mcp.Content{{Type: "text", Text: "获取连接列表失败: " + err.Error()}},
@@ -1605,6 +1639,10 @@ func registerWebshellManagementTools(mcpServer *mcp.Server, db *database.DB, web
IsError: true,
}, nil
}
if principal, ok := authctx.PrincipalFromContext(ctx); ok {
_ = db.SetResourceOwner("webshell", conn.ID, principal.UserID)
_ = db.AssignResourceToUser(principal.UserID, "webshell", conn.ID)
}
return &mcp.ToolResult{
Content: []mcp.Content{{
@@ -2000,8 +2038,17 @@ func initializeKnowledge(
// corsMiddleware CORS中间件
func corsMiddleware() gin.HandlerFunc {
return func(c *gin.Context) {
c.Writer.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")
c.Writer.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true")
origin := strings.TrimSpace(c.GetHeader("Origin"))
if origin != "" {
parsed, err := url.Parse(origin)
if err != nil || parsed.Host == "" || !strings.EqualFold(parsed.Host, c.Request.Host) {
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "cross-origin request denied"})
return
}
c.Writer.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", origin)
c.Writer.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true")
c.Writer.Header().Add("Vary", "Origin")
}
c.Writer.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "Content-Type, Content-Length, Accept-Encoding, X-CSRF-Token, Authorization, accept, origin, Cache-Control, X-Requested-With")
c.Writer.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "POST, OPTIONS, GET, PUT, DELETE")
+29 -12
View File
@@ -4,11 +4,13 @@ import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/agent"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/authctx"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/c2"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/database"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/mcp"
@@ -66,16 +68,16 @@ tcp_reverse 默认仅接受 CSB1 加密 BeaconAES-GCM + ImplantToken)才登
InputSchema: map[string]interface{}{
"type": "object",
"properties": map[string]interface{}{
"action": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "操作: list/get/create/update/start/stop/delete", "enum": []string{"list", "get", "create", "update", "start", "stop", "delete"}},
"listener_id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "监听器 IDget/update/start/stop/delete 需要)"},
"name": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "监听器名称(create/update"},
"type": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "监听器类型(create", "enum": []string{"tcp_reverse", "http_beacon", "https_beacon", "websocket"}},
"action": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "操作: list/get/create/update/start/stop/delete", "enum": []string{"list", "get", "create", "update", "start", "stop", "delete"}},
"listener_id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "监听器 IDget/update/start/stop/delete 需要)"},
"name": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "监听器名称(create/update"},
"type": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "监听器类型(create", "enum": []string{"tcp_reverse", "http_beacon", "https_beacon", "websocket"}},
"bind_host": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "绑定地址,默认 127.0.0.1;外网监听常用 0.0.0.0"},
"callback_host": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "可选:植入端/Payload 回连主机名(公网 IP 或域名)。写入 config_json;生成 oneliner/beacon 时优先于 bind_host。update 时传入空字符串可清除"},
"bind_port": map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "description": fmt.Sprintf("绑定端口(create 必填)。须 ≠ %d(当前本服务 Web/API 端口,配置 server.port", webListenPort), "minimum": 1, "maximum": 65535},
"profile_id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Malleable Profile ID"},
"remark": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "备注"},
"config": map[string]interface{}{"type": "object", "description": "高级配置(beacon 路径/TLS/OPSEC 等),create/update 可用。tcp_reverse 可选 allow_legacy_shell:true 允许未加密经典 shell(默认 false"},
"bind_port": map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "description": fmt.Sprintf("绑定端口(create 必填)。须 ≠ %d(当前本服务 Web/API 端口,配置 server.port", webListenPort), "minimum": 1, "maximum": 65535},
"profile_id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Malleable Profile ID"},
"remark": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "备注"},
"config": map[string]interface{}{"type": "object", "description": "高级配置(beacon 路径/TLS/OPSEC 等),create/update 可用。tcp_reverse 可选 allow_legacy_shell:true 允许未加密经典 shell(默认 false"},
},
"required": []string{"action"},
},
@@ -85,7 +87,7 @@ tcp_reverse 默认仅接受 CSB1 加密 BeaconAES-GCM + ImplantToken)才登
switch action {
case "list":
listeners, err := m.DB().ListC2Listeners()
listeners, err := m.DB().ListC2ListenersForAccess(c2ToolAccess(ctx))
if err != nil {
return makeC2Result(nil, err)
}
@@ -128,6 +130,10 @@ tcp_reverse 默认仅接受 CSB1 加密 BeaconAES-GCM + ImplantToken)才登
if err != nil {
return makeC2Result(nil, err)
}
if principal, ok := authctx.PrincipalFromContext(ctx); ok {
_ = m.DB().SetResourceOwner("c2_listener", listener.ID, principal.UserID)
_ = m.DB().AssignResourceToUser(principal.UserID, "c2_listener", listener.ID)
}
implantToken := listener.ImplantToken
listener.EncryptionKey = ""
listener.ImplantToken = ""
@@ -264,7 +270,7 @@ func registerC2SessionTool(s *mcp.Server, m *c2.Manager, l *zap.Logger) {
if v, ok := params["suspicious"].(bool); ok && v {
filter.Suspicious = true
}
sessions, err := m.DB().ListC2Sessions(filter)
sessions, err := m.DB().ListC2SessionsForAccess(filter, c2ToolAccess(ctx))
return makeC2Result(map[string]interface{}{"sessions": sessions, "count": len(sessions)}, err)
case "get":
@@ -494,7 +500,7 @@ func registerC2TaskManageTool(s *mcp.Server, m *c2.Manager, l *zap.Logger) {
if limit := int(getFloat64(params, "limit")); limit > 0 {
filter.Limit = limit
}
tasks, err := m.DB().ListC2Tasks(filter)
tasks, err := m.DB().ListC2TasksForAccess(filter, c2ToolAccess(ctx))
return makeC2Result(map[string]interface{}{"tasks": tasks, "count": len(tasks)}, err)
case "cancel":
@@ -602,6 +608,9 @@ func registerC2PayloadTool(s *mcp.Server, m *c2.Manager, l *zap.Logger, webListe
if err != nil {
return makeC2Result(nil, err)
}
if principal, ok := authctx.PrincipalFromContext(ctx); ok {
_ = m.DB().RecordC2PayloadArtifact(filepath.Base(result.OutputPath), result.PayloadID, result.ListenerID, principal.UserID)
}
return makeC2Result(map[string]interface{}{
"payload_id": result.PayloadID, "download_path": result.DownloadPath,
"os": result.OS, "arch": result.Arch, "size_bytes": result.SizeBytes,
@@ -648,11 +657,19 @@ func registerC2EventTool(s *mcp.Server, m *c2.Manager, l *zap.Logger) {
filter.Since = &t
}
}
events, err := m.DB().ListC2Events(filter)
events, err := m.DB().ListC2EventsForAccess(filter, c2ToolAccess(ctx))
return makeC2Result(map[string]interface{}{"events": events, "count": len(events)}, err)
})
}
func c2ToolAccess(ctx context.Context) database.RBACListAccess {
principal, ok := authctx.PrincipalFromContext(ctx)
if !ok {
return database.RBACListAccess{Scope: database.RBACScopeAssigned}
}
return database.RBACListAccess{UserID: principal.UserID, Scope: principal.ScopeFor("c2:read")}
}
// ============================================================================
// c2_profile — Malleable Profile 管理工具(新增)
// ============================================================================
+34
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@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
package app
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
func TestCORSMiddlewareAllowsSameOriginAndRejectsForeignOrigin(t *testing.T) {
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
router := gin.New()
router.Use(corsMiddleware())
router.GET("/test", func(c *gin.Context) { c.Status(http.StatusNoContent) })
same := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://app.example/test", nil)
same.Host = "app.example"
same.Header.Set("Origin", "http://app.example")
sameW := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(sameW, same)
if sameW.Code != http.StatusNoContent || sameW.Header().Get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin") != "http://app.example" {
t.Fatalf("same-origin response = %d, allow-origin=%q", sameW.Code, sameW.Header().Get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin"))
}
foreign := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://app.example/test", nil)
foreign.Host = "app.example"
foreign.Header.Set("Origin", "https://evil.example")
foreignW := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(foreignW, foreign)
if foreignW.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Fatalf("foreign-origin response = %d, want %d", foreignW.Code, http.StatusForbidden)
}
}
+249
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@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
package app
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"strings"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/agent"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/authctx"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/database"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/mcp"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/mcp/builtin"
)
func mcpToolAuthorizer(db *database.DB) func(context.Context, string, map[string]interface{}) error {
return func(ctx context.Context, toolName string, args map[string]interface{}) error {
principal, ok := authctx.PrincipalFromContext(ctx)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("missing authenticated principal")
}
require := func(permission string) error {
if !principal.HasPermission(permission) {
return fmt.Errorf("missing permission %s", permission)
}
return nil
}
resource := func(permission, resourceType, argument string) error {
if err := require(permission); err != nil {
return err
}
id := mcpAuthorizationString(args, argument)
if id == "" || db == nil || !db.UserCanAccessResource(principal.UserID, principal.ScopeFor(permission), resourceType, id) {
return fmt.Errorf("no access to %s %s", resourceType, id)
}
return nil
}
switch toolName {
case builtin.ToolWebshellExec, builtin.ToolWebshellFileWrite:
return resource("webshell:write", "webshell", "connection_id")
case builtin.ToolWebshellFileList, builtin.ToolWebshellFileRead:
return resource("webshell:read", "webshell", "connection_id")
case builtin.ToolManageWebshellList:
return require("webshell:read")
case builtin.ToolManageWebshellAdd:
return require("webshell:write")
case builtin.ToolManageWebshellUpdate, builtin.ToolManageWebshellTest:
return resource("webshell:write", "webshell", "connection_id")
case builtin.ToolManageWebshellDelete:
return resource("webshell:delete", "webshell", "connection_id")
case builtin.ToolRecordVulnerability:
if err := require("vulnerability:write"); err != nil {
return err
}
conversationID := mcpAuthorizationString(args, "conversation_id")
if conversationID == "" {
conversationID = mcpAuthorizationConversationID(ctx)
}
if conversationID == "" || db == nil || !db.UserCanAccessResource(principal.UserID, principal.ScopeFor("vulnerability:write"), "conversation", conversationID) {
return fmt.Errorf("no access to conversation %s", conversationID)
}
return nil
case builtin.ToolListVulnerabilities:
if err := require("vulnerability:read"); err != nil {
return err
}
conversationID := mcpAuthorizationConversationID(ctx)
if conversationID == "" || db == nil || !db.UserCanAccessResource(principal.UserID, principal.ScopeFor("vulnerability:read"), "conversation", conversationID) {
return fmt.Errorf("no access to conversation %s", conversationID)
}
return nil
case builtin.ToolGetVulnerability:
return resource("vulnerability:read", "vulnerability", "id")
case builtin.ToolUpsertProjectFact, builtin.ToolDeprecateProjectFact, builtin.ToolRestoreProjectFact:
return authorizeProjectTool(ctx, principal, db, "project:write")
case builtin.ToolGetProjectFact, builtin.ToolListProjectFacts, builtin.ToolSearchProjectFacts:
return authorizeProjectTool(ctx, principal, db, "project:read")
case builtin.ToolListKnowledgeRiskTypes, builtin.ToolSearchKnowledgeBase:
return require("knowledge:read")
case builtin.ToolAnalyzeImage:
return require("agent:execute")
case builtin.ToolBatchTaskList:
return require("tasks:read")
case builtin.ToolBatchTaskGet:
return resource("tasks:read", "batch_task", "queue_id")
case builtin.ToolBatchTaskCreate:
if err := require("tasks:write"); err != nil {
return err
}
if projectID := mcpAuthorizationString(args, "project_id"); projectID != "" && (db == nil || !db.UserCanAccessResource(principal.UserID, principal.ScopeFor("tasks:write"), "project", projectID)) {
return fmt.Errorf("no access to project %s", projectID)
}
return nil
case builtin.ToolBatchTaskDelete, builtin.ToolBatchTaskRemove:
return resource("tasks:delete", "batch_task", "queue_id")
case builtin.ToolBatchTaskStart, builtin.ToolBatchTaskRerun, builtin.ToolBatchTaskPause,
builtin.ToolBatchTaskUpdateMetadata, builtin.ToolBatchTaskUpdateSchedule,
builtin.ToolBatchTaskScheduleEnabled, builtin.ToolBatchTaskAdd, builtin.ToolBatchTaskUpdate:
return resource("tasks:write", "batch_task", "queue_id")
case builtin.ToolC2Listener:
return authorizeC2Action(principal, db, args, "c2_listener", "listener_id")
case builtin.ToolC2Session, builtin.ToolC2Task, builtin.ToolC2File:
if toolName == builtin.ToolC2File && mcpAuthorizationString(args, "action") == "get_result" {
return authorizeC2Action(principal, db, args, "c2_task", "task_id")
}
return authorizeC2Action(principal, db, args, "c2_session", "session_id")
case builtin.ToolC2TaskManage:
return authorizeC2Action(principal, db, args, "c2_task", "task_id")
case builtin.ToolC2Payload:
return resource("c2:write", "c2_listener", "listener_id")
case builtin.ToolC2Event:
if id := mcpAuthorizationString(args, "session_id"); id != "" {
return resource("c2:read", "c2_session", "session_id")
}
if principal.ScopeFor("c2:read") != database.RBACScopeAll {
return fmt.Errorf("unfiltered C2 event list requires global scope")
}
return require("c2:read")
case builtin.ToolC2Profile:
// Profiles are process-global and do not yet have an owner. Writes are
// therefore reserved for global scope; reads require c2:read.
if mcpAuthorizationString(args, "action") == "list" || mcpAuthorizationString(args, "action") == "get" {
return require("c2:read")
}
permission := "c2:write"
if mcpAuthorizationString(args, "action") == "delete" {
permission = "c2:delete"
}
if principal.ScopeFor(permission) != database.RBACScopeAll {
return fmt.Errorf("C2 profile mutation requires global scope")
}
if mcpAuthorizationString(args, "action") == "delete" {
return require("c2:delete")
}
return require("c2:write")
default:
if builtin.IsBuiltinTool(toolName) {
return fmt.Errorf("no authorization policy registered for builtin tool %s", toolName)
}
if principal.HasPermission("agent:local-execute") {
return nil
}
return fmt.Errorf("missing agent:local-execute")
}
}
}
func externalMCPToolAuthorizer() func(context.Context, string, map[string]interface{}) error {
return func(ctx context.Context, toolName string, _ map[string]interface{}) error {
principal, ok := authctx.PrincipalFromContext(ctx)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("missing authenticated principal")
}
if !principal.HasPermission("mcp:external:execute") {
return fmt.Errorf("missing permission mcp:external:execute")
}
if principal.ScopeFor("mcp:external:execute") != database.RBACScopeAll {
return fmt.Errorf("external MCP invocation requires global scope")
}
if strings.TrimSpace(toolName) == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("missing external tool name")
}
return nil
}
}
func authorizeC2Action(principal authctx.Principal, db *database.DB, args map[string]interface{}, resourceType, argument string) error {
action := mcpAuthorizationString(args, "action")
permission := "c2:write"
if action == "list" || action == "get" || action == "get_result" || action == "wait" {
permission = "c2:read"
} else if action == "delete" || action == "delete_batch" {
permission = "c2:delete"
}
if !principal.HasPermission(permission) {
return fmt.Errorf("missing permission %s", permission)
}
id := mcpAuthorizationString(args, argument)
if action == "delete_batch" {
ids := mcpAuthorizationStrings(args, argument+"s")
if len(ids) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("missing resource identifiers %ss", argument)
}
for _, candidate := range ids {
if db == nil || !db.UserCanAccessResource(principal.UserID, principal.ScopeFor(permission), resourceType, candidate) {
return fmt.Errorf("no access to %s %s", resourceType, candidate)
}
}
return nil
}
if id == "" {
if action == "create" || action == "list" {
return nil
}
return fmt.Errorf("missing resource identifier %s", argument)
}
if db == nil || !db.UserCanAccessResource(principal.UserID, principal.ScopeFor(permission), resourceType, id) {
return fmt.Errorf("no access to %s %s", resourceType, id)
}
return nil
}
func mcpAuthorizationStrings(args map[string]interface{}, key string) []string {
values := []string{}
switch raw := args[key].(type) {
case []string:
for _, value := range raw {
if value = strings.TrimSpace(value); value != "" {
values = append(values, value)
}
}
case []interface{}:
for _, item := range raw {
if value, ok := item.(string); ok {
if value = strings.TrimSpace(value); value != "" {
values = append(values, value)
}
}
}
}
return values
}
func authorizeProjectTool(ctx context.Context, principal authctx.Principal, db *database.DB, permission string) error {
if !principal.HasPermission(permission) {
return fmt.Errorf("missing permission %s", permission)
}
conversationID := mcpAuthorizationConversationID(ctx)
if conversationID == "" || db == nil || !db.UserCanAccessResource(principal.UserID, principal.ScopeFor(permission), "conversation", conversationID) {
return fmt.Errorf("no access to conversation %s", conversationID)
}
projectID, err := db.GetConversationProjectID(conversationID)
if err != nil || strings.TrimSpace(projectID) == "" || !db.UserCanAccessResource(principal.UserID, principal.ScopeFor(permission), "project", projectID) {
return fmt.Errorf("no access to project %s", projectID)
}
return nil
}
func mcpAuthorizationConversationID(ctx context.Context) string {
if id := strings.TrimSpace(agent.ConversationIDFromContext(ctx)); id != "" {
return id
}
return strings.TrimSpace(mcp.MCPConversationIDFromContext(ctx))
}
func mcpAuthorizationString(args map[string]interface{}, key string) string {
value, _ := args[key].(string)
return strings.TrimSpace(value)
}
+97
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
package app
import (
"context"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/authctx"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/database"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/mcp/builtin"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/security"
"go.uber.org/zap"
)
func TestMCPToolAuthorizerEnforcesPermissionAndResource(t *testing.T) {
db, err := database.NewDB(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "mcp-authz.db"), zap.NewNop())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer db.Close()
user, err := db.CreateRBACUser("mcp-user", "MCP User", "hash", true, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, id := range []string{"ws_allowed", "ws_hidden"} {
if err := db.CreateWebshellConnection(&database.WebShellConnection{ID: id, URL: "http://127.0.0.1/" + id, Type: "php", Method: "post", CmdParam: "cmd", CreatedAt: time.Now()}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
if err := db.AssignResourceToUser(user.ID, "webshell", "ws_allowed"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
principal := authctx.NewPrincipal(user.ID, user.Username, database.RBACScopeAssigned, map[string]bool{"mcp:write": true, "webshell:write": true})
ctx := authctx.WithPrincipal(context.Background(), principal)
authorize := mcpToolAuthorizer(db)
if err := authorize(ctx, builtin.ToolWebshellExec, map[string]interface{}{"connection_id": "ws_allowed"}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("allowed resource denied: %v", err)
}
if err := authorize(ctx, builtin.ToolWebshellExec, map[string]interface{}{"connection_id": "ws_hidden"}); err == nil {
t.Fatal("foreign webshell resource was allowed")
}
if err := authorize(ctx, builtin.ToolManageWebshellDelete, map[string]interface{}{"connection_id": "ws_allowed"}); err == nil {
t.Fatal("delete without webshell:delete was allowed")
}
}
func TestEveryBuiltinMCPToolHasExplicitAuthorizationPolicy(t *testing.T) {
db, err := database.NewDB(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "mcp-policy-inventory.db"), zap.NewNop())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer db.Close()
permissions := map[string]bool{}
for permission := range security.PermissionCatalog {
permissions[permission] = true
}
ctx := authctx.WithPrincipal(context.Background(), authctx.NewPrincipal("admin", "admin", database.RBACScopeAll, permissions))
authorize := mcpToolAuthorizer(db)
args := map[string]interface{}{
"action": "get", "connection_id": "x", "queue_id": "x", "listener_id": "x",
"session_id": "x", "task_id": "x", "id": "x", "conversation_id": "x",
}
for _, toolName := range builtin.GetAllBuiltinTools() {
err := authorize(ctx, toolName, args)
if err != nil && strings.Contains(err.Error(), "no authorization policy registered") {
t.Errorf("builtin tool %s has no explicit policy", toolName)
}
}
}
func TestExternalMCPRequiresDedicatedPermission(t *testing.T) {
authorize := externalMCPToolAuthorizer()
ctx := authctx.WithPrincipal(context.Background(), authctx.NewPrincipal("u1", "user", database.RBACScopeAssigned, map[string]bool{"agent:execute": true}))
if err := authorize(ctx, "server::tool", nil); err == nil {
t.Fatal("agent:execute alone authorized an external MCP tool")
}
ctx = authctx.WithPrincipal(context.Background(), authctx.NewPrincipal("u1", "user", database.RBACScopeAll, map[string]bool{"mcp:external:execute": true}))
if err := authorize(ctx, "server::tool", nil); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("dedicated external MCP permission rejected: %v", err)
}
}
func TestConfiguredCommandToolRequiresLocalExecutePermission(t *testing.T) {
authorize := mcpToolAuthorizer(nil)
agentOnly := authctx.WithPrincipal(context.Background(), authctx.NewPrincipal("u1", "user", database.RBACScopeAssigned, map[string]bool{"agent:execute": true}))
if err := authorize(agentOnly, "nmap_scan", nil); err == nil {
t.Fatal("agent:execute alone authorized a configured command tool")
}
local := authctx.WithPrincipal(context.Background(), authctx.NewPrincipal("u1", "user", database.RBACScopeAssigned, map[string]bool{"agent:local-execute": true}))
if err := authorize(local, "nmap_scan", nil); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("agent:local-execute rejected: %v", err)
}
}
+55
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
package app
import (
"bytes"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/config"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/database"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/mcp"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/security"
"go.uber.org/zap"
)
func TestStandaloneMCPPrefersUserRBACAndDisablesGlobalTokenByDefault(t *testing.T) {
db, err := database.NewDB(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "mcp-http-auth.db"), zap.NewNop())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
auth, err := security.NewAuthManager("admin-secret", 12)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := auth.AttachRBACStore(db); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
token, _, err := auth.Authenticate("admin", "admin-secret")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
server := mcp.NewServer(zap.NewNop())
server.SetToolAuthorizer(mcpToolAuthorizer(db))
a := &App{config: &config.Config{MCP: config.MCPConfig{AuthHeader: "X-MCP-Token", AuthHeaderValue: "static-secret"}}, auth: auth, mcpServer: server}
body := []byte(`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/list"}`)
userReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/mcp", bytes.NewReader(body))
userReq.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
userW := httptest.NewRecorder()
a.mcpHandlerWithAuth(userW, userReq)
if userW.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("user bearer status = %d: %s", userW.Code, userW.Body.String())
}
staticReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/mcp", bytes.NewReader(body))
staticReq.Header.Set("X-MCP-Token", "static-secret")
staticW := httptest.NewRecorder()
a.mcpHandlerWithAuth(staticW, staticReq)
if staticW.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("global static token status = %d, want 401", staticW.Code)
}
}
+5
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
"strings"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/agent"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/authctx"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/database"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/mcp"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/mcp/builtin"
@@ -313,6 +314,10 @@ func registerRecordVulnerabilityTool(mcpServer *mcp.Server, db *database.DB, log
}
return textResult(fmt.Sprintf("记录漏洞失败: %v", err), true), nil
}
if principal, ok := authctx.PrincipalFromContext(ctx); ok {
_ = db.SetResourceOwner("vulnerability", created.ID, principal.UserID)
_ = db.AssignResourceToUser(principal.UserID, "vulnerability", created.ID)
}
if logger != nil {
logger.Info("漏洞记录成功",