Update config.example.yaml

* docs: define local workflow package mvp

* docs: fix workflow package api contract

* feat: add local workflow package mvp

* feat(workflow): add package API client

* feat(workflow): add package import interface

* feat(workflow): connect package import flow

* fix(workflow): map package validation errors

* fix(workflow): handle import key generation errors

* feat(workflow): localize package import states

* fix(workflow): reset package import modal on open

---------

Co-authored-by: ruanmingchen <“ruanm@chenchen”>

.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# Runtime data
+data/
+*.db
+*.db-shm
+*.db-wal
+*.sqlite
+*.sqlite3
+
+# Local configuration and secrets
+config.yaml
+config.local.yaml
+.env
+.env.*
+*.pem
+*.key
+*.crt
+
+# Build outputs
+cyberstrike-ai
+bin/
+dist/
+build/
+coverage.out
+coverage.html
+
+# Logs and temporary files
+*.log
+tmp/
+temp/
+
+# Python
+venv/
+.venv/
+__pycache__/
+*.py[cod]
+.pytest_cache/
+
+# Go
+vendor/
+
+# macOS / editors
+.DS_Store
+.idea/
+.vscode/

README.md

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 <div align="center">
-  <img src="images/logo.png" alt="CyberStrikeAI Logo" width="200">
+  <img src="images/logo.png" alt="CyberStrikeAI Logo" width="200" >
 </div>
 
 # CyberStrikeAI
@@ -7,31 +7,14 @@
 
 [中文](README_CN.md) | [English](README.md)
 
-**Community**: [Join us on Discord](https://discord.gg/8PjVCMu8Zw)
+**The system of action for AI-native cybersecurity—where intent becomes governed execution, evidence becomes operational memory, and every operation improves the next.**
 
-**CyberStrikeAI is building the agentic execution layer for modern cyber security.**
+CyberStrikeAI connects planning, execution, human oversight, evidence, and replay in one auditable workspace. Built in Go, it combines Eino-powered agents, MCP-native tools, RAG knowledge, visual workflows, and attack-chain modeling and analysis for authorized security operations.
 
-It brings AI agents, security tools, MCP-native integrations, knowledge systems, human oversight, and attack-chain intelligence into a unified workspace for authorized cyber engagements. Instead of treating tools, prompts, evidence, approvals, and reports as separate fragments, CyberStrikeAI turns security intent into auditable multi-agent workflows that can plan, execute, review, replay, and continuously accumulate operational context.
+**Start here:** [Quick start](#quick-start-one-command-deployment) · [Documentation](docs/en-US/README.md) · [Security hardening](docs/en-US/security-hardening.md)
 
-Built in Go, CyberStrikeAI provides a full-stack foundation for AI-native security operations: 100+ curated tool recipes, role-based testing, Agent Skills, Eino-powered single-agent and multi-agent orchestration, RAG knowledge retrieval, graph workflows, vulnerability and task lifecycle management, WebShell operations, chatbot access, and a lightweight built-in C2 framework for authorized lab and engagement scenarios.
+> [!IMPORTANT]
-
+> Use CyberStrikeAI only on systems you own or are explicitly authorized to test. For shared or production environments, review the [security model](docs/en-US/security-model.md) and [hardening guide](docs/en-US/security-hardening.md) before enabling high-risk tools, WebShell, or C2 capabilities.
-<details>
-<summary><strong>WeChat group</strong> (click to reveal QR code)</summary>
-
-<img src="./images/wechat-group-cyberstrikeai-qr.jpg" alt="CyberStrikeAI WeChat group QR code" width="280">
-
-</details>
-
-<details>
-<summary><strong>Sponsorship</strong> (click to expand)</summary>
-
-If CyberStrikeAI helps you, you can support the project via **WeChat Pay** or **Alipay**:
-
-<div align="center">
-  <img src="./images/sponsor-wechat-alipay-qr.jpg" alt="WeChat Pay and Alipay sponsorship QR codes" width="480">
-</div>
-
-</details>
 
 ## Interface & Integration Preview
 
@@ -54,6 +37,9 @@ If CyberStrikeAI helps you, you can support the project via **WeChat Pay** or **
 
 *The dashboard provides a comprehensive overview of system runtime status, security vulnerabilities, tool usage, and knowledge base, helping users quickly understand the platform's core features and current state.*
 
+<details>
+<summary><strong>More interface screenshots</strong></summary>
+
 ### Core Features Overview
 
 <table>
@@ -115,32 +101,50 @@ If CyberStrikeAI helps you, you can support the project via **WeChat Pay** or **
 </tr>
 </table>
 
+</details>
+
 </div>
 
 ## Highlights
 
-- 🤖 Agentic execution layer for translating natural-language intent into precise, governed, auditable security action
+### Agents and orchestration
-- 🧩 Eino-powered single-agent and multi-agent orchestration with Deep, Plan-Execute, and Supervisor modes
+
-- 🔌 MCP-native tool execution with HTTP/stdio/SSE transports, external MCP federation, and dynamic tool discovery
+- 🤖 **Agentic execution** translates natural-language intent into governed, auditable security actions.
-- 🧰 100+ curated security tool recipes, YAML-based extensions, and role-scoped tool control
+- 🧩 **Eino orchestration** supports single-agent execution plus Deep, Plan-Execute, and Supervisor multi-agent modes.
-- 📄 Large-result pagination, compression, and searchable archives
+- 🔀 **Graph workflows** combine Agents, tools, conditions, approvals, and outputs into reusable flows.
-- 🔗 Attack-chain intelligence with graph views, risk scoring, project facts, and step-by-step replay
+- 🎭 **Role-based testing** provides focused prompts and tool policies for common security scenarios.
-- 🧑‍⚖️ Human-in-the-loop governance with approval modes, allowlists, audit-agent review, and traceable decisions
+
-- 🔒 Password-protected web UI, audit logs, SQLite persistence, and operational evidence retention
+### Tools and knowledge
-- 📚 Knowledge base (RAG): **Eino MultiQuery** query rewrite + multi-path vector retrieval + **HTTP rerank** (DashScope `gte-rerank` / Cohere-compatible) + post-processing (dedupe, budget); **Eino Compose** indexing pipeline
+
-- 📁 Conversation grouping with pinning, rename, and batch management
+- 🧰 **Security tools** include 100+ curated YAML recipes with custom extensions and role-scoped access.
-- 📂 **Project management**: shared facts (blackboard) across sessions, `upsert_project_fact` + `links` to chain paths; attack-chain and project fact graph views
+- 🔌 **MCP integration** supports HTTP, stdio, SSE, external federation, and dynamic tool discovery.
-- 🛡️ Vulnerability management with CRUD operations, severity tracking, status workflow, and statistics
+- ⏱️ **Resilient tool execution** runs blocking MCP/tool calls in workers with bounded agent waits, resumable `execution_id` polling, cancellation, per-server circuit breakers, concurrency limits, and unified output caps.
-- 📋 Batch task management: create task queues, add multiple tasks, and execute them sequentially
+- 🎯 **Agent Skills** follow the standard Skill layout and support progressive, on-demand loading.
-- 🎭 Role-based testing: predefined security testing roles (Penetration Testing, CTF, Web App Scanning, etc.) with custom prompts and tool restrictions
+- 📚 **Knowledge base** combines query rewriting, vector retrieval, reranking, and result post-processing.
-- 🔀 **Graph orchestration**: visual workflow editor (Start / Agent / Tool / Condition / HITL / Output) with `{{previous.output}}` and `{{outputs.variable_name}}` for inter-node data passing; bind a graph to a role for automatic execution on chat. See [Graph orchestration guide](docs/en-US/workflow-graph.md)
+- 🖼️ **Vision analysis** uses a separate vision model for screenshots, captchas, and UI while retaining text summaries only.
-- 🧩 **Agent orchestration (CloudWeGo Eino)**: **single-agent** via **`/api/eino-agent/stream`** (Eino ADK `ChatModelAgent`); **multi-agent** via **`/api/multi-agent/stream`** with **`deep`** (coordinator + `task` sub-agents), **`plan_execute`**, or **`supervisor`** (`orchestration` in the request body). ADK **summarization** compresses long contexts; pre-compaction **transcripts** land at `data/conversation_artifacts/<conversation-id>/summarization/transcript.txt` (full user/assistant/tool turns; static system omitted). Markdown under `agents/`: `orchestrator.md`, `orchestrator-plan-execute.md`, `orchestrator-supervisor.md`, plus sub-agent `*.md` (see [Multi-agent doc](docs/en-US/MULTI_AGENT_EINO.md))
+
-- 🖼️ **Vision analysis (`analyze_image`)**: separate VL model (e.g. `qwen-vl-max`) via MCP for local screenshots, captchas, and UI; image bytes stay out of agent history (text summaries only). Configure `vision` in `config.yaml`; see [docs/en-US/VISION.md](docs/en-US/VISION.md)
+### Governance and audit
-- 🎯 **Skills (refactored for Eino)**: packs under `skills_dir` follow **Agent Skills** layout (`SKILL.md` + optional files); **multi-agent** sessions use the official Eino ADK **`skill`** tool for **progressive disclosure** (load by name), with optional **host filesystem / shell** via `multi_agent.eino_skills`; optional **`eino_middleware`** adds patchtoolcalls, tool_search, **plantask** (`TaskCreate` / `TaskList` boards under `skills_dir/.eino/plantask/`), reduction, file **checkpoints** (`checkpoint_dir`), ChatModel **retries**, session **output key**, and Deep tuning—20+ sample domains (SQLi, XSS, API security, …) ship under `skills/`
+
-- 📱 **Chatbot**: Personal WeChat, WeCom, DingTalk, Lark, Telegram, Slack, Discord, and QQ Bot—chat from mobile or IM apps (see [Robot / Chatbot guide](docs/en-US/robot.md))
+- 🧑‍⚖️ **Human in the loop** provides approval modes, tool allowlists, audit-agent review, and traceable decisions.
-- 🧑‍⚖️ **Human-in-the-loop (HITL)**: Chat sidebar to set approval mode and tool allowlists (listed tools skip approval); global list in `config.yaml` under `hitl.tool_whitelist`; the Audit Agent can use a separate lightweight model via `hitl.audit_model`; **Apply** can merge new tools into the file and update the running server without restart; dedicated **HITL** page for pending approvals. See [HITL best practices](docs/en-US/hitl-best-practices.md)
+- 🔐 **Platform RBAC** supports multiple users, system and custom roles, scoped permissions, ownership, and explicit assignments.
-- 🐚 **WebShell management**: Add and manage WebShell connections (e.g. IceSword/AntSword compatible), use a virtual terminal for command execution, a built-in file manager for file operations, and an AI assistant tab that orchestrates tests and keeps per-connection conversation history; supports PHP, ASP, ASPX, JSP and custom shell types with configurable request method and command parameter.
+- 🔒 **Security and audit** provide authenticated access, audit logs, SQLite persistence, and operational evidence retention.
-- 📡 **Built-in C2**: AI-oriented lightweight command-and-control—**listeners** (TCP reverse, HTTP/HTTPS beacon, WebSocket), **encrypted** beacon channel, **session** and **task** queues with persistence, **payload** helpers (one-liner / build / download), **SSE** live events, REST under `/api/c2/*`, plus unified MCP tools (`c2_listener`, `c2_session`, **`c2_task`**, `c2_task_manage`, `c2_payload`, `c2_event`, `c2_profile`, `c2_file`); optional **HITL** approval for sensitive operations and OPSEC-style controls (e.g. command deny rules). **Authorized testing only.**
+- 📄 **Result governance** stores the same capped tool result seen by the agent, protects resume paths from oversized historical output, and adds UI safeguards for large detail views. See [Tool Execution Governance](docs/en-US/tool-execution-governance.md).
+
+### Security operations
+
+- 📁 **Conversation management** provides grouping, pinning, renaming, and batch organization.
+- 📂 **Projects and attack chains** connect cross-session facts, risk scoring, graph views, and step-by-step replay.
+- 🗂️ **Asset management** normalizes and deduplicates domains, IP addresses, ports, and services; supports XLSX/CSV import and export, advanced filters and saved views, ownership and business metadata, cross-page bulk maintenance, and duplicate merging; and tracks scan coverage, linked vulnerabilities, and risk state. See the [Asset Management guide](docs/en-US/asset-management.md).
+- 🛡️ **Vulnerability management** provides severity classification, lifecycle tracking, filtering, and statistics.
+- 📋 **Batch tasks** provide queued execution, editing, status tracking, and retained results.
+- 📱 **Chatbots** connect Personal WeChat, WeCom, DingTalk, Lark, Telegram, Slack, Discord, and QQ Bot.
+
+### Authorized security operations
+
+- 🐚 **WebShell management** provides connection management, a virtual terminal, file operations, and AI-assisted workflows.
+- 📡 **Built-in C2** provides listeners, encrypted beacons, sessions, task queues, payload helpers, and live events.
+
+> WebShell, C2, and other high-risk capabilities are for systems you own or are explicitly authorized to test. See the [security model](docs/en-US/security-model.md) and [hardening guide](docs/en-US/security-hardening.md).
 
 ## Plugins
 
@@ -149,16 +153,24 @@ CyberStrikeAI includes optional integrations under `plugins/`.
 - **Burp Suite extension**: `plugins/burp-suite/cyberstrikeai-burp-extension/`  
   Build output: `plugins/burp-suite/cyberstrikeai-burp-extension/dist/cyberstrikeai-burp-extension.jar`  
   Docs: `plugins/burp-suite/cyberstrikeai-burp-extension/README.md`
+- **Browser extension (Chrome / Edge)**: `plugins/browser-extension/cyberstrikeai-browser-extension/`  
+  Capture Network traffic in DevTools and send it to CyberStrikeAI for AI-assisted security testing—aligned with the Burp plugin.  
+  Install: `chrome://extensions/` → Load unpacked → F12 → **CyberStrikeAI** tab  
+  Package output: `plugins/browser-extension/cyberstrikeai-browser-extension/dist/cyberstrikeai-browser-extension.zip`  
+  Docs: `plugins/browser-extension/cyberstrikeai-browser-extension/README.md` / `README.zh-CN.md`
 
 ## Tool Overview
 
 CyberStrikeAI ships with 100+ curated tools covering the whole kill chain:
 
+<details>
+<summary><strong>View the complete tool categories</strong></summary>
+
 - **Network Scanners** – nmap, masscan, rustscan, arp-scan, nbtscan
 - **Web & App Scanners** – sqlmap, nikto, dirb, gobuster, feroxbuster, ffuf, httpx
 - **Vulnerability Scanners** – nuclei, wpscan, wafw00f, dalfox, xsser
 - **Subdomain Enumeration** – subfinder, amass, findomain, dnsenum, fierce
-- **Network Space Search Engines** – fofa_search, zoomeye_search
+- **Network Space Search Engines** – fofa_search, zoomeye_search, quake_search, shodan_search
 - **API Security** – graphql-scanner, arjun, api-fuzzer, api-schema-analyzer
 - **Container Security** – trivy, clair, docker-bench-security, kube-bench, kube-hunter
 - **Cloud Security** – prowler, scout-suite, cloudmapper, pacu, terrascan, checkov
@@ -170,12 +182,16 @@ CyberStrikeAI ships with 100+ curated tools covering the whole kill chain:
 - **CTF Utilities** – stegsolve, zsteg, hash-identifier, fcrackzip, pdfcrack, cyberchef
 - **System Helpers** – exec, create-file, delete-file, list-files, modify-file
 
+</details>
+
+See [tools/README_EN.md](tools/README_EN.md) for tool definitions, customization, and usage notes.
+
 ## Basic Usage
 
 ### Quick Start (One-Command Deployment)
 
 **Prerequisites:**
-- Go 1.21+ ([Install](https://go.dev/dl/))
+- Go 1.25+ ([Install](https://go.dev/dl/); required by `go.mod`)
 - Python 3.10+ ([Install](https://www.python.org/downloads/))
 
 **One-Command Deployment:**
@@ -193,6 +209,12 @@ The `run.sh` script will automatically:
 - ✅ Build the project
 - ✅ Start the server
 
+**Verify the startup:**
+
+1. Confirm the terminal displays `● ONLINE` followed by the actual Web UI URL.
+2. Open that URL; the default HTTPS mode uses a local self-signed certificate, so accept the browser warning once.
+3. On a new installation, store the one-time `admin` password shown under `ADMIN SETUP REQUIRED`, sign in, and change it immediately.
+
 **Networking defaults:** `run.sh` starts the server with **`--https`** and the repo **`config.yaml`** (local self-signed TLS; better for many concurrent streams). Use **`./run.sh --http`** for plain HTTP. In production, set **`server.tls_cert_path`** / **`server.tls_key_path`** in **`config.yaml`** (see comments there). For manual runs, add **`--https`** or **`CYBERSTRIKE_HTTPS=1`**; if **`-config`** is wrong, the binary prints a short usage hint on stderr.
 
 **First-Time Configuration:**
@@ -201,12 +223,12 @@ The `run.sh` script will automatically:
    - Go to `Settings` → Fill in your API credentials:
      ```yaml
      openai:
-       api_key: "sk-your-key"
+       api_key: "${OPENAI_API_KEY}"
        base_url: "https://api.openai.com/v1"  # or https://api.deepseek.com/v1
        model: "gpt-4o"  # or deepseek-chat, claude-3-opus, etc.
      ```
    - Or edit `config.yaml` directly before launching
-2. **Login** - Use the auto-generated password shown in the console (or set `auth.password` in `config.yaml`)
+2. **Login** - On first startup the console prints an auto-generated initial `admin` password; create accounts from **Platform permissions → User management**
 3. **Install security tools (optional)** - Install tools from `tools/` as needed; missing tools are skipped or substituted at runtime. Common examples:
 
    **macOS (Homebrew):**
@@ -237,9 +259,9 @@ If server logs show `client sent an HTTP request to an HTTPS server`, a client i
 
 **Note:** The Python virtual environment (`venv/`) is automatically created and managed by `run.sh`. Tools that require Python (like `api-fuzzer`, `http-framework-test`, etc.) will automatically use this environment.
 
-### Version Update (No Breaking Changes)
+### Upgrade and Compatibility
 
-**CyberStrikeAI one-click upgrade (recommended):**
+**CyberStrikeAI one-click upgrade:**
 1. (First time) enable the script: `chmod +x upgrade.sh`
 2. Upgrade with: `./upgrade.sh` (optional flags: `--tag vX.Y.Z`, `--no-venv`, `--yes`). Local `tools/`, `roles/`, and `skills/` are always preserved.
 3. The script will back up your `config.yaml` and `data/`, upgrade the code from GitHub Release, update `config.yaml`'s `version`, then restart the server.
@@ -254,401 +276,32 @@ Requirements / tips:
 * `rsync` is recommended/required for the safe code sync.
 * If GitHub API rate-limits you, set `export GITHUB_TOKEN="..."` before running `./upgrade.sh`.
 
-⚠️ **Note:** This procedure only applies to version updates without compatibility or breaking changes. If a release includes compatibility changes, this method may not apply.
+⚠️ **Before upgrading:** review the target release notes for configuration, database, and API changes. Backups are required even for patch upgrades; a version number alone is not a compatibility guarantee.
-
-**Examples:** No breaking changes — e.g. v1.3.1 → v1.3.2; with breaking changes — e.g. v1.3.1 → v1.4.0. The project follows [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/) (SemVer): when only the patch version (third number) changes, this upgrade path is usually safe; when the minor or major version changes, config, data, or APIs may have changed — check the release notes before using this method.
-
-### Core Workflows
-- **Conversation testing** – Natural-language prompts trigger toolchains with streaming SSE output.
-- **Single vs multi-agent** – Chat UI switches between **Eino single-agent** (`/api/eino-agent/stream`) and **multi-agent** (`/api/multi-agent/stream` with `orchestration`: `deep` | `plan_execute` | `supervisor`). Multi mode requires `multi_agent.enabled: true`. MCP tools are bridged the same way for both paths.
-- **Role-based testing** – Select from predefined security testing roles (Penetration Testing, CTF, Web App Scanning, API Security Testing, etc.) to customize AI behavior and tool availability. Each role applies custom system prompts and can restrict available tools for focused testing scenarios.
-- **Graph orchestration** – Design flows on the **Graph Orchestration** page (drag nodes, connect edges, save); bind `workflow_id` on a role to run the graph on chat (Agent, MCP tools, condition branches). Use `{{outputs.variable_name}}` to pass data across non-adjacent nodes. See [Graph orchestration guide](docs/en-US/workflow-graph.md).
-- **Tool monitor** – Inspect running jobs, execution logs, and large-result attachments.
-- **History & audit** – Every conversation and tool invocation is stored in SQLite with replay.
-- **Conversation groups** – Organize conversations into groups, pin important groups, rename or delete groups via context menu.
-- **Vulnerability management** – Create, update, and track vulnerabilities discovered during testing. Filter by severity (critical/high/medium/low/info), status (open/confirmed/fixed/false_positive), and conversation. View statistics and export findings.
-- **Batch task management** – Create task queues with multiple tasks, add or edit tasks before execution, and run them sequentially. Each task executes as a separate conversation, with status tracking (pending/running/completed/failed/cancelled) and full execution history.
-- **WebShell management** – Add and manage WebShell connections (PHP/ASP/ASPX/JSP or custom). Use the virtual terminal to run commands, the file manager to list, read, edit, upload, and delete files, and the AI assistant tab to drive scripted tests with per-connection conversation history. Connections are stored in SQLite; supports GET/POST and configurable command parameter (e.g. IceSword/AntSword style).
-- **Built-in C2** – Create/start **listeners**, generate **payloads**, track **sessions**, enqueue **tasks**, and subscribe to **events** (SSE) from the Web UI or `/api/c2/*`. Agents and external clients use the C2 MCP tool family (including **`c2_task`**); when HITL is enabled, high-risk tasks can require human approval. Intended **only** for systems you are explicitly authorized to test.
-- **Settings** – Tweak provider keys, MCP enablement, tool toggles, and agent iteration limits.
-- **Human-in-the-loop (HITL)** – Sidebar sets mode and allowlisted tools (comma- or newline-separated); global list lives in `config.yaml` under `hitl.tool_whitelist`. The Audit Agent can use a separate low-cost model through `hitl.audit_model`, useful when human reviewers cannot keep up. **Apply** updates browser/server and can merge new tools into the file (**no restart**). **New chat** keeps sidebar choices; **HITL** nav shows pending approvals. Removing a tool in the sidebar does not remove it from the global list in `config.yaml`—edit the file if needed.
-
-### Built-in Safeguards
-- Required-field validation prevents accidental blank API credentials.
-- Auto-generated strong passwords when `auth.password` is empty.
-- Unified auth middleware for every web/API call (Bearer token flow).
-- Timeout and sandbox guards per tool, plus structured logging for triage.
-
-## Advanced Usage
-
-### Role-Based Testing
-- **Predefined roles** – System includes 12+ predefined security testing roles (Penetration Testing, CTF, Web App Scanning, API Security Testing, Binary Analysis, Cloud Security Audit, etc.) in the `roles/` directory.
-- **Custom prompts** – Each role can define a `user_prompt` that prepends to user messages, guiding the AI to adopt specialized testing methodologies and focus areas.
-- **Tool restrictions** – Roles can specify a `tools` list to limit available tools, ensuring focused testing workflows (e.g., CTF role restricts to CTF-specific utilities).
-- **Skills** – Skill packs live under `skills_dir` and load via the Eino ADK **`skill`** tool (**progressive disclosure**) in both **single- and multi-agent** sessions when **`multi_agent.eino_skills`** is enabled. Optional host **read_file / glob / grep / write / edit / execute** and **`eino_middleware`** (tool_search, plantask, reduction, checkpoints, summarization transcripts, etc.) apply per mode—see docs.
-- **Easy role creation** – Create custom roles by adding YAML files to the `roles/` directory. Each role defines `name`, `description`, `user_prompt`, `icon`, `tools`, and `enabled` fields.
-- **Web UI integration** – Select roles from a dropdown in the chat interface. Role selection affects both AI behavior and available tool suggestions.
-
-**Creating a custom role (example):**
-1. Create a YAML file in `roles/` (e.g., `roles/custom-role.yaml`):
-   ```yaml
-   name: Custom Role
-   description: Specialized testing scenario
-   user_prompt: You are a specialized security tester focusing on API security...
-   icon: "\U0001F4E1"
-   tools:
-     - api-fuzzer
-     - arjun
-     - graphql-scanner
-   enabled: true
-   ```
-2. Restart the server or reload configuration; the role appears in the role selector dropdown.
-
-### Multi-Agent Mode (Eino: Deep, Plan-Execute, Supervisor)
-- **What it is** – Multi-agent orchestration on CloudWeGo **Eino** `adk/prebuilt` (alongside **Eino single-agent** on `/api/eino-agent*`): **`deep`** — coordinator + **`task`** sub-agents for complex security testing and delegated synthesis; **`plan_execute`** — planner / executor / replanner for structured loops; **`supervisor`** — expert-routing mode with **`transfer`** / **`exit`** for multiple specialist sub-agents. Client sends **`orchestration`**: `deep` | `plan_execute` | `supervisor` (default `deep`).
-- **Markdown agents** – Under `agents_dir` (default `agents/`):
-  - **Deep orchestrator**: `orchestrator.md` *or* one `.md` with `kind: orchestrator`. Body or `multi_agent.orchestrator_instruction`, then Eino defaults.
-  - **Plan-Execute orchestrator**: fixed name **`orchestrator-plan-execute.md`** (plus optional `orchestrator_instruction_plan_execute` in YAML).
-  - **Supervisor orchestrator**: fixed name **`orchestrator-supervisor.md`** (plus optional `orchestrator_instruction_supervisor`); requires at least one sub-agent, and one-sub-agent runs emit a hint that expert routing has limited value.
-  - **Sub-agents** (for **deep** / **supervisor**): other `*.md` files (YAML front matter + body). Not used as **`task`** targets if marked orchestrator-only.
-- **Management** – Web UI: **Agents → Agent management**; API `/api/multi-agent/markdown-agents`.
-- **Config** – `multi_agent` in `config.yaml`: `enabled`, `robot_default_agent_mode`, `batch_use_multi_agent`, `max_iteration`, `plan_execute_loop_max_iterations`, per-mode orchestrator instruction fields, optional YAML `sub_agents` merged with disk (`id` clash → Markdown wins), **`eino_skills`**, **`eino_middleware`** (optional ADK middleware and Deep/Supervisor tuning).
-- **Resilience & long runs** – `checkpoint_dir` enables ADK **resume** after process crashes (distinct from trace-based “interrupt & continue”). `deep_model_retry_max_retries` retries transient LLM API failures within a single call. **Summarization** writes a filtered **transcript** when compression fires; the summary message includes the path so the model can `read_file` for scan output and other pre-compaction details.
-- **Details** – **[docs/en-US/MULTI_AGENT_EINO.md](docs/en-US/MULTI_AGENT_EINO.md)** (streaming, robots, batch, middleware caveats).
-
-### Skills System (Agent Skills + Eino)
-- **Layout** – Each skill is a directory with **required** `SKILL.md` only ([Agent Skills](https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/agents-and-tools/agent-skills/overview)): YAML front matter **only** `name` and `description`, plus Markdown body. Optional sibling files (`FORMS.md`, `REFERENCE.md`, `scripts/*`, …). **No** `SKILL.yaml` (not part of Claude or Eino specs); sections/scripts/progressive behavior are **derived at runtime** from Markdown and the filesystem.
-- **Runtime refactor** – **`skills_dir`** is the single root for packs. **Multi-agent** loads them through Eino’s official **`skill`** middleware (**progressive disclosure**: model calls `skill` with a pack **name** instead of receiving full SKILL text up front). Configure via **`multi_agent.eino_skills`**: `disable`, `filesystem_tools` (host read/glob/grep/write/edit/execute), `skill_tool_name`.
-- **Eino / RAG** – Packages are also split into `schema.Document` chunks for `FilesystemSkillsRetriever` (`skills.AsEinoRetriever()`) in **compose** graphs (e.g. knowledge/indexing pipelines).
-- **HTTP API** – `/api/skills` listing and `depth` (`summary` | `full`), `section`, and `resource_path` remain for the web UI and ops; **model-side** skill loading in multi-agent uses the **`skill`** tool, not MCP.
-- **Optional `eino_middleware`** – e.g. `tool_search` (dynamic MCP tool list), `patch_tool_calls`, **`plantask`** (Eino `TaskCreate` / `TaskGet` / `TaskUpdate` / `TaskList`; JSON under `skills_dir/.eino/plantask/<conversation-id>/`; Eino clears task files when **all** tasks are marked completed), `reduction`, **`checkpoint_dir`** (`data/eino-checkpoints/`), **`deep_model_retry_max_retries`**, **`deep_output_key`**, task-tool description prefix—see `config.yaml` and `internal/config/config.go`.
-- **Shipped demo** – `skills/cyberstrike-eino-demo/`; see `skills/README.md`.
-
-**Creating a skill:**
-1. `mkdir skills/<skill-id>` and add standard `SKILL.md` (+ any optional files), or drop in an open-source skill folder as-is.
-2. Use **multi-agent** with **`multi_agent.eino_skills`** enabled so the model can call the **`skill`** tool with that pack **name**.
-
-### Tool Orchestration & Extensions
-- **YAML recipes** in `tools/*.yaml` describe commands, arguments, prompts, and metadata.
-- **Directory hot-reload** – pointing `security.tools_dir` to a folder is usually enough; inline definitions in `config.yaml` remain supported for quick experiments.
-- **Large tool outputs** – outputs beyond `reduction_max_length_for_trunc` are summarized via Eino reduction with full content persisted under `tmp/reduction/`; use `read_file` on the path in `<persisted-output>`.
-- **Result compression** – multi-megabyte logs can be summarized or losslessly compressed before persisting to keep SQLite lean.
-
-**Creating a custom tool (typical flow)**
-1. Copy an existing YAML file from `tools/` (for example `tools/nmap.yaml` or `tools/ffuf.yaml`).
-2. Update `name`, `command`, `args`, and `short_description`.
-3. Describe positional or flag parameters in `parameters[]` so the agent knows how to build CLI arguments.
-4. Provide a longer `description`/`notes` block if the agent needs extra context or post-processing tips.
-5. Restart the server or reload configuration; the new tool becomes available immediately and can be enabled/disabled from the Settings panel.
-
-### Attack-Chain Intelligence
-- AI parses each conversation to assemble targets, tools, vulnerabilities, and relationships.
-- The web UI renders the chain as an interactive graph with severity scoring and step replay.
-- Export the chain or raw findings to external reporting pipelines.
-
-### WebShell Management
-- **Connections** – From the Web UI, go to **WebShell Management** to add, edit, or delete WebShell connections. Each connection stores: Shell URL, password/key, shell type (PHP, ASP, ASPX, JSP, Custom), request method (GET/POST), command parameter name (default `cmd`), and an optional remark; all records persist in SQLite and are compatible with common clients such as IceSword and AntSword.
-- **Virtual terminal** – After selecting a connection, use the **Virtual terminal** tab to run arbitrary commands with history and quick commands (whoami/id/ls/pwd etc.). Output is streamed in the browser, and Ctrl+L clears the screen.
-- **File manager** – Use the **File manager** tab to list directories, read or edit files, delete files, create folders/files, upload files (including chunked uploads for large files), rename paths, and download selected files. Path navigation supports breadcrumbs, parent directory jumps, and name filtering.
-- **AI assistant** – Use the **AI assistant** tab to chat with an agent that understands the current WebShell connection, automatically runs tools and shell commands, and maintains per-connection conversation history with a sidebar of previous sessions.
-- **Connectivity test** – Use **Test connectivity** to verify that the shell URL, password, and command parameter are correct before running commands (sends a lightweight `echo 1` check).
-- **Persistence** – All WebShell connections and AI conversations are stored in SQLite (same database as conversations), so they persist across restarts.
-
-### Built-in C2 (Command & Control)
-- **What it is** – A first-party, **AI-native** C2 stack: listeners accept implants (beacons), the server stores **sessions** and **tasks** in SQLite, pushes updates over an **event bus** (including **SSE**), and exposes everything through authenticated **REST** plus MCP.
-- **Listeners & transports** – `tcp_reverse`, `http_beacon`, `https_beacon`, and `websocket`; per-listener crypto keys; running listeners can be **restored after restart** when marked running in the database.
-- **Agent integration** – MCP exposes a small **C2 tool family** (listeners, sessions, **`c2_task`**, task management, payloads, events, profiles, files) so the same agent loop can orchestrate C2 alongside other tools; dangerous task types can go through the existing **HITL** bridge when your session policy requires it.
-- **Safety** – Use **only** in lab or **fully authorized** engagements; combine network isolation, strong auth, and HITL/allowlists as your policy demands.
-
-### MCP Everywhere
-- **Web mode** – ships with HTTP MCP server automatically consumed by the UI.
-- **MCP stdio mode** – `go run cmd/mcp-stdio/main.go` exposes the agent to Cursor/CLI.
-- **External MCP federation** – register third-party MCP servers (HTTP, stdio, or SSE) from the UI, toggle them per engagement, and monitor their health and call volume in real time.
-- **Optional MCP servers** – the [`mcp-servers/`](mcp-servers/README.md) directory provides standalone MCPs (e.g. reverse shell). They speak standard MCP over stdio and work with CyberStrikeAI (Settings → External MCP), Cursor, VS Code, and other MCP clients.
-
-#### MCP stdio quick start
-1. **Build the binary** (run from the project root):
-   ```bash
-   go build -o cyberstrike-ai-mcp cmd/mcp-stdio/main.go
-   ```
-2. **Wire it up in Cursor**  
-   Open `Settings → Tools & MCP → Add Custom MCP`, pick **Command**, then point to the compiled binary and your config:
-   ```json
-   {
-     "mcpServers": {
-       "cyberstrike-ai": {
-         "command": "/absolute/path/to/cyberstrike-ai-mcp",
-         "args": [
-           "--config",
-           "/absolute/path/to/config.yaml"
-         ]
-       }
-     }
-   }
-   ```
-   Replace the paths with your local locations; Cursor will launch the stdio server automatically.
-
-#### MCP HTTP quick start (Cursor / Claude Code)
-The HTTP MCP server runs on a separate port (default `8081`) and supports **header-based authentication** so only clients that send the correct header can call tools.
-
-1. **Enable MCP in config** – In `config.yaml` set `mcp.enabled: true` and optionally `mcp.host` / `mcp.port`. For auth (recommended if the port is reachable from the network), set:
-   - `mcp.auth_header` – header name (e.g. `X-MCP-Token`);
-   - `mcp.auth_header_value` – secret value. **Leave it empty** if you want the server to **auto-generate** a random token on first start and write it back to the config.
-2. **Start the service** – Run `./run.sh` or `go run cmd/server/main.go`. The MCP endpoint is `http://<host>:<port>/mcp` (e.g. `http://localhost:8081/mcp`).
-3. **Copy the JSON from the terminal** – When MCP is enabled, the server prints a **ready-to-paste** JSON block. If `auth_header_value` was empty, it will have been generated and saved; the printed JSON includes the URL and headers.
-4. **Use in Cursor or Claude Code**:
-   - **Cursor**: Paste the block into `~/.cursor/mcp.json` (or your project’s `.cursor/mcp.json`) under `mcpServers`, or merge it into your existing `mcpServers`.
-   - **Claude Code**: Paste into `.mcp.json` or `~/.claude.json` under `mcpServers`.
-
-Example of what the terminal prints (with auth enabled):
-```json
-{
-  "mcpServers": {
-    "cyberstrike-ai": {
-      "url": "http://localhost:8081/mcp",
-      "headers": {
-        "X-MCP-Token": "<auto-generated-or-your-value>"
-      },
-      "type": "http"
-    }
-  }
-}
-```
-If you do not set `auth_header` / `auth_header_value`, the endpoint accepts requests without authentication (suitable only for localhost or trusted networks).
-
-#### External MCP federation (HTTP/stdio/SSE)
-CyberStrikeAI supports connecting to external MCP servers via three transport modes:
-- **HTTP mode** – traditional request/response over HTTP POST
-- **stdio mode** – process-based communication via standard input/output
-- **SSE mode** – Server-Sent Events for real-time streaming communication
-
-To add an external MCP server:
-1. Open the Web UI and navigate to **Settings → External MCP**.
-2. Click **Add External MCP** and provide the configuration in JSON format:
-
-   **HTTP mode example:**
-   ```json
-   {
-     "my-http-mcp": {
-       "transport": "http",
-       "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8081/mcp",
-       "description": "HTTP MCP server",
-       "timeout": 30
-     }
-   }
-   ```
-
-   **stdio mode example:**
-   ```json
-   {
-     "my-stdio-mcp": {
-       "command": "python3",
-       "args": ["/path/to/mcp-server.py"],
-       "description": "stdio MCP server",
-       "timeout": 30
-     }
-   }
-   ```
-
-   **SSE mode example:**
-   ```json
-   {
-     "my-sse-mcp": {
-       "transport": "sse",
-       "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8082/sse",
-       "description": "SSE MCP server",
-       "timeout": 30
-     }
-   }
-   ```
-
-3. Click **Save** and then **Start** to connect to the server.
-4. Monitor the connection status, tool count, and health in real time.
-
-**SSE mode benefits:**
-- Real-time bidirectional communication via Server-Sent Events
-- Suitable for scenarios requiring continuous data streaming
-- Lower latency for push-based notifications
-
-A test SSE MCP server is available at `cmd/test-sse-mcp-server/` for validation purposes.
-
-### Knowledge Base
-- **Vector search** – AI agent can automatically search the knowledge base for relevant security knowledge during conversations using the `search_knowledge_base` tool.
-- **RAG pipeline (always on)** – **MultiQuery** (LLM query rewrite) → vector prefetch & fusion → **HTTP rerank** (DashScope `gte-rerank` or Cohere-compatible `/v1/rerank`) → post-processing (normalized dedupe, char/token budget, final top_k). Rerank failures degrade to fusion order without breaking search.
-- **Vector retrieval** – cosine similarity over stored embeddings with configurable threshold, aligned with Eino `retriever.Retriever` usage.
-- **Auto-indexing** – scans the `knowledge_base/` directory for Markdown files and automatically indexes them with embeddings (Markdown header split + recursive chunking via Eino).
-- **Web management** – create, update, delete knowledge items through the web UI, with category-based organization; settings page exposes MultiQuery / rerank / prefetch options.
-- **Retrieval logs** – tracks all knowledge retrieval operations for audit and debugging.
-
-**Setting up the knowledge base:**
-1. **Enable in config** – set `knowledge.enabled: true` in `config.yaml`:
-   ```yaml
-   knowledge:
-     enabled: true
-     base_path: knowledge_base
-     embedding:
-       provider: openai
-       model: text-embedding-v4
-       base_url: "https://api.openai.com/v1"  # or your embedding API
-       api_key: "sk-xxx"
-     retrieval:
-       top_k: 5
-       similarity_threshold: 0.7
-       multi_query:
-         max_queries: 4        # LLM rewrite variants (always on)
-       rerank:                 # always on; empty fields inherit openai/embedding credentials
-         provider: ""          # auto: dashscope | cohere from base_url
-         model: ""             # empty: gte-rerank (DashScope) or rerank-multilingual-v3.0 (Cohere)
-         base_url: ""
-         api_key: ""
-       post_retrieve:
-         prefetch_top_k: 20    # vector candidates per MultiQuery variant; 0 = max(top_k×4, 20)
-         max_context_chars: 0
-         max_context_tokens: 0
-   ```
-2. **Add knowledge files** – place Markdown files in `knowledge_base/` directory, organized by category (e.g., `knowledge_base/SQL Injection/README.md`).
-3. **Scan and index** – use the web UI to scan the knowledge base directory, which will automatically import files and build vector embeddings.
-4. **Use in conversations** – the AI agent will automatically use `search_knowledge_base` when it needs security knowledge. You can also explicitly ask: "Search the knowledge base for SQL injection techniques".
-
-**Knowledge base structure:**
-- Files are organized by category (directory name becomes the category).
-- Each Markdown file becomes a knowledge item with automatic chunking for vector search.
-- The system supports incremental updates – modified files are re-indexed automatically.
 
 
-### Automation Hooks
+## Configuration
-- **REST APIs** – everything the UI uses (auth, conversations, tool runs, monitor, vulnerabilities, roles) is available over JSON.
-- **Multi-agent APIs** – `POST /api/multi-agent/stream` (SSE, when enabled), `POST /api/multi-agent` (non-streaming), Markdown agents under `/api/multi-agent/markdown-agents` (list/get/create/update/delete).
-- **Role APIs** – manage security testing roles via `/api/roles` endpoints: `GET /api/roles` (list all roles), `GET /api/roles/:name` (get role), `POST /api/roles` (create role), `PUT /api/roles/:name` (update role), `DELETE /api/roles/:name` (delete role). Roles are stored as YAML files in the `roles/` directory and support hot-reload.
-- **Vulnerability APIs** – manage vulnerabilities via `/api/vulnerabilities` endpoints: `GET /api/vulnerabilities` (list with filters), `POST /api/vulnerabilities` (create), `GET /api/vulnerabilities/:id` (get), `PUT /api/vulnerabilities/:id` (update), `DELETE /api/vulnerabilities/:id` (delete), `GET /api/vulnerabilities/stats` (statistics).
-- **Batch Task APIs** – manage batch task queues via `/api/batch-tasks` endpoints: `POST /api/batch-tasks` (create queue), `GET /api/batch-tasks` (list queues), `GET /api/batch-tasks/:queueId` (get queue), `POST /api/batch-tasks/:queueId/start` (start execution), `POST /api/batch-tasks/:queueId/cancel` (cancel), `DELETE /api/batch-tasks/:queueId` (delete), `POST /api/batch-tasks/:queueId/tasks` (add task), `PUT /api/batch-tasks/:queueId/tasks/:taskId` (update task), `DELETE /api/batch-tasks/:queueId/tasks/:taskId` (delete task). Tasks execute sequentially, each creating a separate conversation with full status tracking.
-- **WebShell APIs** – manage WebShell connections and execute commands via `/api/webshell/connections` (GET list, POST create, PUT update, DELETE delete) and `/api/webshell/exec` (command execution), `/api/webshell/fileop` (list/read/write/delete files).
-- **C2 APIs** – manage listeners, sessions, tasks, payloads, files, and events under `/api/c2/*` (e.g. listeners CRUD/start/stop, session sleep, task create/cancel/wait, payload build/download, event stream).
-- **Task control** – pause/resume/stop long scans, re-run steps with new params, or stream transcripts.
-- **Audit & security** – rotate passwords via `/api/auth/change-password`, enforce short-lived sessions, and restrict MCP ports at the network layer when exposing the service.
 
-## Configuration Reference
+Use [`config.example.yaml`](config.example.yaml) as the authoritative configuration template and copy only the values required for your environment. At minimum, configure the server and an OpenAI-compatible model provider:
 
 ```yaml
-auth:
-  password: "change-me"
-  session_duration_hours: 12
 server:
-  host: "0.0.0.0"
+  host: "127.0.0.1"
   port: 8080
-log:
-  level: "info"
-  output: "stdout"
-mcp:
-  enabled: true
-  host: "0.0.0.0"
-  port: 8081
-  auth_header: "X-MCP-Token"       # optional; leave empty for no auth
-  auth_header_value: ""            # optional; leave empty to auto-generate on first start
 openai:
-  api_key: "sk-xxx"
+  api_key: "${OPENAI_API_KEY}"
-  base_url: "https://api.deepseek.com/v1"
+  base_url: "https://api.openai.com/v1"
-  model: "deepseek-chat"
+  model: "your-model"
-database:
-  path: "data/conversations.db"
-  knowledge_db_path: "data/knowledge.db"  # Optional: separate DB for knowledge base
-security:
-  tools_dir: "tools"
-knowledge:
-  enabled: false  # Enable knowledge base feature
-  base_path: "knowledge_base"  # Path to knowledge base directory
-  embedding:
-    provider: "openai"  # Embedding provider (currently only "openai")
-    model: "text-embedding-v4"  # Embedding model name
-    base_url: ""  # Leave empty to use OpenAI base_url
-    api_key: ""  # Leave empty to use OpenAI api_key
-  retrieval:
-    top_k: 5  # Number of top results to return
-    similarity_threshold: 0.7  # Minimum cosine similarity (0-1)
-    multi_query:
-      max_queries: 4  # MultiQuery rewrite variants (always on)
-    rerank:  # HTTP rerank (always on); empty fields inherit openai/embedding credentials
-      provider: ""
-      model: ""
-      base_url: ""
-      api_key: ""
-    post_retrieve:
-      prefetch_top_k: 20  # per MultiQuery variant; 0 = max(top_k×4, 20)
-      max_context_chars: 0
-      max_context_tokens: 0
-roles_dir: "roles"  # Role configuration directory (relative to config file)
-skills_dir: "skills"  # Skills directory (relative to config file)
-agents_dir: "agents"  # Multi-agent Markdown definitions (orchestrator + sub-agents)
-multi_agent:
-  enabled: false
-  default_mode: "eino_single"   # eino_single | multi (UI default when multi-agent is enabled)
-  robot_default_agent_mode: eino_single
-  batch_use_multi_agent: false
-  orchestrator_instruction: ""  # Deep; used when orchestrator.md body is empty
-  # orchestrator_instruction_plan_execute / orchestrator_instruction_supervisor optional
-  # eino_skills: { disable: false, filesystem_tools: true, skill_tool_name: skill }
-  # eino_middleware: plantask_enable, checkpoint_dir, deep_model_retry_max_retries, deep_output_key, ...
-project:
-  enabled: true              # Enable project blackboard & fact MCP tools
-  fact_index_max_runes: 65000
-  fact_summary_max_runes: 24000
-  default_inject_deprecated: false
 ```
 
-### Tool Definition Example (`tools/nmap.yaml`)
+Do not commit real credentials. Review the [configuration reference](docs/en-US/configuration.md), [recommended profiles](docs/en-US/configuration-profiles.md), and [security hardening guide](docs/en-US/security-hardening.md) before exposing the service beyond localhost.
-
-```yaml
-name: "nmap"
-command: "nmap"
-args: ["-sT", "-sV", "-sC"]
-enabled: true
-short_description: "Network mapping & service fingerprinting"
-parameters:
-  - name: "target"
-    type: "string"
-    description: "IP or domain"
-    required: true
-    position: 0
-  - name: "ports"
-    type: "string"
-    flag: "-p"
-    description: "Range, e.g. 1-1000"
-```
-
-### Role Definition Example (`roles/penetration-testing.yaml`)
-
-```yaml
-name: Penetration Testing
-description: Professional penetration testing expert for comprehensive security testing
-user_prompt: You are a professional cybersecurity penetration testing expert. Please use professional penetration testing methods and tools to conduct comprehensive security testing on targets, including but not limited to SQL injection, XSS, CSRF, file inclusion, command execution and other common vulnerabilities.
-icon: "\U0001F3AF"
-tools:
-  - nmap
-  - sqlmap
-  - nuclei
-  - burpsuite
-  - metasploit
-  - httpx
-  - record_vulnerability
-  - list_knowledge_risk_types
-  - search_knowledge_base
-enabled: true
-```
 
 ## Related documentation
 
-- [Documentation index](docs/README.md): deployment, configuration, security model, API, knowledge base, C2, WebShell, MCP, development, testing, and troubleshooting.
+- **New users:** [Deployment](docs/en-US/deployment.md) → [Configuration](docs/en-US/configuration.md) → [Troubleshooting](docs/en-US/troubleshooting.md)
-- [Deployment guide](docs/en-US/deployment.md): source/binary startup, HTTPS, reverse proxy, systemd, backup, upgrade, and rollback.
+- **Operators:** [Configuration profiles](docs/en-US/configuration-profiles.md) → [Security hardening](docs/en-US/security-hardening.md) → [Runbooks](docs/en-US/runbooks.md)
-- [Runbooks](docs/en-US/runbooks.md): production setup, external MCP, knowledge base, authorized Web testing, and C2 cleanup workflows.
+- **Integrators:** [API reference](docs/en-US/api-reference.md) → [API recipes](docs/en-US/api-recipes.md) → [MCP federation](docs/en-US/mcp-federation.md)
-- [Security hardening](docs/en-US/security-hardening.md): launch baseline, HITL allowlist, reverse proxy, file permissions, and periodic review.
+- **Contributors:** [Developer guide](docs/en-US/developer-guide.md) → [Testing](docs/en-US/testing.md) → [Contributing](docs/en-US/contributing-guide.md)
-- [API recipes](docs/en-US/api-recipes.md): examples for login, Agent, streaming, multi-agent, uploads, vulnerabilities, KB, and audit export.
+- **All topics:** [English documentation](docs/en-US/README.md) · [Bilingual documentation index](docs/README.md)
-- [Configuration reference](docs/en-US/configuration.md): main `config.yaml` sections, recommended values, and update guidance.
-- [Security model](docs/en-US/security-model.md): authentication, tool execution, HITL, audit, C2/WebShell, and data safety boundaries.
-- [API reference](docs/en-US/api-reference.md): OpenAPI, authentication, Agent, projects, knowledge base, C2, WebShell, and other API entry points.
-- [Multi-agent mode (Eino)](docs/en-US/MULTI_AGENT_EINO.md): **Deep**, **Plan-Execute**, **Supervisor**, `agents/*.md`, `eino_skills` / `eino_middleware`, APIs, and chat/stream behavior.
-- [Graph orchestration guide](docs/en-US/workflow-graph.md): visual workflow design, node configuration, `previous` / `outputs` variable passing, and role binding.
-- [Robot / Chatbot guide](docs/en-US/robot.md): Setup, commands, and troubleshooting for WeChat, WeCom, DingTalk, Lark, Telegram, Slack, Discord, and QQ Bot.
-- [HITL best practices](docs/en-US/hitl-best-practices.md): reviewer modes, allowlists, Audit Agent prompts, and separate small-model configuration.
 
 ## Project Layout
 
@@ -663,6 +316,7 @@ CyberStrikeAI/
 ├── agents/              # Multi-agent Markdown (orchestrator.md + sub-agent *.md)
 ├── docs/                # Topic docs (deployment, config, security, API, knowledge base, C2, WebShell, etc.)
 ├── images/              # Docs screenshots & diagrams
+├── scripts/             # Repository maintenance checks, including documentation validation
 ├── config.yaml          # Runtime configuration
 ├── run.sh               # Convenience launcher
 └── README*.md
@@ -704,6 +358,26 @@ CyberStrikeAI has joined [404Starlink](https://github.com/knownsec/404StarLink)
 
 ---
 
+## Community and Support
+
+- Join the community on [Discord](https://discord.gg/8PjVCMu8Zw).
+
+<details>
+<summary><strong>WeChat group</strong></summary>
+
+<img src="./images/wechat-group-cyberstrikeai-qr.jpg" alt="CyberStrikeAI WeChat group QR code" width="280">
+
+</details>
+
+<details>
+<summary><strong>Sponsorship via WeChat Pay or Alipay</strong></summary>
+
+<div align="center">
+  <img src="./images/sponsor-wechat-alipay-qr.jpg" alt="WeChat Pay and Alipay sponsorship QR codes" width="480">
+</div>
+
+</details>
+
 ## License
 
 CyberStrikeAI is licensed under the Apache License 2.0.  

README_CN.md

@@ -6,31 +6,14 @@
 
 [中文](README_CN.md) | [English](README.md)
 
-**社区**：[加入 Discord](https://discord.gg/8PjVCMu8Zw)
+**CyberStrikeAI 是 AI 原生网络安全的智能执行中枢——让意图转化为受治理的行动，让证据沉淀为运营记忆，并让每次行动优化下一次行动。**
 
-**CyberStrikeAI 正在构建现代网络安全的智能体执行层。**
+CyberStrikeAI 将规划、执行、人工监督、证据与复盘连接在同一个可审计工作空间中。项目基于 Go 构建，融合 Eino 智能体、MCP 原生工具、RAG 知识、可视化工作流以及攻击链建模与分析能力，面向已获得明确授权的安全任务。
 
-它将 AI 智能体、安全工具、MCP 原生集成、知识系统、人工监督与攻击链智能汇聚到一个面向授权安全任务的统一工作空间中。CyberStrikeAI 不再把工具、提示词、证据、审批和报告视为割裂环节，而是将安全意图转化为可规划、可执行、可审查、可复盘、可持续沉淀上下文的多智能体工作流。
+**从这里开始：** [快速上手](#快速上手一条命令部署) · [中文文档](docs/zh-CN/README.md) · [安全加固](docs/zh-CN/security-hardening.md)
 
-CyberStrikeAI 基于 Go 构建，为 AI 原生安全运营提供完整底座：100+ 精选工具配方、角色化测试、Agent Skills、基于 Eino 的单智能体与多智能体编排、RAG 知识检索、图工作流、漏洞与任务生命周期管理、WebShell 运营、机器人接入，以及面向授权实验室和安全任务场景的内置轻量 C2 框架。
+> [!IMPORTANT]
-
+> 仅可对自有系统或已获得明确授权的目标使用 CyberStrikeAI。在共享或生产环境启用高风险工具、WebShell 或 C2 前，请先阅读[安全模型](docs/zh-CN/security-model.md)和[安全加固指南](docs/zh-CN/security-hardening.md)。
-<details>
-<summary><strong>微信群</strong>（点击展开二维码）</summary>
-
-<img src="./images/wechat-group-cyberstrikeai-qr.jpg" alt="CyberStrikeAI 微信群二维码" width="280">
-
-</details>
-
-<details>
-<summary><strong>赞助</strong>（点击展开）</summary>
-
-若 CyberStrikeAI 对您有帮助，可通过 **微信支付** 或 **支付宝** 赞助项目：
-
-<div align="center">
-  <img src="./images/sponsor-wechat-alipay-qr.jpg" alt="微信与支付宝赞助二维码" width="480">
-</div>
-
-</details>
 
 ## 界面与集成预览
 
@@ -53,6 +36,9 @@ CyberStrikeAI 基于 Go 构建，为 AI 原生安全运营提供完整底座：1
 
 *仪表盘提供系统运行状态、安全漏洞、工具使用情况和知识库的全面概览，帮助用户快速了解平台核心功能和当前状态。*
 
+<details>
+<summary><strong>查看更多界面截图</strong></summary>
+
 ### 核心功能概览
 
 <table>
@@ -114,32 +100,50 @@ CyberStrikeAI 基于 Go 构建，为 AI 原生安全运营提供完整底座：1
 </tr>
 </table>
 
+</details>
+
 </div>
 
 ## 特性速览
 
-- 🤖 面向智能体时代的执行层，将自然语言意图转化为精准、受控、可审计的安全行动
+### 智能体与编排
-- 🧩 基于 Eino 的单智能体与多智能体编排，支持 Deep、Plan-Execute、Supervisor 等模式
+
-- 🔌 MCP 原生工具执行，支持 HTTP / stdio / SSE 传输、外部 MCP 联邦与动态工具发现
+- 🤖 **智能体执行层**：将自然语言意图转化为受控、可审计的安全行动。
-- 🧰 100+ 精选安全工具配方、YAML 扩展机制与按角色收敛的工具控制
+- 🧩 **Eino 编排**：支持单智能体及 Deep、Plan-Execute、Supervisor 多智能体模式。
-- 📄 大结果分页、压缩与全文检索
+- 🔀 **工作流**：通过 Agent、工具、条件、审批和输出节点构建可复用流程。
-- 🔗 攻击链智能分析，支持图谱视图、风险打分、项目事实沉淀与步骤回放
+- 🎭 **角色化测试**：为常见安全场景提供聚焦的提示词和工具策略。
-- 🧑‍⚖️ 人机协同治理，支持审批模式、免审批白名单、审计 Agent 复核与可追溯决策
+
-- 🔒 Web 登录保护、审计日志、SQLite 持久化与行动证据留存
+### 工具与知识扩展
-- 📚 知识库（RAG）：**Eino MultiQuery** 查询改写 + 多路向量检索 + **HTTP 精排**（DashScope `gte-rerank` / Cohere 兼容）+ 后处理（去重、预算）；索引侧为 **Eino Compose** 流水线
+
-- 📁 对话分组管理：支持分组创建、置顶、重命名、删除等操作
+- 🧰 **安全工具**：提供 100+ 精选 YAML 工具配方，支持自定义扩展和按角色控制。
-- 📂 **项目管理**：共享事实（黑板）跨会话沉淀认知，`upsert_project_fact` + `links` 串联攻击路径；聊天攻击链与项目事实图可视化
+- 🔌 **MCP 集成**：支持 HTTP、stdio、SSE、外部 MCP 联邦和动态工具发现。
-- 🛡️ 漏洞管理功能：完整的漏洞 CRUD 操作，支持严重程度分级、状态流转、按对话/严重程度/状态过滤，以及统计看板
+- ⏱️ **弹性工具执行**：阻塞型 MCP/工具调用交给 worker 执行，Agent 只有限等待；支持 `execution_id` 多轮等待、主动取消、单 server 熔断、并发限制和统一输出兜底。
-- 📋 批量任务管理：创建任务队列，批量添加任务，依次顺序执行，支持任务编辑与状态跟踪
+- 🎯 **Agent Skills**：遵循标准 Skill 目录结构，支持渐进式按需加载。
-- 🎭 角色化测试：预设安全测试角色（渗透测试、CTF、Web 应用扫描等），支持自定义提示词和工具限制
+- 📚 **知识库**：组合查询改写、向量检索、精排和结果后处理能力。
-- 🔀 **图编排**：可视化流程编排（开始 / Agent / 工具 / 条件 / 审批 / 输出），节点间用 `{{previous.output}}` 或 `{{outputs.变量名}}` 传参；绑定角色后对话自动按图执行。详见 [图编排使用说明](docs/zh-CN/workflow-graph.md)
+- 🖼️ **视觉分析**：使用独立视觉模型分析截图、验证码和 UI，对话中仅保留文字摘要。
-- 🧩 **Agent 编排（CloudWeGo Eino）**：**单代理** `POST /api/eino-agent/stream`（Eino ADK）；**多代理** `POST /api/multi-agent/stream`，`orchestration` 选 **`deep`** / **`plan_execute`** / **`supervisor`**。ADK **Summarization** 在上下文过长时压缩历史；压缩前将可恢复 **转录** 写入 `data/conversation_artifacts/<会话ID>/summarization/transcript.txt`（保留完整 user/assistant/tool 轮次，省略静态 system）。`agents/` 下主代理与子代理 Markdown 见 [多代理说明](docs/zh-CN/MULTI_AGENT_EINO.md)
+
-- 🖼️ **视觉分析（`analyze_image`）**：独立 Vision 模型（如 `qwen-vl-max`），MCP 工具分析本地截图/验证码/UI；图片仅在单次 VL 调用中出现，对话上下文只保留文字摘要。配置见 `config.yaml` → `vision` 与 [视觉分析说明](docs/zh-CN/VISION.md)
+### 安全治理与审计
-- 🎯 **Skills（面向 Eino 重构）**：技能包放在 **`skills_dir`**，遵循 **Agent Skills** 目录规范（`SKILL.md` + 可选文件）；**多代理** 下通过 Eino 官方 **`skill`** 工具 **渐进式披露**（按 name 加载）。**`multi_agent.eino_skills`** 控制是否启用、本机文件/Shell 工具、工具名覆盖；**`eino_middleware`** 可选 patch、tool_search、**plantask**（`TaskCreate` / `TaskList` 任务板，落在 `skills_dir/.eino/plantask/`）、reduction、文件型 **checkpoint**（`checkpoint_dir`）、ChatModel **重试**、会话 **输出键** 及 Deep 调参。20+ 领域示例仍可绑定角色
+
-- 📱 **机器人**：个人微信、企业微信、钉钉、飞书、Telegram、Slack、Discord、QQ 机器人，在手机或 IM 中与 CyberStrikeAI 对话（详见 [机器人使用说明](docs/zh-CN/robot.md)）
+- 🧑‍⚖️ **人机协同**：支持审批模式、工具白名单、审计 Agent 复核和决策追踪。
-- 🧑‍⚖️ **人机协同（HITL）**：对话页侧栏配置协同模式与免审批工具白名单；全局列表在 `config.yaml` 的 `hitl.tool_whitelist`；审计 Agent 可通过 `hitl.audit_model` 使用独立小模型；点「应用」可将新增工具合并写入配置文件且**无需重启**即可生效；导航 **人机协同** 页处理待审批工具调用。详见 [人机协同最佳实践](docs/zh-CN/hitl-best-practices.md)
+- 🔐 **平台 RBAC**：支持多用户、系统及自定义角色、权限 Scope、资源归属和显式授权。
-- 🐚 **WebShell 管理**：添加与管理 WebShell 连接（兼容冰蝎/蚁剑等），通过虚拟终端执行命令、内置文件管理进行文件操作，并提供按连接维度保存历史的 AI 助手标签页；支持 PHP/ASP/ASPX/JSP 及自定义类型，可配置请求方法与命令参数。
+- 🔒 **安全与审计**：提供登录保护、审计日志、SQLite 持久化和行动证据留存。
-- 📡 **内置 C2**：面向 AI 协同的轻量 **C2**——**多种监听器**（TCP 反向、HTTP/HTTPS Beacon、WebSocket）、**加密** Beacon 信道、**会话与任务**队列及持久化、**Payload** 辅助（一键命令 / 构建 / 下载）、**SSE** 实时事件、REST（`/api/c2/*`）及智能体侧 **一组 C2 MCP 工具**（如 `c2_listener`、`c2_session`、**`c2_task`**、`c2_task_manage`、`c2_payload`、`c2_event`、`c2_profile`、`c2_file`）；敏感操作可对接 **人机协同（HITL）**，并支持 OPSEC 类规则（如命令拒绝正则）。**仅限授权测试。**
+- 📄 **结果治理**：数据库保存与 Agent 实际看到的同一份兜底后工具结果，恢复路径会再次防御历史超大输出，前端详情也有展示保护。详见[工具执行治理](docs/zh-CN/tool-execution-governance.md)。
+
+### 安全运营管理
+
+- 📁 **对话管理**：支持分组、置顶、重命名和批量管理。
+- 📂 **项目与攻击链**：关联跨会话事实、风险评分、图谱视图和步骤回放。
+- 🗂️ **资产管理**：统一归档和去重域名、IP、端口与服务，支持 XLSX/CSV 导入导出、高级筛选与保存视图、责任和业务属性、跨页批量维护、重复资产合并，并跟踪扫描覆盖、关联漏洞和风险状态。详见[资产管理指南](docs/zh-CN/asset-management.md)。
+- 🛡️ **漏洞管理**：支持严重程度分级、状态流转、过滤和统计看板。
+- 📋 **批量任务**：支持任务队列、编辑、状态跟踪和结果留存。
+- 📱 **机器人接入**：支持个人微信、企业微信、钉钉、飞书、Telegram、Slack、Discord 和 QQ。
+
+### 授权安全操作
+
+- 🐚 **WebShell 管理**：提供连接管理、虚拟终端、文件操作和 AI 辅助工作流。
+- 📡 **内置 C2**：提供监听器、加密 Beacon、会话、任务队列、Payload 辅助和实时事件。
+
+> WebShell、C2 及其他高风险能力仅限自有系统或已获得明确授权的测试环境。使用前请阅读[安全模型](docs/zh-CN/security-model.md)和[安全加固指南](docs/zh-CN/security-hardening.md)。
 
 ## 插件（Plugins）
 
@@ -148,16 +152,24 @@ CyberStrikeAI 基于 Go 构建，为 AI 原生安全运营提供完整底座：1
 - **Burp Suite 插件**：`plugins/burp-suite/cyberstrikeai-burp-extension/`  
   构建产物：`plugins/burp-suite/cyberstrikeai-burp-extension/dist/cyberstrikeai-burp-extension.jar`  
   说明文档：`plugins/burp-suite/cyberstrikeai-burp-extension/README.zh-CN.md`
+- **浏览器扩展（Chrome / Edge）**：`plugins/browser-extension/cyberstrikeai-browser-extension/`  
+  在 DevTools 中捕获 Network 流量并发送到 CyberStrikeAI 进行 AI 辅助安全测试，能力与 Burp 插件对齐。  
+  安装：`chrome://extensions/` → 加载已解压 → F12 → **CyberStrikeAI** 标签页  
+  打包产物：`plugins/browser-extension/cyberstrikeai-browser-extension/dist/cyberstrikeai-browser-extension.zip`  
+  说明文档：`plugins/browser-extension/cyberstrikeai-browser-extension/README.zh-CN.md`
 
 ## 工具概览
 
 系统预置 100+ 渗透/攻防工具，覆盖完整攻击链：
 
+<details>
+<summary><strong>查看完整工具分类</strong></summary>
+
 - **网络扫描**：nmap、masscan、rustscan、arp-scan、nbtscan
 - **Web 应用扫描**：sqlmap、nikto、dirb、gobuster、feroxbuster、ffuf、httpx
 - **漏洞扫描**：nuclei、wpscan、wafw00f、dalfox、xsser
 - **子域名枚举**：subfinder、amass、findomain、dnsenum、fierce
-- **网络空间搜索引擎**：fofa_search、zoomeye_search
+- **网络空间搜索引擎**：fofa_search、zoomeye_search、quake_search、shodan_search
 - **API 安全**：graphql-scanner、arjun、api-fuzzer、api-schema-analyzer
 - **容器安全**：trivy、clair、docker-bench-security、kube-bench、kube-hunter
 - **云安全**：prowler、scout-suite、cloudmapper、pacu、terrascan、checkov
@@ -169,12 +181,16 @@ CyberStrikeAI 基于 Go 构建，为 AI 原生安全运营提供完整底座：1
 - **CTF 实用工具**：stegsolve、zsteg、hash-identifier、fcrackzip、pdfcrack、cyberchef
 - **系统辅助**：exec、create-file、delete-file、list-files、modify-file
 
+</details>
+
+工具定义、自定义方式与使用说明见 [tools/README.md](tools/README.md)。
+
 ## 基础使用
 
 ### 快速上手（一条命令部署）
 
 **环境要求：**
-- Go 1.21+ ([下载安装](https://go.dev/dl/))
+- Go 1.25+（[下载安装](https://go.dev/dl/)，以 `go.mod` 为准）
 - Python 3.10+ ([下载安装](https://www.python.org/downloads/))
 
 **一条命令部署：**
@@ -192,6 +208,12 @@ chmod +x run.sh && ./run.sh
 - ✅ 编译构建项目
 - ✅ 启动服务器
 
+**验证是否启动成功：**
+
+1. 确认终端显示 `● ONLINE`，并在其后给出实际 Web UI 地址。
+2. 打开该地址；默认 HTTPS 使用本地自签证书，首次访问需接受一次浏览器证书提示。
+3. 全新安装时，妥善保存 `ADMIN SETUP REQUIRED` 下仅展示一次的 `admin` 密码，登录后立即修改。
+
 **网络默认：** `run.sh` 会以 **`--https`** 并传入项目根 **`config.yaml`** 启动（本机自签证书，多路流式场景更稳）。只要明文 HTTP 用 **`./run.sh --http`**。生产环境在 **`config.yaml`** 的 **`server.tls_cert_path` / `server.tls_key_path`** 配正式证书（见文件内注释）。手动启动可加 **`--https`** 或环境变量 **`CYBERSTRIKE_HTTPS=1`**；`-config` 写错时程序会在终端提示正确写法。
 
 **首次配置：**
@@ -200,12 +222,12 @@ chmod +x run.sh && ./run.sh
    - 进入 `设置` → 填写 API 配置信息：
      ```yaml
      openai:
-       api_key: "sk-your-key"
+       api_key: "${OPENAI_API_KEY}"
        base_url: "https://api.openai.com/v1"  # 或 https://api.deepseek.com/v1
        model: "gpt-4o"  # 或 deepseek-chat, claude-3-opus 等
      ```
    - 或启动前直接编辑 `config.yaml` 文件
-2. **登录系统** - 使用控制台显示的自动生成密码（或在 `config.yaml` 中设置 `auth.password`）
+2. **登录系统** - 首次启动时控制台会显示自动生成的 `admin` 初始密码；也可在「平台权限 → 用户管理」中创建账号
 3. **安装安全工具（可选）** - 按需安装 `tools/` 目录中的工具；未安装的工具在执行时会自动跳过或改用替代方案。常用示例：
 
    **macOS（Homebrew）：**
@@ -236,7 +258,7 @@ go build -o cyberstrike-ai cmd/server/main.go
 
 **说明：** Python 虚拟环境（`venv/`）由 `run.sh` 自动创建和管理。需要 Python 的工具（如 `api-fuzzer`、`http-framework-test` 等）会自动使用该环境。
 
-### CyberStrikeAI 版本更新（无兼容性问题）
+### 版本升级与兼容性
 
 1. （首次使用）启用脚本：`chmod +x upgrade.sh`
 2. 一键升级：`./upgrade.sh`（可选参数：`--tag vX.Y.Z`、`--no-venv`、`--yes`）。本地的 `tools/`、`roles/`、`skills/` 会始终保留不被覆盖。
@@ -252,401 +274,32 @@ go build -o cyberstrike-ai cmd/server/main.go
 * 建议/需要 `rsync` 用于安全同步代码。
 * 如果遇到 GitHub API 限流，运行前设置 `export GITHUB_TOKEN="..."` 再执行 `./upgrade.sh`。
 
-⚠️ **注意：** 仅适用于无兼容性变更的版本更新。若版本存在兼容性调整，此方法不适用。
+⚠️ **升级前必读：** 请查看目标版本的 Release Notes，确认配置、数据库和 API 是否变化。即使只是补丁版本也应先备份，不能仅凭版本号判断兼容性。
-
-**举例：** 无兼容性变更如 v1.3.1 → v1.3.2；有兼容性变更如 v1.3.1 → v1.4.0。项目采用语义化版本（SemVer）：仅第三位（补丁号）变更时通常可安全按上述步骤升级；次版本号或主版本号变更时可能涉及配置、数据或接口调整，需查阅 release notes 再决定是否适用本方法。
-
-### 常用流程
-- **对话测试**：自然语言触发多步工具编排，SSE 实时输出。
-- **单代理 / 多代理**：聊天可选 **Eino 单代理**（`/api/eino-agent/stream`）与 **多代理**（`/api/multi-agent/stream` + `orchestration`）。多代理需 `multi_agent.enabled: true`。MCP 工具桥接一致。
-- **角色化测试**：从预设的安全测试角色（渗透测试、CTF、Web 应用扫描、API 安全测试等）中选择，自定义 AI 行为和可用工具。每个角色可应用自定义系统提示词，并可限制可用工具列表，实现聚焦的测试场景。
-- **图编排**：在 **图编排** 页拖拽节点、连线并保存流程；在角色中绑定 `workflow_id` 后，该角色对话将按图执行（Agent、MCP 工具、条件分支等）。跨节点传参优先用 `{{outputs.变量名}}`。详见 [图编排使用说明](docs/zh-CN/workflow-graph.md)。
-- **工具监控**：查看任务队列、执行日志、大文件附件。
-- **会话历史**：所有对话与工具调用保存在 SQLite，可随时重放。
-- **对话分组**：将对话按项目或主题组织到不同分组，支持置顶、重命名、删除等操作，所有数据持久化存储。
-- **漏洞管理**：在测试过程中创建、更新和跟踪发现的漏洞。支持按严重程度（严重/高/中/低/信息）、状态（待确认/已确认/已修复/误报）和对话进行过滤，查看统计信息并导出发现。
-- **批量任务管理**：创建任务队列，批量添加多个任务，执行前可编辑或删除任务，然后依次顺序执行。每个任务会作为独立对话执行，支持完整的状态跟踪（待执行/执行中/已完成/失败/已取消）和执行历史。
-- **WebShell 管理**：添加并管理 WebShell 连接（PHP/ASP/ASPX/JSP 或自定义类型）。使用虚拟终端执行命令（带命令历史与快捷命令），使用文件管理浏览、读取、编辑、上传与删除目标文件，并支持按路径导航和名称过滤。连接信息持久化存储于 SQLite，支持 GET/POST 及可配置命令参数（兼容冰蝎/蚁剑等）。
-- **内置 C2**：在 Web 界面或 `/api/c2/*` 创建/启动 **监听器**、生成 **Payload**、查看 **会话**、下发 **任务** 并订阅 **事件（SSE）**。智能体与外部客户端通过 **C2 MCP 工具族**（含 **`c2_task`** 等）编排；开启人机协同时，高风险任务可走审批。**仅用于已获明确授权的目标。**
-- **可视化配置**：在界面中切换模型、启停工具、设置迭代次数等。
-- **人机协同（HITL）**：侧栏设置协同模式与免审批工具（逗号或换行）；全局白名单见 `config.yaml` 的 `hitl.tool_whitelist`。审计 Agent 可通过 `hitl.audit_model` 单独配置低成本模型，适合人工审计压力较大时接管常规审批。点「**应用**」可写浏览器/服务端并合并新增工具进配置（**无需重启**）。**新对话**保留侧栏选择；导航 **人机协同** 处理待审批。从侧栏删掉工具不会自动从配置文件移除全局项，需手改 `config.yaml`。
-
-### 默认安全措施
-- 设置面板内置必填校验，防止漏配 API Key/Base URL/模型。
-- `auth.password` 为空时自动生成 24 位强口令并写回 `config.yaml`。
-- 所有 API（除登录外）都需携带 Bearer Token，统一鉴权中间件拦截。
-- 每个工具执行都带有超时、日志和错误隔离。
-
-## 进阶使用
-
-### 角色化测试
-- **预设角色**：系统内置 12+ 个预设的安全测试角色（渗透测试、CTF、Web 应用扫描、API 安全测试、二进制分析、云安全审计等），位于 `roles/` 目录。
-- **自定义提示词**：每个角色可定义 `user_prompt`，会在用户消息前自动添加，引导 AI 采用特定的测试方法和关注重点。
-- **工具限制**：角色可指定 `tools` 列表，限制可用工具，实现聚焦的测试流程（如 CTF 角色限制为 CTF 专用工具）。
-- **Skills**：技能包位于 `skills_dir`；启用 **`multi_agent.eino_skills`** 后，**单代理与多代理**均可通过 Eino **`skill`** 工具按需加载。可选 **`eino_middleware`**（tool_search、plantask、reduction、checkpoint、Summarization 转录等）与本机 read_file/glob/grep 等见文档。
-- **轻松创建角色**：通过在 `roles/` 目录添加 YAML 文件即可创建自定义角色。每个角色定义 `name`、`description`、`user_prompt`、`icon`、`tools`、`enabled` 字段。
-- **Web 界面集成**：在聊天界面通过下拉菜单选择角色。角色选择会影响 AI 行为和可用工具建议。
-
-**创建自定义角色示例：**
-1. 在 `roles/` 目录创建 YAML 文件（如 `roles/custom-role.yaml`）：
-   ```yaml
-   name: 自定义角色
-   description: 专用测试场景
-   user_prompt: 你是一个专注于 API 安全的专业安全测试人员...
-   icon: "\U0001F4E1"
-   tools:
-     - api-fuzzer
-     - arjun
-     - graphql-scanner
-   enabled: true
-   ```
-2. 重启服务或重新加载配置，角色会出现在角色选择下拉菜单中。
-
-### 多代理模式（Eino：Deep / Plan-Execute / Supervisor）
-- **能力说明**：在 **Eino 单代理**（`/api/eino-agent*`）之外，多代理基于 CloudWeGo **Eino** `adk/prebuilt`：**`deep`**、**`plan_execute`**、**`supervisor`**；客户端 **`orchestration`** 选择（缺省 `deep`）。模式定位按 Eino ADK 最佳实践区分：**Deep** 适合复杂安全测试与 task 子代理协作；**Plan-Execute** 适合目标明确的规划 → 执行 → 重规划闭环；**Supervisor** 适合多个专业子代理动态分派的专家路由场景。
-- **Markdown 定义**（`agents_dir`，默认 `agents/`）：
-  - **Deep 主代理**：`orchestrator.md` 或唯一 `kind: orchestrator` 的 `.md`；正文或 `multi_agent.orchestrator_instruction`，再回退 Eino 默认。
-  - **Plan-Execute 主代理**：固定 **`orchestrator-plan-execute.md`**（另可配 `orchestrator_instruction_plan_execute`）。
-  - **Supervisor 主代理**：固定 **`orchestrator-supervisor.md`**（另可配 `orchestrator_instruction_supervisor`）；至少需一名子代理，只有一名子代理时会提示专家路由价值有限。
-  - **子代理**（**deep** / **supervisor**）：其余 `*.md`；标成 orchestrator 的不会进入 `task` 列表。
-- **界面管理**：**Agents → Agent 管理**；API `/api/multi-agent/markdown-agents`。
-- **配置项**：`multi_agent`：`enabled`、`robot_default_agent_mode`、`batch_use_multi_agent`、`max_iteration`、`plan_execute_loop_max_iterations`、各模式 orchestrator 指令字段、可选 YAML `sub_agents` 与目录合并（同 `id` → Markdown 优先）、**`eino_skills`**、**`eino_middleware`**。
-- **长任务与恢复**：`checkpoint_dir` 支持进程崩溃后 ADK **断点续跑**（与基于 trace 的「中断继续」不同）。`deep_model_retry_max_retries` 在同一次 LLM 调用内重试瞬时 API 失败。**Summarization** 触发压缩时会写入过滤后的 **transcript**，摘要消息中带路径，模型可用 `read_file` 找回扫描输出等压缩前细节。
-- **更多细节**：[docs/zh-CN/MULTI_AGENT_EINO.md](docs/zh-CN/MULTI_AGENT_EINO.md)（流式、机器人、批量、中间件差异）。
-
-### Skills 技能系统（Agent Skills + Eino）
-- **目录规范**：与 [Agent Skills](https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/agents-and-tools/agent-skills/overview) 一致，**仅**需目录下的 **`SKILL.md`**：YAML 头只用官方的 **`name` 与 `description`**，正文为 Markdown。可选同目录其他文件（`FORMS.md`、`REFERENCE.md`、`scripts/*` 等）。**不使用 `SKILL.yaml`**（Claude / Eino 官方均无此文件）；章节、`scripts/` 列表、渐进式行为由运行时从正文与磁盘 **自动推导**。
-- **运行侧重构**：**`skills_dir`** 为技能包唯一根目录；**多代理** 通过 Eino 官方 **`skill`** 中间件做 **渐进式披露**（模型按 **name** 调用 `skill`，而非一次性注入全文）。由 **`multi_agent.eino_skills`** 控制：`disable`、`filesystem_tools`（本机读写与 Shell）、`skill_tool_name`。
-- **Eino / 知识流水线**：技能包可切分为 `schema.Document`，供 `FilesystemSkillsRetriever`（`skills.AsEinoRetriever()`）在 **compose** 图（如索引/编排）中使用。
-- **HTTP 管理**：`/api/skills` 列表与 `depth=summary|full`、`section`、`resource_path` 等仍用于 Web 与运维；**模型侧** 多代理走 **`skill`** 工具，而非 MCP。
-- **可选 `eino_middleware`**：如 `tool_search`（动态工具列表）、`patch_tool_calls`、**`plantask`**（Eino `TaskCreate` / `TaskGet` / `TaskUpdate` / `TaskList`；JSON 存于 `skills_dir/.eino/plantask/<会话ID>/`；**全部**任务标为 completed 后 Eino 会清理任务文件）、`reduction`、**`checkpoint_dir`**（如 `data/eino-checkpoints/`）、**`deep_model_retry_max_retries`**、**`deep_output_key`**、task 描述前缀等，见 `config.yaml` 与 `internal/config/config.go`。
-- **自带示例**：`skills/cyberstrike-eino-demo/`；说明见 `skills/README.md`。
-
-**新建技能：**
-1. 在 `skills/` 下创建 `<skill-id>/`，放入标准 `SKILL.md`（及任意可选文件），或直接解压开源技能包到该目录。
-2. 启用 **`multi_agent.eino_skills`** 并使用 **多代理** 会话，由模型通过 **`skill`** 工具按包 **name** 加载。
-
-### 工具编排与扩展
-- `tools/*.yaml` 定义命令、参数、提示词与元数据，可热加载。
-- `security.tools_dir` 指向目录即可批量启用；仍支持在主配置里内联定义。
-- **大工具输出**：超过 `reduction_max_length_for_trunc` 时由 Eino reduction 摘要，完整内容落盘至 `tmp/reduction/`；按 `<persisted-output>` 中的路径用 `read_file` 读取。
-- **结果压缩/摘要**：多兆字节日志可先压缩或生成摘要再写入 SQLite，减小档案体积。
-
-**自定义工具的一般步骤**
-1. 复制 `tools/` 下现有示例（如 `tools/nmap.yaml` 或 `tools/ffuf.yaml`）。
-2. 修改 `name`、`command`、`args`、`short_description` 等基础信息。
-3. 在 `parameters[]` 中声明位置参数或带 flag 的参数，方便智能体自动拼装命令。
-4. 视需要补充 `description` 或 `notes`，给 AI 额外上下文或结果解读提示。
-5. 重启服务或在界面中重新加载配置，新工具即可在 Settings 面板中启用/禁用。
-
-### 攻击链分析
-- 智能体解析每次对话，抽取目标、工具、漏洞与因果关系。
-- Web 端可交互式查看链路节点、风险级别及时间轴，支持导出报告。
-
-### WebShell 管理
-- **连接管理**：在 Web 界面进入 **WebShell 管理**，可添加、编辑或删除 WebShell 连接。每条连接包含：Shell 地址、密码/密钥、Shell 类型（PHP/ASP/ASPX/JSP/自定义）、请求方式（GET/POST）、命令参数名（默认 `cmd`）、备注等信息，并持久化存储在 SQLite，兼容冰蝎、蚁剑等常见客户端。
-- **虚拟终端**：选择连接后，在 **虚拟终端** 标签页中执行任意命令，支持命令历史与常用快捷命令（whoami/id/ls/pwd 等），输出在浏览器中实时显示，支持 Ctrl+L 清屏。
-- **文件管理**：在 **文件管理** 标签页中可列出目录、读取/编辑文件、删除文件、新建文件/目录、上传文件（大文件分片上传）、重命名路径以及下载勾选文件，并支持面包屑导航与名称过滤。
-- **AI 助手**：在 **AI 助手** 标签页中与智能体对话，由系统自动结合当前 WebShell 连接执行工具与命令，侧边栏展示该连接下的所有历史会话，支持多轮追踪与查看。
-- **连通性测试**：使用 **测试连通性** 可在执行命令前通过一次 `echo 1` 调用校验 Shell 地址、密码与命令参数是否正确。
-- **持久化**：所有 WebShell 连接与相关 AI 会话均保存在 SQLite（与对话共用数据库），服务重启后仍可继续使用。
-
-### 内置 C2（Command & Control）
-- **定位**：平台内置的 **AI 原生** C2 能力栈——监听器接入植入体（Beacon），服务端以 SQLite 持久化 **会话** 与 **任务**，通过 **事件总线** 推送变更（含 **SSE**），并由鉴权后的 **REST** 与 MCP 统一对外。
-- **监听器与传输**：支持 `tcp_reverse`、`http_beacon`、`https_beacon`、`websocket`；按监听器独立密钥；数据库中标记为运行中的监听器可在 **服务重启后尝试恢复**。
-- **与智能体联动**：通过 **`c2_task` 等 C2 MCP 工具** 与现有对话/多代理工具链协同；在会话策略需要时，危险任务类型可走既有 **人机协同（HITL）** 审批流。
-- **安全提示**：**仅**在实验环境或 **已获完整书面授权** 的对抗演练中使用；结合网络隔离、强鉴权及 HITL/白名单等策略管控风险。
-
-### MCP 全场景
-- **Web 模式**：自带 HTTP MCP 服务供前端调用。
-- **MCP stdio 模式**：`go run cmd/mcp-stdio/main.go` 可接入 Cursor/命令行。
-- **外部 MCP 联邦**：在设置中注册第三方 MCP（HTTP/stdio/SSE），按需启停并实时查看调用统计与健康度。
-- **可选 MCP 服务**：项目中的 [`mcp-servers/`](mcp-servers/README_CN.md) 目录提供独立 MCP（如反向 Shell），采用标准 MCP stdio，可在 CyberStrikeAI（设置 → 外部 MCP）、Cursor、VS Code 等任意支持 MCP 的客户端中使用。
-
-#### MCP stdio 快速集成
-1. **编译可执行文件**（在项目根目录执行）：
-   ```bash
-   go build -o cyberstrike-ai-mcp cmd/mcp-stdio/main.go
-   ```
-2. **在 Cursor 中配置**  
-   打开 `Settings → Tools & MCP → Add Custom MCP`，选择 **Command**，指定编译后的程序与配置文件：
-   ```json
-   {
-     "mcpServers": {
-       "cyberstrike-ai": {
-         "command": "/absolute/path/to/cyberstrike-ai-mcp",
-         "args": [
-           "--config",
-           "/absolute/path/to/config.yaml"
-         ]
-       }
-     }
-   }
-   ```
-   将路径替换成你本地的实际地址，Cursor 会自动启动 stdio 版本的 MCP。
-
-#### MCP HTTP 快速集成（Cursor / Claude Code）
-HTTP MCP 服务在独立端口（默认 `8081`）运行，支持 **Header 鉴权**：仅携带正确 header 的客户端可调用工具。
-
-1. **在配置中启用 MCP** – 在 `config.yaml` 中设置 `mcp.enabled: true`，并按需设置 `mcp.host` / `mcp.port`。若需鉴权（端口对外暴露时建议开启），可设置：
-   - `mcp.auth_header`：鉴权用的 header 名（如 `X-MCP-Token`）；
-   - `mcp.auth_header_value`：鉴权密钥。**留空**时，首次启动会自动生成随机密钥并写回配置文件。
-2. **启动服务** – 执行 `./run.sh` 或 `go run cmd/server/main.go`。MCP 端点为 `http://<host>:<port>/mcp`（例如 `http://localhost:8081/mcp`）。
-3. **从终端复制 JSON** – 启用 MCP 后，启动时会在终端打印一段 **可直接复制的 JSON**。若 `auth_header_value` 留空，会自动生成并写入配置，打印内容中会包含 URL 与 headers。
-4. **在 Cursor 或 Claude Code 中使用**：
-   - **Cursor**：将整段 JSON 粘贴到 `~/.cursor/mcp.json` 或项目下的 `.cursor/mcp.json` 的 `mcpServers` 中（或合并进现有 `mcpServers`）。
-   - **Claude Code**：粘贴到 `.mcp.json` 或 `~/.claude.json` 的 `mcpServers` 中。
-
-终端打印示例（开启鉴权时）：
-```json
-{
-  "mcpServers": {
-    "cyberstrike-ai": {
-      "url": "http://localhost:8081/mcp",
-      "headers": {
-        "X-MCP-Token": "<自动生成或你配置的值>"
-      },
-      "type": "http"
-    }
-  }
-}
-```
-若不配置 `auth_header` / `auth_header_value`，则端点不鉴权（仅适合本机或可信网络）。
-
-#### 外部 MCP 联邦（HTTP/stdio/SSE）
-CyberStrikeAI 支持通过三种传输模式连接外部 MCP 服务器：
-- **HTTP 模式** – 通过 HTTP POST 进行传统的请求/响应通信
-- **stdio 模式** – 通过标准输入/输出进行进程间通信
-- **SSE 模式** – 通过 Server-Sent Events 实现实时流式通信
-
-添加外部 MCP 服务器：
-1. 打开 Web 界面，进入 **设置 → 外部MCP**。
-2. 点击 **添加外部MCP**，以 JSON 格式提供配置：
-
-   **HTTP 模式示例：**
-   ```json
-   {
-     "my-http-mcp": {
-       "transport": "http",
-       "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8081/mcp",
-       "description": "HTTP MCP 服务器",
-       "timeout": 30
-     }
-   }
-   ```
-
-   **stdio 模式示例：**
-   ```json
-   {
-     "my-stdio-mcp": {
-       "command": "python3",
-       "args": ["/path/to/mcp-server.py"],
-       "description": "stdio MCP 服务器",
-       "timeout": 30
-     }
-   }
-   ```
-
-   **SSE 模式示例：**
-   ```json
-   {
-     "my-sse-mcp": {
-       "transport": "sse",
-       "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8082/sse",
-       "description": "SSE MCP 服务器",
-       "timeout": 30
-     }
-   }
-   ```
-
-3. 点击 **保存**，然后点击 **启动** 连接服务器。
-4. 实时监控连接状态、工具数量和健康度。
-
-**SSE 模式优势：**
-- 通过 Server-Sent Events 实现实时双向通信
-- 适用于需要持续数据流的场景
-- 对于基于推送的通知，延迟更低
-
-可在 `cmd/test-sse-mcp-server/` 目录找到用于验证的测试 SSE MCP 服务器。
 
 
-### 知识库功能
+## 配置
-- **向量检索**：AI 智能体在对话过程中可自动调用 `search_knowledge_base` 工具搜索知识库中的安全知识。
-- **RAG 管线（始终启用）**：**MultiQuery**（LLM 查询改写）→ 向量预取与融合 → **HTTP 精排**（DashScope `gte-rerank` 或 Cohere 兼容 `/v1/rerank`）→ 后处理（规范化去重、字符/token 预算、最终 top_k）。精排失败时自动降级为融合排序，检索仍可用。
-- **向量相似度**：基于嵌入余弦相似度与相似度阈值过滤（与 Eino `retriever.Retriever` 语义一致）。
-- **自动索引**：扫描 `knowledge_base/` 目录下的 Markdown 文件，自动构建向量嵌入索引（Eino Markdown 标题切分 + 递归分块）。
-- **Web 管理**：通过 Web 界面创建、更新、删除知识项，支持分类管理；设置页可配置 MultiQuery / 精排 / 预取候选数。
-- **检索日志**：记录所有知识检索操作，便于审计与调试。
 
-**知识库配置步骤：**
+请以 [`config.example.yaml`](config.example.yaml) 作为权威配置模板，只复制当前环境需要的配置。最少需要配置服务监听地址和一个 OpenAI 兼容模型：
-1. **启用功能**：在 `config.yaml` 中设置 `knowledge.enabled: true`：
-   ```yaml
-   knowledge:
-     enabled: true
-     base_path: knowledge_base
-     embedding:
-       provider: openai
-       model: text-embedding-v4
-       base_url: "https://api.openai.com/v1"  # 或你的嵌入模型 API
-       api_key: "sk-xxx"
-     retrieval:
-       top_k: 5
-       similarity_threshold: 0.7
-       multi_query:
-         max_queries: 4        # LLM 改写变体上限（始终启用）
-       rerank:                 # 精排始终启用；留空则继承 openai/embedding 凭据
-         provider: ""          # 空=按 base_url 推断 dashscope | cohere
-         model: ""             # 空=DashScope→gte-rerank，Cohere→rerank-multilingual-v3.0
-         base_url: ""
-         api_key: ""
-       post_retrieve:
-         prefetch_top_k: 20    # 每条 MultiQuery 变体的向量候选数；0=max(top_k×4, 20)
-         max_context_chars: 0
-         max_context_tokens: 0
-   ```
-2. **添加知识文件**：将 Markdown 文件放入 `knowledge_base/` 目录，按分类组织（如 `knowledge_base/SQL注入/README.md`）。
-3. **扫描索引**：在 Web 界面中点击"扫描知识库"，系统会自动导入文件并构建向量索引。
-4. **对话中使用**：AI 智能体在需要安全知识时会自动调用知识检索工具。你也可以显式要求："搜索知识库中关于 SQL 注入的技术"。
-
-**知识库结构说明：**
-- 文件按分类组织（目录名作为分类）。
-- 每个 Markdown 文件自动切块并生成向量嵌入。
-- 支持增量更新，修改后的文件会自动重新索引。
-
-
-### 自动化与安全
-- **REST API**：认证、会话、任务、监控、漏洞管理、角色管理等接口全部开放，可与 CI/CD 集成。
-- **多代理 API**：`POST /api/multi-agent/stream`（SSE，需启用多代理）、`POST /api/multi-agent`（非流式）；Markdown 子代理/主代理管理见 `/api/multi-agent/markdown-agents`（列表/读写/增删）。
-- **角色管理 API**：通过 `/api/roles` 端点管理安全测试角色：`GET /api/roles`（列表）、`GET /api/roles/:name`（获取角色）、`POST /api/roles`（创建角色）、`PUT /api/roles/:name`（更新角色）、`DELETE /api/roles/:name`（删除角色）。角色以 YAML 文件形式存储在 `roles/` 目录，支持热加载。
-- **漏洞管理 API**：通过 `/api/vulnerabilities` 端点管理漏洞：`GET /api/vulnerabilities`（列表，支持过滤）、`POST /api/vulnerabilities`（创建）、`GET /api/vulnerabilities/:id`（获取）、`PUT /api/vulnerabilities/:id`（更新）、`DELETE /api/vulnerabilities/:id`（删除）、`GET /api/vulnerabilities/stats`（统计）。
-- **批量任务 API**：通过 `/api/batch-tasks` 端点管理批量任务队列：`POST /api/batch-tasks`（创建队列）、`GET /api/batch-tasks`（列表）、`GET /api/batch-tasks/:queueId`（获取队列）、`POST /api/batch-tasks/:queueId/start`（开始执行）、`POST /api/batch-tasks/:queueId/cancel`（取消）、`DELETE /api/batch-tasks/:queueId`（删除队列）、`POST /api/batch-tasks/:queueId/tasks`（添加任务）、`PUT /api/batch-tasks/:queueId/tasks/:taskId`（更新任务）、`DELETE /api/batch-tasks/:queueId/tasks/:taskId`（删除任务）。任务依次顺序执行，每个任务创建独立对话，支持完整状态跟踪。
-- **WebShell API**：通过 `/api/webshell/connections`（GET 列表、POST 创建、PUT 更新、DELETE 删除）及 `/api/webshell/exec`（执行命令）、`/api/webshell/fileop`（列出/读取/写入/删除文件）管理 WebShell 连接与执行操作。
-- **C2 API**：在 `/api/c2/*` 管理监听器、会话、任务、Payload、文件与事件（如监听器增删改查/启停、会话休眠、任务创建/取消/等待、Payload 构建/下载、事件流等）。
-- **任务控制**：支持暂停/终止长任务、修改参数后重跑、流式获取日志。
-- **安全管理**：`/api/auth/change-password` 可即时轮换口令；建议在暴露 MCP 端口时配合网络层 ACL。
-
-## 配置参考
 
 ```yaml
-auth:
-  password: "change-me"
-  session_duration_hours: 12
 server:
-  host: "0.0.0.0"
+  host: "127.0.0.1"
   port: 8080
-log:
-  level: "info"
-  output: "stdout"
-mcp:
-  enabled: true
-  host: "0.0.0.0"
-  port: 8081
-  auth_header: "X-MCP-Token"       # 可选；留空则不鉴权
-  auth_header_value: ""            # 可选；留空则首次启动自动生成并写回
 openai:
-  api_key: "sk-xxx"
+  api_key: "${OPENAI_API_KEY}"
-  base_url: "https://api.deepseek.com/v1"
+  base_url: "https://api.openai.com/v1"
-  model: "deepseek-chat"
+  model: "your-model"
-database:
-  path: "data/conversations.db"
-  knowledge_db_path: "data/knowledge.db"  # 可选：知识库独立数据库
-security:
-  tools_dir: "tools"
-knowledge:
-  enabled: false  # 是否启用知识库功能
-  base_path: "knowledge_base"  # 知识库目录路径
-  embedding:
-    provider: "openai"  # 嵌入模型提供商（目前仅支持 openai）
-    model: "text-embedding-v4"  # 嵌入模型名称
-    base_url: ""  # 留空则使用 OpenAI 配置的 base_url
-    api_key: ""  # 留空则使用 OpenAI 配置的 api_key
-  retrieval:
-    top_k: 5  # 检索返回的 Top-K 结果数量
-    similarity_threshold: 0.7  # 余弦相似度阈值（0-1），低于此值的结果将被过滤
-    multi_query:
-      max_queries: 4  # MultiQuery 改写变体上限（始终启用）
-    rerank:  # HTTP 精排（始终启用）；留空则继承 openai/embedding 凭据
-      provider: ""
-      model: ""
-      base_url: ""
-      api_key: ""
-    post_retrieve:
-      prefetch_top_k: 20  # 每条 MultiQuery 变体；0=max(top_k×4, 20)
-      max_context_chars: 0
-      max_context_tokens: 0
-roles_dir: "roles"  # 角色配置文件目录（相对于配置文件所在目录）
-skills_dir: "skills"  # Skills 目录（相对于配置文件所在目录）
-agents_dir: "agents"  # 多代理 Markdown（主代理 orchestrator.md + 子代理 *.md）
-multi_agent:
-  enabled: false
-  default_mode: "eino_single"   # eino_single | multi（开启多代理时的界面默认模式）
-  robot_default_agent_mode: eino_single
-  batch_use_multi_agent: false
-  orchestrator_instruction: ""  # Deep；orchestrator.md 正文为空时使用
-  # orchestrator_instruction_plan_execute / orchestrator_instruction_supervisor 可选
-  # eino_skills: { disable: false, filesystem_tools: true, skill_tool_name: skill }
-  # eino_middleware: plantask_enable、checkpoint_dir、deep_model_retry_max_retries、deep_output_key 等
-project:
-  enabled: true              # 启用项目黑板与事实 MCP 工具
-  fact_index_max_runes: 65000
-  fact_summary_max_runes: 24000
-  default_inject_deprecated: false
 ```
 
-### 工具模版示例（`tools/nmap.yaml`）
+不要提交真实凭证。将服务暴露到 localhost 之外前，请阅读[配置参考](docs/zh-CN/configuration.md)、[推荐配置画像](docs/zh-CN/configuration-profiles.md)和[安全加固指南](docs/zh-CN/security-hardening.md)。
-
-```yaml
-name: "nmap"
-command: "nmap"
-args: ["-sT", "-sV", "-sC"]
-enabled: true
-short_description: "网络资产扫描与服务指纹识别"
-parameters:
-  - name: "target"
-    type: "string"
-    description: "IP 或域名"
-    required: true
-    position: 0
-  - name: "ports"
-    type: "string"
-    flag: "-p"
-    description: "端口范围，如 1-1000"
-```
-
-### 角色配置示例（`roles/渗透测试.yaml`）
-
-```yaml
-name: 渗透测试
-description: 专业渗透测试专家，全面深入的漏洞检测
-user_prompt: 你是一个专业的网络安全渗透测试专家。请使用专业的渗透测试方法和工具，对目标进行全面的安全测试，包括但不限于SQL注入、XSS、CSRF、文件包含、命令执行等常见漏洞。
-icon: "\U0001F3AF"
-tools:
-  - nmap
-  - sqlmap
-  - nuclei
-  - burpsuite
-  - metasploit
-  - httpx
-  - record_vulnerability
-  - list_knowledge_risk_types
-  - search_knowledge_base
-enabled: true
-```
 
 ## 相关文档
 
-- [文档导航](docs/README.md)：部署、配置、安全模型、API、知识库、C2、WebShell、MCP、开发、测试、排错等完整专题入口。
+- **新用户：** [部署指南](docs/zh-CN/deployment.md) → [配置参考](docs/zh-CN/configuration.md) → [排错指南](docs/zh-CN/troubleshooting.md)
-- [部署指南](docs/zh-CN/deployment.md)：源码/二进制运行、HTTPS、反向代理、systemd、备份、升级与回滚。
+- **运维人员：** [配置画像](docs/zh-CN/configuration-profiles.md) → [安全加固](docs/zh-CN/security-hardening.md) → [运维 Runbooks](docs/zh-CN/runbooks.md)
-- [运维 Runbooks](docs/zh-CN/runbooks.md)：生产部署、外部 MCP、知识库、授权 Web 测试、C2 清理等可执行流程。
+- **集成开发：** [API 参考](docs/zh-CN/api-reference.md) → [API Recipes](docs/zh-CN/api-recipes.md) → [MCP 联邦](docs/zh-CN/mcp-federation.md)
-- [安全加固指南](docs/zh-CN/security-hardening.md)：上线前基线、HITL 白名单、反向代理、文件权限和周期巡检。
+- **项目贡献：** [开发者指南](docs/zh-CN/developer-guide.md) → [测试指南](docs/zh-CN/testing.md) → [贡献规范](docs/zh-CN/contributing-guide.md)
-- [API Recipes](docs/zh-CN/api-recipes.md)：登录、Agent、流式、多代理、上传、漏洞、知识库和审计导出调用示例。
+- **全部专题：** [中文文档](docs/zh-CN/README.md) · [双语文档索引](docs/README.md)
-- [配置参考](docs/zh-CN/configuration.md)：`config.yaml` 各配置段、推荐值和修改建议。
-- [安全模型](docs/zh-CN/security-model.md)：认证、工具执行、HITL、审计、C2/WebShell 和数据安全边界。
-- [API 参考](docs/zh-CN/api-reference.md)：OpenAPI、认证、Agent、项目、知识库、C2、WebShell 等接口入口。
-- [多代理模式（Eino）](docs/zh-CN/MULTI_AGENT_EINO.md)：**Deep**、**Plan-Execute**、**Supervisor**、`agents/*.md`、`eino_skills` / `eino_middleware`、接口与流式说明。
-- [图编排使用说明](docs/zh-CN/workflow-graph.md)：可视化流程搭建、节点配置、`previous` / `outputs` 变量传参与角色绑定。
-- [机器人使用说明](docs/zh-CN/robot.md)：个人微信、企业微信、钉钉、飞书、Telegram、Slack、Discord、QQ 机器人的配置、命令与排查。
-- [人机协同最佳实践](docs/zh-CN/hitl-best-practices.md)：审批方模式、白名单、审计 Agent 提示词策略与独立小模型配置。
 
 ## 项目结构
 
@@ -661,6 +314,7 @@ CyberStrikeAI/
 ├── agents/              # 多代理 Markdown（orchestrator.md + 子代理 *.md）
 ├── docs/                # 专题文档（部署、配置、安全、API、知识库、C2、WebShell 等）
 ├── images/              # 文档配图
+├── scripts/             # 仓库维护检查，包括文档校验
 ├── config.yaml          # 运行配置
 ├── run.sh               # 启动脚本
 └── README*.md
@@ -700,6 +354,26 @@ CyberStrikeAI 现已加入 [404星链计划](https://github.com/knownsec/404Star
 
 ---
 
+## 社区与支持
+
+- 在 [Discord](https://discord.gg/8PjVCMu8Zw) 加入社区。
+
+<details>
+<summary><strong>微信群</strong></summary>
+
+<img src="./images/wechat-group-cyberstrikeai-qr.jpg" alt="CyberStrikeAI 微信群二维码" width="280">
+
+</details>
+
+<details>
+<summary><strong>通过微信支付或支付宝赞助</strong></summary>
+
+<div align="center">
+  <img src="./images/sponsor-wechat-alipay-qr.jpg" alt="微信与支付宝赞助二维码" width="480">
+</div>
+
+</details>
+
 ## 许可证
 
 CyberStrikeAI 采用 **Apache License 2.0** 开源许可。  

cmd/mcp-stdio/main.go

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ func main() {
 
 	// 注册工具
 	executor.RegisterTools(mcpServer)
+	mcp.RegisterExecutionControlTools(mcpServer, nil)
 
 	log.Logger.Info("MCP服务器（stdio模式）已启动，等待消息...")
 

cmd/server/main.go

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/app"
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/config"
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/logger"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/termout"
 	"flag"
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
@@ -16,10 +17,15 @@ import (
 func main() {
 	var configPath = flag.String("config", "config.yaml", "配置文件路径")
 	var httpsBootstrap = flag.Bool("https", false, "启用主站 HTTPS：未配置 tls_cert_path/tls_key_path 时使用内存自签证书（本地测试）；与 run.sh 默认行为一致")
+	var httpBootstrap = flag.Bool("http", false, "强制主站使用明文 HTTP：覆盖配置文件中的 tls_enabled/tls_auto_self_sign/tls_cert_path/tls_key_path")
 	flag.Parse()
 
 	// 环境变量兼容（便于 systemd/docker 等不传参场景）
-	if !*httpsBootstrap {
+	if *httpsBootstrap && *httpBootstrap {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "--http 与 --https 不能同时使用")
+		os.Exit(2)
+	}
+	if !*httpsBootstrap && !*httpBootstrap {
 		v := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("CYBERSTRIKE_HTTPS"))
 		if v == "1" || strings.EqualFold(v, "true") || strings.EqualFold(v, "yes") {
 			*httpsBootstrap = true
@@ -35,13 +41,24 @@ func main() {
 		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "无效的 -config 路径 %q。\n若同时需要 HTTPS，请写成: ./cyberstrike-ai --https -config config.yaml（-config 后必须是 yaml 文件路径）。\n", cp)
 		os.Exit(2)
 	}
-	cfg, err := config.Load(cp)
+	localConfig, err := config.EnsureLocalConfig(cp)
 	if err != nil {
 		fmt.Printf("加载配置失败: %v\n", err)
 		return
 	}
 
-	if *httpsBootstrap {
+	cfg, err := config.Load(cp)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Printf("加载配置失败: %v\n", err)
+		return
+	}
+	if localConfig.Created {
+		termout.PrintConfigCreated()
+	}
+
+	if *httpBootstrap {
+		config.ApplyPlainHTTPBootstrap(cfg)
+	} else if *httpsBootstrap {
 		config.ApplyDevHTTPSBootstrap(cfg)
 	}
 
@@ -53,15 +70,12 @@ func main() {
 	if config.MainWebUIUsesHTTPS(&cfg.Server) {
 		scheme = "https"
 	}
-	fmt.Println()
+	termout.PrintStartupWebUI(termout.StartupWebUIOptions{
-	fmt.Printf("→ Web 界面: %s://127.0.0.1:%d/\n", scheme, port)
+		Scheme:       scheme,
-	if scheme == "https" && cfg.Server.TLSAutoSelfSign {
+		Port:         port,
-		fmt.Println("  （内存自签证书：浏览器首次需确认「继续访问」）")
+		SelfSigned:   scheme == "https" && cfg.Server.TLSAutoSelfSign,
-	}
+		HTTPRedirect: scheme == "https" && config.ServerHTTPRedirectEnabled(&cfg.Server),
-	if scheme == "https" && config.ServerHTTPRedirectEnabled(&cfg.Server) {
+	})
-		fmt.Printf("  （http://127.0.0.1:%d/ 将自动跳转到 HTTPS）\n", port)
-	}
-	fmt.Println()
 
 	// MCP 启用且 auth_header_value 为空时，自动生成随机密钥并写回配置
 	if err := config.EnsureMCPAuth(cp, cfg); err != nil {

config.example.yaml

@@ -10,11 +10,14 @@
 # ============================================
 
 # 前端显示的版本号（可选，不填则显示默认版本）
-version: "v1.6.51"
+version: "v1.7.7"
 # 服务器配置
 server:
   host: 0.0.0.0 # 监听地址，0.0.0.0 表示监听所有网络接口
   port: 8080 # 服务端口；未启用 TLS 时为 http://localhost:8080
+  # 其他可信 Web 集成的精确 Origin。Chromium 浏览器插件会自动识别，无需配置；不要使用通配符。
+  # cors_allowed_origins:
+  #   - https://trusted-integration.example
   # --- 可选：HTTPS + HTTP/2（缓解浏览器对同源 HTTP/1.1 的并发连接数限制，多路 Deep 流式更稳）---
   # 启用 TLS 的条件（满足其一即可）：tls_enabled: true，或 tls_auto_self_sign: true，或同时配置了 tls_cert_path + tls_key_path。
   # 启用后请用 https://127.0.0.1:<本端口>/ 访问；若仍用 http:// 访问同端口，将自动 308 跳转到 HTTPS（可用 tls_http_redirect: false 关闭）。
@@ -28,7 +31,6 @@ server:
   tls_auto_self_sign: true
 # 认证配置
 auth:
-  password:  # Web 登录密码，请修改为强密码
   session_duration_hours: 12 # 登录有效期（小时），超时后需重新登录
 # 日志配置
 log:
@@ -61,9 +63,10 @@ openai:
   api_key: sk-xxxxxxx # API 密钥（必填）
   model: qwen3-max # 模型名称（必填）
   max_total_tokens: 120000 # LLM 相关上下文的最大 Token 数限制（内存压缩和攻击链构建会共用此配置）
+  max_completion_tokens: 16384 # 单次生成上限（含 reasoning 与可见输出），防止依赖网关隐式默认值
   # Eino 路径模型推理：DeepSeek/OpenAI 为 thinking / reasoning_effort；Claude 4.6+ 为 adaptive + output_config.effort（仅显式配置 effort 时下发）；3.7 为 enabled+budget_tokens:10000（文档示例），effort 不映射，自定义预算用 extra_request_fields
   reasoning:
-    mode: on # auto | on | off；off 时不附加任何推理扩展字段
+    mode: on # auto | on | off；off：OpenAI/Claude 不附加推理字段，DeepSeek 发送 thinking.type=disabled（其默认开启思考）
     effort: high # low | medium | high | max | xhigh（最高档：OpenAI 常用 xhigh，部分网关用 max，原样下发）；空表示不指定
     allow_client_reasoning: true # false 时忽略对话请求体 reasoning，仅以下方为准
     profile: openai_compat # auto | deepseek_compat | openai_compat | output_config_effort
@@ -83,19 +86,32 @@ vision:
   detail: auto # low | high | auto（Eino ImageURLDetail）
   timeout_seconds: 60
 # ============================================
-# 信息收集（FOFA）配置（可选）
+# 资产管理（网络空间测绘搜索）配置（可选）
 # ============================================
-# 用于「信息收集」页面调用 FOFA API（后端代理，避免前端暴露 key）
+# 用于「资产管理 → 信息收集」页面调用 FOFA / ZoomEye / Quake / Shodan API
-# 也可通过环境变量配置：FOFA_EMAIL / FOFA_API_KEY（优先级更高）
+# 后端代理请求，避免前端暴露 key；环境变量优先级更高
 fofa:
   base_url: https://fofa.info/api/v1/search/all # 可选，留空则使用默认
-  email: "" # FOFA 账号邮箱（可选，建议在系统设置中填写）
   api_key: "" # FOFA API Key（可选，建议在系统设置中填写）
+zoomeye:
+  base_url: https://api.zoomeye.org/v2/search # 可选，留空则使用默认
+  api_key: "" # ZoomEye API Key；也可通过 ZOOMEYE_API_KEY 环境变量配置
+quake:
+  base_url: https://quake.360.cn/api/v3/search/quake_service # 可选，留空则使用默认
+  api_key: "" # Quake API Token；也可通过 QUAKE_API_KEY 环境变量配置
+shodan:
+  base_url: https://api.shodan.io # 可选，留空则使用默认
+  api_key: "" # Shodan API Key；也可通过 SHODAN_API_KEY 环境变量配置
 # Agent 配置
 # 达到最大迭代次数时，AI 会自动总结测试结果
 agent:
   max_iterations: 12000 # 全局最大迭代次数（单代理 / Deep / Supervisor / Plan-Execute 主执行器 / 子代理均沿用；agents/*.md 中 max_iterations>0 可单独覆盖）
   tool_timeout_minutes: 60 # 单次工具执行最大时长（分钟），超时自动终止；0 表示不限制（不推荐，易出现长时间挂起）
+  tool_wait_timeout_seconds: 300 # 工具本轮最多等待（秒）；到时返回 execution_id，worker 继续后台执行，可用 wait_tool_execution 继续等待；0=等到完成
+  external_mcp_max_concurrent_per_server: 5 # 单个外部 MCP server 同时运行的工具数；0=默认2；负数=不限制
+  external_mcp_max_concurrent_total: 16 # 所有外部 MCP 工具全局并发上限；0=默认16；负数=不限制
+  external_mcp_circuit_failure_threshold: 5 # 单个外部 MCP server 连续失败多少次后熔断；0=默认3；负数=关闭熔断
+  external_mcp_circuit_cooldown_seconds: 60 # 熔断冷却秒数；0=默认60
   shell_no_output_timeout_seconds: 1200 # execute/exec 连续无新输出则终止（秒）；通用防挂死；0=默认300；-1=关闭
   workspace_root_dir: "" # 会话工作目录根路径（curl/wget 下载、read_file/glob/grep 本地分析）；空=tmp/workspace，其下按 projects/{id} 或 conversations/{id} 隔离；勿用系统 /tmp
   # system_prompt_path: prompts/single-agent.md # 可选：单代理系统提示文件（相对本配置文件所在目录）；非空且可读时替换内置提示
@@ -196,27 +212,36 @@ multi_agent:
   # Eino ADK 中间件与 Deep/Supervisor/plan_execute Executor 调参（结构体见 internal/config/config.go → MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig）
   # plan_execute：下列 patch/reduction/tool_search/plantask 等同样作用于 Executor（经 ExecPreMiddlewares）；Planner/Replanner 不挂 MCP 前置中间件。
   eino_middleware:
+    max_tool_arguments_bytes: 65536 # 单个工具 arguments 硬上限；超出时禁止执行并要求模型改写
+    max_shell_command_bytes: 65536 # exec/execute.command 硬上限；与普通工具 arguments 上限一致
+    model_output_repair_max_attempts: 1 # 非法/截断模型输出最多自动修复一次，避免循环
     patch_tool_calls: true # true：修补历史中无 tool_result 的悬空 tool_call（流式中断/重试后更稳）；false：关闭；字段省略时默认等同 true
     tool_search_enable: true # true：工具数 ≥ min 时启用 tool_search，仅前 N 个工具常驻，其余按正则按需解锁，省 token、减误选；false：全量工具进上下文
     tool_search_min_tools: 20 # 达到该数量才启用 tool_search（避免工具很少时多此一举）；与 always_visible 配合使用
     tool_search_always_visible: 12 # 始终直接暴露给模型的工具个数（顺序与角色工具列表一致）；其余工具进入动态池，需 tool_search 解锁
-    tool_search_always_visible_tools: [read_file, glob, grep, analyze_image, write_file, edit_file, execute, task, transfer_to_agent, exit, write_todos, skill, tool_search, TaskCreate, TaskGet, TaskUpdate, TaskList, record_vulnerability, list_vulnerabilities, get_vulnerability, list_knowledge_risk_types, search_knowledge_base, webshell_exec, webshell_file_list, webshell_file_read, webshell_file_write, manage_webshell_list, manage_webshell_add, manage_webshell_update, manage_webshell_delete, manage_webshell_test, batch_task_list, batch_task_get, batch_task_start, batch_task_rerun, batch_task_pause, batch_task_update_metadata, batch_task_update_schedule, batch_task_schedule_enabled, batch_task_update_task, batch_task_remove_task, batch_task_delete, batch_task_create, batch_task_add_task, http-framework-test, exec] # 后端内置常驻工具白名单（优先于 always_visible 数量策略）
+    tool_search_always_visible_tools: [read_file, glob, grep, analyze_image, write_file, edit_file, execute, task, transfer_to_agent, exit, write_todos, skill, tool_search, TaskCreate, TaskGet, TaskUpdate, TaskList, record_vulnerability, list_vulnerabilities, get_vulnerability, get_tool_execution, wait_tool_execution, cancel_tool_execution, list_knowledge_risk_types, search_knowledge_base, webshell_exec, webshell_file_list, webshell_file_read, webshell_file_write, manage_webshell_list, manage_webshell_add, manage_webshell_update, manage_webshell_delete, manage_webshell_test, batch_task_list, batch_task_get, batch_task_start, batch_task_rerun, batch_task_pause, batch_task_update_metadata, batch_task_update_schedule, batch_task_schedule_enabled, batch_task_update_task, batch_task_remove_task, batch_task_delete, batch_task_create, batch_task_add_task, http-framework-test, exec] # 后端内置常驻工具白名单（优先于 always_visible 数量策略）
     plantask_enable: true # P0：主代理挂载 TaskCreate/Get/Update/List 结构化任务板；需 eino_skills 可用且 skills_dir 存在
     plantask_rel_dir: .eino/plantask # 任务文件相对 skills_dir，按会话分子目录：skills/.eino/plantask/<conversationId>/
-    reduction_enable: true # true：大工具输出截断/落盘以控上下文；依赖与 plantask 相同的 eino local 写盘后端，无后端时不挂载
+    reduction_enable: true # true：大工具输出截断并落盘到本地文件（tmp/reduction/.../trunc/<id>），上下文只留 <persisted-output> 预览；不依赖 eino_skills
-    reduction_max_length_for_trunc: 50000 # 单条工具结果超过该字符数（bytes）时截断并落盘（由 reduction 中间件处理）
+    reduction_max_length_for_trunc: 100000 # 单条工具结果超过该字节数时：全文写入本地 trunc 文件，返回带路径的截断预览（MCP/exec 与 reduction 共用此阈值）
-    reduction_max_tokens_for_clear: 160000 # 历史工具结果清理阈值（tokens），超阈值时在模型调用前清理旧结果
+    reduction_max_tokens_for_clear: 60000 # 历史工具结果清理阈值（tokens），应低于 max_total_tokens * summarization_trigger_ratio
-    reduction_root_dir: "" # 非空：截断/清理内容落盘根路径；空：使用系统临时目录下按会话隔离的默认路径
+    reduction_root_dir: "" # 非空：截断/清理内容落盘根路径；空：项目目录下 tmp/reduction（按会话/项目隔离）
     reduction_clear_exclude: [] # 不参与「清理阶段」的工具名额外列表（会与 task/transfer/exit 等内置排除项合并）；需要时用 YAML 列表填写
     reduction_sub_agents: true # true：子代理也挂 reduction；false：仅编排主代理使用 reduction
     summarization_trigger_ratio: 0.8 # summarization 触发比例（max_total_tokens * ratio），建议 0.75~0.85
+    summarization_output_reserve_tokens: 8192 # 摘要模型输出预留 token；摘要输入预算 = 触发阈值 - 该值
     summarization_emit_internal_events: true # true：发出 summarization 内部事件（便于诊断）
+    summarization_user_intent_ledger_max_runes: 96000 # 压缩后注入模型上下文的「原始用户输入与约束账本」总字符上限；DB 原始消息不裁剪
+    summarization_user_intent_ledger_entry_max_runes: 16000 # 账本中单条用户消息的字符上限；超出仅裁剪模型可见账本，不影响 DB 原文
+    latest_user_message_max_runes: 48000 # 本轮最新 user 进入模型上下文的字符上限；超出时全文落盘，仅注入 head/tail 预览
+    latest_user_message_head_runes: 24000 # 超长本轮 user 的头部预览字符数
+    latest_user_message_tail_runes: 24000 # 超长本轮 user 的尾部预览字符数
     plan_execute_user_input_budget_ratio: 0.35 # plan_execute 中 userInput 预算比例（planner/replanner/executor 共用）
     plan_execute_executed_steps_budget_ratio: 0.2 # plan_execute 中 executed_steps 预算比例
     plan_execute_max_step_result_runes: 4000 # plan_execute 每步结果最大字符数（超出截断）
     plan_execute_keep_last_steps: 8 # plan_execute 仅保留最近 N 步正文，早期步骤折叠为标题
     checkpoint_dir: data/eino-checkpoints # P0：进程崩溃/OOM 后同会话自动 ADK Resume；正常结束会删 .ckpt；与「中断并继续」(last_react_*) 是两套机制
-    run_retry_max_attempts: 0 # 429/5xx/网络抖动时可退避重试次数（run loop + summarization 共用 isEinoTransientRunError）；0=默认 10
+    run_retry_max_attempts: 0 # 408/409/425/429/5xx/网络抖动时可退避重试次数；0=默认 4（永久性 4xx 不重试）
     run_retry_max_backoff_sec: 0 # 单次退避上限秒数；0=默认 30
     empty_response_continue_max_attempts: 0 # Run 成功但未捕获助手正文（含流式中断）时 Handler 退避续跑次数；0=默认 5
     deep_output_key: final_answer # P0：Eino session 写入最终助手结论（框架内部；Deep/Supervisor 主/eino_single）
@@ -267,10 +292,11 @@ security:
 # MCP (Model Context Protocol) 用于工具注册和调用
 mcp:
   enabled: false # 是否启用 MCP 服务器（http模式）
-  host: 0.0.0.0 # MCP 服务器监听地址
+  host: 127.0.0.1 # MCP 服务器监听地址；需要远程访问时再显式修改并配置网络层访问控制
   port: 8081 # MCP 服务器端口
-  auth_header: "X-MCP-Token" # 鉴权：请求需携带该 header 且值与 auth_header_value 一致方可调用。留空表示不鉴权
+  auth_header: "X-MCP-Token" # 可选的全局服务凭证 Header；普通调用请使用用户 Authorization: Bearer Token
-  auth_header_value: "" # 鉴权密钥值（与 auth_header 配合使用，建议使用随机字符串）
+  auth_header_value: "" # 全局服务凭证值，仅 allow_global_access=true 时生效
+  allow_global_access: false # 高风险兼容模式：静态密钥映射为全局服务身份；默认请使用用户 Bearer Token
 # 外部 MCP 配置
 external_mcp:
   servers: {}
@@ -339,6 +365,11 @@ knowledge:
 robots:
   wechat: # 微信 iLink（个人微信 ClawBot，扫码绑定）
     enabled: false
+    # 鉴权默认 user_binding；专用机器人可改 service_account，并必须限制真实发送者
+    auth:
+      mode: user_binding # user_binding | service_account
+      # service_user_id: "admin 或专用服务账号的 RBAC user ID"
+      # allowed_external_users: ["t:tenant|u:sender"]
     bot_token: ""
     ilink_bot_id: ""
     ilink_user_id: ""
@@ -347,6 +378,8 @@ robots:
     bot_agent: CyberStrikeAI/1.0
   wecom: # 企业微信
     enabled: false
+    auth:
+      mode: user_binding
     token: ""
     encoding_aes_key: ""
     corp_id: ""
@@ -354,30 +387,42 @@ robots:
     agent_id: 0
   dingtalk: # 钉钉
     enabled: false
+    auth:
+      mode: user_binding
     client_id: ""
     client_secret: ""
     allow_conversation_id_fallback: false
   lark: # 飞书
     enabled: false
+    auth:
+      mode: user_binding
     app_id: ""
     app_secret: ""
     verify_token: ""
     allow_chat_id_fallback: false
   telegram: # Telegram
     enabled: false
+    auth:
+      mode: user_binding
     bot_token: ""
     bot_username: ""
     allow_group_messages: false
   slack: # Slack
     enabled: false
+    auth:
+      mode: user_binding
     bot_token: ""
     app_token: ""
   discord: # Discord
     enabled: false
+    auth:
+      mode: user_binding
     bot_token: ""
     allow_guild_messages: false
   qq: # QQ 机器人
     enabled: false
+    auth:
+      mode: user_binding
     app_id: ""
     client_secret: ""
     sandbox: true

docs/README.md

@@ -1,66 +1,87 @@
 # CyberStrikeAI Documentation
 
-Documentation is split by language:
+[中文](#中文文档) | [English](#english-documentation)
 
-- [中文文档](zh-CN/)
+CyberStrikeAI documentation is organized by user journey. Start with deployment, then move to the topic that matches your task.
-- [English docs](en-US/)
 
 ## 中文文档
 
-- [部署指南](zh-CN/deployment.md)
+### 按目标开始
-- [运维 Runbooks](zh-CN/runbooks.md)
+
-- [配置画像](zh-CN/configuration-profiles.md)
+- **快速体验**：[部署指南](zh-CN/deployment.md) → [配置参考](zh-CN/configuration.md) → [排错指南](zh-CN/troubleshooting.md)
-- [安全加固指南](zh-CN/security-hardening.md)
+- **生产部署**：[配置画像](zh-CN/configuration-profiles.md) → [安全加固](zh-CN/security-hardening.md) → [运维 Runbooks](zh-CN/runbooks.md) → [审计与监控](zh-CN/audit-and-monitoring.md)
-- [API Recipes](zh-CN/api-recipes.md)
+- **接入与自动化**：[API 参考](zh-CN/api-reference.md) → [API Recipes](zh-CN/api-recipes.md) → [MCP 联邦](zh-CN/mcp-federation.md)
-- [贡献规范](zh-CN/contributing-guide.md)
+- **参与开发**：[开发者指南](zh-CN/developer-guide.md) → [测试指南](zh-CN/testing.md) → [贡献规范](zh-CN/contributing-guide.md)
-- [配置参考](zh-CN/configuration.md)
+
-- [安全模型](zh-CN/security-model.md)
+### 核心概念与编排
+
 - [架构说明](zh-CN/architecture.md)
-- [API 参考](zh-CN/api-reference.md)
+- [安全模型](zh-CN/security-model.md)
-- [排错指南](zh-CN/troubleshooting.md)
-- [审计与监控](zh-CN/audit-and-monitoring.md)
-- [知识库](zh-CN/knowledge-base.md)
-- [C2 使用说明](zh-CN/c2.md)
-- [WebShell 管理](zh-CN/webshell.md)
-- [MCP 联邦](zh-CN/mcp-federation.md)
 - [Agent 与角色](zh-CN/agent-and-role-guide.md)
 - [Skills 指南](zh-CN/skills-guide.md)
-- [插件开发](zh-CN/plugin-development.md)
+- [Eino 多代理](zh-CN/MULTI_AGENT_EINO.md)
-- [发布流程](zh-CN/release-process.md)
+- [工作流](zh-CN/workflow-graph.md)
-- [测试指南](zh-CN/testing.md)
+- [工具执行治理](zh-CN/tool-execution-governance.md)
-- [图编排使用说明](zh-CN/workflow-graph.md)
 - [人机协同最佳实践](zh-CN/hitl-best-practices.md)
-- [机器人使用说明](zh-CN/robot.md)
+
+### 功能指南
+
+- [知识库](zh-CN/knowledge-base.md)
+- [RBAC 权限管理](zh-CN/rbac.md)
+- [机器人接入](zh-CN/robot.md)
 - [视觉分析](zh-CN/VISION.md)
-- [前端国际化方案](zh-CN/frontend-i18n.md)
+- [WebShell 管理](zh-CN/webshell.md)
-- [Eino 多代理改造说明](zh-CN/MULTI_AGENT_EINO.md)
+- [C2 使用说明](zh-CN/c2.md)
 
-## English Docs
+### 开发与发布
+
+- [开发者指南](zh-CN/developer-guide.md)
+- [插件开发](zh-CN/plugin-development.md)
+- [前端国际化](zh-CN/frontend-i18n.md)
+- [测试指南](zh-CN/testing.md)
+- [贡献规范](zh-CN/contributing-guide.md)
+- [发布流程](zh-CN/release-process.md)
+
+## English Documentation
+
+### Choose a path
+
+- **Try locally**: [Deployment](en-US/deployment.md) → [Configuration](en-US/configuration.md) → [Troubleshooting](en-US/troubleshooting.md)
+- **Run in production**: [Configuration Profiles](en-US/configuration-profiles.md) → [Security Hardening](en-US/security-hardening.md) → [Runbooks](en-US/runbooks.md) → [Audit and Monitoring](en-US/audit-and-monitoring.md)
+- **Integrate and automate**: [API Reference](en-US/api-reference.md) → [API Recipes](en-US/api-recipes.md) → [MCP Federation](en-US/mcp-federation.md)
+- **Contribute code**: [Developer Guide](en-US/developer-guide.md) → [Testing](en-US/testing.md) → [Contributing](en-US/contributing-guide.md)
+
+### Concepts and orchestration
 
-- [Deployment Guide](en-US/deployment.md)
-- [Runbooks](en-US/runbooks.md)
-- [Configuration Profiles](en-US/configuration-profiles.md)
-- [Security Hardening](en-US/security-hardening.md)
-- [API Recipes](en-US/api-recipes.md)
-- [Contributing Guide](en-US/contributing-guide.md)
-- [Configuration Reference](en-US/configuration.md)
-- [Security Model](en-US/security-model.md)
 - [Architecture](en-US/architecture.md)
-- [API Reference](en-US/api-reference.md)
+- [Security Model](en-US/security-model.md)
-- [Troubleshooting](en-US/troubleshooting.md)
+- [Agents and Roles](en-US/agent-and-role-guide.md)
-- [Audit and Monitoring](en-US/audit-and-monitoring.md)
+- [Skills](en-US/skills-guide.md)
-- [Knowledge Base](en-US/knowledge-base.md)
+- [Eino Multi-Agent](en-US/MULTI_AGENT_EINO.md)
-- [C2 Guide](en-US/c2.md)
+- [Workflows](en-US/workflow-graph.md)
-- [WebShell Management](en-US/webshell.md)
+- [Tool Execution Governance](en-US/tool-execution-governance.md)
-- [MCP Federation](en-US/mcp-federation.md)
-- [Agent and Role Guide](en-US/agent-and-role-guide.md)
-- [Skills Guide](en-US/skills-guide.md)
-- [Plugin Development](en-US/plugin-development.md)
-- [Release Process](en-US/release-process.md)
-- [Testing Guide](en-US/testing.md)
-- [Graph Orchestration Guide](en-US/workflow-graph.md)
 - [HITL Best Practices](en-US/hitl-best-practices.md)
-- [Robot / Chatbot Guide](en-US/robot.md)
+
+### Feature guides
+
+- [Knowledge Base](en-US/knowledge-base.md)
+- [RBAC Administration](en-US/rbac.md)
+- [Robot / Chatbot](en-US/robot.md)
 - [Vision Analysis](en-US/VISION.md)
+- [WebShell Management](en-US/webshell.md)
+- [C2 Guide](en-US/c2.md)
+
+### Development and release
+
+- [Developer Guide](en-US/developer-guide.md)
+- [Plugin Development](en-US/plugin-development.md)
 - [Frontend i18n](en-US/frontend-i18n.md)
-- [Eino Multi-Agent Notes](en-US/MULTI_AGENT_EINO.md)
+- [Testing](en-US/testing.md)
+- [Contributing](en-US/contributing-guide.md)
+- [Release Process](en-US/release-process.md)
+
+## Documentation conventions
+
+- Commands assume the repository root unless stated otherwise.
+- Examples use placeholders; never commit real credentials or target systems without explicit authorization.
+- Runtime behavior and configuration defaults are authoritative in `config.example.yaml` and the source code. If a document differs, report it as documentation drift.

docs/en-US/README.md

@@ -1,29 +1,32 @@
-# English Docs
+# English Documentation
 
-- [Deployment Guide](deployment.md): deployment modes, HTTPS, reverse proxy, systemd, backup, upgrade, and acceptance checks.
+[Documentation home](../README.md) | [中文](../zh-CN/README.md)
-- [Runbooks](runbooks.md): operational steps for production setup, external MCP, KB, Web testing, C2 cleanup, and tool debugging.
+
-- [Configuration Profiles](configuration-profiles.md): recommended profiles for dev, internal team, knowledge-only, production, C2, and MCP automation.
+## Choose a path
-- [Security Hardening](security-hardening.md): pre-launch baseline, reverse proxy, HITL allowlist, file permissions, and periodic review.
+
-- [API Recipes](api-recipes.md): examples for login, Agent, streaming, multi-agent, uploads, vulnerabilities, KB, MCP, and audit export.
+- **Try locally**: [Deployment](deployment.md) → [Configuration](configuration.md) → [Troubleshooting](troubleshooting.md)
-- [Contributing Guide](contributing-guide.md): checklists for APIs, config, tools, frontend, DB, high-risk features, and docs.
+- **Run in production**: [Configuration Profiles](configuration-profiles.md) → [Security Hardening](security-hardening.md) → [Runbooks](runbooks.md) → [Audit and Monitoring](audit-and-monitoring.md)
-- [Configuration Reference](configuration.md): `config.yaml` fields, hot-apply boundaries, recommended values, and source anchors.
+- **Integrate and automate**: [API Reference](api-reference.md) → [API Recipes](api-recipes.md) → [MCP Federation](mcp-federation.md)
-- [Security Model](security-model.md): trust boundaries, HITL, tool execution, C2/WebShell, and data safety.
+- **Contribute code**: [Developer Guide](developer-guide.md) → [Testing](testing.md) → [Contributing](contributing-guide.md)
-- [Architecture](architecture.md): request flow, module relationships, complexity hotspots, and design trade-offs.
+
-- [API Reference](api-reference.md): authentication, OpenAPI, SSE, stability tiers, and common endpoints.
+## Concepts and orchestration
-- [Troubleshooting](troubleshooting.md): diagnostic order, minimal commands, common misdiagnoses, and issue template.
+
-- [Audit and Monitoring](audit-and-monitoring.md): platform audit, tool monitoring, HITL logs, and retention.
+- [Architecture](architecture.md) · [Security Model](security-model.md) · [RBAC](rbac.md)
-- [Knowledge Base](knowledge-base.md): indexing pipeline, retrieval tuning, log analysis, and content writing.
+- [Agents and Roles](agent-and-role-guide.md) · [Skills](skills-guide.md) · [Eino Multi-Agent](MULTI_AGENT_EINO.md)
-- [C2 Guide](c2.md): lifecycle, task classification, event review, and safety guidance.
+- [Workflows](workflow-graph.md) · [Tool Execution Governance](tool-execution-governance.md) · [HITL Best Practices](hitl-best-practices.md)
-- [WebShell Management](webshell.md): operation tiers, naming, AI guardrails, and troubleshooting.
+
-- [MCP Federation](mcp-federation.md): built-in MCP, external MCP, lifecycle, and tool naming.
+## Feature guides
-- [Agent and Role Guide](agent-and-role-guide.md): roles, sub-agents, Skills, orchestration modes, and tool visibility.
+
-- [Skills Guide](skills-guide.md): Skill structure, progressive disclosure, anti-patterns, and local-tool risk.
+- [Asset Management](asset-management.md) · [Knowledge Base](knowledge-base.md) · [Robot / Chatbot](robot.md) · [Vision](VISION.md)
-- [Plugin Development](plugin-development.md): API plugins, MCP plugins, resource-pack plugins, and security boundaries.
+- [WebShell](webshell.md) · [C2](c2.md) · [MCP Federation](mcp-federation.md)
-- [Release Process](release-process.md): release risk, config compatibility, DB migrations, and acceptance checks.
+
-- [Testing Guide](testing.md): test layers, regression focus, test data, and failure cases.
+## Operations and reference
-- [Graph Orchestration Guide](workflow-graph.md)
+
-- [HITL Best Practices](hitl-best-practices.md)
+- [Deployment](deployment.md) · [Configuration](configuration.md) · [Configuration Profiles](configuration-profiles.md)
-- [Robot / Chatbot Guide](robot.md)
+- [Security Hardening](security-hardening.md) · [Audit and Monitoring](audit-and-monitoring.md) · [Runbooks](runbooks.md)
-- [Vision Analysis](VISION.md)
+- [API Reference](api-reference.md) · [API Recipes](api-recipes.md) · [Troubleshooting](troubleshooting.md)
-- [Frontend i18n](frontend-i18n.md)
+
-- [Eino Multi-Agent Notes](MULTI_AGENT_EINO.md)
+## Development and release
+
+- [Developer Guide](developer-guide.md) · [Plugin Development](plugin-development.md) · [Frontend i18n](frontend-i18n.md)
+- [Testing](testing.md) · [Contributing](contributing-guide.md) · [Release Process](release-process.md)

docs/en-US/api-recipes.md

@@ -151,3 +151,52 @@ curl -k "https://127.0.0.1:8080/api/audit/logs/export" \
 ```
 
 Exported logs may contain sensitive operational data. Store encrypted.
+
+## Recipe 11: Bulk Import Assets
+
+Create `assets.json`:
+
+```json
+{
+  "source": "api-import",
+  "source_query": "cmdb-export-2026-07",
+  "assets": [
+    {
+      "domain": "app.example.com",
+      "port": 443,
+      "protocol": "https",
+      "tags": ["production", "internet"],
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "ip": "192.0.2.10",
+      "port": 22,
+      "protocol": "ssh",
+      "status": "active"
+    }
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+Submit it:
+
+```bash
+curl -k https://127.0.0.1:8080/api/assets/import \
+  -H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  --data-binary @assets.json
+```
+
+Example response:
+
+```json
+{"created":2,"updated":0,"skipped":0}
+```
+
+Notes:
+
+- The caller needs `asset:write`.
+- Each asset requires at least one of `host`, `ip`, or `domain`.
+- One request supports up to 100,000 assets. For large payloads, use a file with `--data-binary` instead of embedding JSON in the command line.
+- An existing “target + port + protocol” is merged and counted in `updated`.
+- To work from XLSX/CSV, use **Asset Inventory → Bulk Import** in the Web UI. The API itself accepts JSON rather than multipart files.

docs/en-US/api-reference.md

@@ -55,6 +55,132 @@ Streaming endpoints are long-lived. Clients should:
 - disable proxy buffering;
 - pass `conversationId` when continuing a conversation.
 
+## Asset Management and Bulk Import
+
+Asset endpoints:
+
+- `GET /api/assets`: list and filter assets;
+- `GET /api/assets/selection`: resolve cross-page selection from the current filters, up to 10,000 rows;
+- `GET /api/assets/stats`: retrieve statistics; `days` accepts only `7`, `30`, or `90`;
+- `POST /api/assets/import`: create or deduplicate and update up to 100,000 assets;
+- `POST /api/assets/scan-links`: record up to 10,000 scan links;
+- `PUT /api/assets/bulk`: atomically update up to 10,000 assets;
+- `PUT /api/assets/project-binding`: bind up to 10,000 asset IDs to a project;
+- `POST /api/assets/batch-delete`: atomically delete up to 10,000 assets;
+- `POST /api/assets/merge`: merge 2-100 duplicate assets with a shared identity;
+- `PUT /api/assets/:id`: update an asset;
+- `DELETE /api/assets/:id`: delete an asset.
+
+`GET /api/assets` and `GET /api/assets/selection` share filters and sorting. `selection` ignores pagination and returns all matching rows, up to 10,000:
+
+| Category | Parameters |
+| --- | --- |
+| Pagination (list only) | `page`, `page_size` (maximum: 100) |
+| Common | `q`, `status`, `project_id`, `risk_level`, `min_vulnerabilities`, `max_vulnerabilities` |
+| Target and source | `host`, `ip`, `domain`, `port`, `protocol`, `source`, `tag` |
+| Responsibility and business | `responsible_person`, `department`, `business_system`, `environment`, `criticality` |
+| Location | `country`, `province`, `city` |
+| Scan | `scan_state=never|scanned`, `scan_overdue_days`, `last_scan_before`, `last_scan_after` |
+| Discovery time | `first_seen_before`, `first_seen_after`, `last_seen_before`, `last_seen_after` |
+| Sort | `sort_by`, `sort_order=asc|desc` |
+
+Time parameters accept RFC3339 or `YYYY-MM-DD`. Supported `sort_by` values are `last_seen_at`, `last_scan_at`, `first_seen_at`, `created_at`, `updated_at`, `host`, `port`, `risk_level`, and `vulnerability_count`.
+
+`POST /api/assets/import` accepts JSON, not an XLSX/CSV upload. The Web UI parses the template in the browser, previews it, and converts valid rows to this request:
+
+```http
+POST /api/assets/import
+Authorization: Bearer <token>
+Content-Type: application/json
+
+{
+  "source": "manual-import",
+  "source_query": "asset-import-2026-07.xlsx",
+  "assets": [
+    {
+      "host": "https://app.example.com:443",
+      "domain": "app.example.com",
+      "port": 443,
+      "protocol": "https",
+      "title": "Example App",
+      "server": "nginx",
+      "project_id": "<project-id>",
+      "responsible_person": "Alice",
+      "department": "Security",
+      "business_system": "Customer Portal",
+      "environment": "production",
+      "criticality": "critical",
+      "tags": ["production", "internet"],
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "ip": "192.0.2.10",
+      "port": 22,
+      "protocol": "ssh",
+      "status": "active"
+    }
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+Request rules:
+
+- `assets` must contain between 1 and 100,000 entries;
+- at least one of `host`, `ip`, or `domain` must be non-empty for each asset;
+- `port` must be between `0` and `65535`;
+- `status` must be `active` or `inactive`;
+- `environment` may be empty or `production`, `staging`, `testing`, `development`, or `other`;
+- `criticality` may be empty or `critical`, `high`, `medium`, or `low`;
+- an asset may have up to 30 tags, each no longer than 64 characters;
+- a non-empty `project_id` must reference a project accessible to the caller;
+- the caller needs `asset:write`;
+- the server deduplicates by “target + port + protocol” and processes the request in one transaction.
+
+Successful response:
+
+```json
+{
+  "created": 120,
+  "updated": 8,
+  "skipped": 2
+}
+```
+
+`created` counts new records, `updated` counts deduplicated merges, and `skipped` counts empty or inaccessible existing records. Validation errors return `400` with the failing asset position in `error`; inaccessible projects return `403`. See [Asset Management](asset-management.md#import-from-a-spreadsheet) for the template and UI workflow.
+
+Bulk edit example:
+
+```http
+PUT /api/assets/bulk
+Content-Type: application/json
+
+{
+  "asset_ids": ["<asset-id-1>", "<asset-id-2>"],
+  "responsible_person": "Alice",
+  "department": "Security",
+  "environment": "production",
+  "criticality": "high",
+  "add_tags": ["internet-facing"],
+  "remove_tags": ["untriaged"]
+}
+```
+
+All patch fields are optional; omitted fields retain their current values. `add_tags` and `remove_tags` are deduplicated inside the transaction. Bulk edit, project binding, and batch deletion validate access to every requested asset first, so a missing or inaccessible ID fails the entire operation.
+
+Duplicate merge example:
+
+```http
+POST /api/assets/merge
+Content-Type: application/json
+
+{
+  "asset_ids": ["<primary-id>", "<duplicate-id>"],
+  "primary_id": "<primary-id>"
+}
+```
+
+Every record being removed must share a domain, IP address, or Host with the primary asset. Existing primary values win, empty fields are filled from the other records, and tags are unioned. The caller needs permission to update the primary and delete the other assets.
+
 ## Stability Tiers
 
 | API type | Stability | Recommendation |
@@ -62,6 +188,7 @@ Streaming endpoints are long-lived. Clients should:
 | `/api/auth/*` | high | safe to integrate |
 | `/api/eino-agent*` | high | preferred chat entry |
 | `/api/openapi/spec` | high | client generation |
+| `/api/assets/*` | high | asset management and bulk import |
 | `/api/config*` | medium | admin automation only |
 | `/api/c2/*`, `/api/webshell/*` | medium | high-risk, restrict access |
 | frontend private calls | low | avoid plugin dependency |
@@ -70,6 +197,7 @@ Streaming endpoints are long-lived. Clients should:
 
 - Conversations: `/api/conversations`
 - Projects/facts: `/api/projects`
+- Assets and bulk import: `/api/assets`
 - Vulnerabilities: `/api/vulnerabilities`
 - Knowledge: `/api/knowledge/*`
 - Roles: `/api/roles`
@@ -101,3 +229,5 @@ curl -k https://127.0.0.1:8080/api/eino-agent \
 - OpenAPI: `internal/handler/openapi.go`
 - Single-agent: `internal/handler/eino_single_agent.go`
 - Multi-agent: `internal/handler/multi_agent.go`
+- Asset endpoints: `internal/handler/asset.go`
+- Asset storage and deduplication: `internal/database/asset.go`

docs/en-US/asset-management.md

@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
+# Asset Management
+
+[中文](../zh-CN/asset-management.md)
+
+Asset management consolidates domains, IP addresses, ports, and services discovered through manual entry, network-space search engines, HTTP APIs, and Agent tasks into a maintainable baseline. It answers three questions: what assets exist, which assets have been assessed, and where risk is concentrated.
+
+> This feature is designed for security testing and attack-surface governance. It is not a replacement for a full enterprise CMDB. Add and scan only systems you own or are explicitly authorized to test.
+
+## Overview
+
+Asset management provides three main views:
+
+- **Overview**: asset totals, IPs, domains, ports, recent changes, scan coverage, and protocol distribution.
+- **Asset inventory**: identity, service details, source, tags, project ownership, responsibility and business metadata, scan history, and risk state.
+- **Reconnaissance**: search FOFA, ZoomEye, Quake, or Shodan and save confirmed results individually or in batches.
+
+Assets can launch single-target analysis or batch scans. After an Agent records findings and completes the scan callback, the inventory displays related vulnerability counts, risk level, and latest scan time.
+
+The overview can show the last 7, 30, or 90 days. It includes added/inactive asset trends, vulnerability discovery trends (including critical/high findings), total and 30-day scan coverage, never-scanned and stale counts, and the top eight protocols. Every statistic is restricted to the current user's accessible assets.
+
+## Asset fields
+
+An asset can include:
+
+- host, IP address, domain, port, and protocol;
+- page title and service or product fingerprint;
+- country/region, state/province, and city;
+- responsible person, department, business system, environment, and criticality;
+- source, source query, and tags;
+- active or inactive status;
+- project and owner;
+- first seen, last seen, created, and updated timestamps;
+- latest scan time and linked conversation, task queue, and subtask;
+- related vulnerability count and current risk level.
+
+At least one of `host`, `ip`, or `domain` is required.
+
+## Build an asset baseline
+
+### Add an asset manually
+
+Go to **Asset Management → Asset Inventory** and select **Add Asset**. Supported target forms include:
+
+```text
+https://example.com:8443
+example.com
+192.0.2.10:443
+[2001:db8::1]:443
+```
+
+The system attempts to identify the URL, domain, IP address, port, and protocol. You can then add a project, tags, title, service fingerprint, location, responsible person, department, business system, environment, criticality, and status.
+
+### Import from a spreadsheet
+
+Go to **Asset Management → Asset Inventory** and select **Bulk Import**:
+
+1. Download the XLSX (recommended) or CSV template.
+2. Enter assets in the `Assets` sheet without changing the header row.
+3. Choose the completed file or drop it onto the upload area.
+4. Review row-level validation. Duplicates, invalid values, and inaccessible projects are marked as errors.
+5. Select **Import valid rows**. Invalid rows are not submitted. When the file contains more than 100 rows, the preview shows the first 100 while submission processes every valid row.
+6. Review the created, updated, and skipped counts.
+
+Template columns:
+
+| Column | Required | Description |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `target` | Conditional | URL, domain, IPv4, IPv6, or a target with a port; required when `host`, `ip`, and `domain` are all empty |
+| `project` | No | Exact name or ID of an existing project; leave blank for no project |
+| `tags` | No | Comma, semicolon, or pipe-separated; up to 30 tags and 64 characters per tag |
+| `host` | Conditional | Full URL or host; may supplement `target` |
+| `ip` | Conditional | Valid IPv4 or IPv6 address |
+| `domain` | Conditional | Valid domain; internationalized domains are normalized |
+| `port` | No | `0-65535`; may be inferred from `target` |
+| `protocol` | No | Such as `http`, `https`, or `ssh`; may be inferred from a URL or common port |
+| `title` | No | Page title, up to 500 characters |
+| `server` | No | Service or product fingerprint |
+| `country` / `province` / `city` | No | Location metadata |
+| `responsible_person` | No | Responsible person, up to 255 characters |
+| `department` | No | Responsible department, up to 255 characters |
+| `business_system` | No | Owning business system, up to 255 characters |
+| `environment` | No | `production`, `staging`, `testing`, `development`, or `other` |
+| `criticality` | No | `critical`, `high`, `medium`, or `low` |
+| `status` | No | `active` or `inactive`; defaults to `active` |
+
+The parser recognizes the template's English headers and common Chinese aliases. Environment and criticality columns also accept their corresponding Chinese values. Automated exports should keep the English headers and enum values to avoid ambiguous mappings.
+
+Limits and behavior:
+
+- One XLSX/CSV file may contain up to 100,000 rows and be up to 100 MB.
+- One `/api/assets/import` request may contain up to 100,000 assets.
+- Later rows with the same “target + port + protocol” in one file are marked as duplicates and are not submitted.
+- The Web UI parses and previews the file; the server remains responsible for authorization, validation, normalization, deduplication, and transactional writes.
+- Existing assets receive non-empty incoming fields and a refreshed last-seen time instead of a duplicate record.
+- Bulk import requires `asset:write`. Referenced projects must also be accessible to the current user.
+- Do not remove the server-side row limit. Split larger datasets and import them during a low-traffic window.
+
+### Import from network-space search
+
+1. Configure the relevant API key in the configuration file or under **System Settings → Asset Management**. Environment variables are also supported: `FOFA_API_KEY`, `ZOOMEYE_API_KEY`, `QUAKE_API_KEY`, and `SHODAN_API_KEY`.
+2. Open **Asset Management → Reconnaissance**.
+3. Select the data source: FOFA, ZoomEye, Quake, or Shodan.
+4. Enter or generate a query for that source and confirm its scope.
+5. Run the query, select results whose ownership has been verified, and choose **Save Selected**.
+6. Review the created, updated, and skipped counts.
+
+Internet search results are not automatically your assets. Narrow the query with organization domains, certificates, network ranges, or product fingerprints, then verify authorization before saving results.
+
+## Normalization and deduplication
+
+Different sources may describe the same target in different forms. The system:
+
+- trims surrounding whitespace;
+- normalizes IP addresses, domains, and protocols to lowercase;
+- extracts hostname, protocol, and port from URL-like hosts;
+- fills default HTTP/HTTPS ports when omitted;
+- converts internationalized domains to ASCII/Punycode;
+- removes empty or duplicate tags;
+- supplies default source and status values.
+
+Assets use “target + port + protocol” as the service-level deduplication key. The preferred target is the domain, followed by the IP address, then the host. As a result, `80/http` and `443/https` on the same host remain separate assets.
+
+When an existing asset is imported again, non-empty incoming fields and the last-seen time are updated. Existing fields omitted by the new record and the original first-seen time are preserved.
+
+## Search, filters, and views
+
+Keyword search in the Web UI covers hosts, IP addresses, domains, titles, services, tags, responsible people, departments, and business systems. Status and project are the primary filters; advanced filters can combine:
+
+- risk level and minimum vulnerability count;
+- protocol, port, source, and exact tag;
+- scanned, never scanned, or not scanned for 30/60/90 days;
+- country/region, state/province, city, responsible person, department, and business system;
+- environment, criticality, first-seen dates, and last-seen dates;
+- sorting by last seen, latest scan, risk, vulnerability count, first seen, target name, or port.
+
+Sorting by latest scan time in ascending order places never-scanned assets first, making coverage gaps visible.
+
+Frequently used combinations can be saved as filter views. Saved views use the current browser's `localStorage`; they are not synchronized to the server, other browsers, or other users.
+
+The HTTP API and `query_assets` additionally support `max_vulnerabilities`, latest-scan time ranges, and allowlisted creation/update sort fields. HTTP lists allow up to 100 rows per page, while Agent queries allow up to 50.
+
+## Bulk maintenance and export
+
+After selecting assets, you can act on the current page or select every result matching the current filters. Cross-page selection resolves the filters again on the server and is limited to 10,000 assets; narrow the filters when the result exceeds that limit.
+
+Available actions:
+
+- **Bind project**: replace the project binding for all selected assets;
+- **Bulk edit**: change status, responsible person, department, business system, environment, and criticality, and add or remove tags;
+- **Create scan task / Send to chat**: apply one prompt template to the selected assets;
+- **Export CSV / XLSX**: export the currently selected rows in the browser, including ownership, risk, vulnerability count, and timestamp fields;
+- **Merge duplicates**: keep the first selected asset as primary, fill its empty fields from the other records, and union their tags;
+- **Batch delete**: permanently delete the selected assets.
+
+Bulk edit, project binding, and batch delete are all-or-nothing transactions. If any requested asset is missing or outside the caller's scope, the entire operation fails without a partial update.
+
+Merge is only allowed when every duplicate shares a domain, IP address, or Host with the primary asset, and accepts 2-100 selected records. Existing primary values win, tags are unioned subject to the 30-tag limit, and the other records are deleted. It requires both `asset:write` and `asset:delete`; confirm the primary record and the scan history you need to retain before merging.
+
+## Scanning and risk updates
+
+### Scan one asset
+
+Select **Scan** from the asset inventory. The system:
+
+1. creates a conversation containing the target and asset ID;
+2. links the conversation to the asset;
+3. prompts the Agent to inspect exposed services and authorized risks;
+4. stores confirmed findings with `record_vulnerability`;
+5. updates scan state with `complete_asset_scan`.
+
+Scan prompts support `{{asset_id}}`, `{{target}}`, `{{host}}`, `{{ip}}`, `{{domain}}`, and `{{port}}`. Adjust scope, ports, test intensity, and validation methods to match the authorization before starting.
+
+### Batch scans
+
+Select multiple assets and choose **Create Scan Task**. The system creates one subtask per asset and links each asset to its queue and subtask.
+
+The current defaults use manual scheduling, one concurrent task, and Eino single-Agent mode to limit load on targets and the local host. You must still confirm the test window, request rate, permitted validation methods, and approval requirements.
+
+### Risk calculation
+
+Asset risk is calculated dynamically from open vulnerabilities in the latest linked scan:
+
+- `critical`, `high`, `medium`, `low`, or `info`: an open finding at that level exists;
+- `normal`: the asset was scanned and has no open risk;
+- `unassessed`: no scan has completed.
+
+Resolved, false-positive, and ignored findings remain in historical counts but no longer increase the current risk level.
+
+## Agent tools
+
+Six built-in tools expose asset operations to Agents:
+
+- `create_asset`: create or deduplicate and update an asset;
+- `get_asset`: retrieve full details by ID;
+- `query_assets`: filter, sort, and paginate assets;
+- `update_asset`: partially update an asset;
+- `delete_asset`: delete an asset;
+- `complete_asset_scan`: record scan completion.
+
+`query_assets` returns 20 summaries by default and allows at most 50 per page. Use `get_asset` for full details so large inventories do not consume the model context.
+
+Both `create_asset` and `update_asset` accept responsibility and business metadata, and `query_assets` can filter by those fields. Agent writes go through the same normalization, validation, deduplication, and authorization checks as the HTTP API.
+
+## Access control
+
+Asset permissions are separated into:
+
+- `asset:read`: view assets and statistics;
+- `asset:write`: create, import, edit, and update scan state;
+- `asset:delete`: delete assets.
+
+Server-side authorization considers the asset owner, explicit resource assignments, the linked project, and permission scope (`all`, `assigned`, or `own`). When a conversation is linked to a project, Agent asset queries are restricted to that project and tool arguments cannot widen the boundary.
+
+Asset batch endpoint limits:
+
+- `POST /api/assets/import`: up to 100,000 assets per request;
+- `GET /api/assets/selection`: resolve up to 10,000 matching assets;
+- `POST /api/assets/scan-links`: up to 10,000 links per request;
+- `PUT /api/assets/bulk`: up to 10,000 asset IDs per request;
+- `PUT /api/assets/project-binding`: up to 10,000 asset IDs per request;
+- `POST /api/assets/batch-delete`: up to 10,000 asset IDs per request;
+- `POST /api/assets/merge`: merge 2-100 asset IDs per request.
+
+## Recommended workflow
+
+1. Define an explicitly authorized set of domains, IP addresses, or network ranges.
+2. Add a few critical targets manually and verify normalization and deduplication.
+3. Use tags to separate production, testing, critical-business, and internet-facing scopes.
+4. Configure one or more network-space search engines, begin with narrow queries, and verify ownership.
+5. Test scanning and vulnerability callbacks on one low-risk target.
+6. Use never-scanned and over-30-day filters to identify coverage gaps.
+7. After validating the workflow, expand gradually with small batch tasks.
+
+A small, verified baseline is usually more valuable than a large inventory with unclear ownership and inconsistent sources.

docs/en-US/configuration-profiles.md

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ server:
   tls_enabled: true
   tls_auto_self_sign: true
 auth:
-  password: "dev-only-change-me"
+  session_duration_hours: 12
 audit:
   enabled: true
   retention_days: 7
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ server:
   port: 8080
   tls_enabled: false
 auth:
-  password: "<long-random-password>"
+  session_duration_hours: 12
 audit:
   enabled: true
   retention_days: 30
@@ -90,7 +90,6 @@ Goal: long-running production red-team or security platform.
 
 ```yaml
 auth:
-  password: "<managed-secret>"
   session_duration_hours: 8
 audit:
   enabled: true

docs/en-US/configuration.md

@@ -11,8 +11,10 @@ server:
   host: 0.0.0.0
   port: 8080
   tls_enabled: true
+  # Optional: other trusted Web integrations; Chromium extensions need no entry.
+  # cors_allowed_origins:
+  #   - https://trusted-integration.example
 auth:
-  password: "change-me"
   session_duration_hours: 12
 openai:
   provider: openai
@@ -24,7 +26,9 @@ agent:
   tool_timeout_minutes: 60
 ```
 
-Change the default password immediately. Use HTTPS or a trusted reverse proxy in any shared environment.
+Change the initial `admin` password from the Web UI after first login. Use HTTPS or a trusted reverse proxy in any shared environment.
+
+Valid Chromium `chrome-extension://<32-character-extension-id>` origins are recognized automatically. The extension must still obtain host permission and authenticate with a password and Bearer token. `server.cors_allowed_origins` remains available as an exact allowlist for other trusted Web integrations; wildcards are not accepted, and changing it requires a restart.
 
 ## Hot-Apply Boundaries
 

docs/en-US/contributing-guide.md

@@ -103,6 +103,16 @@ Update:
 - `docs/zh-CN/README.md`
 - `docs/en-US/README.md`
 
+Before submitting documentation changes, run:
+
+```bash
+python3 scripts/check-docs.py
+```
+
+The check verifies local links, fenced code blocks, bilingual filename parity, locale index coverage, and the Go version documented by the root READMEs. Keep versioned examples derived from authoritative files such as `go.mod` and `config.example.yaml` whenever possible.
+
+The same command runs automatically in the `Documentation` GitHub Actions workflow when documentation, `go.mod`, or the checker itself changes.
+
 ## Review Focus
 
 Prioritize:

docs/en-US/rbac.md

@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+# CyberStrikeAI RBAC Administration Guide
+
+[中文](../zh-CN/rbac.md)
+
+CyberStrikeAI can execute Agents, MCP tools, WebShell operations, C2 actions, and batch jobs. RBAC therefore applies beyond navigation visibility: it is enforced across HTTP APIs, resource queries, Agent contexts, built-in and external MCP tools, background jobs, and chatbot execution.
+
+---
+
+## 1. Two different kinds of roles
+
+| Concept | Management location | Purpose |
+|---------|---------------------|---------|
+| **Platform role (RBAC Role)** | **Platform permissions** | Controls which features and resources a user may access |
+| **AI testing role (Agent Role)** | **Roles** / `roles/*.yaml` | Controls Agent prompts, methodology, and candidate tools |
+
+An AI testing role is not an authorization boundary. Selecting a penetration-testing role does not grant platform permissions, and granting RBAC permissions does not change the Agent prompt.
+
+---
+
+## 2. Authorization model
+
+An operation is allowed only when all relevant checks pass:
+
+```text
+enabled account
+  + required permission for the route/tool
+  + scope attached to that permission
+  + resource owner / explicit assignment / parent inheritance
+  + additional rules for process-global operations
+```
+
+Request flow:
+
+1. Login issues a Bearer token whose session contains user, roles, permissions, and per-permission scopes.
+2. HTTP middleware maps the route to a permission, for example `GET /api/projects` → `project:read`.
+3. Resource-ID requests also check ownership, explicit assignments, or supported parent inheritance.
+4. Agent execution receives an immutable Principal through `context.Context`.
+5. Built-in MCP tools authorize both the tool and resource IDs in tool arguments. External MCP has separate restrictions.
+6. Denials are written to RBAC/audit logs.
+
+Frontend button hiding is only a usability feature. The server is the security boundary.
+
+---
+
+## 3. Built-in platform roles
+
+| Role | Scope | Default capability |
+|------|-------|--------------------|
+| **Administrator `admin`** | `all` | Every known permission, including RBAC, configuration, terminal, audit deletion, and global definition management |
+| **Operator `operator`** | `assigned` | Normal read/write/execute work; excludes RBAC, core configuration, terminal, audit management, external MCP execution, and several global definition writes |
+| **Auditor `auditor`** | `all` | Read permissions across modules plus `audit:read`; no writes |
+| **Viewer `viewer`** | `assigned` | Read-only access within authorized resources |
+
+System roles cannot be edited or deleted. Their grants are rebuilt from the current permission catalog during upgrade, preventing stale grants from older versions. Create custom roles for different job functions.
+
+An account without a role can still authenticate but has almost no business capability; do not treat “no role” as a complete job profile.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Permission catalog
+
+Permissions use `module:action`. Common actions are `read`, `write`, `delete`, and `execute`. The authoritative catalog for the running build is available in Platform permissions or `GET /api/rbac/metadata`.
+
+| Module | Permissions |
+|--------|-------------|
+| Account | `auth:self` |
+| Dashboard | `dashboard:read` |
+| Chat | `chat:read`, `chat:write`, `chat:delete` |
+| Agent | `agent:execute`, `agent:local-execute` |
+| HITL | `hitl:read`, `hitl:write` |
+| Tasks | `tasks:read`, `tasks:write`, `tasks:delete` |
+| Projects | `project:read`, `project:write`, `project:delete` |
+| Vulnerabilities | `vulnerability:read`, `vulnerability:write`, `vulnerability:delete` |
+| WebShell | `webshell:read`, `webshell:write`, `webshell:delete` |
+| C2 | `c2:read`, `c2:write`, `c2:delete` |
+| MCP | `mcp:read`, `mcp:execute`, `mcp:write`, `mcp:external:execute` |
+| Knowledge | `knowledge:read`, `knowledge:write`, `knowledge:delete` |
+| Skills | `skills:read`, `skills:write`, `skills:delete` |
+| Markdown Agents | `agents:read`, `agents:write`, `agents:delete` |
+| AI testing roles | `roles:read`, `roles:write`, `roles:delete` |
+| Workflows | `workflow:read`, `workflow:execute`, `workflow:write`, `workflow:delete` |
+| Configuration | `config:read`, `config:write` |
+| Terminal | `terminal:execute` |
+| Audit | `audit:read`, `audit:delete` |
+| RBAC | `rbac:read`, `rbac:write` |
+| Notifications | `notification:read`, `notification:write` |
+| Robots | `robot:read`, `robot:write` |
+| Files | `files:read`, `files:write`, `files:delete` |
+| Attack chain | `attackchain:read`, `attackchain:write` |
+| Network-space search / Reconnaissance | `fofa:execute` |
+| OpenAPI | `openapi:read` |
+| Chat groups | `group:read`, `group:write`, `group:delete` |
+| Monitor | `monitor:read`, `monitor:write`, `monitor:delete` |
+
+Important distinctions:
+
+- `agent:execute` runs Agents but does not grant local filesystem, shell, or arbitrary configured command access.
+- `agent:local-execute` is the local execution fallback and should be limited to trusted operators.
+- `mcp:execute` protects the authenticated MCP HTTP entry point.
+- `mcp:external:execute` allows Agent calls to external MCP tools and currently also requires `all` scope.
+- `fofa:execute` is kept for backward compatibility, but it now protects the Reconnaissance page for FOFA, ZoomEye, Quake, and Shodan searches.
+- `mcp:write` manages external MCP configuration; it is separate from external tool execution.
+- `robot:write` manages robot configuration and the test endpoint. Chatbot conversations use the bound user or configured service account's business permissions.
+
+---
+
+## 5. Resource scopes
+
+Each role has one scope:
+
+| Scope | Meaning | Typical use |
+|-------|---------|-------------|
+| `all` | All resources covered by the permission | Administrator, global auditor |
+| `assigned` | Explicitly assigned resources and supported parent-resource inheritance | Project member, assigned asset operator |
+| `own` | Primarily resources created by/owned by the user; some resource types also support explicit assignment or parent inheritance | Personal workspace, isolated robot identity |
+
+Users may have multiple roles. Permissions are unioned, while scopes are merged **for the same permission only**:
+
+```text
+all > assigned > own
+```
+
+Example:
+
+```text
+Global audit role:  project:read  + all
+Personal editor:    project:write + own
+
+Effective:
+project:read  → all
+project:write → own
+```
+
+A global read role does not widen an unrelated write permission. Authorization code must use `ScopeFor(permission)`, not the user's broadest display scope.
+
+### Process-global restrictions
+
+Some definitions have no owner. Their mutations require the corresponding permission with `all` scope even if the user has a `write` key:
+
+- AI testing roles, Skills, and Markdown Agents.
+- External MCP configuration.
+- Robot configuration.
+- Workflow definitions.
+- Knowledge mutations other than search.
+- Global HITL allowlist, reviewer, and audit policy.
+- C2 Profile mutations.
+- Some global monitor statistics.
+
+---
+
+## 6. Ownership, assignments, and inheritance
+
+Use Platform permissions → Member details → Resource assignments. Directly assignable resource types include:
+
+- `project`
+- `conversation`
+- `vulnerability`
+- `webshell`
+- `batch_task`
+- `c2_listener`
+
+A batch request accepts at most 100 resources. Duplicate grants are skipped.
+
+Supported inheritance includes:
+
+| Child resource | Parent access source |
+|----------------|----------------------|
+| Conversation | Project |
+| Vulnerability | Project or related conversation |
+| Message, process detail, attack chain | Conversation |
+| C2 Session | Listener |
+| C2 Task/file/event | Session, Task, or Listener chain |
+
+Assigning a project therefore usually avoids assigning each conversation and vulnerability separately. The concrete route/tool server check remains authoritative.
+
+---
+
+## 7. Web administration workflow
+
+### Create a user
+
+1. Sign in as an administrator and open **Platform permissions**.
+2. Create a user with username, display name, an eight-character-or-longer password, and enabled status.
+3. Assign one or more platform roles.
+4. For `assigned` roles, configure resource assignments.
+5. Have the user sign in again and verify roles, permission count, and scope in the top-right user menu.
+
+### Create a custom role
+
+1. Give the role a job-oriented name and description.
+2. Select `all`, `assigned`, or `own`.
+3. Select only required permissions.
+4. Test list, detail, mutation, deletion, Agent, and tool behavior with a test account.
+5. Assign it to production users only after verification.
+
+System roles are immutable; create a custom role instead of modifying them.
+
+### When changes take effect
+
+- Updating a user, password, enabled state, or role membership revokes that user's sessions; they must sign in again.
+- Updating or deleting a custom role revokes all sessions; all users must sign in again.
+- Robots resolve the bound user/service account on every message, so disablement and role changes affect the next message.
+- Background batch jobs resolve a Principal from the task owner rather than trusting frontend state.
+
+---
+
+## 8. Suggested role templates
+
+### Read-only project member
+
+```text
+Scope: assigned
+dashboard:read
+chat:read
+project:read
+vulnerability:read
+files:read
+attackchain:read
+```
+
+### Daily security operator
+
+```text
+Scope: assigned
+agent:execute
+chat:read / chat:write
+project:read / project:write
+vulnerability:read / vulnerability:write
+tasks:read / tasks:write
+files:read / files:write
+hitl:read / hitl:write
+```
+
+Add `agent:local-execute` or `terminal:execute` only when local commands are required. Add individual `:delete` permissions only when deletion is part of the job.
+
+### Robot service account
+
+```text
+Scope: own (isolated workspace) or assigned (specific projects)
+agent:execute
+chat:read / chat:write
+optional project, vulnerability, and knowledge permissions
+```
+
+`admin` can be used as a robot service account, but exact sender allowlisting still applies. Every allowlisted sender receives full permissions and shares admin-owned data. See the [Robot guide](robot.md).
+
+---
+
+## 9. Agent, MCP, and robot boundaries
+
+### Agent
+
+The HTTP user becomes an immutable Principal propagated to single-agent, multi-agent, workflow, and tool contexts. A long-running task may survive an SSE disconnect while retaining that identity.
+
+### Built-in MCP
+
+Every built-in tool requires an explicit authorization policy. WebShell tools check both `webshell:read/write/delete` and the target `connection_id`; project, vulnerability, task, and C2 tools validate resource arguments as well. An unregistered built-in policy fails closed. Other local/configured tools require `agent:local-execute`.
+
+### External MCP
+
+Agent calls to external MCP require `mcp:external:execute` with `all` scope because an external service's resource model is not protected by local ownership and assignments.
+
+### Robots
+
+- `user_binding`: each platform sender binds their own RBAC user.
+- `service_account`: exact allowlisted senders share one RBAC user.
+- Platform signature verification authenticates message origin, not business authorization.
+- Run `whoami` to inspect the effective Principal.
+
+---
+
+## 10. RBAC API
+
+All requests use:
+
+```http
+Authorization: Bearer <token>
+```
+
+Management routes require `rbac:read` or `rbac:write`; the resource picker requires `rbac:write`.
+
+| Method | Path | Purpose |
+|--------|------|---------|
+| GET | `/api/rbac/me` | Current user, roles, permissions, overall scope, per-permission scopes |
+| GET | `/api/rbac/metadata` | Permission catalog, roles, grants, and scopes |
+| GET/POST | `/api/rbac/users` | List/create users |
+| PUT/DELETE | `/api/rbac/users/:id` | Update/delete a user |
+| GET/POST | `/api/rbac/roles` | List/create roles |
+| PUT/DELETE | `/api/rbac/roles/:id` | Update/delete a custom role |
+| GET | `/api/rbac/resources?type=project&q=...` | Search assignable resources |
+| GET/POST | `/api/rbac/resource-assignments` | List/create assignments |
+| DELETE | `/api/rbac/resource-assignments/:id` | Revoke an assignment |
+
+Create a user:
+
+```bash
+curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/rbac/users \
+  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  -d '{
+    "username": "operator01",
+    "display_name": "Security Operator 01",
+    "password": "change-me-123",
+    "enabled": true,
+    "roles": ["operator"]
+  }'
+```
+
+Create a custom role:
+
+```bash
+curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/rbac/roles \
+  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  -d '{
+    "name": "Project Auditor",
+    "description": "Read assigned projects",
+    "scope": "assigned",
+    "permissions": ["chat:read", "project:read", "vulnerability:read"]
+  }'
+```
+
+Assign projects:
+
+```bash
+curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/rbac/resource-assignments \
+  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  -d '{
+    "user_id": "USER_ID",
+    "resource_type": "project",
+    "resource_ids": ["PROJECT_ID_1", "PROJECT_ID_2"]
+  }'
+```
+
+---
+
+## 11. Audit and operations recommendations
+
+- Use individual administrator accounts instead of sharing one password.
+- Name custom roles by job function and document purpose/owner.
+- Review high-risk permissions separately: `terminal:execute`, `agent:local-execute`, `c2:write/delete`, `webshell:write/delete`, `rbac:write`, and `config:write`.
+- Periodically review `all` roles, service accounts, robot allowlists, and dormant users.
+- On offboarding, disable the account first, then revoke robot bindings, assignments, and sessions.
+- Monitor RBAC denials, user/role changes, resource assignments, and robot service-account execution in audit logs.
+- Pair RBAC with HITL for dangerous tools; permission to invoke does not bypass approval policy.
+
+---
+
+## 12. Troubleshooting
+
+### A button is missing
+
+The frontend hides actions based on `/api/rbac/me`. Verify the required permission. Direct API calls are still rejected server-side.
+
+### Permission exists but the resource is denied
+
+Inspect the scope for that specific permission, not only the overall display scope. Then check owner, explicit assignment, and parent assignment.
+
+### Role changed but the user sees old access
+
+Role changes revoke sessions. Sign in again. Robots resolve again on the next message.
+
+### The built-in `admin` password is lost
+
+Prefer resetting it from another administrator account with `rbac:write`. If no administrator session is available, follow the [administrator password recovery procedure](troubleshooting.md#recover-a-forgotten-admin-password) on the server.
+
+### A global mutation is denied despite `write`
+
+Process-global definitions require the corresponding permission with `all` scope. Create a dedicated global administration role instead of widening unrelated permissions.
+
+### Agent chat works but commands fail
+
+`agent:execute` and `agent:local-execute` are separate. Grant local execution only when necessary and combine it with HITL, tool allowlists, and audit.
+
+### External MCP requires global scope
+
+The user needs `mcp:external:execute`, and that permission's scope must be `all`.

docs/en-US/robot.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 [中文](../zh-CN/robot.md)
 
-This document explains how to chat with CyberStrikeAI from **personal WeChat**, **DingTalk**, **Lark (Feishu)**, and **WeCom (Enterprise WeChat)** using long-lived connections or HTTP callbacks—no need to open a browser on the server. Following the steps below helps avoid common mistakes.
+This guide covers **Personal WeChat, WeCom, DingTalk, Lark, Telegram, Slack, Discord, and QQ Bot**, including platform connectivity, RBAC identity binding, service-account allowlists, commands, verification, and troubleshooting.
 
 ---
 
@@ -15,10 +15,18 @@ This document explains how to chat with CyberStrikeAI from **personal WeChat**,
    - **Personal WeChat**: Open **WeChat / iLink** → **Generate QR code and bind**, then scan with WeChat (see [Section 3.4](#34-personal-wechat-wechat--ilink))
    - **DingTalk**: Enable and fill in Client ID / Client Secret
    - **Lark**: Enable and fill in App ID / App Secret
-5. Click **Apply configuration** to save (WeChat binding saves and enables automatically on success—usually no extra click needed)
+5. Click **Apply configuration** to save and automatically restart the corresponding bot connection. WeChat binding saves and enables automatically on success.
-6. **Restart the CyberStrikeAI process** (DingTalk/Lark: saving alone does not establish the connection; WeChat auto-restarts the iLink poll after binding—usually no manual restart needed)
 
-Settings are written to the `robots` section of `config.yaml`; you can also edit the file directly. **After changing DingTalk or Lark config, you must restart for the long-lived connection to take effect.** Personal WeChat binding automatically writes `robots.wechat` and restarts the iLink long poll.
+Settings are written to the `robots` section of `config.yaml`; you can also edit the file directly. Web-based **Apply configuration** restarts the corresponding connection automatically. Restart the CyberStrikeAI process only when editing YAML directly. Personal WeChat binding automatically writes `robots.wechat` and restarts the iLink long poll.
+
+### Shortest path to first use
+
+After the platform connection works, configure the business identity before sending normal prompts:
+
+- **Multiple users**: choose User binding → each user generates a code from the top-right Web user menu → sends the bind command to the bot → runs `whoami` to verify.
+- **Only you**: run `whoami` first and copy the sender ID → choose Service account → set User ID to `admin` or another RBAC user → paste the exact sender allowlist → apply configuration → run `whoami` again.
+
+Start normal AI chat only after the response shows an authorized status and the expected effective identity.
 
 ---
 
@@ -82,7 +90,7 @@ If you only have a **custom bot** Webhook URL (`oapi.dingtalk.com/robot/send?acc
    - In CyberStrikeAI: System settings → Robot settings → DingTalk.  
    - Enable “Enable DingTalk robot”.  
    - Paste the Client ID and Client Secret from step 3.  
-   - Click **Apply configuration**, then **restart CyberStrikeAI**.
+   - Click **Apply configuration**; CyberStrikeAI restarts the DingTalk connection automatically.
 
 ---
 
@@ -105,7 +113,7 @@ If you only have a **custom bot** Webhook URL (`oapi.dingtalk.com/robot/send?acc
 | App Secret | From Lark open platform app credentials |
 | Verify Token | Optional; for event subscription |
 
-**Lark setup in short**: Log in to [Lark Open Platform](https://open.feishu.cn) → Create an enterprise app → In “Credentials and basic info” get **App ID** and **App Secret** → In “Application capabilities” enable **Robot** and the right permissions → Add **event subscription** and **permissions** below → Publish the app → Enter App ID and App Secret in CyberStrikeAI robot settings → Save and **restart** the app.
+**Lark setup in short**: Log in to [Lark Open Platform](https://open.feishu.cn) → Create an enterprise app → In “Credentials and basic info” get **App ID** and **App Secret** → In “Application capabilities” enable **Robot** and the right permissions → Add **event subscription** and **permissions** below → Publish the app → Enter App ID and App Secret in CyberStrikeAI robot settings → **Apply configuration**.
 
 **Event subscription**  
 The long-lived connection only receives message events if you subscribe to them. In the app’s **Events and callbacks** (事件与回调) → **Event subscription** (事件订阅), add the event **Receive message** (**im.message.receive_v1**). Without it, the connection succeeds but no message events are delivered (no logs when users send messages).
@@ -272,12 +280,79 @@ In **Permission management** (权限管理), enable the following (names and ide
 
 ---
 
-## 4. Bot commands
+## 4. RBAC authorization and bot commands
+
+Platform credentials and callback signatures authenticate the messaging platform. CyberStrikeAI RBAC determines what the sender can actually do. Each bot instance uses one authorization mode.
+
+### 4.1 Choose an authorization mode
+
+| Scenario | Recommended mode | Identity and data behavior |
+|----------|------------------|----------------------------|
+| Shared WeCom, Lark, DingTalk, or Slack bot | `user_binding` | Each sender binds their own Web user; permissions and resources remain isolated |
+| Personal WeChat, single-user bot, fixed automation entry | `service_account` | Allowlisted senders share the configured RBAC user's permissions and owned resources |
+
+Both modes resolve user status, roles, per-permission scope, and resource assignments before every message. Basic AI chat requires:
+
+```text
+agent:execute
+chat:read
+chat:write
+```
+
+Grant project, role, local execution, WebShell, C2, or MCP permissions only when those features are required. Conversation deletion also requires `chat:delete`.
+
+### 4.2 User-binding mode (default)
+
+Administrator:
+
+1. Open System settings → Robot settings → select a platform.
+2. Set Authorization policy to `user_binding` and apply the configuration.
+
+Each user:
+
+1. Sign in to the Web UI and open the top-right user menu → **Bind robot account**.
+2. Generate a binding code; a five-minute countdown starts.
+3. Send the full command to the target bot, for example `bind 7C6E-BD4C`.
+4. Send `whoami` and confirm the effective RBAC identity is their own Web user.
+
+Codes are stored only as hashes and are single-use. When the countdown ends, the UI marks the code expired, disables copying, and refreshes the binding list; the server also rejects it. Generating a new code immediately invalidates the previous unused code. Users can send `unbind` or revoke a binding from the Web dialog.
+
+### 4.3 Service-account mode
+
+1. Connect the bot to its messaging platform.
+2. Have each intended sender run `whoami` and copy the exact sender ID. For Personal WeChat it usually resembles `xxxx@im.wechat`; never substitute `ilink_bot_id` or configured `ilink_user_id`.
+3. In Robot settings, select `service_account`.
+4. Enter the RBAC **User ID**, not its display name. `admin` is allowed; every allowlisted sender then receives full platform permissions and the UI shows a red warning.
+5. Add one exact sender ID per line. Matching is case-sensitive and `*` wildcards are rejected.
+6. Apply configuration and run `whoami` again to verify the effective user, roles, and scope.
+
+Example:
+
+```yaml
+robots:
+  wechat:
+    auth:
+      mode: service_account
+      service_user_id: admin
+      allowed_external_users:
+        - "o9cq806s32Sm2_kyOmkyaV7Rn1lU@im.wechat"
+```
+
+Service-account mode rejects `bind` and `unbind`. All allowlisted senders share conversations, projects, and other resources owned by the service account. Use `user_binding` when that sharing is undesirable.
+
+### 4.4 Inspect the effective identity
+
+Send `whoami`. The response includes platform, exact sender ID, authorization mode and status, effective RBAC user and ID, roles, scope, and permission count. A non-allowlisted sender sees only the denial status and no service-account details.
+
+### 4.5 Command list
 
 Send these **text commands** to the bot on any connected platform (text only):
 
 | Command | Description |
 |---------|-------------|
+| **绑定 \<code\>** or **bind \<code\>** | Bind the verified platform sender to the RBAC user that generated the code |
+| **解绑** or **unbind** | Remove the current platform identity binding |
+| **身份** or **whoami** | Show sender ID, authorization mode, binding status, and the effective RBAC user, roles, and scope |
 | **帮助** (help) | Show command help |
 | **列表** or **对话列表** (list) | List all conversation titles and IDs |
 | **切换 \<conversationID\>** or **继续 \<conversationID\>** | Continue in the given conversation |
@@ -292,6 +367,8 @@ Send these **text commands** to the bot on any connected platform (text only):
 
 Any other text is sent to the AI as a user message, same as in the web UI (e.g. penetration testing, security analysis).
 
+Group messages are authorized as the actual sender, never as a group ID. In service-account mode, explicitly allowlisted senders intentionally share the configured account.
+
 ---
 
 ## 5. How to use (do I need to @ the bot?)
@@ -310,14 +387,17 @@ Summary: **Personal WeChat and direct chat**—just send; **DingTalk/Lark in a g
 
 1. CyberStrikeAI web UI → System settings → Robot settings → **WeChat / iLink** → **Generate QR code and bind**.  
 2. Scan with WeChat and confirm (enter pairing code on the web page if prompted).  
-3. After binding, send “帮助” in the WeChat private chat to test.
+3. Send `whoami` in the WeChat private chat and copy the sender ID.
+4. Choose `user_binding`, or configure `service_account` with the RBAC user and exact sender allowlist.
+5. Apply configuration, run `whoami` again, then send a normal message.
 
 **DingTalk / Lark**
 
 1. **In the open platform**: Complete app creation, copy credentials, enable the bot (DingTalk: **Stream mode**), set permissions, and publish (Section 3).  
 2. **In CyberStrikeAI**: System settings → Robot settings → Enable the platform, paste Client ID/App ID and Client Secret/App Secret → **Apply configuration**.  
-3. **Restart the CyberStrikeAI process** (otherwise the long-lived connection is not established).  
+3. **Choose authorization**: use `user_binding` for multiple users, or configure a service account and exact allowlist for a dedicated bot.
-4. **On your phone**: Open DingTalk or Lark, find the bot (direct chat or @ in a group), send “帮助” or any message to test.
+4. **Apply configuration**; the Web UI restarts the corresponding connection automatically.
+5. **On your phone**: Open the bot, run `whoami` first, then send a normal message.
 
 If the bot does not respond, see **Section 9 (troubleshooting)** and **Section 10 (common pitfalls)**.
 
@@ -331,6 +411,11 @@ Example `robots` section in `config.yaml`:
 robots:
   wechat: # Personal WeChat iLink (auto-filled after QR bind; usually no manual edit)
     enabled: true
+    auth:
+      mode: service_account
+      service_user_id: admin
+      allowed_external_users:
+        - "exact sender ID copied from whoami"
     bot_token: "your_bot_token@im.bot:..."
     ilink_bot_id: "your_bot_id@im.bot"
     ilink_user_id: "your_user_id@im.wechat"
@@ -339,10 +424,14 @@ robots:
     bot_agent: "CyberStrikeAI/1.0"
   dingtalk:
     enabled: true
+    auth:
+      mode: user_binding
     client_id: "your_dingtalk_app_key"
     client_secret: "your_dingtalk_app_secret"
   lark:
     enabled: true
+    auth:
+      mode: user_binding
     app_id: "your_lark_app_id"
     app_secret: "your_lark_app_secret"
     verify_token: ""
@@ -372,7 +461,7 @@ robots:
     sandbox: true
 ```
 
-After changing DingTalk/Lark/WeCom/Telegram/Slack/Discord/QQ settings, **Apply configuration** restarts the corresponding connections. Personal WeChat QR binding saves and restarts automatically.
+Authorization is configured independently per platform; omitting `auth` defaults to `user_binding`. **Apply configuration** restarts the corresponding connections. Restart the process only after editing YAML directly. Personal WeChat QR binding saves and restarts automatically.
 
 ---
 
@@ -380,20 +469,24 @@ After changing DingTalk/Lark/WeCom/Telegram/Slack/Discord/QQ settings, **Apply c
 
 You can verify bot logic with the **test API** (no DingTalk/Lark client needed):
 
-1. Log in to the CyberStrikeAI web UI (so you have a session).
+1. Sign in with an account that has global `robot:write` permission and obtain a Bearer token.
-2. Call the test endpoint with curl (include your session Cookie):
+2. Call the test endpoint with curl:
 
 ```bash
-# Replace YOUR_COOKIE with the Cookie from your browser (F12 → Network → any request → Request headers → Cookie)
+# Adjust the URL, username, and password for your deployment
+TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:8080/api/auth/login" \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  -d '{"username":"admin","password":"YOUR_PASSWORD"}' | jq -r '.token')
+
 curl -X POST "http://localhost:8080/api/robot/test" \
   -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-  -H "Cookie: YOUR_COOKIE" \
+  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
   -d '{"platform":"dingtalk","user_id":"test_user","text":"帮助"}'
 ```
 
-If the JSON response contains `"reply":"【CyberStrikeAI 机器人命令】..."`, command handling works. You can also try `"text":"列表"` or `"text":"当前"`.
+If the JSON response contains `"reply":"【CyberStrikeAI 机器人命令】..."`, command handling works. `help`, `version`, and `whoami` work before binding. `list`, `current`, and normal AI messages enforce RBAC: the test `platform + user_id` must already be bound or exactly match the service-account allowlist.
 
-API: `POST /api/robot/test` (requires login). Body: `{"platform":"optional","user_id":"optional","text":"required"}`. Response: `{"reply":"..."}`.
+API: `POST /api/robot/test` (requires global `robot:write`). Body: `{"platform":"optional","user_id":"optional","text":"required"}`. Response: `{"reply":"..."}`. This endpoint simulates bot business logic only; it does not validate a third-party callback signature or long-lived connection.
 
 ---
 
@@ -407,7 +500,7 @@ Check in this order:
    Robot settings should show “Connected” or a bound Bot ID; `robots.wechat.bot_token` in `config.yaml` must not be empty.
 
 2. **Enabled?**  
-   Confirm “Enable WeChat robot” is checked; restart CyberStrikeAI if you just changed settings.
+   Confirm “Enable WeChat robot” is checked and click **Apply configuration** if you just changed settings.
 
 3. **Application logs**  
    - On startup: `微信 iLink 长轮询已启动`;  
@@ -430,8 +523,8 @@ Check in this order:
 1. **Client ID / Client Secret match the open platform exactly**  
    Copy from “Credentials and basic info”; avoid typing. Watch **0** vs **o** and **1** vs **l** (e.g. `ding9gf9tiozuc504aer` has **504**, not 5o4).
 
-2. **Did you restart after saving?**  
+2. **Did you apply the configuration?**  
-   The long-lived connection is created at **startup**. “Apply configuration” only updates the config file; you **must restart the CyberStrikeAI process** for the DingTalk connection to start.
+   Web changes require **Apply configuration**, which restarts the corresponding connection automatically. Restart the process only after editing `config.yaml` directly.
 
 3. **Application logs**  
    - On startup you should see: `钉钉 Stream 正在连接…`, `钉钉 Stream 已启动（无需公网），等待收消息`.  
@@ -441,6 +534,15 @@ Check in this order:
 4. **Open platform**  
    The app must be **published**. Under “Robot” you must enable **Stream** for receiving messages (HTTP callback only is not enough). Permission management must include robot receive/send message permissions.
 
+### 9.3 Reply says unbound, sender denied, or permission missing
+
+1. Run `whoami` and inspect the authorization mode and status.
+2. In `user_binding`, generate a code from the top-right Web user menu and send the complete bind command from the same platform identity. Regenerate expired or already-used codes.
+3. In `service_account`, copy the exact sender ID from `whoami` into that platform's allowlist. Preserve case, tenant prefixes, and suffixes such as `@im.wechat`.
+4. If an effective user is shown but permissions are missing, grant at least `agent:execute`, `chat:read`, and `chat:write` for normal AI chat.
+5. A missing or disabled service user is rejected when applying configuration.
+6. If `admin` is denied, the usual cause is an allowlist mismatch—not insufficient admin permissions.
+
 ---
 
 ## 10. Common pitfalls
@@ -448,7 +550,11 @@ Check in this order:
 - **Personal WeChat vs WeCom**: Personal WeChat uses `robots.wechat` + web QR bind; WeCom uses `robots.wecom` + admin callback URL—they are completely different.  
 - **WeChat QR expired**: QR codes last ~5 minutes; regenerate instead of reusing an old one.  
 - **Wrong bot type**: The “Custom” bot added in a DingTalk **group** (Webhook + sign secret) **cannot** be used for two-way chat. Only the **enterprise internal app** bot from the open platform is supported.  
-- **Saved but not restarted**: After changing DingTalk/Lark robot settings you **must restart** the app (WeChat QR bind restarts the connection automatically).  
+- **Configuration not applied**: Click **Apply configuration** after Web changes; connections restart automatically. A process restart is needed only for direct YAML edits.  
+- **Bot ID used as sender ID**: Copy the sender ID from `whoami`; do not use `ilink_bot_id`, configured `ilink_user_id`, a group ID, or a display name.  
+- **Reusing an expired code**: Codes last five minutes and are single-use; generating a new code immediately invalidates the old one.  
+- **Assuming service-account users are isolated**: All allowlisted senders share that account's conversations and owned resources. Use `user_binding` for isolation.  
+- **Assuming admin removes the allowlist**: It does not. The sender must still match exactly, but every matching sender gets full permissions.  
 - **Client ID typo**: If the platform shows `504`, use `504` (not `5o4`); prefer copy/paste.  
 - **DingTalk: only HTTP callback, no Stream**: This app receives messages via **Stream**. In the open platform, message reception must be **Stream mode**.  
 - **App not published**: After changing the bot or permissions in the open platform, **publish a new version** under “Version management and release”, or changes won’t apply.
@@ -459,5 +565,5 @@ Check in this order:
 
 - All platforms: **text messages only**; other types (e.g. image, voice) are not supported and may be ignored.  
 - Personal WeChat: **private chat only**—group @-bot is not supported.  
-- Conversations are shared with the web UI: conversations created from the bot appear in the web “Conversations” list and vice versa.  
+- Bot data is shared with the web UI: under `user_binding` it belongs to the bound user; under `service_account` it belongs to the service account and is shared by allowlisted senders.  
 - Bot execution uses the same **Eino single/multi-agent** path as the web UI (`ProcessMessageForRobot`, with progress callbacks and process details stored in the DB); only the final reply is sent back to personal WeChat/DingTalk/Lark/WeCom in one message (no SSE). Default: `robot_default_agent_mode: eino_single`.

docs/en-US/runbooks.md

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ config.yaml
 
 ```yaml
 auth:
-  password: "<long-random-password>"
+  session_duration_hours: 12
 server:
   host: 127.0.0.1
   port: 8080

docs/en-US/security-hardening.md

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ This checklist covers pre-production and continuous hardening for CyberStrikeAI.
 
 ## Before Going Live
 
-- Change `auth.password` to a long random secret.
+- Change the initial `admin` password from the Web UI after first login.
 - Use HTTPS or a trusted reverse proxy.
 - Restrict access by IP, VPN, or bastion.
 - Enable `audit.enabled`.

docs/en-US/tool-execution-governance.md

@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+# Tool Execution Governance
+
+[Back to English documentation](README.md)
+
+This document describes how CyberStrikeAI governs long-running tools, blocking MCP calls, oversized outputs, cancellation, and context restore. The goal is to preserve standard Agent/Eino tool semantics while preventing tool hangs, context blowups, oversized database records, and unsafe resume behavior.
+
+## Goals
+
+- **Keep the agent runner responsive**: tools may run for a long time, but the current runner waits only for a bounded interval.
+- **Allow long tasks to continue**: timeout returns an `execution_id`; later turns can call `wait_tool_execution`.
+- **Support cancellation**: users and agents can cancel a running execution.
+- **Keep DB and agent views identical**: the database stores the same canonical capped result returned to the agent.
+- **Protect resume paths**: resume uses model-facing traces and caps historical oversized tool traces.
+- **Isolate external MCP failures**: external MCP servers are protected by per-server concurrency limits, global concurrency limits, and circuit breakers.
+
+## Execution Model
+
+Tool calls still appear to Eino/Agent as standard tool invocations, but the blocking work runs in a worker:
+
+```text
+Agent calls tool
+  -> ExecutionService creates execution
+  -> worker runs the real MCP/tool call
+  -> Agent bounded wait
+       -> completed: return tool result
+       -> still running: return execution_id, worker continues in background
+```
+
+This prevents MCP servers, `exec`, `sqlmap`, `nmap`, `nuclei`, and similar long-running tools from binding the current runner indefinitely.
+
+## Execution Statuses
+
+| Status | Meaning |
+|---|---|
+| `queued` | Execution exists and is waiting for a worker or concurrency slot |
+| `running` | Worker is executing |
+| `background_running` | UI display state: agent stopped waiting, background worker continues |
+| `completed` | This tool call completed |
+| `failed` | The tool actually failed |
+| `cancelled` | User, agent, or session cleanup cancelled the execution |
+| `hard_timeout` | The tool exceeded its hard timeout |
+| `orphaned` | A persisted running execution no longer has a runtime worker |
+
+Important: when `wait_tool_execution` reaches `timeout_seconds` and the target execution is still running, the wait call itself is a completed observation, not a failed tool execution.
+
+## Control Tools
+
+| Tool | Purpose |
+|---|---|
+| `get_tool_execution` | Read current execution state |
+| `wait_tool_execution` | Wait for a selected execution for a bounded interval |
+| `cancel_tool_execution` | Cancel a selected execution |
+
+`get_tool_execution` and `wait_tool_execution` can include a live output preview:
+
+- `include_partial_output`: whether to return partial output, default `true`.
+- `partial_output_max_bytes`: tail preview limit for this call, default `4096`, maximum `65536`.
+
+Partial output is a bounded preview of output produced so far, not the final `result`. The canonical `result` is still written only when the tool finishes. Tools that do not support streaming output simply omit partial fields.
+
+Typical flow:
+
+```text
+1. Call a long-running tool such as exec/sqlmap/nmap
+2. After tool_wait_timeout_seconds, receive execution_id
+3. Agent can continue reasoning, use other tools, or call wait_tool_execution
+4. If still incomplete, continue waiting or call cancel_tool_execution
+```
+
+`tool_wait_timeout_seconds` applies to internal MCP tools, external MCP tools, and Eino filesystem's streaming `execute`. Eino's non-streaming filesystem tools such as `ls/read_file/write_file/edit_file/glob/grep` are recorded in execution monitoring, but they are not converted into resumable background workers.
+
+## Cancellation and Session Cleanup
+
+- User stop cancels running tools for the current conversation.
+- Normal session end cancels remaining running tools for the current conversation.
+- Interrupt-and-continue style flows do not mass-cancel tools.
+- Conversation-scoped cancellation avoids killing tools from other conversations.
+
+## External MCP Isolation
+
+External MCP servers can hang, disconnect, or return failures. CyberStrikeAI uses three protections:
+
+| Capability | Config | Description |
+|---|---|---|
+| Per-server concurrency | `external_mcp_max_concurrent_per_server` | Max simultaneous calls for one external MCP server |
+| Global concurrency | `external_mcp_max_concurrent_total` | Max simultaneous external MCP calls across all servers |
+| Circuit breaker | `external_mcp_circuit_failure_threshold` / `external_mcp_circuit_cooldown_seconds` | Temporarily fast-fails a server after repeated failures |
+
+Recommended defaults:
+
+```yaml
+agent:
+  external_mcp_max_concurrent_per_server: 2
+  external_mcp_max_concurrent_total: 16
+  external_mcp_circuit_failure_threshold: 3
+  external_mcp_circuit_cooldown_seconds: 60
+```
+
+## Output Governance
+
+CyberStrikeAI uses `multi_agent.eino_middleware.reduction_max_length_for_trunc` as the unified tool result cap. The example configuration uses 50000 bytes.
+
+```yaml
+multi_agent:
+  eino_middleware:
+    reduction_enable: true
+    reduction_max_length_for_trunc: 50000
+```
+
+Coverage:
+
+| Channel | Behavior |
+|---|---|
+| Agent-facing tool result | Uses the canonical capped result |
+| DB / monitor storage | Stores the same canonical result |
+| `get_tool_execution` / `wait_tool_execution` | Reads the same canonical result |
+| Eino `execute` / filesystem monitor records | Capped before completion is persisted |
+| Non-streaming `exec` stdout/stderr | Source-side bounded buffer |
+| Streaming `exec` stdout/stderr | Streamed UI output is also bounded |
+| PTY execution path | Uses the same output cap |
+| Frontend detail modal | Has an additional UI display cap |
+
+When the cap is reached, the full output is written to a local trunc file and the agent-facing payload becomes a `<persisted-output>` notice (with absolute path) that fits inside the configured budget.
+
+Example:
+
+```text
+<persisted-output>
+Output too large (200000). Full output saved to: /path/to/tmp/reduction/conversations/<id>/trunc/<execution_id>
+Use read_file with offset/limit to read parts of the file.
+Preview (first …):
+…
+
+Preview (last …):
+…
+
+</persisted-output>
+```
+
+The current strategy is “spill full text to disk + bounded preview in context.” Agents can recover the original via `read_file`.
+
+## Database and Resume Context
+
+New results are written through this path:
+
+```text
+tool completes
+  -> NormalizeToolResultForStorage
+  -> update in-memory execution
+  -> persist to DB
+  -> return to Agent
+```
+
+So, under normal operation, the DB stores exactly the result returned to the agent.
+
+Resume uses `LastAgentTraceInput`, which is the model-facing trace that actually reached ChatModel, not raw event accumulation. The restore path also caps historical tool content to prevent context blowups from:
+
+- pre-upgrade DB records that contain raw large output,
+- manual imports or migrations,
+- lowering the configured cap from a larger value,
+- future bypasses that accidentally skip canonicalization.
+
+## Recommended Configuration
+
+For long-running security tasks:
+
+```yaml
+agent:
+  max_iterations: 800
+  tool_timeout_minutes: 60
+  tool_wait_timeout_seconds: 30
+  external_mcp_max_concurrent_per_server: 2
+  external_mcp_max_concurrent_total: 16
+  external_mcp_circuit_failure_threshold: 3
+  external_mcp_circuit_cooldown_seconds: 60
+  shell_no_output_timeout_seconds: 1200
+
+multi_agent:
+  eino_middleware:
+    reduction_enable: true
+    reduction_max_length_for_trunc: 50000
+```
+
+| Parameter | Recommended | Notes |
+|---|---:|---|
+| `max_iterations` | `300-1000` | Very large values weaken loop protection |
+| `tool_timeout_minutes` | `60` | Hard timeout for tools such as sqlmap |
+| `tool_wait_timeout_seconds` | `30-60` | Agent wait bound before returning `execution_id` |
+| `shell_no_output_timeout_seconds` | `600-1200` | Kills silent hangs |
+| `reduction_max_length_for_trunc` | `50000` | Unified tool result cap |
+
+Do not make `tool_wait_timeout_seconds` very large by default. Long tasks should continue in workers and be observed by `execution_id`, rather than blocking one turn for several minutes.
+
+## Testing
+
+Long-task test prompt:
+
+```text
+Call exec to run sleep 120. If it is not done after 10 seconds, do not keep waiting; report execution_id, call wait_tool_execution for 5 seconds, then cancel_tool_execution if still incomplete and report final status.
+```
+
+Large-output test prompt:
+
+```text
+Call exec to run: python3 - <<'PY'
+print("A" * 200000)
+PY
+Then show the tool result length and whether it contains the truncation marker.
+```
+
+Expected behavior:
+
+- The initial long task returns an `execution_id` and status `running` or UI `background_running`.
+- `wait_tool_execution` timing out while the target is still running is not displayed as a tool failure.
+- Large output never exceeds `reduction_max_length_for_trunc`.
+- DB, monitor details, and agent continuation use the same capped result.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- CyberStrikeAI cannot control how a remote external MCP server collects output internally; it caps results after they enter CyberStrikeAI and protects calls with concurrency limits and circuit breakers.
+- Oversized tool output is spilled to local `tmp/reduction/.../trunc/<id>` (or `reduction_root_dir`) before truncation; the bounded result includes an absolute path for `read_file`.

docs/en-US/troubleshooting.md

@@ -37,11 +37,23 @@ Page inaccessible:
 
 Login fails:
 
-- wrong `auth.password`;
+- wrong RBAC user password;
 - config not applied/restarted;
 - stale cookie;
 - audit throttling repeated failures.
 
+### Recover a forgotten `admin` password
+
+If another administrator with `rbac:write` is available, reset the password under **Platform permissions → User management**.
+
+If no administrator session is available, the built-in `admin` account can be recovered on the server. Stop CyberStrikeAI, back up the database, change to the project root, and run the command below. Enter and confirm the new password when prompted:
+
+```bash
+HASH=$(htpasswd -nBC 10 '' | cut -d: -f2 | tr -d '\n') && sqlite3 data/conversations.db "UPDATE rbac_users SET password_hash='$HASH', updated_at=CURRENT_TIMESTAMP WHERE id='admin' AND username='admin' AND is_builtin=1; SELECT changes();"
+```
+
+Output `1` means that the row was updated. The command requires `sqlite3` and `htpasswd`. If `database.path` in `config.yaml` is not the default, replace `data/conversations.db`. Password input is hidden, is not written to shell history, and is stored as a bcrypt hash. Restart the service afterward to invalidate existing login sessions.
+
 Model fails:
 
 - wrong `base_url` path;

docs/en-US/workflow-graph.md

@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
-# CyberStrikeAI Graph Orchestration Guide
+# CyberStrikeAI Workflows Guide
 
 [中文](../zh-CN/workflow-graph.md)
 
-This document explains how to use **Graph Orchestration**: building workflows on the canvas, configuring node types, passing data between nodes, and binding a graph to a role for automatic execution.
+This document explains how to use **Workflows**: building workflows on the canvas, configuring node types, passing data between nodes, and binding a workflow to a role for automatic execution.
 
 ---
 
-## 1. Where to find Graph Orchestration
+## 1. Where to find Workflows
 
 1. Log in to the CyberStrikeAI web UI.  
-2. Open **Graph Orchestration** in the left sidebar.  
+2. Open **Workflows** in the left sidebar.  
 3. Select an existing workflow from the list, or create a new one.  
 4. Drag nodes, draw edges, and configure properties on the canvas.  
 5. Fill in **ID**, **Name**, and **Description**, then click **Save**.

docs/zh-CN/README.md

@@ -1,29 +1,32 @@
 # 中文文档
 
-- [部署指南](deployment.md)：部署形态、HTTPS、反向代理、systemd、备份、升级和验收。
+[文档首页](../README.md) | [English](../en-US/README.md)
-- [运维 Runbooks](runbooks.md)：生产部署、外部 MCP、知识库、Web 测试、C2 清理和工具排障的操作步骤。
+
-- [配置画像](configuration-profiles.md)：本地开发、内网团队、知识库、高审计生产、C2 演练等推荐配置。
+## 按目标开始
-- [安全加固指南](security-hardening.md)：上线前基线、反向代理、HITL 白名单、文件权限和周期巡检。
+
-- [API Recipes](api-recipes.md)：登录、Agent、流式、多代理、上传、漏洞、知识库、MCP 和审计导出示例。
+- **快速体验**：[部署指南](deployment.md) → [配置参考](configuration.md) → [排错指南](troubleshooting.md)
-- [贡献规范](contributing-guide.md)：新增 API、配置、工具、前端、数据库、高风险能力和文档的 checklist。
+- **生产部署**：[配置画像](configuration-profiles.md) → [安全加固](security-hardening.md) → [运维 Runbooks](runbooks.md) → [审计与监控](audit-and-monitoring.md)
-- [配置参考](configuration.md)：`config.yaml` 字段、热应用边界、参数建议和源码锚点。
+- **接入与自动化**：[API 参考](api-reference.md) → [API Recipes](api-recipes.md) → [MCP 联邦](mcp-federation.md)
-- [安全模型](security-model.md)：信任边界、HITL、工具执行、C2/WebShell 与数据安全。
+- **参与开发**：[开发者指南](developer-guide.md) → [测试指南](testing.md) → [贡献规范](contributing-guide.md)
-- [架构说明](architecture.md)：请求路径、模块关系、复杂度热点和设计取舍。
+
-- [API 参考](api-reference.md)：认证、OpenAPI、SSE、稳定性分层和常用接口。
+## 核心概念与编排
-- [排错指南](troubleshooting.md)：诊断顺序、最小命令、常见误判和故障模板。
+
-- [审计与监控](audit-and-monitoring.md)：平台审计、工具监控、HITL 日志和保留策略。
+- [架构说明](architecture.md) · [安全模型](security-model.md) · [RBAC](rbac.md)
-- [知识库](knowledge-base.md)：索引链路、检索调参、日志分析和内容写法。
+- [Agent 与角色](agent-and-role-guide.md) · [Skills](skills-guide.md) · [Eino 多代理](MULTI_AGENT_EINO.md)
-- [C2 使用说明](c2.md)：生命周期、任务分级、事件复盘和安全建议。
+- [工作流](workflow-graph.md) · [工具执行治理](tool-execution-governance.md) · [人机协同最佳实践](hitl-best-practices.md)
-- [WebShell 管理](webshell.md)：操作分层、连接命名、AI 约束和排错。
+
-- [MCP 联邦](mcp-federation.md)：内置 MCP、外部 MCP、生命周期和工具命名。
+## 功能指南
-- [Agent 与角色](agent-and-role-guide.md)：角色、子代理、Skill、编排模式和工具可见性。
+
-- [Skills 指南](skills-guide.md)：Skill 结构、渐进式披露、反模式和本地工具风险。
+- [资产管理](asset-management.md) · [知识库](knowledge-base.md) · [机器人接入](robot.md) · [视觉分析](VISION.md)
-- [插件开发](plugin-development.md)：API 插件、MCP 插件、资源包插件和安全边界。
+- [WebShell](webshell.md) · [C2](c2.md) · [MCP 联邦](mcp-federation.md)
-- [发布流程](release-process.md)：发布风险、配置兼容、数据库迁移和验收。
+
-- [测试指南](testing.md)：测试分层、回归重点、测试数据和失败用例。
+## 运维与参考
-- [图编排使用说明](workflow-graph.md)
+
-- [人机协同最佳实践](hitl-best-practices.md)
+- [部署指南](deployment.md) · [配置参考](configuration.md) · [配置画像](configuration-profiles.md)
-- [机器人使用说明](robot.md)
+- [安全加固](security-hardening.md) · [审计与监控](audit-and-monitoring.md) · [运维 Runbooks](runbooks.md)
-- [视觉分析](VISION.md)
+- [API 参考](api-reference.md) · [API Recipes](api-recipes.md) · [排错指南](troubleshooting.md)
-- [前端国际化方案](frontend-i18n.md)
+
-- [Eino 多代理改造说明](MULTI_AGENT_EINO.md)
+## 开发与发布
+
+- [开发者指南](developer-guide.md) · [插件开发](plugin-development.md) · [前端国际化](frontend-i18n.md)
+- [测试指南](testing.md) · [贡献规范](contributing-guide.md) · [发布流程](release-process.md)

docs/zh-CN/api-recipes.md

@@ -151,3 +151,52 @@ curl -k "https://127.0.0.1:8080/api/audit/logs/export" \
 ```
 
 导出文件可能包含敏感操作信息，应加密保存。
+
+## Recipe 11：批量导入资产
+
+先准备 `assets.json`：
+
+```json
+{
+  "source": "api-import",
+  "source_query": "cmdb-export-2026-07",
+  "assets": [
+    {
+      "domain": "app.example.com",
+      "port": 443,
+      "protocol": "https",
+      "tags": ["production", "internet"],
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "ip": "192.0.2.10",
+      "port": 22,
+      "protocol": "ssh",
+      "status": "active"
+    }
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+提交：
+
+```bash
+curl -k https://127.0.0.1:8080/api/assets/import \
+  -H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  --data-binary @assets.json
+```
+
+返回示例：
+
+```json
+{"created":2,"updated":0,"skipped":0}
+```
+
+注意：
+
+- 调用者需要 `asset:write` 权限。
+- 每条资产至少填写 `host`、`ip` 或 `domain`。
+- 单次最多 100000 条；大批量请求建议使用文件配合 `--data-binary`，不要把 JSON 直接写进命令行。
+- 已存在的“目标 + 端口 + 协议”会合并更新并计入 `updated`。
+- 如需从 XLSX/CSV 操作，使用 Web 端 **资产库 → 批量导入**；接口本身接收 JSON，不接收 multipart 文件。

docs/zh-CN/api-reference.md

@@ -89,6 +89,136 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 - `GET /api/attack-chain/:conversationId`
 - `POST /api/attack-chain/:conversationId/regenerate`
 
+## 资产管理与批量导入
+
+资产接口：
+
+- `GET /api/assets`：分页查询资产；
+- `GET /api/assets/selection`：按当前筛选条件解析跨页选择，最多返回 10000 条；
+- `GET /api/assets/stats`：获取资产统计，`days` 仅支持 `7`、`30` 或 `90`；
+- `POST /api/assets/import`：新增或去重更新资产，单次最多 100000 条；
+- `POST /api/assets/scan-links`：批量记录扫描关联，单次最多 10000 条；
+- `PUT /api/assets/bulk`：原子批量更新最多 10000 个资产；
+- `PUT /api/assets/project-binding`：批量绑定项目，单次最多 10000 个资产 ID；
+- `POST /api/assets/batch-delete`：原子批量删除最多 10000 个资产；
+- `POST /api/assets/merge`：合并 2-100 个具有共同身份的重复资产；
+- `PUT /api/assets/:id`：更新资产；
+- `DELETE /api/assets/:id`：删除资产。
+
+`GET /api/assets` 和 `GET /api/assets/selection` 使用相同的筛选与排序参数；`selection` 会忽略分页参数并返回全部匹配项（最多 10000 条）：
+
+| 类别 | 参数 |
+| --- | --- |
+| 分页（仅列表） | `page`、`page_size`（最大 100） |
+| 常用 | `q`、`status`、`project_id`、`risk_level`、`min_vulnerabilities`、`max_vulnerabilities` |
+| 目标与来源 | `host`、`ip`、`domain`、`port`、`protocol`、`source`、`tag` |
+| 责任与业务 | `responsible_person`、`department`、`business_system`、`environment`、`criticality` |
+| 地理 | `country`、`province`、`city` |
+| 扫描 | `scan_state=never|scanned`、`scan_overdue_days`、`last_scan_before`、`last_scan_after` |
+| 发现时间 | `first_seen_before`、`first_seen_after`、`last_seen_before`、`last_seen_after` |
+| 排序 | `sort_by`、`sort_order=asc|desc` |
+
+时间参数接受 RFC3339 或 `YYYY-MM-DD`。`sort_by` 支持 `last_seen_at`、`last_scan_at`、`first_seen_at`、`created_at`、`updated_at`、`host`、`port`、`risk_level` 和 `vulnerability_count`。
+
+`POST /api/assets/import` 接收 JSON，而不是 XLSX/CSV 文件。Web 端会在浏览器中解析模板、预览并转换为该请求格式：
+
+```http
+POST /api/assets/import
+Authorization: Bearer <token>
+Content-Type: application/json
+
+{
+  "source": "manual-import",
+  "source_query": "asset-import-2026-07.xlsx",
+  "assets": [
+    {
+      "host": "https://app.example.com:443",
+      "domain": "app.example.com",
+      "port": 443,
+      "protocol": "https",
+      "title": "Example App",
+      "server": "nginx",
+      "project_id": "<project-id>",
+      "responsible_person": "Alice",
+      "department": "Security",
+      "business_system": "Customer Portal",
+      "environment": "production",
+      "criticality": "critical",
+      "tags": ["production", "internet"],
+      "status": "active"
+    },
+    {
+      "ip": "192.0.2.10",
+      "port": 22,
+      "protocol": "ssh",
+      "status": "active"
+    }
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+请求规则：
+
+- `assets` 必须包含 `1-100000` 条；
+- 每条资产的 `host`、`ip`、`domain` 至少一项非空；
+- `port` 范围为 `0-65535`；
+- `status` 仅支持 `active` 或 `inactive`；
+- `environment` 支持空值或 `production`、`staging`、`testing`、`development`、`other`；
+- `criticality` 支持空值或 `critical`、`high`、`medium`、`low`；
+- 标签最多 30 个，单个最多 64 个字符；
+- `project_id` 非空时，调用者必须有权访问该项目；
+- 需要 `asset:write` 权限；
+- 服务端按“目标 + 端口 + 协议”去重，并在同一事务中处理本次请求。
+
+成功响应：
+
+```json
+{
+  "created": 120,
+  "updated": 8,
+  "skipped": 2
+}
+```
+
+- `created`：新建数量；
+- `updated`：命中去重键并合并更新的数量；
+- `skipped`：空记录或因资源归属不可更新而跳过的数量。
+
+字段校验失败返回 `400`，且响应 `error` 会包含出错资产的顺序。项目无权访问返回 `403`。批量导入的模板字段和 UI 操作见[资产管理指南](asset-management.md#从表格批量导入)。
+
+批量编辑示例：
+
+```http
+PUT /api/assets/bulk
+Content-Type: application/json
+
+{
+  "asset_ids": ["<asset-id-1>", "<asset-id-2>"],
+  "responsible_person": "Alice",
+  "department": "Security",
+  "environment": "production",
+  "criticality": "high",
+  "add_tags": ["internet-facing"],
+  "remove_tags": ["untriaged"]
+}
+```
+
+批量字段均为可选；未提供的字段保持原值。`add_tags` 和 `remove_tags` 会在事务内去重处理。批量编辑、项目绑定和批量删除会先验证全部资产的可访问性，任一 ID 不存在或无权访问时整批失败。
+
+重复资产合并示例：
+
+```http
+POST /api/assets/merge
+Content-Type: application/json
+
+{
+  "asset_ids": ["<primary-id>", "<duplicate-id>"],
+  "primary_id": "<primary-id>"
+}
+```
+
+每个待删除记录必须与主资产共享域名、IP 或 Host。主资产已有字段优先，空字段从其他记录补齐，标签取并集；调用者需要更新主资产和删除其余资产的权限。
+
 ## 工具、MCP、配置
 
 配置：
@@ -208,6 +338,7 @@ C2：
 | `/api/auth/*` | 高 | 可直接集成 |
 | `/api/eino-agent*` | 高 | 推荐外部对话入口 |
 | `/api/openapi/spec` | 高 | 用于生成客户端 |
+| `/api/assets/*` | 高 | 资产管理与批量导入 |
 | `/api/config*` | 中 | 管理工具使用，谨慎自动化 |
 | `/api/c2/*`、`/api/webshell/*` | 中 | 高风险，必须加权限边界 |
 | 前端私有调用细节 | 低 | 不建议插件依赖 |
@@ -237,3 +368,5 @@ curl -k https://127.0.0.1:8080/api/eino-agent \
 - OpenAPI：`internal/handler/openapi.go`
 - 单代理：`internal/handler/eino_single_agent.go`
 - 多代理：`internal/handler/multi_agent.go`
+- 资产接口：`internal/handler/asset.go`
+- 资产存储与去重：`internal/database/asset.go`

docs/zh-CN/architecture.md

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ flowchart LR
     M --> T["内置工具 / YAML 工具 / Skills FS"]
     M --> EM["外部 MCP"]
     A --> K["知识库检索"]
-    H --> W["Workflow 图编排"]
+    H --> W["Workflow 工作流"]
     H --> C2["内置 C2"]
     H --> WS["WebShell"]
     H --> AU["Audit / Monitor"]
@@ -73,9 +73,9 @@ MCP 相关：
 
 ## Workflow
 
-图编排在 `internal/workflow/`，HTTP 入口在 `internal/handler/workflow*.go`。它支持 start、agent、tool、condition、hitl、output、end 等节点。
+工作流引擎在 `internal/workflow/`，HTTP 入口在 `internal/handler/workflow*.go`。它支持 start、agent、tool、condition、hitl、output、end 等节点。
 
-详细使用见 [图编排使用说明](workflow-graph.md)。
+详细使用见 [工作流使用说明](workflow-graph.md)。
 
 ## 知识库
 

docs/zh-CN/asset-management.md

@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
+# 资产管理
+
+[English](../en-US/asset-management.md)
+
+资产管理用于将手工录入、网络空间测绘搜索、HTTP API 和 Agent 任务中发现的域名、IP、端口与服务统一归档，形成可持续维护的资产基线。它关注三个问题：当前拥有哪些资产、哪些资产已经检查、风险集中在哪里。
+
+> 资产管理面向安全测试和攻击面治理，不替代完整的企业 CMDB。仅可录入和扫描自有系统或已获得明确授权的目标。
+
+## 功能概览
+
+资产管理包含三个主要入口：
+
+- **资产概览**：统计资产总量、IP、域名、端口、近期变化、扫描覆盖率和协议分布。
+- **资产库**：维护资产身份、服务信息、来源、标签、项目归属、责任与业务属性、扫描记录和风险状态。
+- **信息收集**：查询 FOFA、ZoomEye、Quake 或 Shodan，并将确认归属的结果单条或批量写入资产库。
+
+资产可以进一步发起单目标分析或批量扫描。Agent 保存漏洞并完成扫描回写后，资产列表会同步展示相关漏洞数量、风险等级和最近扫描时间。
+
+概览支持切换最近 7、30 或 90 天，展示新增/停用资产趋势、漏洞发现趋势（含严重和高危）、扫描覆盖率、30 天内覆盖率、从未扫描与过期资产数量，以及协议 Top 8 分布。所有统计均受当前用户的资产访问范围约束。
+
+## 资产字段
+
+每条资产可记录：
+
+- Host、IP、域名、端口和协议；
+- 页面标题、服务或产品指纹；
+- 国家/地区、省份/州和城市；
+- 负责人、部门、业务系统、环境和重要性；
+- 来源、来源查询条件和标签；
+- 活跃或停用状态；
+- 所属项目和所有者；
+- 首次发现、最近发现、创建和更新时间；
+- 最近扫描时间及关联的对话、任务队列和子任务；
+- 相关漏洞数量和当前风险等级。
+
+至少需要提供 `host`、`ip` 或 `domain` 中的一项。
+
+## 建立资产基线
+
+### 手工新增
+
+进入 **资产管理 → 资产库**，点击 **新增资产**。常见目标格式包括：
+
+```text
+https://example.com:8443
+example.com
+192.0.2.10:443
+[2001:db8::1]:443
+```
+
+系统会尽量识别 URL、域名、IP、端口和协议。保存前可继续补充项目、标签、标题、服务指纹、地理位置、负责人、部门、业务系统、环境、重要性和状态。
+
+### 从表格批量导入
+
+进入 **资产管理 → 资产库**，点击 **批量导入**：
+
+1. 下载 XLSX（推荐）或 CSV 模板。
+2. 在 `Assets` 工作表中填写资产；不要修改表头。
+3. 上传文件，或将文件拖入上传区域。
+4. 查看逐行校验结果。文件内重复、格式错误和无权访问的项目会标为错误。
+5. 点击 **导入有效数据**。错误行不会提交，预览超过 100 行时只展示前 100 行，但提交会处理全部有效行。
+6. 根据提示核对新增、更新和跳过数量。
+
+模板字段：
+
+| 字段 | 必填 | 说明 |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `target` | 条件必填 | URL、域名、IPv4、IPv6 或带端口目标；当 `host`、`ip`、`domain` 均为空时必填 |
+| `project` | 否 | 已有项目的精确名称或项目 ID；留空表示不绑定 |
+| `tags` | 否 | 逗号、中文逗号、分号或竖线分隔；最多 30 个，单个最多 64 个字符 |
+| `host` | 条件必填 | 完整 URL 或 Host；可与 `target` 配合补充 |
+| `ip` | 条件必填 | 合法 IPv4 或 IPv6 |
+| `domain` | 条件必填 | 合法域名，国际化域名会规范化 |
+| `port` | 否 | `0-65535`；留空时可从 `target` 推断 |
+| `protocol` | 否 | 如 `http`、`https`、`ssh`；留空时可从 URL 或常用端口推断 |
+| `title` | 否 | 页面标题，最多 500 个字符 |
+| `server` | 否 | 服务或产品指纹 |
+| `country` / `province` / `city` | 否 | 地理归属信息 |
+| `responsible_person` | 否 | 负责人，最多 255 个字符 |
+| `department` | 否 | 责任部门，最多 255 个字符 |
+| `business_system` | 否 | 所属业务系统，最多 255 个字符 |
+| `environment` | 否 | `production`、`staging`、`testing`、`development` 或 `other` |
+| `criticality` | 否 | `critical`、`high`、`medium` 或 `low` |
+| `status` | 否 | `active` 或 `inactive`，也接受“活跃”“停用”；默认 `active` |
+
+表头同时识别模板中的英文字段和常用中文别名；环境和重要性也接受模板列中对应的中文值。为避免不同系统导出的列名产生歧义，自动化流程仍建议使用模板中的英文表头和枚举值。
+
+限制与处理规则：
+
+- 单个 XLSX/CSV 文件最多 100000 行、100 MB。
+- `/api/assets/import` 单次请求最多 100000 条资产。
+- 文件内相同“目标 + 端口 + 协议”的后续行会标记为重复，不会提交。
+- Web 端负责文件解析、预览和即时格式提示；服务端仍会执行权限检查、字段校验、规范化、去重和事务写入。
+- 已存在的资产会合并本次提供的非空字段并更新最近发现时间；不会创建重复记录。
+- 批量导入需要 `asset:write` 权限。填写项目时，当前用户还必须有权访问该项目。
+- 不建议取消服务端条数上限。更大规模的数据应拆分文件并在低峰期导入。
+
+### 从网络空间测绘搜索导入
+
+1. 在配置文件或 **系统设置 → 资产管理** 中填写对应 API Key，也可使用环境变量：`FOFA_API_KEY`、`ZOOMEYE_API_KEY`、`QUAKE_API_KEY`、`SHODAN_API_KEY`。
+2. 进入 **资产管理 → 信息收集**。
+3. 选择数据源：FOFA、ZoomEye、Quake 或 Shodan。
+4. 输入或生成该数据源的查询语句，并确认查询范围。
+5. 执行查询，选择确认归属的结果后点击 **入库所选**。
+6. 根据返回的新增、更新和跳过数量检查导入结果。
+
+外部搜索结果不等同于自有资产。建议先通过组织域名、证书、网段或产品指纹缩小范围，确认授权后再入库。
+
+## 规范化与去重
+
+不同入口可能使用不同形式描述同一目标。系统会执行以下处理：
+
+- 去除字段首尾空白；
+- IP、域名和协议转为小写；
+- 从 URL 型 Host 提取 hostname、协议和端口；
+- 为未显式指定端口的 HTTP/HTTPS 补充默认端口；
+- 将国际化域名转换为 ASCII/Punycode；
+- 清理并去重标签；
+- 为缺失的状态和来源补充默认值。
+
+资产以“目标 + 端口 + 协议”作为服务级去重依据。目标优先采用域名，其次为 IP，最后为 Host。因此，同一主机的 `80/http` 和 `443/https` 会被视为不同资产。
+
+重复资产再次入库时，系统会更新本次提供的非空字段和最近发现时间，保留未提供的原有信息，不会重置首次发现时间。
+
+## 查询、筛选与视图
+
+Web 端的关键字搜索覆盖 Host、IP、域名、标题、服务、标签、负责人、部门和业务系统。常用筛选包括状态和项目；展开高级筛选后还可以组合：
+
+- 风险等级和最少漏洞数；
+- 协议、端口、来源和精确标签；
+- 已扫描、从未扫描，以及 30/60/90 天未扫描；
+- 国家/地区、省份/州、城市、负责人、部门和业务系统；
+- 环境、重要性、首次发现和最近发现日期范围；
+- 最近发现、最近扫描、风险、漏洞数、首次发现、目标名称或端口排序。
+
+按最近扫描时间升序排列时，从未扫描的资产优先显示，便于识别覆盖盲区。
+
+常用筛选组合可以保存为筛选视图。筛选视图保存在当前浏览器的 `localStorage` 中，不会同步到服务端、其他浏览器或其他用户。
+
+HTTP API 和 `query_assets` 还支持 `max_vulnerabilities`、最近扫描时间范围，以及创建/更新时间等白名单排序字段。HTTP 列表每页最多 100 条，Agent 查询每页最多 50 条。
+
+## 批量维护与导出
+
+选择资产后，可以对当前页执行操作，也可以选择当前筛选条件命中的全部结果。跨页选择由服务端重新解析当前筛选条件，最多返回 10000 条；超过上限时需要进一步缩小范围。
+
+可用操作：
+
+- **绑定项目**：为所选资产统一替换项目归属；
+- **批量编辑**：修改状态、负责人、部门、业务系统、环境和重要性，并增删标签；
+- **创建扫描任务 / 发送到对话**：复用同一提示词模板处理所选资产；
+- **导出 CSV / XLSX**：在浏览器中导出当前已选择的资产，包含责任属性、风险、漏洞数量和时间字段；
+- **合并重复资产**：保留第一个所选资产为主资产，以其他记录的非空字段补齐主资产并合并标签；
+- **批量删除**：永久删除所选资产。
+
+批量编辑、项目绑定和批量删除采用全有或全无的事务：只要其中一个资产不存在或超出调用者权限，整批操作就会失败，不会留下部分更新。
+
+合并仅适用于具有共同域名、IP 或 Host 的记录，每次可选择 2-100 条。主资产已有值优先，标签取并集且仍受 30 个标签限制，其余记录会被删除。该操作同时需要 `asset:write` 和 `asset:delete`；合并前应确认主资产选择以及需要保留的扫描历史。
+
+## 扫描与风险回写
+
+### 单资产扫描
+
+在资产列表中点击 **扫描**。系统会：
+
+1. 创建新对话并注入资产目标和资产 ID；
+2. 将对话与资产关联；
+3. 引导 Agent 检查暴露服务和授权范围内的安全风险；
+4. 使用 `record_vulnerability` 保存确认的问题；
+5. 使用 `complete_asset_scan` 回写扫描状态。
+
+扫描提示词支持 `{{asset_id}}`、`{{target}}`、`{{host}}`、`{{ip}}`、`{{domain}}` 和 `{{port}}` 变量。发起前应按授权范围调整测试强度、端口和验证方式。
+
+### 批量扫描
+
+在资产库中选择多个目标后，点击 **创建扫描任务**。系统会为每个资产创建独立子任务，并建立资产、队列和子任务之间的关联。
+
+当前默认使用手动调度、单并发和 Eino 单 Agent 模式，以减少对目标和本机资源的瞬时压力。执行前仍需确认测试窗口、请求频率、允许的验证方式和审批要求。
+
+### 风险计算
+
+资产风险根据最近一次关联扫描中的未关闭漏洞动态计算：
+
+- `critical`、`high`、`medium`、`low`、`info`：存在对应等级的未关闭漏洞；
+- `normal`：已扫描且没有开放风险；
+- `unassessed`：尚未完成扫描。
+
+已修复、误报或忽略的漏洞仍保留在历史数量中，但不会继续提高当前风险等级。
+
+## Agent 工具
+
+系统向 Agent 提供六个内置资产工具：
+
+- `create_asset`：新增资产或去重更新；
+- `get_asset`：按 ID 获取完整详情；
+- `query_assets`：分页、筛选和排序；
+- `update_asset`：局部更新；
+- `delete_asset`：删除资产；
+- `complete_asset_scan`：扫描完成后回写状态。
+
+`query_assets` 默认每页返回 20 条、最多 50 条摘要。需要完整信息时使用 `get_asset`，避免大量资产数据占用模型上下文。
+
+`create_asset` 和 `update_asset` 均支持责任与业务属性；`query_assets` 也可以按这些字段筛选。Agent 写入仍经过与 HTTP API 相同的规范化、字段校验、去重和权限检查。
+
+## 权限控制
+
+资产权限分为：
+
+- `asset:read`：查看资产和统计数据；
+- `asset:write`：创建、导入、修改和回写扫描；
+- `asset:delete`：删除资产。
+
+服务端会同时检查资产所有者、显式资源授权、所属项目及权限 Scope（`all`、`assigned`、`own`）。当对话绑定项目后，Agent 的资产查询会被限制在该项目内，工具参数不能扩大访问范围。
+
+资产批量接口限制：
+
+- `POST /api/assets/import`：单次最多 100000 条；
+- `GET /api/assets/selection`：最多解析 10000 条匹配资产；
+- `POST /api/assets/scan-links`：单次最多 10000 条；
+- `PUT /api/assets/bulk`：单次最多 10000 个资产 ID；
+- `PUT /api/assets/project-binding`：单次最多 10000 个资产 ID；
+- `POST /api/assets/batch-delete`：单次最多 10000 个资产 ID；
+- `POST /api/assets/merge`：单次合并 2-100 个资产 ID。
+
+## 推荐使用流程
+
+1. 划定一组明确授权的域名、IP 或网段。
+2. 手工加入少量核心目标，验证识别和去重结果。
+3. 使用标签区分生产、测试、核心业务和外网范围。
+4. 配置一个或多个网络空间测绘搜索引擎，从窄查询开始并确认资产归属。
+5. 对单个低风险目标测试扫描和漏洞回写流程。
+6. 使用“从未扫描”和“超过 30 天未扫描”筛选覆盖盲区。
+7. 确认流程稳定后，再逐步创建小规模批量任务。
+
+经过确认的小规模资产基线通常比来源混乱的全量清单更有价值。

docs/zh-CN/configuration-profiles.md

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ server:
   tls_enabled: true
   tls_auto_self_sign: true
 auth:
-  password: "dev-only-change-me"
+  session_duration_hours: 12
 audit:
   enabled: true
   retention_days: 7
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ server:
   port: 8080
   tls_enabled: false
 auth:
-  password: "<long-random-password>"
+  session_duration_hours: 12
 audit:
   enabled: true
   retention_days: 30
@@ -107,7 +107,6 @@ multi_agent:
 
 ```yaml
 auth:
-  password: "<managed-secret>"
   session_duration_hours: 8
 audit:
   enabled: true

docs/zh-CN/configuration.md

@@ -5,14 +5,16 @@ CyberStrikeAI 的主配置文件是 `config.yaml`。大多数配置也可以在
 ## 基础配置
 
 ```yaml
-version: "v1.6.51"
+version: "vX.Y.Z" # 占位符；请使用 config.example.yaml 中当前发布版本的值
 server:
   host: 0.0.0.0
   port: 8080
   tls_enabled: true
   tls_auto_self_sign: true
+  # 可选：其他可信 Web 集成；Chromium 浏览器插件无需配置
+  # cors_allowed_origins:
+  #   - https://trusted-integration.example
 auth:
-  password: "change-me"
   session_duration_hours: 12
 log:
   level: info
@@ -22,8 +24,9 @@ log:
 - `version`：前端展示版本。
 - `server.host/port`：Web 服务监听地址和端口。
 - `server.tls_*`：HTTPS 配置。生产环境建议使用 `tls_cert_path` 和 `tls_key_path`。
-- `auth.password`：Web 登录密码，必须改为强密码。
+- Chromium 浏览器插件的合法 `chrome-extension://<32位插件ID>` Origin 会被自动识别，无需配置。插件仍需按域授权，并使用密码登录与 Bearer Token 调用 API。
-- `auth.session_duration_hours`：登录会话有效期。
+- `server.cors_allowed_origins`：仅供其他可信 Web 集成使用的额外 Origin 精确白名单；不支持 `*`，修改后需重启服务。
+- `auth.session_duration_hours`：登录会话有效期（小时）。登录密码由 RBAC 用户管理，首次启动时在控制台输出 `admin` 初始密码。
 - `log.output`：可以是 `stdout`、`stderr` 或文件路径。
 
 ## 模型配置

docs/zh-CN/contributing-guide.md

@@ -103,6 +103,16 @@ docs/en-US/
 - `docs/zh-CN/README.md`
 - `docs/en-US/README.md`
 
+提交文档变更前运行：
+
+```bash
+python3 scripts/check-docs.py
+```
+
+该检查会验证本地链接、代码块闭合、中英文文件名对齐、语言导航覆盖率，以及根 README 中的 Go 版本是否与 `go.mod` 一致。版本化示例应尽量从 `go.mod`、`config.example.yaml` 等权威文件派生，避免手工同步。
+
+当文档、`go.mod` 或检查脚本变更时，GitHub Actions 中的 `Documentation` 工作流会自动运行同一条命令。
+
 ## Review 关注点
 
 代码评审优先看：

docs/zh-CN/developer-guide.md

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ internal/database/       SQLite 数据访问
 internal/security/       认证、限流、Shell 执行
 internal/mcp/            MCP Server、外部 MCP 管理
 internal/multiagent/     Eino 单代理、多代理、中间件
-internal/workflow/       图编排运行时
+internal/workflow/       工作流运行时
 internal/knowledge/      知识库索引与检索
 internal/c2/             内置 C2
 internal/project/        项目事实黑板

docs/zh-CN/rbac.md

@@ -0,0 +1,391 @@
+# CyberStrikeAI RBAC 使用与管理指南
+
+[English](../en-US/rbac.md)
+
+CyberStrikeAI 是可执行 Agent、MCP、WebShell、C2 和批量任务的安全自动化平台。RBAC 不仅控制页面是否可见，还会贯穿 HTTP API、资源查询、Agent 上下文、内置/外部 MCP 工具、后台任务和机器人执行链路。
+
+---
+
+## 一、先区分两种“角色”
+
+| 概念 | 管理入口 | 作用 |
+|------|----------|------|
+| **平台角色（RBAC Role）** | 左侧 **平台权限** | 决定用户能调用哪些功能、能访问哪些资源 |
+| **AI 测试角色（Agent Role）** | 左侧 **角色** / `roles/*.yaml` | 决定 Agent 的提示词、测试方法和可选工具集合 |
+
+AI 测试角色不是安全授权边界。即使选择了“渗透测试”角色，用户仍必须拥有对应的平台权限；反过来，RBAC 有权限也不会自动改变 Agent 提示词。
+
+---
+
+## 二、授权模型
+
+一次访问同时满足以下条件才会放行：
+
+```text
+有效账号
+  + 路由/工具所需 permission
+  + 该 permission 对应的 scope
+  + 目标资源 owner / 显式授权 / 父资源继承
+  + 全局操作的额外限制
+```
+
+处理链路：
+
+1. 登录后签发 Bearer Token，会话包含用户、角色、权限和逐权限 Scope。
+2. HTTP 中间件把路由映射为权限，例如 `GET /api/projects` → `project:read`。
+3. 对带资源 ID 的请求继续校验 owner、显式资源授权或父资源继承。
+4. Agent 启动时把不可变 Principal 写入 `context.Context`。
+5. 内置 MCP 工具根据工具和参数再次检查权限与资源；外部 MCP 也有独立限制。
+6. 拒绝事件写入 RBAC/审计日志。
+
+前端隐藏按钮只用于改善体验，不构成安全边界；真正的拒绝发生在服务端。
+
+---
+
+## 三、内置平台角色
+
+| 角色 | Scope | 默认能力 |
+|------|-------|----------|
+| **管理员 `admin`** | `all` | 所有已知权限，包括 RBAC、配置、终端、审计删除和全局定义管理 |
+| **操作员 `operator`** | `assigned` | 日常读写与执行能力；不含 RBAC、核心配置、终端、审计管理、外部 MCP 执行和部分全局定义写权限 |
+| **审计员 `auditor`** | `all` | 各模块只读权限和 `audit:read`，不执行写操作 |
+| **只读用户 `viewer`** | `assigned` | 各模块只读权限，仅查看被授权范围 |
+
+系统角色不可修改或删除，升级时会按当前版本的权限目录重新构建授权，避免旧版本残留权限。需要不同组合时创建自定义角色。
+
+没有分配任何角色的账号仍可登录，但基本没有业务权限；不要依赖“无角色”作为完整岗位配置。
+
+---
+
+## 四、权限命名与目录
+
+权限使用 `模块:动作` 命名。常见动作：
+
+- `read`：查看、列表、查询、导出。
+- `write`：创建、更新、执行或管理。
+- `delete`：删除。
+- `execute`：执行 Agent、终端、工作流或特定能力。
+
+当前权限按模块分组如下；运行版本的权威目录以“平台权限”页面或 `GET /api/rbac/metadata` 为准。
+
+| 模块 | 权限 |
+|------|------|
+| 账号 | `auth:self` |
+| 仪表盘 | `dashboard:read` |
+| 对话 | `chat:read`、`chat:write`、`chat:delete` |
+| Agent | `agent:execute`、`agent:local-execute` |
+| HITL | `hitl:read`、`hitl:write` |
+| 任务 | `tasks:read`、`tasks:write`、`tasks:delete` |
+| 项目 | `project:read`、`project:write`、`project:delete` |
+| 漏洞 | `vulnerability:read`、`vulnerability:write`、`vulnerability:delete` |
+| WebShell | `webshell:read`、`webshell:write`、`webshell:delete` |
+| C2 | `c2:read`、`c2:write`、`c2:delete` |
+| MCP | `mcp:read`、`mcp:execute`、`mcp:write`、`mcp:external:execute` |
+| 知识库 | `knowledge:read`、`knowledge:write`、`knowledge:delete` |
+| Skills | `skills:read`、`skills:write`、`skills:delete` |
+| Markdown Agents | `agents:read`、`agents:write`、`agents:delete` |
+| AI 测试角色 | `roles:read`、`roles:write`、`roles:delete` |
+| 工作流 | `workflow:read`、`workflow:execute`、`workflow:write`、`workflow:delete` |
+| 系统配置 | `config:read`、`config:write` |
+| 终端 | `terminal:execute` |
+| 审计 | `audit:read`、`audit:delete` |
+| RBAC | `rbac:read`、`rbac:write` |
+| 通知 | `notification:read`、`notification:write` |
+| 机器人 | `robot:read`、`robot:write` |
+| 文件 | `files:read`、`files:write`、`files:delete` |
+| 攻击链 | `attackchain:read`、`attackchain:write` |
+| 网络空间测绘 / 信息收集 | `fofa:execute` |
+| OpenAPI | `openapi:read` |
+| 对话分组 | `group:read`、`group:write`、`group:delete` |
+| 执行监控 | `monitor:read`、`monitor:write`、`monitor:delete` |
+
+特殊权限说明：
+
+- `fofa:execute` 为兼容旧版本保留权限名，现在保护 **信息收集** 页中的 FOFA、ZoomEye、Quake、Shodan 查询。
+
+- `agent:execute` 允许运行 Agent，但不自动允许本地文件系统、Shell 或任意配置命令。
+- `agent:local-execute` 是本地执行兜底权限，应仅授予可信操作员。
+- `mcp:execute` 用于访问认证后的 MCP HTTP 入口。
+- `mcp:external:execute` 用于 Agent 调用外部 MCP 工具，当前还要求该权限的 Scope 为 `all`。
+- 管理外部 MCP 配置使用 `mcp:write`，与执行外部工具是两项权限。
+- `robot:write` 管理机器人配置和测试入口；机器人聊天本身使用绑定用户或服务账号的业务权限。
+
+---
+
+## 五、资源 Scope
+
+每个角色包含一个 Scope：
+
+| Scope | 含义 | 适合场景 |
+|-------|------|----------|
+| `all` | 访问该权限覆盖的所有资源 | 管理员、全局审计员 |
+| `assigned` | 访问管理员指定的资源及系统支持的父资源继承范围 | 项目成员、指定资产操作员 |
+| `own` | 以本人创建/归属资源为主；部分资源仍可通过显式授权或父资源关系访问 | 个人工作区、机器人独立身份 |
+
+权限和 Scope 是绑定在一起计算的。一个用户可拥有多个角色，权限取并集；**同一个权限**的 Scope 取最宽值：
+
+```text
+all > assigned > own
+```
+
+示例：
+
+- “全局审计”角色：`project:read` + `all`
+- “个人项目编辑”角色：`project:write` + `own`
+
+最终结果是：
+
+```text
+project:read  → all
+project:write → own
+```
+
+全局读取不会把无关的写权限扩大为全局写入。服务端授权必须使用 `ScopeFor(permission)`，不能使用用户的最宽总 Scope。
+
+### 全局对象限制
+
+部分对象是进程级共享定义，没有 owner。即使用户拥有 `write`，若该权限 Scope 不是 `all`，服务端仍拒绝修改。例如：
+
+- AI 测试角色、Skills、Markdown Agents。
+- 外部 MCP 配置。
+- 机器人配置。
+- 工作流定义。
+- 知识库写操作（搜索除外）。
+- HITL 全局白名单、默认审核方和审计策略。
+- C2 Profile 写操作。
+- 部分全局监控统计。
+
+---
+
+## 六、资源归属、显式授权与继承
+
+可在“平台权限 → 成员详情 → 资源授权”中给用户分配资源。当前可直接选择的主要类型：
+
+- 项目 `project`
+- 对话 `conversation`
+- 漏洞 `vulnerability`
+- WebShell `webshell`
+- 批量任务队列 `batch_task`
+- C2 Listener `c2_listener`
+
+一次批量授权最多 100 个资源。重复授权会跳过，不会创建重复记录。
+
+部分子资源会继承父资源访问能力：
+
+| 子资源 | 可继承的父资源 |
+|--------|----------------|
+| 对话 | 所属项目 |
+| 漏洞 | 所属项目或关联对话 |
+| 消息、过程详情、攻击链 | 所属对话 |
+| C2 Session | Listener |
+| C2 Task / 文件 /事件 | Session、Task 或 Listener 链路 |
+
+因此，给用户授权一个项目，通常不需要再逐个授权该项目中的每条对话和漏洞。仍应以具体页面/API 的服务端检查结果为准。
+
+---
+
+## 七、Web 管理流程
+
+### 7.1 创建用户
+
+1. 使用管理员进入左侧 **平台权限**。
+2. 创建平台用户，设置用户名、显示名称、至少 8 位密码和启用状态。
+3. 分配一个或多个平台角色。
+4. 若角色 Scope 为 `assigned`，继续配置资源授权。
+5. 让用户重新登录并在右上角用户菜单确认角色、权限数量和 Scope。
+
+### 7.2 创建自定义角色
+
+1. 新建平台角色并填写清晰的岗位名称与说明。
+2. 选择 `all`、`assigned` 或 `own`。
+3. 只勾选岗位实际需要的权限。
+4. 先用测试账号验证列表、详情、写操作、删除和 Agent 工具调用。
+5. 再批量分配给正式用户。
+
+系统角色不可编辑；复制其思路创建自定义角色即可。
+
+### 7.3 权限变更何时生效
+
+- 更新用户、密码、启用状态或角色后，该用户现有会话会被撤销，需要重新登录。
+- 更新或删除自定义角色后，平台会撤销全部现有会话，所有用户需重新登录。
+- 机器人每条消息实时解析绑定用户/服务账号权限；用户禁用或角色调整会立即影响下一条消息。
+- 后台批量任务会根据任务 owner 重新解析 Principal，不应依赖创建任务时的前端状态。
+
+---
+
+## 八、推荐角色模板
+
+以下是起点，不是固定策略。
+
+### 只读项目成员
+
+```text
+Scope: assigned
+dashboard:read
+chat:read
+project:read
+vulnerability:read
+files:read
+attackchain:read
+```
+
+### 日常安全操作员
+
+```text
+Scope: assigned
+agent:execute
+chat:read / chat:write
+project:read / project:write
+vulnerability:read / vulnerability:write
+tasks:read / tasks:write
+files:read / files:write
+hitl:read / hitl:write
+```
+
+只有确实需要本机命令时才增加 `agent:local-execute` 或 `terminal:execute`；需要删除时再增加对应 `:delete`。
+
+### 机器人专用账号
+
+```text
+Scope: own（独立工作区）或 assigned（指定项目）
+agent:execute
+chat:read / chat:write
+按需增加 project、vulnerability、knowledge 等权限
+```
+
+也可使用 `admin` 作为机器人服务账号，但发送者仍需精确白名单；白名单内每个人都会获得完整权限并共享 admin 数据。详见[机器人指南](robot.md)。
+
+---
+
+## 九、Agent、MCP 与机器人边界
+
+### Agent
+
+HTTP 登录用户会被转换为不可变 Principal，传入单 Agent、多 Agent、工作流和工具执行上下文。长任务脱离 SSE 连接后仍保留身份，但不会因为前端按钮可见而绕过服务端权限。
+
+### 内置 MCP
+
+每个内置工具必须有显式授权策略。例如 WebShell 工具会同时检查 `webshell:read/write/delete` 和 `connection_id` 的资源访问；漏洞、项目、任务与 C2 工具也会检查参数指向的资源。
+
+未登记授权策略的内置工具默认拒绝。普通本地/配置工具需要 `agent:local-execute`。
+
+### 外部 MCP
+
+Agent 调用外部 MCP 工具需要 `mcp:external:execute`，且当前要求 Scope 为 `all`。这是因为外部服务的资源模型通常不受本地 owner/assignment 约束。
+
+### 机器人
+
+- `user_binding`：平台发送者绑定自己的 RBAC 用户。
+- `service_account`：精确白名单发送者统一使用一个 RBAC 用户。
+- 平台验签只做来源认证，不代替业务授权。
+- 发送 `身份` / `whoami` 可检查实际 Principal。
+
+---
+
+## 十、RBAC API
+
+所有接口使用：
+
+```http
+Authorization: Bearer <token>
+```
+
+管理接口需要 `rbac:read` 或 `rbac:write`，资源选择器需要 `rbac:write`。
+
+| 方法 | 路径 | 说明 |
+|------|------|------|
+| GET | `/api/rbac/me` | 当前用户、角色、权限、总 Scope 与逐权限 Scope |
+| GET | `/api/rbac/metadata` | 权限目录、角色、角色权限和 Scope 列表 |
+| GET/POST | `/api/rbac/users` | 列出/创建用户 |
+| PUT/DELETE | `/api/rbac/users/:id` | 更新/删除用户 |
+| GET/POST | `/api/rbac/roles` | 列出/创建角色 |
+| PUT/DELETE | `/api/rbac/roles/:id` | 更新/删除自定义角色 |
+| GET | `/api/rbac/resources?type=project&q=...` | 分页搜索可授权资源 |
+| GET/POST | `/api/rbac/resource-assignments` | 列出/创建资源授权 |
+| DELETE | `/api/rbac/resource-assignments/:id` | 撤销资源授权 |
+
+创建用户示例：
+
+```bash
+curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/rbac/users \
+  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  -d '{
+    "username": "operator01",
+    "display_name": "安全操作员 01",
+    "password": "change-me-123",
+    "enabled": true,
+    "roles": ["operator"]
+  }'
+```
+
+创建自定义角色示例：
+
+```bash
+curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/rbac/roles \
+  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  -d '{
+    "name": "项目审计员",
+    "description": "只读查看指定项目",
+    "scope": "assigned",
+    "permissions": ["chat:read", "project:read", "vulnerability:read"]
+  }'
+```
+
+批量授权项目示例：
+
+```bash
+curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/rbac/resource-assignments \
+  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  -d '{
+    "user_id": "USER_ID",
+    "resource_type": "project",
+    "resource_ids": ["PROJECT_ID_1", "PROJECT_ID_2"]
+  }'
+```
+
+---
+
+## 十一、审计与运维建议
+
+- 使用个人账号管理平台，避免多人共享管理员密码。
+- 自定义角色按岗位命名，描述中写明用途和负责人。
+- 高风险权限单独审批：`terminal:execute`、`agent:local-execute`、`c2:write/delete`、`webshell:write/delete`、`rbac:write`、`config:write`。
+- 定期检查 `all` Scope 角色、服务账号、机器人白名单和长期未使用用户。
+- 用户离职时先禁用账号，再撤销机器人绑定、资源授权和会话。
+- 在日志审计中关注 `rbac/access_denied`、角色/用户变更、资源授权、机器人服务账号执行。
+- 配合 HITL 控制高风险工具；RBAC 允许调用不等于可以跳过审批。
+
+---
+
+## 十二、常见问题
+
+### 页面按钮看不到
+
+检查用户是否有对应权限；前端会根据 `/api/rbac/me` 隐藏无权操作。直接调用 API 仍会由服务端拒绝。
+
+### 有权限但返回“无权访问该资源”
+
+检查该权限的 Scope，而不是只看用户总 Scope；再检查资源 owner、显式授权和父资源授权。
+
+### 角色改了但用户仍是旧权限
+
+角色变更会撤销会话。让用户重新登录；机器人下一条消息会重新解析权限。
+
+### 忘记了内置 `admin` 密码
+
+优先使用其他具备 `rbac:write` 权限的管理员账号重置。若没有可用的管理员会话，请按[排错指南中的管理员密码恢复流程](troubleshooting.md#忘记-admin-密码)在服务器上紧急重置。
+
+### `write` 权限存在但全局配置仍被拒绝
+
+全局对象写操作要求对应权限的 Scope 为 `all`。创建一个 `all` Scope 的专用管理角色，而不是扩大无关权限。
+
+### Agent 能对话但不能运行命令
+
+`agent:execute` 与 `agent:local-execute` 分离。按需授予本地执行权限，并结合 HITL、工具白名单和审计。
+
+### 外部 MCP 提示需要 global scope
+
+除 `mcp:external:execute` 外，该权限的 Scope 还必须为 `all`。外部 MCP 的数据边界不由本地资源授权自动保护。

docs/zh-CN/robot.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 [English](../en-US/robot.md)
 
-本文档说明如何通过**个人微信**、**钉钉**、**飞书**与 **企业微信** 与 CyberStrikeAI 对话（长连接 / 回调模式），在手机端即可使用，无需在服务器上打开网页。按下面步骤操作可避免常见弯路。
+本文档说明如何通过**个人微信、企业微信、钉钉、飞书、Telegram、Slack、Discord 和 QQ 机器人**使用 CyberStrikeAI，包括平台接入、RBAC 身份绑定、服务账号白名单、命令、验证与故障排查。
 
 ---
 
@@ -15,10 +15,18 @@
    - **个人微信**：点击「微信 / iLink」→「生成二维码并绑定」，用微信扫码确认（见 [3.4 个人微信](#34-个人微信-wechat--ilink)）
    - **钉钉**：勾选并填写 Client ID / Client Secret
    - **飞书**：勾选并填写 App ID / App Secret
-5. 点击 **应用配置** 保存（微信扫码绑定成功后会**自动保存并启用**，一般无需再点）
+5. 点击 **应用配置** 保存；程序会自动重启对应机器人连接。微信扫码绑定成功后会自动保存并启用，一般无需再点。
-6. **重启 CyberStrikeAI 应用**（钉钉/飞书：只保存不重启，长连接不会建立；微信绑定成功后会自动重启连接，通常无需手动重启）
 
-配置会写入 `config.yaml` 的 `robots` 段，也可在配置文件中直接编辑。**修改钉钉/飞书配置后必须重启，长连接才会生效。** 个人微信绑定成功后程序会自动写入 `robots.wechat` 并重启 iLink 长轮询。
+配置会写入 `config.yaml` 的 `robots` 段，也可在配置文件中直接编辑。通过 Web 点击“应用配置”会自动重启对应连接；直接手工修改 `config.yaml` 时，需要重启 CyberStrikeAI 进程。个人微信绑定成功后程序会自动写入 `robots.wechat` 并重启 iLink 长轮询。
+
+### 最短使用路径
+
+平台连接成功后，不要直接开始普通对话，先完成业务身份配置：
+
+- **多人使用**：机器人设置选择“逐用户绑定” → 每位用户在 Web 右上角头像生成绑定码 → 在机器人中发送绑定命令 → 发送 `身份` 验证。
+- **只有自己使用**：先在机器人中发送 `身份` 复制发送者 ID → 机器人设置选择“专用服务账号” → User ID 填 `admin` 或其他 RBAC 用户 → 粘贴发送者白名单 → 应用配置 → 再次发送 `身份` 验证。
+
+看到“鉴权状态：已授权”且“实际身份”正确后，即可直接发送普通文本与 AI 对话。
 
 ---
 
@@ -300,12 +308,88 @@
 
 ---
 
-## 四、机器人命令
+## 四、RBAC 鉴权与机器人命令
+
+平台 Token、签名或长连接凭证只负责证明“消息来自该平台”；真正能执行哪些操作，由 CyberStrikeAI 的 RBAC 决定。每个机器人实例都必须选择一种业务鉴权模式。
+
+### 4.1 应该选择哪种模式
+
+| 使用场景 | 推荐模式 | 身份与数据范围 |
+|----------|----------|----------------|
+| 企业微信、飞书、钉钉、Slack 等多人共享机器人 | `user_binding` | 每个发送者绑定自己的 Web 用户，权限和数据互相隔离 |
+| 个人微信、单人专属机器人、固定自动化入口 | `service_account` | 白名单发送者统一使用配置的 RBAC 用户，并共享该账号的数据 |
+
+两种模式都会在**每条消息**执行前重新读取用户状态、角色、逐权限 Scope 和资源授权。用户被禁用或权限被收回后，下一条消息立即失效。
+
+机器人执行普通 AI 对话至少需要以下权限：
+
+```text
+agent:execute
+chat:read
+chat:write
+```
+
+使用项目、角色、本地命令、WebShell、C2 或外部 MCP 时，还需按功能增加对应权限。删除对话需要 `chat:delete`。
+
+### 4.2 逐用户绑定模式（默认）
+
+管理员操作：
+
+1. 系统设置 → 机器人设置 → 选择平台。
+2. 在“业务鉴权策略”中选择“逐用户绑定（`user_binding`）”。
+3. 点击“应用配置”。
+
+每位使用者操作：
+
+1. 登录 CyberStrikeAI Web，点击右上角头像 → **绑定机器人账号**。
+2. 点击 **生成绑定码**，页面开始 5 分钟倒计时。
+3. 在目标机器人中发送页面给出的完整命令，例如 `绑定 7C6E-BD4C`。
+4. 发送 `身份` 或 `whoami`，确认“鉴权状态：已授权”且“实际身份”是自己的 Web 用户。
+
+绑定码仅保存哈希、只能使用一次。倒计时结束后前端会标记失效、禁用复制并刷新绑定列表；服务端也会拒绝过期码。重新生成会让此前尚未使用的旧码立即失效。用户可发送 `解绑`，或在 Web 绑定窗口中撤销绑定。
+
+### 4.3 专用服务账号模式
+
+1. 先让机器人正常连接平台。
+2. 目标使用者向机器人发送 `身份` / `whoami`，复制返回的完整“发送者 ID”。个人微信的 ID 通常形如 `xxxx@im.wechat`；必须以命令返回值为准，不能用 `ilink_bot_id` 或配置中的 `ilink_user_id` 代替。
+3. 系统设置 → 机器人设置 → 选择平台 → 业务鉴权策略选择“专用服务账号（`service_account`）”。
+4. 填写服务账号的 **RBAC User ID**，不是显示名称。可以填写 `admin`；此时白名单发送者拥有完整平台权限，界面会显示红色风险提示。
+5. 在“允许的平台发送者 ID”中每行填写一个完整 ID。必须精确匹配、区分大小写，不允许 `*` 通配符。
+6. 点击“应用配置”，再发送 `身份` 确认“实际身份”和角色正确。
+
+示例：
+
+```yaml
+robots:
+  wechat:
+    auth:
+      mode: service_account
+      service_user_id: admin
+      allowed_external_users:
+        - "o9cq806s32Sm2_kyOmkyaV7Rn1lU@im.wechat"
+```
+
+服务账号模式不接受 `绑定` / `解绑` 命令。多个白名单发送者会共享服务账号创建的对话、项目和其他 `own` 范围资源；若不希望共享，请使用逐用户绑定。
+
+### 4.4 如何检查当前身份
+
+发送：
+
+```text
+身份
+```
+
+返回内容包含：平台、真实发送者 ID、鉴权模式、鉴权状态、实际 RBAC 用户、RBAC User ID、平台角色、资源范围和有效权限数量。不在服务账号白名单中的发送者只会看到拒绝状态，不会看到服务账号详情。
+
+### 4.5 命令列表
 
 在任一已接入平台（钉钉/飞书/微信/Telegram/Slack/Discord/QQ 等）向机器人发送以下**文本命令**（仅支持文本）：
 
 | 命令 | 说明 |
 |------|------|
+| **绑定 \<绑定码\>** | 将当前平台发送者绑定到生成绑定码的 RBAC 用户 |
+| **解绑** | 解除当前平台账号绑定；也可在 Web 端的绑定列表中撤销 |
+| **身份** 或 **whoami** | 显示平台发送者 ID、鉴权模式、绑定状态及当前实际 RBAC 用户、角色和资源范围 |
 | **帮助** | 显示命令帮助与说明 |
 | **列表** 或 **对话列表** | 列出所有对话的标题与对话 ID |
 | **切换 \<对话ID\>** 或 **继续 \<对话ID\>** | 指定对话 ID，后续消息在该对话中继续 |
@@ -320,6 +404,8 @@
 
 除以上命令外，**直接输入任意文字**会作为用户消息发给 AI，与 Web 端对话逻辑一致（渗透测试/安全分析等）。
 
+群聊消息按实际发送者鉴权，不使用群 ID 作为业务身份。服务账号模式除外：白名单发送者会明确共享配置的服务账号权限和资源。
+
 ---
 
 ## 五、如何使用（要 @ 机器人吗？）
@@ -338,14 +424,17 @@
 
 1. CyberStrikeAI Web 端 → 系统设置 → 机器人设置 → **微信 / iLink** → **生成二维码并绑定**。  
 2. 手机微信扫码确认（如需配对数字则在 Web 页填写）。  
-3. 绑定成功后，在手机微信私聊中发「帮助」测试。
+3. 在手机微信私聊中发送 `身份`，复制发送者 ID。  
+4. 回到机器人设置选择 `user_binding`，或选择 `service_account` 并填写服务账号与发送者白名单。  
+5. 点击应用配置，在微信中再次发送 `身份`，确认实际 RBAC 身份后再发送普通消息。
 
 **钉钉 / 飞书**
 
 1. **在开放平台**：按第三节完成应用创建、凭证复制、机器人开通（钉钉务必选 **Stream 模式**）、权限与发布。  
 2. **在 CyberStrikeAI**：系统设置 → 机器人设置 → 勾选对应平台，粘贴 Client ID/App ID、Client Secret/App Secret → 点击 **应用配置**。  
-3. **重启 CyberStrikeAI 进程**（否则长连接不会建立）。  
+3. **选择鉴权模式**：多人使用建议 `user_binding`；专用机器人配置服务账号与发送者白名单。  
-4. **在手机钉钉/飞书**：找到该机器人（单聊直接发，群聊需 @机器人），发「帮助」或任意内容测试。
+4. **应用配置**：Web 会自动重启对应连接。  
+5. **在手机钉钉/飞书**：找到机器人（单聊直接发，群聊需 @），先发 `身份` 检查鉴权，再发普通内容测试。
 
 若发消息没反应，先看 **第九节排查** 和 **第十节常见弯路**。
 
@@ -359,6 +448,11 @@
 robots:
   wechat: # 个人微信 iLink（扫码绑定后自动写入，一般无需手填）
     enabled: true
+    auth:
+      mode: service_account
+      service_user_id: admin
+      allowed_external_users:
+        - "从身份命令复制的完整发送者 ID"
     bot_token: "your_bot_token@im.bot:..."
     ilink_bot_id: "your_bot_id@im.bot"
     ilink_user_id: "your_user_id@im.wechat"
@@ -367,10 +461,14 @@ robots:
     bot_agent: "CyberStrikeAI/1.0"
   dingtalk:
     enabled: true
+    auth:
+      mode: user_binding
     client_id: "your_dingtalk_app_key"
     client_secret: "your_dingtalk_app_secret"
   lark:
     enabled: true
+    auth:
+      mode: user_binding
     app_id: "your_lark_app_id"
     app_secret: "your_lark_app_secret"
     verify_token: ""
@@ -400,7 +498,7 @@ robots:
     sandbox: true
 ```
 
-修改钉钉/飞书/企业微信/Telegram/Slack/Discord/QQ 配置后，点击 **应用配置** 会自动重启对应长连接。个人微信扫码绑定成功后会自动写入并重启 iLink 连接。
+每个平台的 `auth` 独立配置；省略时默认为 `user_binding`。修改配置后，在 Web 点击 **应用配置** 会自动重启对应连接；手工编辑 YAML 则需重启进程。个人微信扫码绑定成功后会自动写入并重启 iLink 连接。
 
 ---
 
@@ -408,20 +506,24 @@ robots:
 
 在未安装钉钉或飞书时，可用**测试接口**验证机器人逻辑是否正常：
 
-1. 先登录 CyberStrikeAI Web 端（保证有登录态）。  
+1. 使用具有全局 `robot:write` 权限的账号登录并获取 Bearer Token。  
-2. 使用 curl 调用测试接口（需携带登录后的 Cookie）：
+2. 使用 curl 调用测试接口：
 
 ```bash
-# 将 YOUR_COOKIE 替换为登录后获得的 Cookie（浏览器 F12 → 网络 → 任意请求 → 请求头中的 Cookie）
+# 先登录；请按实际地址、用户名和密码修改
+TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:8080/api/auth/login" \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  -d '{"username":"admin","password":"YOUR_PASSWORD"}' | jq -r '.token')
+
 curl -X POST "http://localhost:8080/api/robot/test" \
   -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-  -H "Cookie: YOUR_COOKIE" \
+  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
   -d '{"platform":"dingtalk","user_id":"test_user","text":"帮助"}'
 ```
 
-若返回 JSON 中含有 `"reply":"【CyberStrikeAI 机器人命令】..."`，说明命令处理正常。可再试 `"text":"列表"`、`"text":"当前"` 等。
+若返回 JSON 中含有 `"reply":"【CyberStrikeAI 机器人命令】..."`，说明命令处理正常。`帮助`、`版本` 和 `身份` 可在未绑定时执行；`列表`、`当前` 和普通 AI 消息会走真实 RBAC，测试用 `platform + user_id` 必须已经绑定，或与服务账号模式的发送者白名单精确匹配。
 
-接口说明：`POST /api/robot/test`（需登录），请求体 `{"platform":"可选","user_id":"可选","text":"必填"}`，响应 `{"reply":"回复内容"}`。
+接口说明：`POST /api/robot/test`（需全局 `robot:write`），请求体 `{"platform":"可选","user_id":"可选","text":"必填"}`，响应 `{"reply":"回复内容"}`。该接口仅模拟机器人业务逻辑，不验证第三方平台签名或长连接。
 
 ---
 
@@ -458,8 +560,8 @@ curl -X POST "http://localhost:8080/api/robot/test" \
 1. **Client ID / Client Secret 是否与开放平台完全一致**  
    从「凭证与基础信息」里**复制粘贴**，不要手打。注意数字 **0** 与字母 **o**、数字 **1** 与字母 **l**（例如 `ding9gf9tiozuc504aer` 中间是 **504** 不是 5o4）。
 
-2. **是否在保存配置后重启了应用**  
+2. **配置是否已应用**  
-   机器人长连接在**应用启动时**建立。在 Web 端点击「应用配置」只写入配置文件，**必须重启 CyberStrikeAI 进程**后钉钉连接才会生效。
+   在 Web 端修改后必须点击“应用配置”，程序会自动重启对应连接。若直接手工编辑 `config.yaml`，则需重启 CyberStrikeAI 进程。
 
 3. **看程序日志**  
    - 启动后应看到：`钉钉 Stream 正在连接…`、`钉钉 Stream 已启动（无需公网），等待收消息`。  
@@ -469,6 +571,15 @@ curl -X POST "http://localhost:8080/api/robot/test" \
 4. **开放平台侧**  
    应用需已**发布**；在「机器人」能力中需开启**流式接入（Stream）** 用于接收消息（仅 HTTP 回调不够）；权限管理里需有机器人接收、发送消息等权限。
 
+### 9.3 收到回复但提示未绑定、白名单拒绝或权限不足
+
+1. 先发送 `身份`，查看“鉴权模式”和“鉴权状态”。
+2. `user_binding` 显示未绑定：在 Web 右上角头像中生成绑定码，并在同一个平台账号中发送完整绑定命令。绑定码过期或已经使用时需重新生成。
+3. `service_account` 显示白名单拒绝：把 `身份` 返回的完整发送者 ID 原样加入当前平台的白名单，注意大小写、租户前缀和 `@im.wechat` 等后缀。
+4. 显示实际身份但提示缺少权限：在“平台权限”检查该 RBAC 用户的角色。普通 AI 对话至少需要 `agent:execute`、`chat:read`、`chat:write`。
+5. 服务账号不存在或被禁用：应用配置会拒绝保存；恢复用户或选择其他已启用 RBAC 用户。
+6. 使用 `admin` 时仍被拒绝：通常是发送者不在精确白名单中，而不是 admin 权限不足。
+
 ---
 
 ## 十、常见弯路（避免踩坑）
@@ -476,7 +587,11 @@ curl -X POST "http://localhost:8080/api/robot/test" \
 - **个人微信与企业微信混淆**：个人微信走 `robots.wechat` + Web 扫码绑定；企业微信走 `robots.wecom` + 管理后台回调 URL，二者完全不同。  
 - **个人微信二维码过期**：二维码约 5 分钟有效，过期需重新生成，不要一直扫旧码。  
 - **用错了机器人类型**：在钉钉**群里**添加的「自定义」机器人（Webhook + 加签）**不能**用来做对话，本程序只支持**开放平台「企业内部应用」**里的机器人。  
-- **只保存没重启**：钉钉/飞书改完配置后必须**重启应用**，否则长连接不会建立（个人微信扫码绑定会自动重启连接）。  
+- **改完没有点应用配置**：Web 中修改机器人配置后要点击“应用配置”；程序会自动重启对应连接。只有手工编辑 YAML 时才需要重启进程。  
+- **把 Bot ID 当成发送者 ID**：服务账号白名单必须填写 `身份` 命令返回的“发送者 ID”，不要填 `ilink_bot_id`、`ilink_user_id`、群 ID 或显示昵称。  
+- **绑定码过期后继续使用**：绑定码 5 分钟有效且只能使用一次；新生成的码会让旧码立即失效。  
+- **服务账号误以为数据隔离**：同一服务账号白名单中的发送者共享该账号的对话和 `own` 范围资源；需要隔离时应使用 `user_binding`。  
+- **admin 配置后任意人都能用**：不会。即使服务账号是 `admin`，发送者仍必须与白名单精确匹配；但白名单中的人将拥有完整权限。  
 - **Client ID 抄错**：开放平台是 `504` 就填 `504`，不要填成 `5o4`；尽量用复制粘贴。  
 - **钉钉只开了 HTTP 回调没开 Stream**：本程序通过 **Stream 长连接**收消息，开放平台里机器人的消息接收方式必须选 **Stream 模式**。  
 - **应用没发布**：开放平台里修改了机器人或权限后，要在「版本管理与发布」里**发布新版本**，否则不生效。
@@ -487,5 +602,5 @@ curl -X POST "http://localhost:8080/api/robot/test" \
 
 - 各平台均**仅处理文本消息**；其他类型（如图片、语音）会提示暂不支持或忽略。  
 - 个人微信仅支持**私聊**，不支持群聊 @ 机器人。  
-- 会话与 Web 端共用同一套对话数据：在机器人里创建的对话会在 Web 端「对话」列表中看到，反之亦然。  
+- 会话与 Web 端共用同一套数据：`user_binding` 下归属于绑定用户；`service_account` 下归属于服务账号，并由白名单发送者共享。  
 - 机器人执行与 **Eino 单/多代理** 相同逻辑（`ProcessMessageForRobot`，含进度回调与过程详情入库），仅不向客户端推送 SSE，最后一次性回复个人微信/钉钉/飞书/企业微信。默认 `robot_default_agent_mode: eino_single`。

docs/zh-CN/runbooks.md

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ config.yaml
 
 ```yaml
 auth:
-  password: "<long-random-password>"
+  session_duration_hours: 12
 server:
   host: 127.0.0.1
   port: 8080

docs/zh-CN/security-hardening.md

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 
 ## 上线前必做
 
-- 修改 `auth.password` 为长随机密码。
+- 首次部署后立即修改 `admin` 初始密码（Web 界面或平台权限 → 用户管理）。
 - 使用 HTTPS，或放在可信反向代理之后。
 - 限制来源 IP、VPN 或堡垒机访问。
 - 开启 `audit.enabled`。

docs/zh-CN/security-model.md

@@ -16,9 +16,9 @@ CyberStrikeAI 面向授权安全测试场景，内置命令执行、MCP 工具
 
 ## 认证与会话
 
-`auth.password` 是 Web 登录密码。建议：
+Web 登录凭据由 RBAC 用户管理（默认内置 `admin` 账号）。建议：
 
-- 首次部署立即修改默认密码。
+- 首次部署后立即修改 `admin` 初始密码（控制台首次启动会输出）。
 - 使用长随机密码，并限制分享范围。
 - 将服务放在内网、VPN、堡垒机或反向代理认证后面。
 - 生产环境开启 HTTPS，避免明文传输 Cookie。

docs/zh-CN/tool-execution-governance.md

@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+# 工具执行治理
+
+[返回中文文档](README.md)
+
+本文说明 CyberStrikeAI 对长时间工具、MCP 阻塞、大输出、取消和恢复上下文的治理策略。目标是让 Agent 保持标准工具语义，同时避免工具卡死、上下文爆炸、数据库膨胀或恢复时重新注入历史大输出。
+
+## 设计目标
+
+- **Agent 不被工具绑死**：工具调用可以很慢，但当前 runner 只等待有限时间。
+- **长任务可继续观察**：超时返回 `execution_id`，后续可用 `wait_tool_execution` 多轮等待。
+- **用户和 Agent 都能取消**：当前会话结束或用户停止任务时，会取消仍在运行的工具。
+- **数据库与 Agent 视图一致**：DB 保存的是 Agent 实际拿到的兜底后结果，不再保存另一份原始大输出。
+- **恢复不会撑爆上下文**：续跑使用 model-facing trace；历史异常大 tool trace 恢复时也会再次裁剪。
+- **外部 MCP 有隔离保护**：按 server 限并发、按全局限并发，并对连续失败的 server 熔断。
+
+## 执行模型
+
+普通工具调用仍然对 Eino/Agent 表现为一次标准 tool call，但底层执行分为两段：
+
+```text
+Agent 调用工具
+  -> ExecutionService 创建 execution
+  -> worker 执行真实 MCP/工具调用
+  -> Agent bounded wait
+       -> 完成：返回工具结果
+       -> 未完成：返回 execution_id，worker 继续后台运行
+```
+
+这解决了 MCP server、`exec`、`sqlmap`、`nmap`、`nuclei` 等长任务阻塞当前 runner 的问题。
+
+## 工具状态语义
+
+| 状态 | 含义 |
+|---|---|
+| `queued` | execution 已创建，等待 worker 或并发槽位 |
+| `running` | worker 正在执行 |
+| `background_running` | 前端展示状态，表示本轮 Agent 已停止等待，但后台仍在跑 |
+| `completed` | 本次 tool call 本身已完成 |
+| `failed` | 工具真实失败 |
+| `cancelled` | 用户、Agent 或会话清理主动取消 |
+| `hard_timeout` | 超过硬超时，被系统终止 |
+| `orphaned` | 重启/异常后发现 DB 中仍是 running，但运行时已无对应 worker |
+
+注意：`wait_tool_execution` 到达 `timeout_seconds` 时，如果目标 execution 仍在运行，**这次 wait 调用本身是完成的观察动作**，不是工具执行失败。返回体会说明目标仍为 `running`，前端不应显示为红色失败。
+
+## 控制工具
+
+| 工具 | 用途 |
+|---|---|
+| `get_tool_execution` | 读取 execution 当前状态 |
+| `wait_tool_execution` | 等待指定 execution 一段时间 |
+| `cancel_tool_execution` | 主动取消指定 execution |
+
+`get_tool_execution` 与 `wait_tool_execution` 支持返回运行中输出预览：
+
+- `include_partial_output`：是否返回 partial output，默认 `true`。
+- `partial_output_max_bytes`：本次返回的尾部预览上限，默认 `4096`，最大 `65536`。
+
+partial output 是“已产生输出的有界预览”，不等同于最终 `result`。最终 `result` 仍只在工具结束时写入 canonical execution 记录；不支持流式输出的工具不会返回 partial 字段。
+
+典型流程：
+
+```text
+1. 调用 exec/sqlmap/nmap 等长任务
+2. 超过 tool_wait_timeout_seconds 后拿到 execution_id
+3. Agent 可继续推理、改用其他工具，或调用 wait_tool_execution
+4. 仍未完成时可继续等待，或调用 cancel_tool_execution
+```
+
+`tool_wait_timeout_seconds` 适用于内部 MCP、外部 MCP，以及 Eino filesystem 的流式 `execute`。Eino 的 `ls/read_file/write_file/edit_file/glob/grep` 等非流式 filesystem 工具会写入 execution 监控记录，但不作为后台 worker 做软等待续跑。
+
+## 取消和会话清理
+
+- 用户点击“停止任务”时，会取消当前会话仍在运行的工具。
+- 会话正常结束后，会批量取消当前会话仍 `running` 的工具。
+- “中断并继续”类流程不会做会话级批量取消，以免误杀后续需要等待的 worker。
+- 取消只针对当前 conversation 绑定的 execution，不会误杀其他会话的工具。
+
+## 外部 MCP 隔离
+
+外部 MCP 可能因为远端 server 卡住、断连或返回异常而拖慢 Agent。系统提供三层保护：
+
+| 能力 | 配置 | 说明 |
+|---|---|---|
+| 单 server 并发限制 | `external_mcp_max_concurrent_per_server` | 同一个外部 MCP server 同时运行的工具数 |
+| 全局并发限制 | `external_mcp_max_concurrent_total` | 所有外部 MCP 工具总并发 |
+| 熔断 | `external_mcp_circuit_failure_threshold` / `external_mcp_circuit_cooldown_seconds` | 单 server 连续失败后短期快速失败，避免反复打坏 server |
+
+推荐默认：
+
+```yaml
+agent:
+  external_mcp_max_concurrent_per_server: 2
+  external_mcp_max_concurrent_total: 16
+  external_mcp_circuit_failure_threshold: 3
+  external_mcp_circuit_cooldown_seconds: 60
+```
+
+## 输出兜底
+
+系统使用 `multi_agent.eino_middleware.reduction_max_length_for_trunc` 作为统一工具结果上限。当前示例配置为 50000 bytes。
+
+```yaml
+multi_agent:
+  eino_middleware:
+    reduction_enable: true
+    reduction_max_length_for_trunc: 50000
+```
+
+兜底覆盖：
+
+| 渠道 | 行为 |
+|---|---|
+| Agent 实际拿到的工具结果 | 使用兜底后的 canonical result |
+| DB/监控存储 | 保存同一份 canonical result |
+| `get_tool_execution` / `wait_tool_execution` | 读取同一份 canonical result |
+| Eino `execute` / filesystem 监控记录 | 完成记录前统一兜底 |
+| 非流式 `exec` stdout/stderr | 源头 bounded buffer |
+| 流式 `exec` stdout/stderr | 推送给前端的累计输出也受上限控制 |
+| PTY 执行路径 | 同样受上限控制 |
+| 前端详情弹窗 | 额外有 UI 展示截断保护 |
+
+触发上限后，完整输出先写入本地 trunc 文件，Agent 侧只保留计入预算的 `<persisted-output>` 预览（含绝对路径）。因此阈值为 50000 时，上下文文本不会超过该上限。
+
+示例：
+
+```text
+<persisted-output>
+Output too large (200000). Full output saved to: /path/to/tmp/reduction/conversations/<id>/trunc/<execution_id>
+Use read_file with offset/limit to read parts of the file.
+Preview (first …):
+…
+
+Preview (last …):
+…
+
+</persisted-output>
+```
+
+当前策略是「全文落盘 + 上下文预览」：超过 `reduction_max_length_for_trunc` 时，完整输出写入本地文件（默认 `tmp/reduction/conversations/<会话ID>/trunc/<execution_id>`），Agent/DB/监控拿到的是带绝对路径的 `<persisted-output>` 预览；可用 `read_file` 按 offset/limit 回读全文。
+
+## DB 与恢复上下文
+
+新执行结果的写入路径如下：
+
+```text
+工具完成
+  -> NormalizeToolResultForStorage
+  -> 写入内存 execution
+  -> 写入 DB
+  -> 返回给 Agent
+```
+
+因此正常情况下，DB 中保存的就是 Agent 拿到的结果。
+
+续跑恢复时，系统使用 `LastAgentTraceInput` 中的 model-facing trace，也就是实际送入 ChatModel 的消息快照，而不是原始事件流累计。恢复入口还会对历史 tool 内容再次应用上限，防止以下情况撑爆上下文：
+
+- 升级前 DB 已经存过原始大输出。
+- 手工迁移或导入的数据绕过了当前写入路径。
+- 配置从更大阈值改成 50000。
+- 未来某条旁路写入漏掉 canonicalize。
+
+## 关键配置建议
+
+长任务场景推荐：
+
+```yaml
+agent:
+  max_iterations: 800
+  tool_timeout_minutes: 60
+  tool_wait_timeout_seconds: 30
+  external_mcp_max_concurrent_per_server: 2
+  external_mcp_max_concurrent_total: 16
+  external_mcp_circuit_failure_threshold: 3
+  external_mcp_circuit_cooldown_seconds: 60
+  shell_no_output_timeout_seconds: 1200
+
+multi_agent:
+  eino_middleware:
+    reduction_enable: true
+    reduction_max_length_for_trunc: 50000
+```
+
+参数说明：
+
+| 参数 | 建议 | 说明 |
+|---|---:|---|
+| `max_iterations` | `300-1000` | 太大等于放弃循环保护 |
+| `tool_timeout_minutes` | `60` | 单次工具硬超时，适合 sqlmap 等长任务 |
+| `tool_wait_timeout_seconds` | `30-60` | Agent 本轮等待上限，到时返回 `execution_id` |
+| `shell_no_output_timeout_seconds` | `600-1200` | 连续无输出时终止，防止静默挂死 |
+| `reduction_max_length_for_trunc` | `50000` | 工具结果统一上限 |
+
+不建议把 `tool_wait_timeout_seconds` 设置得很大。长任务应由 worker 后台跑，Agent 通过 `execution_id` 继续观察，而不是一轮等待数分钟。
+
+## 测试建议
+
+可以用以下对话测试长任务语义：
+
+```text
+调用 exec 执行 sleep 120；如果超过 10 秒还没完成，不要一直等，告诉我 execution_id，然后调用 wait_tool_execution 等 5 秒；如果仍未完成，再调用 cancel_tool_execution，最后说明状态。
+```
+
+可以用以下命令测试大输出兜底：
+
+```text
+调用 exec 执行：python3 - <<'PY'
+print("A" * 200000)
+PY
+然后展示工具结果长度和是否包含截断提示。
+```
+
+预期：
+
+- 初始长任务会返回 `execution_id`，状态为 `running` 或前端展示 `background_running`。
+- `wait_tool_execution` 等待到上限但目标未完成时，本次 wait 调用不应显示为执行失败。
+- 大输出结果不会超过 `reduction_max_length_for_trunc`。
+- DB、监控详情、Agent 继续推理看到的是同一份兜底结果。
+
+## 当前边界
+
+- 外部 MCP 的远端 server 内部如何采集输出不由 CyberStrikeAI 控制；CyberStrikeAI 会在结果进入本系统后统一兜底、限并发和熔断。
+- 超长工具输出会在截断前写入本地 `tmp/reduction/.../trunc/<id>`（或 `reduction_root_dir`），bounded result 中包含可 `read_file` 的绝对路径。

docs/zh-CN/troubleshooting.md

@@ -23,12 +23,22 @@ https://127.0.0.1:8080/
 
 检查：
 
-- `config.yaml` 中的 `auth.password`。
+- RBAC 用户密码是否正确（默认 `admin`；首次启动密码见控制台输出）。
-- 是否修改后未重启或未应用配置。
+- 是否修改密码后旧会话已失效，需重新登录。
 - 浏览器 Cookie 是否异常，可尝试无痕窗口。
 - 审计日志中是否有登录失败节流。
 
-生产环境忘记密码时，需要在服务器上修改 `config.yaml` 并重启服务。
+### 忘记 `admin` 密码
+
+如果仍有其他具备 `rbac:write` 权限的管理员账号，优先在 **平台权限 → 用户管理** 中重置密码。
+
+如果没有可用的管理员会话，可在服务器上紧急重置内置 `admin` 账号。先停止 CyberStrikeAI 服务并备份数据库，然后在项目根目录执行以下命令，按提示输入并确认新密码：
+
+```bash
+HASH=$(htpasswd -nBC 10 '' | cut -d: -f2 | tr -d '\n') && sqlite3 data/conversations.db "UPDATE rbac_users SET password_hash='$HASH', updated_at=CURRENT_TIMESTAMP WHERE id='admin' AND username='admin' AND is_builtin=1; SELECT changes();"
+```
+
+输出 `1` 表示修改成功。该命令需要 `sqlite3` 和 `htpasswd`；如果 `config.yaml` 中的 `database.path` 不是默认值，请替换 `data/conversations.db`。密码输入不会显示，也不会写入 Shell 历史，并以 bcrypt 哈希保存。完成后重新启动服务，使原有登录会话失效。
 
 ## 模型无响应
 

docs/zh-CN/workflow-graph.md

@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
-# CyberStrikeAI 图编排使用说明
+# CyberStrikeAI 工作流使用说明
 
 [English](../en-US/workflow-graph.md)
 
-本文档说明 **图编排（Graph Orchestration）** 的完整使用方式：如何在画布上搭建流程、配置各类型节点、在节点之间传递数据，以及如何将流程绑定到角色并自动运行。
+本文档说明 **工作流（Workflow）** 的完整使用方式：如何在画布上搭建流程、配置各类型节点、在节点之间传递数据，以及如何将流程绑定到角色并自动运行。
 
 ---
 
-## 一、在哪里使用图编排
+## 一、在哪里使用工作流
 
 1. 登录 CyberStrikeAI Web 端  
-2. 左侧导航进入 **图编排**  
+2. 左侧导航进入 **工作流**  
 3. 在左侧列表选择已有流程，或新建流程  
 4. 在中央画布拖拽、连线、配置节点  
 5. 填写流程 **ID**、**名称**、**描述** 后点击 **保存**
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
 
 ## 三、执行模型（先理解再配置）
 
-图编排按 **有向图** 执行，引擎从 **开始** 节点出发，沿连线依次运行下游节点。
+工作流按 **有向图** 执行，引擎从 **开始** 节点出发，沿连线依次运行下游节点。
 
 每次运行会维护一份内部状态，模板变量 `{{...}}` 从这里取值：
 
@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ HITL 等待信息会记录：
 ### 8.1 在角色管理中绑定
 
 1. 进入 **角色管理**，编辑或新建角色  
-2. 选择 **工作流 / 图编排** 绑定的流程 ID  
+2. 选择绑定的 **工作流** ID  
 3. 策略设为 `auto`（默认：有 `workflow_id` 时自动执行）  
 4. 保存角色
 

internal/agent/agent.go

@@ -24,18 +24,17 @@ import (
 
 // Agent AI代理
 type Agent struct {
-	openAIClient          *openai.Client
+	openAIClient        *openai.Client
-	config                *config.OpenAIConfig
+	config              *config.OpenAIConfig
-	agentConfig           *config.AgentConfig
+	agentConfig         *config.AgentConfig
-	mcpServer             *mcp.Server
+	mcpServer           *mcp.Server
-	externalMCPMgr        *mcp.ExternalMCPManager // 外部MCP管理器
+	externalMCPMgr      *mcp.ExternalMCPManager // 外部MCP管理器
-	logger                *zap.Logger
+	logger              *zap.Logger
-	maxIterations         int
+	maxIterations       int
-	mu                    sync.RWMutex      // 添加互斥锁以支持并发更新
+	mu                  sync.RWMutex      // 添加互斥锁以支持并发更新
-	toolNameMapping       map[string]string // 工具名称映射：OpenAI格式 -> 原始格式（用于外部MCP工具）
+	toolNameMapping     map[string]string // 工具名称映射：OpenAI格式 -> 原始格式（用于外部MCP工具）
-	currentConversationID string            // 当前对话ID（用于自动传递给工具）
+	promptBaseDir       string            // 解析 system_prompt_path 时相对路径的基准目录（通常为 config.yaml 所在目录）
-	promptBaseDir         string            // 解析 system_prompt_path 时相对路径的基准目录（通常为 config.yaml 所在目录）
+	toolDescriptionMode string            // 工具描述模式: "short" | "full"，默认 short
-	toolDescriptionMode   string            // 工具描述模式: "short" | "full"，默认 short
 }
 
 type agentConversationIDKey struct{}
@@ -91,15 +90,15 @@ func NewAgent(cfg *config.OpenAIConfig, agentCfg *config.AgentConfig, mcpServer
 	llmClient := openai.NewClient(cfg, httpClient, logger)
 
 	return &Agent{
-		openAIClient:         llmClient,
+		openAIClient:        llmClient,
-		config:               cfg,
+		config:              cfg,
-		agentConfig:          agentCfg,
+		agentConfig:         agentCfg,
-		mcpServer:            mcpServer,
+		mcpServer:           mcpServer,
-		externalMCPMgr:       externalMCPMgr,
+		externalMCPMgr:      externalMCPMgr,
-		logger:               logger,
+		logger:              logger,
-		maxIterations:        maxIterations,
+		maxIterations:       maxIterations,
-		toolNameMapping:      make(map[string]string), // 初始化工具名称映射
+		toolNameMapping:     make(map[string]string), // 初始化工具名称映射
-		toolDescriptionMode:  "short",
+		toolDescriptionMode: "short",
 	}
 }
 
@@ -120,6 +119,9 @@ type ChatMessage struct {
 	ToolName string `json:"tool_name,omitempty"`
 	// ReasoningContent 对应 OpenAI/DeepSeek 的 reasoning_content；思考模式 + 工具调用后续跑须回传（见 DeepSeek 文档）。
 	ReasoningContent string `json:"reasoning_content,omitempty"`
+	// ModelFacingTrace is runtime-only metadata: true means Content was already the exact
+	// payload seen at the model boundary and must be restored byte-for-byte.
+	ModelFacingTrace bool `json:"-"`
 }
 
 // MarshalJSON 自定义JSON序列化，将tool_calls中的arguments转换为JSON字符串
@@ -523,12 +525,6 @@ func (a *Agent) executeToolViaMCP(ctx context.Context, toolName string, args map
 	// 如果是record_vulnerability工具，自动添加conversation_id
 	if toolName == builtin.ToolRecordVulnerability {
 		conversationID := agentConversationIDFromContext(ctx)
-		if conversationID == "" {
-			a.mu.RLock()
-			conversationID = a.currentConversationID
-			a.mu.RUnlock()
-		}
-
 		if conversationID != "" {
 			args["conversation_id"] = conversationID
 			a.logger.Debug("自动添加conversation_id到record_vulnerability工具",
@@ -658,7 +654,7 @@ func (a *Agent) UpdateToolDescriptionMode(mode string) {
 		mode = "short"
 	}
 	a.toolDescriptionMode = mode
-	a.logger.Info("Agent工具描述模式已更新", zap.String("tool_description_mode", mode))
+	a.logger.Debug("Agent工具描述模式已更新", zap.String("tool_description_mode", mode))
 }
 
 // RepairOrphanToolMessages 清理失去配对的tool消息和未完成的tool_calls，避免OpenAI报错
@@ -766,39 +762,53 @@ func (a *Agent) ToolsForRole(roleTools []string) []Tool {
 
 // ExecuteMCPToolForConversation 在指定会话上下文中执行 MCP 工具（行为与主 Agent 循环中的工具调用一致，如自动注入 conversation_id）。
 func (a *Agent) ExecuteMCPToolForConversation(ctx context.Context, conversationID, toolName string, args map[string]interface{}) (*ToolExecutionResult, error) {
-	a.mu.Lock()
-	prev := a.currentConversationID
-	a.currentConversationID = conversationID
-	a.mu.Unlock()
-	defer func() {
-		a.mu.Lock()
-		a.currentConversationID = prev
-		a.mu.Unlock()
-	}()
 	ctx = withAgentConversationID(ctx, conversationID)
+	ctx = mcp.WithMCPConversationID(ctx, conversationID)
 	return a.executeToolViaMCP(ctx, toolName, args)
 }
 
 // BeginLocalToolExecution 在非 CallTool 路径工具开始时写入 running 状态，供 MCP 监控页展示「执行中」。
-func (a *Agent) BeginLocalToolExecution(toolName string, args map[string]interface{}) string {
+func (a *Agent) BeginLocalToolExecution(ctx context.Context, toolName string, args map[string]interface{}) string {
 	if a == nil || a.mcpServer == nil {
 		return ""
 	}
-	return a.mcpServer.BeginToolExecution(toolName, args)
+	return a.mcpServer.BeginToolExecution(ctx, toolName, args)
 }
 
 // FinishLocalToolExecution 完成 BeginLocalToolExecution 创建的记录；executionID 为空时一次性写入已完成记录。
-func (a *Agent) FinishLocalToolExecution(executionID, toolName string, args map[string]interface{}, resultText string, invokeErr error) string {
+func (a *Agent) FinishLocalToolExecution(ctx context.Context, executionID, toolName string, args map[string]interface{}, resultText string, invokeErr error) string {
 	if a == nil || a.mcpServer == nil {
 		return ""
 	}
-	return a.mcpServer.FinishToolExecution(executionID, toolName, args, resultText, invokeErr)
+	return a.mcpServer.FinishToolExecution(ctx, executionID, toolName, args, resultText, invokeErr)
+}
+
+// AppendLocalToolExecutionPartialOutput records a bounded live-output preview for a running local tool.
+func (a *Agent) AppendLocalToolExecutionPartialOutput(executionID, chunk string) {
+	if a == nil || a.mcpServer == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	a.mcpServer.AppendToolExecutionPartialOutput(executionID, chunk)
+}
+
+func (a *Agent) RegisterLocalToolExecutionCancel(executionID string, cancel context.CancelFunc) {
+	if a == nil || a.mcpServer == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	a.mcpServer.RegisterToolExecutionCancel(executionID, cancel)
+}
+
+func (a *Agent) UnregisterLocalToolExecutionCancel(executionID string) {
+	if a == nil || a.mcpServer == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	a.mcpServer.UnregisterToolExecutionCancel(executionID)
 }
 
 // RecordLocalToolExecution 将非 CallTool 路径完成的工具调用写入 MCP 监控库（与 CallTool 落库一致），返回 executionId。
 // 用于 Eino filesystem execute 等场景，使助手气泡「渗透测试详情」与常规 MCP 一致可点进监控。
-func (a *Agent) RecordLocalToolExecution(toolName string, args map[string]interface{}, resultText string, invokeErr error) string {
+func (a *Agent) RecordLocalToolExecution(ctx context.Context, toolName string, args map[string]interface{}, resultText string, invokeErr error) string {
-	return a.FinishLocalToolExecution("", toolName, args, resultText, invokeErr)
+	return a.FinishLocalToolExecution(ctx, "", toolName, args, resultText, invokeErr)
 }
 
 // UpdateMCPExecutionDisplayResult 将监控库中的工具结果更新为送入模型的展示正文（reduction 后）。
@@ -834,6 +844,46 @@ func (a *Agent) CancelMCPToolExecutionWithNote(executionID, note string) bool {
 	return false
 }
 
+// CancelRunningMCPToolsForConversation cancels all currently running internal/external MCP executions
+// owned by the conversation. It is used when a session ends or the user stops a task.
+func (a *Agent) CancelRunningMCPToolsForConversation(conversationID, note string) int {
+	conversationID = strings.TrimSpace(conversationID)
+	if a == nil || conversationID == "" {
+		return 0
+	}
+	note = strings.TrimSpace(note)
+	seen := make(map[string]struct{})
+	cancelled := 0
+	cancelIfConversationMatches := func(execID string, get func(string) (*mcp.ToolExecution, bool), cancel func(string, string) bool) {
+		execID = strings.TrimSpace(execID)
+		if execID == "" {
+			return
+		}
+		if _, ok := seen[execID]; ok {
+			return
+		}
+		seen[execID] = struct{}{}
+		exec, ok := get(execID)
+		if !ok || exec == nil || strings.TrimSpace(exec.ConversationID) != conversationID {
+			return
+		}
+		if cancel(execID, note) {
+			cancelled++
+		}
+	}
+	if a.mcpServer != nil {
+		for execID := range a.mcpServer.ActiveRunningExecutionIDs() {
+			cancelIfConversationMatches(execID, a.mcpServer.GetExecution, a.mcpServer.CancelToolExecutionWithNote)
+		}
+	}
+	if a.externalMCPMgr != nil {
+		for execID := range a.externalMCPMgr.ActiveRunningExecutionIDs() {
+			cancelIfConversationMatches(execID, a.externalMCPMgr.GetExecution, a.externalMCPMgr.CancelToolExecutionWithNote)
+		}
+	}
+	return cancelled
+}
+
 // extractQuotedToolName 尝试从错误信息中提取被引用的工具名称
 func extractQuotedToolName(errMsg string) string {
 	start := strings.Index(errMsg, "\"")

internal/agent/agent_test.go

@@ -1,10 +1,15 @@
 package agent
 
 import (
+	"context"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
 	"testing"
+	"time"
 
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/config"
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/mcp"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/mcp/builtin"
 
 	"go.uber.org/zap"
 )
@@ -65,3 +70,141 @@ func TestAgent_NewAgent_CustomConfig(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("迭代次数不匹配。期望: 15, 实际: %d", agent.maxIterations)
 	}
 }
+
+func TestAgentCancelRunningMCPToolsForConversation(t *testing.T) {
+	ag := setupTestAgent(t)
+	ag.mcpServer.ConfigureToolWaitTimeoutSeconds(1)
+	ag.mcpServer.RegisterTool(mcp.Tool{Name: "block", InputSchema: map[string]interface{}{"type": "object"}}, func(ctx context.Context, args map[string]interface{}) (*mcp.ToolResult, error) {
+		<-ctx.Done()
+		return nil, ctx.Err()
+	})
+
+	ctx1 := mcp.WithMCPConversationID(context.Background(), "conv-1")
+	result1, execID1, err := ag.mcpServer.CallTool(ctx1, "block", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CallTool conv-1: %v", err)
+	}
+	if result1 == nil || !result1.IsError || execID1 == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("expected bounded wait for conv-1, result=%#v id=%q", result1, execID1)
+	}
+
+	ctx2 := mcp.WithMCPConversationID(context.Background(), "conv-2")
+	result2, execID2, err := ag.mcpServer.CallTool(ctx2, "block", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CallTool conv-2: %v", err)
+	}
+	if result2 == nil || !result2.IsError || execID2 == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("expected bounded wait for conv-2, result=%#v id=%q", result2, execID2)
+	}
+
+	if got := ag.CancelRunningMCPToolsForConversation("conv-1", "session ended"); got != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("cancelled count = %d, want 1", got)
+	}
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(time.Second)
+	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
+		exec1, _ := ag.mcpServer.GetExecution(execID1)
+		exec2, _ := ag.mcpServer.GetExecution(execID2)
+		if exec1 != nil && exec1.Status == mcp.ToolExecutionStatusCancelled {
+			if exec2 == nil || exec2.Status != mcp.ToolExecutionStatusRunning {
+				t.Fatalf("conv-2 execution should remain running, got %#v", exec2)
+			}
+			if !strings.Contains(exec1.Error, "session ended") && (exec1.Result == nil || !strings.Contains(mcp.ToolResultPlainText(exec1.Result), "session ended")) {
+				t.Fatalf("cancel note missing from conv-1 execution: %#v", exec1)
+			}
+			_ = ag.CancelRunningMCPToolsForConversation("conv-2", "")
+			return
+		}
+		time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
+	}
+	t.Fatal("conv-1 execution did not become cancelled")
+}
+
+func TestExecuteMCPToolForConversationInjectsConversationID(t *testing.T) {
+	ag := setupTestAgent(t)
+	gotArgs := make(chan map[string]interface{}, 1)
+	ag.mcpServer.RegisterTool(mcp.Tool{Name: builtin.ToolRecordVulnerability, InputSchema: map[string]interface{}{"type": "object"}}, func(ctx context.Context, args map[string]interface{}) (*mcp.ToolResult, error) {
+		gotArgs <- args
+		return &mcp.ToolResult{Content: []mcp.Content{{Type: "text", Text: "ok"}}}, nil
+	})
+
+	result, err := ag.ExecuteMCPToolForConversation(context.Background(), "conv-record", builtin.ToolRecordVulnerability, map[string]interface{}{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ExecuteMCPToolForConversation: %v", err)
+	}
+	if result == nil || result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("expected successful result, got %#v", result)
+	}
+
+	select {
+	case args := <-gotArgs:
+		if got := args["conversation_id"]; got != "conv-record" {
+			t.Fatalf("conversation_id = %#v, want conv-record", got)
+		}
+	case <-time.After(time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("tool was not called")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestExecuteMCPToolForConversationBindsExecutionConversation(t *testing.T) {
+	ag := setupTestAgent(t)
+	ag.mcpServer.ConfigureToolWaitTimeoutSeconds(1)
+	release := make(chan struct{})
+	ag.mcpServer.RegisterTool(mcp.Tool{Name: "slow-bind", InputSchema: map[string]interface{}{"type": "object"}}, func(ctx context.Context, args map[string]interface{}) (*mcp.ToolResult, error) {
+		select {
+		case <-release:
+			return &mcp.ToolResult{Content: []mcp.Content{{Type: "text", Text: "done"}}}, nil
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return nil, ctx.Err()
+		}
+	})
+
+	result, err := ag.ExecuteMCPToolForConversation(context.Background(), "conv-bound", "slow-bind", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ExecuteMCPToolForConversation: %v", err)
+	}
+	if result == nil || !result.IsError || result.ExecutionID == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("expected bounded wait result with execution id, result=%#v", result)
+	}
+
+	exec, ok := ag.mcpServer.GetExecution(result.ExecutionID)
+	if !ok || exec == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("missing execution %q", result.ExecutionID)
+	}
+	if exec.ConversationID != "conv-bound" {
+		t.Fatalf("execution conversation = %q, want conv-bound", exec.ConversationID)
+	}
+	close(release)
+}
+
+func TestExecuteMCPToolForConversationConcurrentRecordIsolation(t *testing.T) {
+	ag := setupTestAgent(t)
+	seen := make(chan string, 2)
+	ag.mcpServer.RegisterTool(mcp.Tool{Name: builtin.ToolRecordVulnerability, InputSchema: map[string]interface{}{"type": "object"}}, func(ctx context.Context, args map[string]interface{}) (*mcp.ToolResult, error) {
+		if conv, _ := args["conversation_id"].(string); conv != "" {
+			seen <- conv
+		}
+		return &mcp.ToolResult{Content: []mcp.Content{{Type: "text", Text: "ok"}}}, nil
+	})
+
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	for _, conv := range []string{"conv-a", "conv-b"} {
+		conv := conv
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func() {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			if _, err := ag.ExecuteMCPToolForConversation(context.Background(), conv, builtin.ToolRecordVulnerability, map[string]interface{}{}); err != nil {
+				t.Errorf("ExecuteMCPToolForConversation %s: %v", conv, err)
+			}
+		}()
+	}
+	wg.Wait()
+	close(seen)
+
+	got := map[string]int{}
+	for conv := range seen {
+		got[conv]++
+	}
+	if got["conv-a"] != 1 || got["conv-b"] != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("conversation ids = %#v, want one call for conv-a and conv-b", got)
+	}
+}

internal/agent/agent_trace.go

@@ -5,6 +5,31 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 )
 
+const ModelFacingTraceVersionKey = "cyberstrike_model_facing_trace_version"
+
+// IsModelFacingTraceJSON reports whether a persisted trace was produced from the final
+// model-boundary state. Legacy traces have no version marker and require one-time migration.
+func IsModelFacingTraceJSON(traceInputJSON string) bool {
+	var raw []map[string]interface{}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(traceInputJSON)), &raw); err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	for _, msg := range raw {
+		extra, _ := msg["extra"].(map[string]interface{})
+		v, ok := extra[ModelFacingTraceVersionKey]
+		if !ok {
+			continue
+		}
+		switch n := v.(type) {
+		case float64:
+			return n >= 1
+		case int:
+			return n >= 1
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
 // ParseTraceMessages 解析落库的 last_react_input（OpenAI 风格 messages JSON 数组）。
 func ParseTraceMessages(traceInputJSON string) ([]ChatMessage, error) {
 	traceInputJSON = strings.TrimSpace(traceInputJSON)
@@ -15,6 +40,7 @@ func ParseTraceMessages(traceInputJSON string) ([]ChatMessage, error) {
 	if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(traceInputJSON), &raw); err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
+	modelFacing := IsModelFacingTraceJSON(traceInputJSON)
 	out := make([]ChatMessage, 0, len(raw))
 	for _, msgMap := range raw {
 		msg := ChatMessage{}
@@ -23,6 +49,7 @@ func ParseTraceMessages(traceInputJSON string) ([]ChatMessage, error) {
 			continue
 		}
 		msg.Role = role
+		msg.ModelFacingTrace = modelFacing
 		if content, ok := msgMap["content"].(string); ok {
 			msg.Content = content
 		}

internal/agent/agent_trace_test.go

@@ -55,3 +55,22 @@ func TestMergeAssistantTraceOutput(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("expected merged output, got %q", out[len(out)-1].Content)
 	}
 }
+
+func TestParseTraceMessagesMarksVersionedModelFacingTrace(t *testing.T) {
+	raw := `[{"role":"system","content":"s","extra":{"cyberstrike_model_facing_trace_version":1}},{"role":"user","content":"u"},{"role":"tool","content":"exact","tool_call_id":"c1"}]`
+	if !IsModelFacingTraceJSON(raw) {
+		t.Fatal("versioned trace not detected")
+	}
+	msgs, err := ParseTraceMessages(raw)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for i, msg := range msgs {
+		if !msg.ModelFacingTrace {
+			t.Fatalf("message %d missing model-facing marker", i)
+		}
+	}
+	if IsModelFacingTraceJSON(`[{"role":"user","content":"legacy"}]`) {
+		t.Fatal("legacy trace incorrectly marked model-facing")
+	}
+}

internal/app/app.go

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
@@ -16,6 +17,7 @@ import (
 
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/agent"
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/audit"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/authctx"
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/c2"
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/config"
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/database"
@@ -64,6 +66,7 @@ type App struct {
 	slackCancel        context.CancelFunc        // Slack Socket Mode 取消函数
 	discordCancel      context.CancelFunc        // Discord Gateway 取消函数
 	qqCancel           context.CancelFunc        // QQ WebSocket 取消函数
+	alertCancel        context.CancelFunc        // 漏洞提醒持久化投递 worker
 	c2Manager          *c2.Manager               // C2 管理器（未启用 C2 时为 nil）
 	c2Watchdog         *c2.SessionWatchdog       // C2 会话看门狗
 	c2WatchdogCancel   context.CancelFunc        // 看门狗取消函数
@@ -81,13 +84,7 @@ func New(cfg *config.Config, log *logger.Logger, configPath string) (*App, error
 	router := gin.Default()
 
 	// CORS中间件
-	router.Use(corsMiddleware())
+	router.Use(corsMiddleware(cfg.Server.CORSAllowedOrigins))
-
-	// 认证管理器
-	authManager, err := security.NewAuthManager(cfg.Auth.Password, cfg.Auth.SessionDurationHours)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("初始化认证失败: %w", err)
-	}
 
 	// 初始化数据库
 	dbPath := cfg.Database.Path
@@ -105,44 +102,84 @@ func New(cfg *config.Config, log *logger.Logger, configPath string) (*App, error
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("初始化数据库失败: %w", err)
 	}
 
+	// 认证管理器（数据库初始化后挂载 RBAC）
+	authManager := security.NewAuthManager(cfg.Auth.SessionDurationHours)
+	if generatedPassword, err := authManager.AttachRBACStore(db); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("初始化RBAC失败: %w", err)
+	} else if generatedPassword != "" {
+		config.PrintBootstrapAdminPassword(generatedPassword)
+	}
+	for platform, userID := range cfg.Robots.ServiceAccountUserIDs() {
+		user, userErr := db.GetRBACUserByID(userID)
+		if userErr != nil || !user.Enabled {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("robots.%s.auth.service_user_id 必须指向已启用的 RBAC 用户", platform)
+		}
+	}
+
 	auditSvc := audit.NewService(db, cfg, log.Logger)
 	audit.RegisterConversationCreateHook(auditSvc)
 	auditSvc.PurgeExpired()
 	audit.StartRetentionLoop(auditSvc, log.Logger)
+	if err := db.PurgeWorkflowPackageLifecycle(time.Now().UTC()); err != nil {
+		log.Logger.Warn("清理过期工作流包记录失败", zap.Error(err))
+	}
+	go func() {
+		ticker := time.NewTicker(time.Hour)
+		defer ticker.Stop()
+		for range ticker.C {
+			if err := db.PurgeWorkflowPackageLifecycle(time.Now().UTC()); err != nil {
+				log.Logger.Warn("清理过期工作流包记录失败", zap.Error(err))
+			}
+		}
+	}()
 
 	monitorRetention := monitor.NewService(db, cfg, log.Logger)
 	monitorRetention.PurgeExpired()
 	monitor.StartRetentionLoop(monitorRetention, log.Logger)
 
+	if err := handler.NewHITLManager(db, log.Logger).EnsureSchema(); err != nil {
+		log.Logger.Warn("初始化 HITL 表失败", zap.Error(err))
+	}
 	hitlRetention := hitl.NewService(db, cfg, log.Logger)
 	hitlRetention.PurgeExpired()
 	hitl.StartRetentionLoop(hitlRetention, log.Logger)
 
 	// 创建MCP服务器（带数据库持久化）
 	mcpServer := mcp.NewServerWithStorage(log.Logger, db)
+	mcpServer.SetToolAuthorizer(mcpToolAuthorizer(db))
 	mcpServer.ConfigureHTTPToolCallTimeoutFromAgentMinutes(cfg.Agent.ToolTimeoutMinutes)
+	mcpServer.ConfigureToolWaitTimeoutSeconds(cfg.Agent.ToolWaitTimeoutSeconds)
+	mcpServer.ConfigureToolResultMaxBytes(cfg.MultiAgent.EinoMiddleware.ReductionMaxLengthForTruncEffective())
+	mcpServer.ConfigureToolResultSpillRoot(cfg.MultiAgent.EinoMiddleware.ReductionRootDir)
 
 	// 创建安全工具执行器
 	executor := security.NewExecutor(&cfg.Security, mcpServer, log.Logger)
 	executor.SetShellNoOutputTimeoutSeconds(cfg.Agent.ShellNoOutputTimeoutSeconds)
+	executor.SetToolOutputMaxBytes(cfg.MultiAgent.EinoMiddleware.ReductionMaxLengthForTruncEffective())
+	executor.SetToolOutputSpillRoot(cfg.MultiAgent.EinoMiddleware.ReductionRootDir)
 
 	// 注册工具
 	executor.RegisterTools(mcpServer)
 
 	// 注册漏洞记录工具
 	registerVulnerabilityTools(mcpServer, db, log.Logger)
+	registerAssetTools(mcpServer, db, log.Logger)
 	registerProjectFactTools(mcpServer, db, cfg, log.Logger)
 	registerVisionTools(mcpServer, cfg, log.Logger)
 
-	if cfg.Auth.GeneratedPassword != "" {
-		config.PrintGeneratedPasswordWarning(cfg.Auth.GeneratedPassword, cfg.Auth.GeneratedPasswordPersisted, cfg.Auth.GeneratedPasswordPersistErr)
-		cfg.Auth.GeneratedPassword = ""
-		cfg.Auth.GeneratedPasswordPersisted = false
-		cfg.Auth.GeneratedPasswordPersistErr = ""
-	}
-
 	// 创建外部MCP管理器（使用与内部MCP服务器相同的存储）
 	externalMCPMgr := mcp.NewExternalMCPManagerWithStorage(log.Logger, db)
+	externalMCPMgr.SetToolAuthorizer(externalMCPToolAuthorizer())
+	externalMCPMgr.ConfigureToolWaitTimeoutSeconds(cfg.Agent.ToolWaitTimeoutSeconds)
+	externalMCPMgr.ConfigureToolResultMaxBytes(cfg.MultiAgent.EinoMiddleware.ReductionMaxLengthForTruncEffective())
+	externalMCPMgr.ConfigureToolResultSpillRoot(cfg.MultiAgent.EinoMiddleware.ReductionRootDir)
+	externalMCPMgr.ConfigureResilience(mcp.ExternalMCPResilienceConfig{
+		MaxConcurrentPerServer:  cfg.Agent.ExternalMCPMaxConcurrentPerServer,
+		MaxConcurrentTotal:      cfg.Agent.ExternalMCPMaxConcurrentTotal,
+		CircuitFailureThreshold: cfg.Agent.ExternalMCPCircuitFailureThreshold,
+		CircuitCooldown:         time.Duration(cfg.Agent.ExternalMCPCircuitCooldownSeconds) * time.Second,
+	})
+	mcp.RegisterExecutionControlTools(mcpServer, externalMCPMgr)
 	if cfg.ExternalMCP.Servers != nil {
 		externalMCPMgr.LoadConfigs(&cfg.ExternalMCP)
 		// 启动所有启用的外部MCP客户端
@@ -168,7 +205,7 @@ func New(cfg *config.Config, log *logger.Logger, configPath string) (*App, error
 	var knowledgeHandler *handler.KnowledgeHandler
 
 	var knowledgeDBConn *database.DB
-	log.Logger.Info("检查知识库配置", zap.Bool("enabled", cfg.Knowledge.Enabled))
+	log.Logger.Debug("检查知识库配置", zap.Bool("enabled", cfg.Knowledge.Enabled))
 	if cfg.Knowledge.Enabled {
 		// 确定知识库数据库路径
 		knowledgeDBPath := cfg.Database.KnowledgeDBPath
@@ -311,7 +348,7 @@ func New(cfg *config.Config, log *logger.Logger, configPath string) (*App, error
 	}
 
 	skillsDir := skillpackage.SkillsRootFromConfig(cfg.SkillsDir, configPath)
-	log.Logger.Info("Skills 目录（Eino ADK skill 中间件 + Web 管理 API）", zap.String("skillsDir", skillsDir))
+	log.Logger.Debug("Skills 目录（Eino ADK skill 中间件 + Web 管理 API）", zap.String("skillsDir", skillsDir))
 	configDir := filepath.Dir(configPath)
 	plantaskRel := strings.TrimSpace(cfg.MultiAgent.EinoMiddleware.PlantaskRelDir)
 	if plantaskRel == "" {
@@ -337,7 +374,7 @@ func New(cfg *config.Config, log *logger.Logger, configPath string) (*App, error
 	}
 	markdownAgentsHandler := handler.NewMarkdownAgentsHandler(agentsDir)
 	markdownAgentsHandler.SetAudit(auditSvc)
-	log.Logger.Info("多代理 Markdown 子 Agent 目录", zap.String("agentsDir", agentsDir))
+	log.Logger.Debug("多代理 Markdown 子 Agent 目录", zap.String("agentsDir", agentsDir))
 
 	// 创建处理器
 	agentHandler := handler.NewAgentHandler(agent, db, cfg, log.Logger)
@@ -359,18 +396,23 @@ func New(cfg *config.Config, log *logger.Logger, configPath string) (*App, error
 	authHandler.SetAudit(auditSvc)
 	attackChainHandler := handler.NewAttackChainHandler(db, &cfg.OpenAI, log.Logger)
 	vulnerabilityHandler := handler.NewVulnerabilityHandler(db, log.Logger)
+	assetHandler := handler.NewAssetHandler(db, log.Logger)
 	projectHandler := handler.NewProjectHandler(db, log.Logger)
+	rbacHandler := handler.NewRBACHandler(db, log.Logger)
+	rbacHandler.SetAudit(auditSvc)
+	rbacHandler.SetAuthManager(authManager)
 	workflowHandler := handler.NewWorkflowHandler(db, log.Logger)
 	workflowHandler.SetAudit(auditSvc)
 	workflowHandler.SetRuntime(agent, cfg)
 	vulnerabilityHandler.SetAudit(auditSvc)
 	webshellHandler := handler.NewWebShellHandler(log.Logger, db)
 	webshellHandler.SetAudit(auditSvc)
-	chatUploadsHandler := handler.NewChatUploadsHandler(log.Logger)
+	chatUploadsHandler := handler.NewChatUploadsHandler(log.Logger, db)
 	chatUploadsHandler.SetAudit(auditSvc)
 	registerWebshellTools(mcpServer, db, webshellHandler, log.Logger)
 	registerWebshellManagementTools(mcpServer, db, webshellHandler, log.Logger)
 	configHandler := handler.NewConfigHandler(configPath, cfg, mcpServer, executor, agent, attackChainHandler, externalMCPMgr, log.Logger)
+	configHandler.SetDB(db)
 	configHandler.SetAudit(auditSvc)
 	agentHandler.SetHitlToolWhitelistSaver(configHandler)
 	agentHandler.SetHitlAuditStrategySaver(configHandler)
@@ -403,6 +445,8 @@ func New(cfg *config.Config, log *logger.Logger, configPath string) (*App, error
 	conversationHandler.SetTaskStopper(agentHandler)
 	auditHandler := handler.NewAuditHandler(db, auditSvc, log.Logger)
 	robotHandler := handler.NewRobotHandler(cfg, db, agentHandler, log.Logger)
+	robotHandler.SetAudit(auditSvc)
+	db.SetVulnerabilityCreatedHook(robotHandler.NotifyNewVulnerability)
 	openAPIHandler := handler.NewOpenAPIHandler(db, log.Logger, conversationHandler, agentHandler)
 
 	// 创建 App 实例（部分字段稍后填充）
@@ -431,10 +475,14 @@ func New(cfg *config.Config, log *logger.Logger, configPath string) (*App, error
 	}
 	// 飞书/钉钉长连接（无需公网），启用时在后台启动；后续前端应用配置时会通过 RestartRobotConnections 重启
 	app.startRobotConnections()
+	alertCtx, alertCancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	app.alertCancel = alertCancel
+	go robotHandler.RunVulnerabilityAlertWorker(alertCtx)
 
 	// 设置漏洞工具注册器（内置工具，必须设置）
 	vulnerabilityRegistrar := func() error {
 		registerVulnerabilityTools(mcpServer, db, log.Logger)
+		registerAssetTools(mcpServer, db, log.Logger)
 		registerProjectFactTools(mcpServer, db, cfg, log.Logger)
 		registerVisionTools(mcpServer, cfg, log.Logger)
 		return nil
@@ -524,6 +572,7 @@ func New(cfg *config.Config, log *logger.Logger, configPath string) (*App, error
 		attackChainHandler,
 		app, // 传递 App 实例以便动态获取 knowledgeHandler
 		vulnerabilityHandler,
+		assetHandler,
 		projectHandler,
 		workflowHandler,
 		webshellHandler,
@@ -535,6 +584,8 @@ func New(cfg *config.Config, log *logger.Logger, configPath string) (*App, error
 		terminalHandler,
 		app.c2Handler,
 		auditHandler,
+		auditSvc,
+		rbacHandler,
 		mcpServer,
 		authManager,
 		openAPIHandler,
@@ -547,17 +598,30 @@ func New(cfg *config.Config, log *logger.Logger, configPath string) (*App, error
 // mcpHandlerWithAuth 在鉴权通过后转发到 MCP 处理；若配置了 auth_header 则校验请求头，否则直接放行
 func (a *App) mcpHandlerWithAuth(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	cfg := a.config.MCP
-	if cfg.AuthHeader != "" {
+	if authHeader := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("Authorization")); len(authHeader) > 7 && strings.EqualFold(authHeader[:7], "Bearer ") {
-		actual := []byte(r.Header.Get(cfg.AuthHeader))
+		if session, ok := a.auth.ValidateToken(strings.TrimSpace(authHeader[7:])); ok && session.Permissions["mcp:execute"] {
-		expected := []byte(cfg.AuthHeaderValue)
+			principal := authctx.NewPrincipalWithScopes(session.UserID, session.Username, session.Scope, session.Permissions, session.PermissionScopes)
-		if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(actual, expected) != 1 {
+			a.mcpServer.HandleHTTP(w, r.WithContext(authctx.WithPrincipal(r.Context(), principal)))
-			a.logger.Logger.Debug("MCP 鉴权失败：header 缺失或值不匹配", zap.String("header", cfg.AuthHeader))
-			w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
-			w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"unauthorized"}`))
 			return
 		}
 	}
+	if !cfg.AllowGlobalAccess || strings.TrimSpace(cfg.AuthHeader) == "" || strings.TrimSpace(cfg.AuthHeaderValue) == "" {
+		http.Error(w, "use an authorized user bearer token; global MCP service access is disabled", http.StatusUnauthorized)
+		return
+	}
+	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(r.Header.Get(cfg.AuthHeader)), []byte(cfg.AuthHeaderValue)) != 1 {
+		a.logger.Logger.Debug("MCP 鉴权失败：header 缺失或值不匹配", zap.String("header", cfg.AuthHeader))
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
+		w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"unauthorized"}`))
+		return
+	}
+	permissions := make(map[string]bool, len(security.PermissionCatalog))
+	for permission := range security.PermissionCatalog {
+		permissions[permission] = true
+	}
+	principal := authctx.NewPrincipal("service:mcp", "mcp-service", database.RBACScopeAll, permissions)
+	r = r.WithContext(authctx.WithPrincipal(r.Context(), principal))
 	a.mcpServer.HandleHTTP(w, r)
 }
 
@@ -602,20 +666,20 @@ func (a *App) RunWithContext(ctx context.Context) error {
 		}
 		switch tlsMode {
 		case mainTLSFromFiles:
-			a.logger.Info("启动 HTTPS 主服务（已启用 HTTP/2 协商）",
+			a.logger.Debug("启动 HTTPS 主服务（已启用 HTTP/2 协商）",
 				zap.String("address", addr),
 				zap.String("cert", certFile),
 			)
 		case mainTLSInMemorySelfSigned:
-			a.logger.Info("启动 HTTPS 主服务（内存自签证书，仅测试；已启用 HTTP/2 协商）",
+			a.logger.Debug("启动 HTTPS 主服务（内存自签证书，仅测试；已启用 HTTP/2 协商）",
 				zap.String("address", addr),
 			)
 		}
 		if httpRedirect {
-			a.logger.Info("已启用 HTTP→HTTPS 自动跳转（同端口嗅探分流）", zap.String("address", addr))
+			a.logger.Debug("已启用 HTTP→HTTPS 自动跳转（同端口嗅探分流）", zap.String("address", addr))
 		}
 	} else {
-		a.logger.Info("启动 HTTP 主服务", zap.String("address", addr))
+		a.logger.Debug("启动 HTTP 主服务", zap.String("address", addr))
 	}
 
 	// 监听 context 取消，优雅关闭 HTTP 服务器
@@ -677,6 +741,10 @@ func (a *App) Shutdown() {
 	shutdownCtx, shutdownCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
 	_ = einoobserve.ShutdownOtel(shutdownCtx)
 	shutdownCancel()
+	if a.alertCancel != nil {
+		a.alertCancel()
+		a.alertCancel = nil
+	}
 
 	// 停止钉钉/飞书长连接
 	a.robotMu.Lock()
@@ -807,6 +875,7 @@ func setupRoutes(
 	attackChainHandler *handler.AttackChainHandler,
 	app *App, // 传递 App 实例以便动态获取 knowledgeHandler
 	vulnerabilityHandler *handler.VulnerabilityHandler,
+	assetHandler *handler.AssetHandler,
 	projectHandler *handler.ProjectHandler,
 	workflowHandler *handler.WorkflowHandler,
 	webshellHandler *handler.WebShellHandler,
@@ -818,6 +887,8 @@ func setupRoutes(
 	terminalHandler *handler.TerminalHandler,
 	c2Handler *handler.C2Handler,
 	auditHandler *handler.AuditHandler,
+	auditSvc *audit.Service,
+	rbacHandler *handler.RBACHandler,
 	mcpServer *mcp.Server,
 	authManager *security.AuthManager,
 	openAPIHandler *handler.OpenAPIHandler,
@@ -827,11 +898,15 @@ func setupRoutes(
 
 	// 认证相关路由
 	authRoutes := api.Group("/auth")
+	loginRL := security.NewRateLimiter(10, 1*time.Minute)
 	{
-		authRoutes.POST("/login", authHandler.Login)
+		authRoutes.POST("/login", security.RateLimitMiddleware(loginRL), authHandler.Login)
 		authRoutes.POST("/logout", security.AuthMiddleware(authManager), authHandler.Logout)
-		authRoutes.POST("/change-password", security.AuthMiddleware(authManager), authHandler.ChangePassword)
+		authRoutes.POST("/change-password", security.AuthMiddleware(authManager), security.RequirePermission("auth:self"), authHandler.ChangePassword)
 		authRoutes.GET("/validate", security.AuthMiddleware(authManager), authHandler.Validate)
+		authRoutes.POST("/robot-binding-code", security.AuthMiddleware(authManager), security.RequirePermission("auth:self"), robotHandler.CreateRobotBindingCode)
+		authRoutes.GET("/robot-bindings", security.AuthMiddleware(authManager), security.RequirePermission("auth:self"), robotHandler.ListMyRobotBindings)
+		authRoutes.DELETE("/robot-bindings/:id", security.AuthMiddleware(authManager), security.RequirePermission("auth:self"), robotHandler.DeleteMyRobotBinding)
 	}
 
 	// 机器人回调（无需登录，供企业微信/钉钉/飞书服务器调用）
@@ -848,7 +923,31 @@ func setupRoutes(
 
 	protected := api.Group("")
 	protected.Use(security.AuthMiddleware(authManager))
+	protected.Use(security.RBACMiddlewareWithDenyHook(app.db, func(c *gin.Context, reason, permission string) {
+		if auditSvc != nil {
+			auditSvc.Record(c, audit.Entry{
+				Level: "warn", Category: "rbac", Action: "access_denied", Result: "failure",
+				Message: "RBAC 拒绝访问", ResourceType: "route", ResourceID: c.FullPath(),
+				Detail: map[string]interface{}{"reason": reason, "permission": permission, "method": c.Request.Method},
+			})
+		}
+	}))
 	{
+		protected.GET("/rbac/me", rbacHandler.Me)
+		protected.GET("/rbac/metadata", rbacHandler.Metadata)
+		protected.GET("/rbac/users", rbacHandler.ListUsers)
+		protected.POST("/rbac/users", rbacHandler.CreateUser)
+		protected.PUT("/rbac/users/:id", rbacHandler.UpdateUser)
+		protected.DELETE("/rbac/users/:id", rbacHandler.DeleteUser)
+		protected.GET("/rbac/roles", rbacHandler.ListRoles)
+		protected.POST("/rbac/roles", rbacHandler.CreateRole)
+		protected.PUT("/rbac/roles/:id", rbacHandler.UpdateRole)
+		protected.DELETE("/rbac/roles/:id", rbacHandler.DeleteRole)
+		protected.GET("/rbac/resource-assignments", rbacHandler.ListResourceAssignments)
+		protected.GET("/rbac/resources", rbacHandler.ListAssignableResources)
+		protected.POST("/rbac/resource-assignments", rbacHandler.AssignResource)
+		protected.DELETE("/rbac/resource-assignments/:id", rbacHandler.DeleteResourceAssignment)
+
 		// 机器人测试（需登录）：POST /api/robot/test，body: {"platform":"dingtalk","user_id":"test","text":"帮助"}，用于验证机器人逻辑
 		protected.POST("/robot/test", robotHandler.HandleRobotTest)
 
@@ -897,6 +996,19 @@ func setupRoutes(
 		// 信息收集 - 自然语言解析为 FOFA 语法（需人工确认后再查询）
 		protected.POST("/fofa/parse", fofaHandler.ParseNaturalLanguage)
 
+		// 资产管理
+		protected.GET("/assets", assetHandler.List)
+		protected.GET("/assets/selection", assetHandler.Selection)
+		protected.GET("/assets/stats", assetHandler.Stats)
+		protected.POST("/assets/import", assetHandler.Import)
+		protected.POST("/assets/scan-links", assetHandler.RecordScans)
+		protected.PUT("/assets/bulk", assetHandler.BulkUpdate)
+		protected.PUT("/assets/project-binding", assetHandler.UpdateProjectBinding)
+		protected.POST("/assets/batch-delete", assetHandler.BatchDelete)
+		protected.POST("/assets/merge", security.RequirePermission("asset:write"), assetHandler.Merge)
+		protected.PUT("/assets/:id", assetHandler.Update)
+		protected.DELETE("/assets/:id", assetHandler.Delete)
+
 		// 批量任务管理
 		protected.POST("/batch-tasks", agentHandler.CreateBatchQueue)
 		protected.GET("/batch-tasks", agentHandler.ListBatchQueues)
@@ -918,6 +1030,7 @@ func setupRoutes(
 		protected.GET("/conversations", conversationHandler.ListConversations)
 		protected.GET("/conversations/:id", conversationHandler.GetConversation)
 		protected.GET("/messages/:id/process-details", conversationHandler.GetMessageProcessDetails)
+		protected.GET("/process-details/:id", conversationHandler.GetProcessDetail)
 		protected.PUT("/conversations/:id", conversationHandler.UpdateConversation)
 		protected.PUT("/conversations/:id/project", conversationHandler.SetConversationProject)
 		protected.DELETE("/conversations/:id", conversationHandler.DeleteConversation)
@@ -1135,6 +1248,8 @@ func setupRoutes(
 		protected.DELETE("/vulnerabilities/batch", vulnerabilityHandler.BatchDeleteVulnerabilities)
 		protected.GET("/vulnerabilities/filter-options", vulnerabilityHandler.GetVulnerabilityFilterOptions)
 		protected.GET("/vulnerabilities/stats", vulnerabilityHandler.GetVulnerabilityStats)
+		protected.GET("/vulnerability-alerts/subscription", vulnerabilityHandler.GetMyAlertSubscription)
+		protected.PUT("/vulnerability-alerts/subscription", vulnerabilityHandler.UpdateMyAlertSubscription)
 		protected.GET("/vulnerabilities/:id", vulnerabilityHandler.GetVulnerability)
 		protected.POST("/vulnerabilities", vulnerabilityHandler.CreateVulnerability)
 		protected.PUT("/vulnerabilities/:id", vulnerabilityHandler.UpdateVulnerability)
@@ -1222,6 +1337,7 @@ func setupRoutes(
 
 		// 对话附件（chat_uploads）管理
 		protected.GET("/chat-uploads", chatUploadsHandler.List)
+		protected.GET("/chat-uploads/export", chatUploadsHandler.Export)
 		protected.GET("/chat-uploads/download", chatUploadsHandler.Download)
 		protected.GET("/chat-uploads/content", chatUploadsHandler.GetContent)
 		protected.POST("/chat-uploads", chatUploadsHandler.Upload)
@@ -1237,13 +1353,18 @@ func setupRoutes(
 		protected.PUT("/roles/:name", roleHandler.UpdateRole)
 		protected.DELETE("/roles/:name", roleHandler.DeleteRole)
 
-		// 图编排 / 工作流定义（图结构固定，业务字段保存在 graph_json 中）
+		// 工作流定义（图结构固定，业务字段保存在 graph_json 中）
 		protected.GET("/workflows/runs/pending", workflowHandler.ListPendingRuns)
 		protected.GET("/workflows/runs/:runId/replay", workflowHandler.ReplayRun)
 		protected.GET("/workflows/runs/:runId", workflowHandler.GetRun)
 		protected.POST("/workflows/runs/:runId/resume", workflowHandler.ResumeRun)
 		protected.POST("/workflows/validate", workflowHandler.Validate)
 		protected.POST("/workflows/dry-run", workflowHandler.DryRun)
+		protected.GET("/workflows/:id/package", workflowHandler.ExportPackage)
+		protected.POST("/workflow-package-inspections", workflowHandler.CreatePackageInspection)
+		protected.GET("/workflow-package-inspections/:inspectionId", workflowHandler.GetPackageInspection)
+		protected.POST("/workflow-package-imports", workflowHandler.ApplyPackageImport)
+		protected.GET("/workflow-package-imports/:importId", workflowHandler.GetPackageImport)
 		protected.GET("/workflows", workflowHandler.List)
 		protected.GET("/workflows/:id", workflowHandler.Get)
 		protected.POST("/workflows", workflowHandler.Create)
@@ -1444,7 +1565,7 @@ func registerWebshellTools(mcpServer *mcp.Server, db *database.DB, webshellHandl
 	}
 	mcpServer.RegisterTool(writeTool, writeHandler)
 
-	logger.Info("WebShell 工具注册成功")
+	logger.Debug("WebShell 工具注册成功")
 }
 
 // registerWebshellManagementTools 注册 WebShell 连接管理 MCP 工具
@@ -1465,7 +1586,13 @@ func registerWebshellManagementTools(mcpServer *mcp.Server, db *database.DB, web
 		},
 	}
 	listHandler := func(ctx context.Context, args map[string]interface{}) (*mcp.ToolResult, error) {
-		connections, err := db.ListWebshellConnections()
+		connections := []database.WebShellConnection{}
+		var err error
+		if principal, ok := authctx.PrincipalFromContext(ctx); ok {
+			connections, err = db.ListWebshellConnectionsForAccess(principal.UserID, principal.ScopeFor("webshell:read"))
+		} else {
+			return &mcp.ToolResult{Content: []mcp.Content{{Type: "text", Text: "缺少认证身份"}}, IsError: true}, nil
+		}
 		if err != nil {
 			return &mcp.ToolResult{
 				Content: []mcp.Content{{Type: "text", Text: "获取连接列表失败: " + err.Error()}},
@@ -1580,6 +1707,10 @@ func registerWebshellManagementTools(mcpServer *mcp.Server, db *database.DB, web
 				IsError: true,
 			}, nil
 		}
+		if principal, ok := authctx.PrincipalFromContext(ctx); ok {
+			_ = db.SetResourceOwner("webshell", conn.ID, principal.UserID)
+			_ = db.AssignResourceToUser(principal.UserID, "webshell", conn.ID)
+		}
 
 		return &mcp.ToolResult{
 			Content: []mcp.Content{{
@@ -1805,7 +1936,7 @@ func registerWebshellManagementTools(mcpServer *mcp.Server, db *database.DB, web
 	}
 	mcpServer.RegisterTool(testTool, testHandler)
 
-	logger.Info("WebShell 管理工具注册成功")
+	logger.Debug("WebShell 管理工具注册成功")
 }
 
 // initializeKnowledge 初始化知识库组件（用于动态初始化）
@@ -1972,13 +2103,36 @@ func initializeKnowledge(
 	return knowledgeHandler, nil
 }
 
-// corsMiddleware CORS中间件
+// corsMiddleware allows same-origin requests, valid Chromium extension
-func corsMiddleware() gin.HandlerFunc {
+// origins, and exact origins explicitly configured by the operator. CORS is
+// not an authentication boundary; API access still requires a valid session.
+func corsMiddleware(configuredOrigins []string) gin.HandlerFunc {
+	allowedOrigins := make(map[string]struct{}, len(configuredOrigins))
+	for _, origin := range configuredOrigins {
+		if normalized, ok := normalizeCORSOrigin(origin); ok {
+			allowedOrigins[normalized] = struct{}{}
+		}
+	}
+
 	return func(c *gin.Context) {
-		c.Writer.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")
+		origin := strings.TrimSpace(c.GetHeader("Origin"))
-		c.Writer.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true")
+		if origin != "" {
+			c.Writer.Header().Add("Vary", "Origin")
+			normalized, valid := normalizeCORSOrigin(origin)
+			_, explicitlyAllowed := allowedOrigins[normalized]
+			parsed, _ := url.Parse(origin)
+			sameHost := valid && strings.EqualFold(parsed.Host, c.Request.Host)
+			browserExtension := valid && isChromiumExtensionOrigin(parsed)
+			if !sameHost && !browserExtension && !explicitlyAllowed {
+				c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "cross-origin request denied"})
+				return
+			}
+			c.Writer.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", origin)
+			c.Writer.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true")
+		}
 		c.Writer.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "Content-Type, Content-Length, Accept-Encoding, X-CSRF-Token, Authorization, accept, origin, Cache-Control, X-Requested-With")
 		c.Writer.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "POST, OPTIONS, GET, PUT, DELETE")
+		c.Writer.Header().Set("Access-Control-Max-Age", "600")
 
 		if c.Request.Method == "OPTIONS" {
 			c.AbortWithStatus(204)
@@ -1988,3 +2142,37 @@ func corsMiddleware() gin.HandlerFunc {
 		c.Next()
 	}
 }
+
+// isChromiumExtensionOrigin accepts only Chrome's canonical 32-character
+// extension IDs (letters a-p). It does not allow arbitrary custom schemes or
+// web origins, and the extension must separately obtain host permission.
+func isChromiumExtensionOrigin(origin *url.URL) bool {
+	if origin == nil || !strings.EqualFold(origin.Scheme, "chrome-extension") || origin.Port() != "" {
+		return false
+	}
+	id := strings.ToLower(origin.Hostname())
+	if len(id) != 32 {
+		return false
+	}
+	for _, ch := range id {
+		if ch < 'a' || ch > 'p' {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+// normalizeCORSOrigin validates and canonicalizes a serialized origin. CORS
+// origins never contain credentials, paths, query strings, or fragments.
+func normalizeCORSOrigin(raw string) (string, bool) {
+	raw = strings.TrimSpace(raw)
+	if raw == "" || raw == "*" || strings.EqualFold(raw, "null") {
+		return "", false
+	}
+	parsed, err := url.Parse(raw)
+	if err != nil || parsed.Scheme == "" || parsed.Host == "" || parsed.User != nil ||
+		(parsed.Path != "" && parsed.Path != "/") || parsed.RawQuery != "" || parsed.Fragment != "" {
+		return "", false
+	}
+	return strings.ToLower(parsed.Scheme) + "://" + strings.ToLower(parsed.Host), true
+}

internal/app/asset_tools.go

@@ -0,0 +1,511 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"database/sql"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/authctx"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/database"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/mcp"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/mcp/builtin"
+
+	"go.uber.org/zap"
+)
+
+const agentAssetPageSizeMax = 50
+
+func registerAssetTools(server *mcp.Server, db *database.DB, logger *zap.Logger) {
+	if server == nil || db == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	properties := assetMutationProperties()
+
+	server.RegisterTool(mcp.Tool{
+		Name: builtin.ToolCreateAsset, ShortDescription: "新增或去重更新资产",
+		Description: "向资产库新增资产。按目标+端口+协议去重；若资产已存在则更新非空字段。至少提供 host、ip、domain 之一。",
+		// Bedrock rejects tool schemas with top-level oneOf/allOf/anyOf. The
+		// host/ip/domain requirement is enforced by assetFromCreateArgs below.
+		InputSchema: map[string]interface{}{"type": "object", "properties": properties},
+	}, func(ctx context.Context, args map[string]interface{}) (*mcp.ToolResult, error) {
+		asset, err := assetFromCreateArgs(args)
+		if err != nil {
+			return textResult("错误: "+err.Error(), true), nil
+		}
+		access, owner, global := assetAccessFromToolContext(ctx, "asset:write")
+		result, err := db.UpsertAssets([]*database.Asset{asset}, owner, global)
+		if err != nil {
+			logger.Error("Agent 保存资产失败", zap.Error(err))
+			return textResult("错误: "+err.Error(), true), nil
+		}
+		if result.Skipped > 0 || asset.ID == "" {
+			return textResult("资产未保存：同一资产已存在但当前用户无权更新，或目标字段为空", true), nil
+		}
+		saved, err := db.GetAsset(asset.ID, access)
+		if err != nil {
+			return textResult("资产已保存，但无法读取结果: "+err.Error(), true), nil
+		}
+		action := "created"
+		if result.Updated > 0 {
+			action = "updated"
+		}
+		return assetJSONResult(map[string]interface{}{"action": action, "asset": assetToolDetail(saved)})
+	})
+
+	server.RegisterTool(mcp.Tool{
+		Name: builtin.ToolGetAsset, ShortDescription: "按 ID 查看资产详情", Description: "按资产 ID 返回完整资产详情。查询列表时先用 query_assets，避免一次拉取过多详情。",
+		InputSchema: map[string]interface{}{"type": "object", "properties": map[string]interface{}{"id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "资产 ID"}}, "required": []string{"id"}},
+	}, func(ctx context.Context, args map[string]interface{}) (*mcp.ToolResult, error) {
+		projectID, projectScoped, err := agentAssetProjectScope(db, ctx)
+		if err != nil {
+			return textResult("错误: "+err.Error(), true), nil
+		}
+		asset, err := db.GetAsset(strings.TrimSpace(strArg(args, "id")), assetAccessOnly(ctx, "asset:read"))
+		if err != nil {
+			if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
+				return textResult("错误: 资产不存在或无权查看", true), nil
+			}
+			return textResult("错误: "+err.Error(), true), nil
+		}
+		if projectScoped && strings.TrimSpace(asset.ProjectID) != projectID {
+			return textResult("错误: 资产不存在或不属于当前对话绑定的项目", true), nil
+		}
+		return assetJSONResult(assetToolDetail(asset))
+	})
+
+	server.RegisterTool(mcp.Tool{
+		Name: builtin.ToolQueryAssets, ShortDescription: "灵活分页查询资产",
+		Description: "分页查询资产。支持精确字段、时间范围、扫描状态和白名单排序。查最久未扫描资产请使用 sort_by=last_scan_at、sort_order=asc；从未扫描资产会排在最前。默认每页 20 条，最大 50 条，返回精简摘要；使用 get_asset 获取单条详情。",
+		InputSchema: assetQuerySchema(),
+	}, func(ctx context.Context, args map[string]interface{}) (*mcp.ToolResult, error) {
+		filter, page, pageSize, err := assetFilterFromToolArgs(args)
+		if err != nil {
+			return textResult("错误: "+err.Error(), true), nil
+		}
+		projectID, projectScoped, err := agentAssetProjectScope(db, ctx)
+		if err != nil {
+			return textResult("错误: "+err.Error(), true), nil
+		}
+		if projectScoped {
+			// 对话绑定项目后，项目范围是服务端强制边界；不能通过工具参数扩大或切换范围。
+			filter.ProjectID = projectID
+		}
+		items, total, err := db.ListAssets(pageSize, (page-1)*pageSize, filter, assetAccessOnly(ctx, "asset:read"))
+		if err != nil {
+			return textResult("错误: "+err.Error(), true), nil
+		}
+		totalPages := (total + pageSize - 1) / pageSize
+		if totalPages < 1 {
+			totalPages = 1
+		}
+		var b strings.Builder
+		b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("资产查询：第 %d/%d 页，本页 %d 条，共 %d 条，page_size=%d\n", page, totalPages, len(items), total, pageSize))
+		for _, asset := range items {
+			b.WriteString(formatAssetListItem(asset))
+			b.WriteByte('\n')
+		}
+		if page < totalPages {
+			b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("下一页：保持筛选条件并设置 page=%d。", page+1))
+		}
+		return textResult(b.String(), false), nil
+	})
+
+	updateProperties := assetMutationProperties()
+	updateProperties["id"] = map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "资产 ID"}
+	server.RegisterTool(mcp.Tool{
+		Name: builtin.ToolUpdateAsset, ShortDescription: "局部更新资产",
+		Description: "按 ID 局部更新资产，只修改显式传入的字段；可传空 project_id 清除项目绑定，可传空 tags 清空标签。",
+		InputSchema: map[string]interface{}{"type": "object", "properties": updateProperties, "required": []string{"id"}},
+	}, func(ctx context.Context, args map[string]interface{}) (*mcp.ToolResult, error) {
+		id := strings.TrimSpace(strArg(args, "id"))
+		access := assetAccessOnly(ctx, "asset:write")
+		asset, err := db.GetAsset(id, access)
+		if err != nil {
+			return textResult("错误: 资产不存在或无权更新", true), nil
+		}
+		if err := applyAssetPatch(asset, args); err != nil {
+			return textResult("错误: "+err.Error(), true), nil
+		}
+		if err := db.UpdateAsset(id, asset, access); err != nil {
+			return textResult("错误: "+err.Error(), true), nil
+		}
+		updated, err := db.GetAsset(id, access)
+		if err != nil {
+			return textResult("资产已更新，但无法读取结果: "+err.Error(), true), nil
+		}
+		return assetJSONResult(map[string]interface{}{"action": "updated", "asset": assetToolDetail(updated)})
+	})
+
+	server.RegisterTool(mcp.Tool{
+		Name: builtin.ToolDeleteAsset, ShortDescription: "删除资产", Description: "按 ID 永久删除资产记录。仅在用户明确要求删除时调用。",
+		InputSchema: map[string]interface{}{"type": "object", "properties": map[string]interface{}{"id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "资产 ID"}}, "required": []string{"id"}},
+	}, func(ctx context.Context, args map[string]interface{}) (*mcp.ToolResult, error) {
+		id := strings.TrimSpace(strArg(args, "id"))
+		if err := db.DeleteAsset(id, assetAccessOnly(ctx, "asset:delete")); err != nil {
+			return textResult("错误: 资产不存在或无权删除", true), nil
+		}
+		return textResult("资产已删除: "+id, false), nil
+	})
+
+	server.RegisterTool(mcp.Tool{
+		Name:             builtin.ToolCompleteAssetScan,
+		ShortDescription: "完成资产扫描并回写结果",
+		Description:      "目标扫描完成后调用：把资产的上次扫描时间更新为当前时间，并关联当前对话。相关漏洞数量不手填，而是自动统计当前扫描对话中通过 record_vulnerability 保存的漏洞。应在漏洞均已落库后调用；一个扫描对话建议只对应一个资产。",
+		InputSchema: map[string]interface{}{
+			"type": "object",
+			"properties": map[string]interface{}{
+				"id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "已完成扫描的资产 ID"},
+			},
+			"required": []string{"id"},
+		},
+	}, func(ctx context.Context, args map[string]interface{}) (*mcp.ToolResult, error) {
+		id := strings.TrimSpace(strArg(args, "id"))
+		conversationID := conversationIDFromToolCtx(ctx)
+		if conversationID == "" {
+			return textResult("错误: 无法确定当前扫描对话", true), nil
+		}
+		access := assetAccessOnly(ctx, "asset:write")
+		if err := db.CompleteAssetScan(id, conversationID, access); err != nil {
+			if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
+				return textResult("错误: 资产不存在或无权回写扫描结果", true), nil
+			}
+			return textResult("错误: "+err.Error(), true), nil
+		}
+		updated, err := db.GetAsset(id, access)
+		if err != nil {
+			return textResult("扫描结果已回写，但无法读取资产: "+err.Error(), true), nil
+		}
+		return assetJSONResult(map[string]interface{}{
+			"action":  "scan_completed",
+			"message": "上次扫描时间已更新；相关漏洞数由当前扫描对话中已保存的漏洞自动计算",
+			"asset":   assetToolDetail(updated),
+		})
+	})
+}
+
+func assetMutationProperties() map[string]interface{} {
+	return map[string]interface{}{
+		"project_id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "host": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"},
+		"ip": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "port": map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "minimum": 0, "maximum": 65535},
+		"domain": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "protocol": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"},
+		"title": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "server": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"},
+		"country": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "province": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "city": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"},
+		"responsible_person": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "department": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"},
+		"business_system": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"},
+		"environment":     map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "enum": []string{"production", "staging", "testing", "development", "other"}},
+		"criticality":     map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "enum": []string{"critical", "high", "medium", "low"}},
+		"source":          map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "source_query": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"},
+		"status": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "enum": []string{"active", "inactive"}},
+		"tags":   map[string]interface{}{"type": "array", "items": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "maxItems": 50},
+	}
+}
+
+func assetQuerySchema() map[string]interface{} {
+	properties := map[string]interface{}{
+		"q":          map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "模糊搜索 host、IP、域名、标题、服务和标签"},
+		"project_id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "status": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "enum": []string{"active", "inactive"}},
+		"protocol": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "source": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "tag": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"},
+		"host": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "ip": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "domain": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"},
+		"port":                map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "minimum": 0, "maximum": 65535},
+		"risk_level":          map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "enum": []string{"unassessed", "critical", "high", "medium", "low", "info", "normal"}},
+		"min_vulnerabilities": map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "minimum": 0},
+		"max_vulnerabilities": map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "minimum": 0},
+		"country":             map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "province": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "city": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"},
+		"responsible_person": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "department": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"},
+		"business_system": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "environment": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "criticality": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"},
+		"scan_state":        map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "enum": []string{"never", "scanned"}, "description": "never=从未扫描，scanned=扫描过"},
+		"scan_overdue_days": map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "minimum": 1},
+		"last_scan_before":  map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "RFC3339 时间或 YYYY-MM-DD"},
+		"last_scan_after":   map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "RFC3339 时间或 YYYY-MM-DD"},
+		"first_seen_before": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "RFC3339 时间或 YYYY-MM-DD"},
+		"first_seen_after":  map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "RFC3339 时间或 YYYY-MM-DD"},
+		"last_seen_before":  map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "RFC3339 时间或 YYYY-MM-DD"},
+		"last_seen_after":   map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "RFC3339 时间或 YYYY-MM-DD"},
+		"sort_by":           map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "enum": []string{"last_seen_at", "last_scan_at", "first_seen_at", "created_at", "updated_at", "host", "port", "risk_level", "vulnerability_count"}},
+		"sort_order":        map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "enum": []string{"asc", "desc"}},
+		"page":              map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "minimum": 1},
+		"page_size":         map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "minimum": 1, "maximum": agentAssetPageSizeMax},
+	}
+	return map[string]interface{}{"type": "object", "properties": properties}
+}
+
+func assetFromCreateArgs(args map[string]interface{}) (*database.Asset, error) {
+	asset := &database.Asset{}
+	if err := applyAssetPatch(asset, args); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(asset.Host) == "" && strings.TrimSpace(asset.IP) == "" && strings.TrimSpace(asset.Domain) == "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("host、ip、domain 至少需要一个")
+	}
+	return asset, nil
+}
+
+func applyAssetPatch(asset *database.Asset, args map[string]interface{}) error {
+	setString := func(key string, dst *string) {
+		if _, ok := args[key]; ok {
+			*dst = strings.TrimSpace(strArg(args, key))
+		}
+	}
+	setString("project_id", &asset.ProjectID)
+	setString("host", &asset.Host)
+	setString("ip", &asset.IP)
+	setString("domain", &asset.Domain)
+	setString("protocol", &asset.Protocol)
+	setString("title", &asset.Title)
+	setString("server", &asset.Server)
+	setString("country", &asset.Country)
+	setString("province", &asset.Province)
+	setString("city", &asset.City)
+	setString("responsible_person", &asset.ResponsiblePerson)
+	setString("department", &asset.Department)
+	setString("business_system", &asset.BusinessSystem)
+	setString("environment", &asset.Environment)
+	setString("criticality", &asset.Criticality)
+	setString("source", &asset.Source)
+	setString("source_query", &asset.SourceQuery)
+	setString("status", &asset.Status)
+	if _, ok := args["port"]; ok {
+		port := intArg(args, "port", -1)
+		if port < 0 || port > 65535 {
+			return fmt.Errorf("port 必须在 0-65535 之间")
+		}
+		asset.Port = port
+	}
+	if raw, ok := args["tags"]; ok {
+		tags, err := stringSliceArg(raw)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("tags: %w", err)
+		}
+		asset.Tags = tags
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func assetFilterFromToolArgs(args map[string]interface{}) (database.AssetListFilter, int, int, error) {
+	filter := database.AssetListFilter{
+		Search: strings.TrimSpace(strArg(args, "q")), ProjectID: strings.TrimSpace(strArg(args, "project_id")), Status: strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(strArg(args, "status"))),
+		Protocol: strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(strArg(args, "protocol"))), Source: strings.TrimSpace(strArg(args, "source")), Tag: strings.TrimSpace(strArg(args, "tag")),
+		Host: strings.TrimSpace(strArg(args, "host")), IP: strings.TrimSpace(strArg(args, "ip")), Domain: strings.TrimSpace(strArg(args, "domain")),
+		ScanState: strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(strArg(args, "scan_state"))), SortBy: strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(strArg(args, "sort_by"))),
+		SortOrder: strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(strArg(args, "sort_order"))),
+		RiskLevel: strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(strArg(args, "risk_level"))),
+		Country:   strings.TrimSpace(strArg(args, "country")), Province: strings.TrimSpace(strArg(args, "province")), City: strings.TrimSpace(strArg(args, "city")),
+		ResponsiblePerson: strings.TrimSpace(strArg(args, "responsible_person")), Department: strings.TrimSpace(strArg(args, "department")),
+		BusinessSystem: strings.TrimSpace(strArg(args, "business_system")), Environment: strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(strArg(args, "environment"))),
+		Criticality: strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(strArg(args, "criticality"))),
+	}
+	if !oneOfOrEmpty(filter.Status, "active", "inactive") {
+		return filter, 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("status 仅支持 active 或 inactive")
+	}
+	if !oneOfOrEmpty(filter.ScanState, "never", "scanned") {
+		return filter, 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("scan_state 仅支持 never 或 scanned")
+	}
+	if !oneOfOrEmpty(filter.SortBy, "last_seen_at", "last_scan_at", "first_seen_at", "created_at", "updated_at", "host", "port", "risk_level", "vulnerability_count") {
+		return filter, 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("sort_by 不受支持")
+	}
+	if !oneOfOrEmpty(filter.SortOrder, "asc", "desc") {
+		return filter, 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("sort_order 仅支持 asc 或 desc")
+	}
+	if _, ok := args["port"]; ok {
+		port := intArg(args, "port", -1)
+		if port < 0 || port > 65535 {
+			return filter, 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("port 必须在 0-65535 之间")
+		}
+		filter.Port = &port
+	}
+	if _, ok := args["min_vulnerabilities"]; ok {
+		value := intArg(args, "min_vulnerabilities", -1)
+		if value < 0 {
+			return filter, 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("min_vulnerabilities 不能小于 0")
+		}
+		filter.MinVulnerabilities = &value
+	}
+	if _, ok := args["max_vulnerabilities"]; ok {
+		value := intArg(args, "max_vulnerabilities", -1)
+		if value < 0 {
+			return filter, 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("max_vulnerabilities 不能小于 0")
+		}
+		filter.MaxVulnerabilities = &value
+	}
+	if _, ok := args["scan_overdue_days"]; ok {
+		value := intArg(args, "scan_overdue_days", 0)
+		if value < 1 {
+			return filter, 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("scan_overdue_days 必须大于 0")
+		}
+		filter.ScanOverdueDays = &value
+	}
+	var err error
+	if filter.LastScanBefore, err = parseAssetToolTime("last_scan_before", strArg(args, "last_scan_before")); err != nil {
+		return filter, 0, 0, err
+	}
+	if filter.LastScanAfter, err = parseAssetToolTime("last_scan_after", strArg(args, "last_scan_after")); err != nil {
+		return filter, 0, 0, err
+	}
+	if filter.FirstSeenBefore, err = parseAssetToolTime("first_seen_before", strArg(args, "first_seen_before")); err != nil {
+		return filter, 0, 0, err
+	}
+	if filter.FirstSeenAfter, err = parseAssetToolTime("first_seen_after", strArg(args, "first_seen_after")); err != nil {
+		return filter, 0, 0, err
+	}
+	if filter.LastSeenBefore, err = parseAssetToolTime("last_seen_before", strArg(args, "last_seen_before")); err != nil {
+		return filter, 0, 0, err
+	}
+	if filter.LastSeenAfter, err = parseAssetToolTime("last_seen_after", strArg(args, "last_seen_after")); err != nil {
+		return filter, 0, 0, err
+	}
+	page := intArg(args, "page", 1)
+	pageSize := intArg(args, "page_size", 20)
+	if page < 1 || page > 1_000_000 {
+		return filter, 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("page 必须在 1-1000000 之间")
+	}
+	if pageSize < 1 || pageSize > agentAssetPageSizeMax {
+		return filter, 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("page_size 必须在 1-%d 之间", agentAssetPageSizeMax)
+	}
+	return filter, page, pageSize, nil
+}
+
+func oneOfOrEmpty(value string, allowed ...string) bool {
+	if value == "" {
+		return true
+	}
+	for _, candidate := range allowed {
+		if value == candidate {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func parseAssetToolTime(field, value string) (*time.Time, error) {
+	value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
+	if value == "" {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	for _, layout := range []string{time.RFC3339, "2006-01-02"} {
+		if parsed, err := time.Parse(layout, value); err == nil {
+			return &parsed, nil
+		}
+	}
+	return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s 必须是 RFC3339 时间或 YYYY-MM-DD", field)
+}
+
+func stringSliceArg(raw interface{}) ([]string, error) {
+	values := []string{}
+	switch typed := raw.(type) {
+	case []string:
+		values = append(values, typed...)
+	case []interface{}:
+		for _, item := range typed {
+			value, ok := item.(string)
+			if !ok {
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("必须是字符串数组")
+			}
+			values = append(values, value)
+		}
+	default:
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("必须是字符串数组")
+	}
+	if len(values) > 50 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("最多 50 个标签")
+	}
+	return values, nil
+}
+
+func assetAccessOnly(ctx context.Context, permission string) database.RBACListAccess {
+	principal, ok := authctx.PrincipalFromContext(ctx)
+	if !ok {
+		return database.RBACListAccess{}
+	}
+	return database.RBACListAccess{UserID: principal.UserID, Scope: principal.ScopeFor(permission)}
+}
+
+func assetAccessFromToolContext(ctx context.Context, permission string) (database.RBACListAccess, string, bool) {
+	principal, ok := authctx.PrincipalFromContext(ctx)
+	if !ok {
+		return database.RBACListAccess{}, "", false
+	}
+	access := database.RBACListAccess{UserID: principal.UserID, Scope: principal.ScopeFor(permission)}
+	return access, principal.UserID, access.Scope == database.RBACScopeAll
+}
+
+// agentAssetProjectScope returns the hard asset-read boundary implied by the
+// current conversation. An unbound conversation (or a tool call outside a
+// conversation) keeps the existing all-accessible-assets behavior. A bound
+// conversation can only read assets assigned to that exact project.
+func agentAssetProjectScope(db *database.DB, ctx context.Context) (projectID string, scoped bool, err error) {
+	conversationID := conversationIDFromToolCtx(ctx)
+	if conversationID == "" {
+		return "", false, nil
+	}
+	projectID, err = db.GetConversationProjectID(conversationID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", false, fmt.Errorf("无法确定当前对话的项目范围")
+	}
+	projectID = strings.TrimSpace(projectID)
+	return projectID, projectID != "", nil
+}
+
+func formatAssetListItem(asset *database.Asset) string {
+	target := asset.Domain
+	if target == "" {
+		target = asset.IP
+	}
+	if target == "" {
+		target = asset.Host
+	}
+	if asset.Port > 0 {
+		target = fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", target, asset.Port)
+	}
+	lastScan := "never"
+	if asset.LastScanAt != nil {
+		lastScan = asset.LastScanAt.Format(time.RFC3339)
+	}
+	return fmt.Sprintf("- id=%s | target=%s | protocol=%s | status=%s | last_scan_at=%s | risk=%s | vulnerabilities=%d", asset.ID, truncateRunes(target, 120), truncateRunes(asset.Protocol, 30), truncateRunes(asset.Status, 30), lastScan, asset.RiskLevel, asset.VulnerabilityCount)
+}
+
+// assetToolDetail keeps even a single unusually large imported record from
+// consuming the model context. The database and HTTP API retain full values.
+func assetToolDetail(asset *database.Asset) map[string]interface{} {
+	if asset == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	tags := make([]string, 0, len(asset.Tags))
+	for i, tag := range asset.Tags {
+		if i >= 50 {
+			break
+		}
+		tags = append(tags, truncateRunes(tag, 100))
+	}
+	detail := map[string]interface{}{
+		"id": asset.ID, "project_id": asset.ProjectID, "project_name": truncateRunes(asset.ProjectName, 200),
+		"host": truncateRunes(asset.Host, 500), "ip": truncateRunes(asset.IP, 100), "port": asset.Port,
+		"domain": truncateRunes(asset.Domain, 255), "protocol": truncateRunes(asset.Protocol, 50),
+		"title": truncateRunes(asset.Title, 500), "server": truncateRunes(asset.Server, 500),
+		"country": truncateRunes(asset.Country, 100), "province": truncateRunes(asset.Province, 100), "city": truncateRunes(asset.City, 100),
+		"responsible_person": truncateRunes(asset.ResponsiblePerson, 255), "department": truncateRunes(asset.Department, 255),
+		"business_system": truncateRunes(asset.BusinessSystem, 255), "environment": asset.Environment, "criticality": asset.Criticality,
+		"source": truncateRunes(asset.Source, 100), "source_query": truncateRunes(asset.SourceQuery, 2000),
+		"status": truncateRunes(asset.Status, 50), "tags": tags,
+		"first_seen_at": asset.FirstSeenAt, "last_seen_at": asset.LastSeenAt, "created_at": asset.CreatedAt, "updated_at": asset.UpdatedAt,
+		"last_scan_conversation_id": asset.LastScanConversationID, "last_scan_queue_id": asset.LastScanQueueID, "last_scan_task_id": asset.LastScanTaskID,
+		"vulnerability_count": asset.VulnerabilityCount, "risk_level": asset.RiskLevel,
+	}
+	if asset.LastScanAt != nil {
+		detail["last_scan_at"] = asset.LastScanAt
+	}
+	if len(asset.Tags) > len(tags) {
+		detail["tags_truncated"] = true
+	}
+	return detail
+}
+
+func assetJSONResult(value interface{}) (*mcp.ToolResult, error) {
+	encoded, err := json.MarshalIndent(value, "", "  ")
+	if err != nil {
+		return textResult("错误: "+err.Error(), true), nil
+	}
+	return textResult(string(encoded), false), nil
+}

internal/app/asset_tools_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/authctx"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/database"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/mcp"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/mcp/builtin"
+
+	"go.uber.org/zap"
+)
+
+func TestAssetToolsCRUDQueryAndPageLimit(t *testing.T) {
+	db, err := database.NewDB(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "asset-tools.db"), zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	user, err := db.CreateRBACUser("asset-agent", "Asset Agent", "hash", true, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	principal := authctx.NewPrincipal(user.ID, user.Username, database.RBACScopeAssigned, map[string]bool{
+		"asset:read": true, "asset:write": true, "asset:delete": true,
+	})
+	ctx := authctx.WithPrincipal(context.Background(), principal)
+	server := mcp.NewServer(zap.NewNop())
+	server.SetToolAuthorizer(mcpToolAuthorizer(db))
+	registerAssetTools(server, db, zap.NewNop())
+
+	wantTools := map[string]bool{
+		builtin.ToolCreateAsset: false, builtin.ToolGetAsset: false, builtin.ToolQueryAssets: false,
+		builtin.ToolUpdateAsset: false, builtin.ToolDeleteAsset: false, builtin.ToolCompleteAssetScan: false,
+	}
+	for _, tool := range server.GetAllTools() {
+		if _, ok := wantTools[tool.Name]; ok {
+			wantTools[tool.Name] = true
+		}
+	}
+	for name, found := range wantTools {
+		if !found {
+			t.Fatalf("asset tool not registered: %s", name)
+		}
+	}
+
+	for _, tool := range server.GetAllTools() {
+		if tool.Name != builtin.ToolCreateAsset {
+			continue
+		}
+		for _, keyword := range []string{"oneOf", "allOf", "anyOf"} {
+			if _, exists := tool.InputSchema[keyword]; exists {
+				t.Fatalf("create asset schema contains Bedrock-incompatible top-level %s", keyword)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	result, _, err := server.CallTool(ctx, builtin.ToolCreateAsset, map[string]interface{}{"title": "Missing target"})
+	if err != nil || result == nil || !result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("create asset accepted missing host/ip/domain: result=%#v err=%v", result, err)
+	}
+
+	result, _, err = server.CallTool(ctx, builtin.ToolCreateAsset, map[string]interface{}{
+		"ip": "192.0.2.42", "port": 443, "protocol": "https", "title": "Before", "tags": []interface{}{"prod"},
+	})
+	if err != nil || result == nil || result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("create asset result=%#v err=%v", result, err)
+	}
+	assets, total, err := db.ListAssets(20, 0, database.AssetListFilter{}, database.RBACListAccess{UserID: user.ID, Scope: database.RBACScopeAssigned})
+	if err != nil || total != 1 || len(assets) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("saved assets total=%d len=%d err=%v", total, len(assets), err)
+	}
+	id := assets[0].ID
+
+	result, _, err = server.CallTool(ctx, builtin.ToolUpdateAsset, map[string]interface{}{"id": id, "title": "After"})
+	if err != nil || result == nil || result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("update asset result=%#v err=%v", result, err)
+	}
+	updated, err := db.GetAsset(id, database.RBACListAccess{UserID: user.ID, Scope: database.RBACScopeAssigned})
+	if err != nil || updated.Title != "After" || updated.IP != "192.0.2.42" {
+		t.Fatalf("partial update lost fields: %#v err=%v", updated, err)
+	}
+
+	result, _, err = server.CallTool(ctx, builtin.ToolQueryAssets, map[string]interface{}{
+		"sort_by": "last_scan_at", "sort_order": "asc", "page": 1, "page_size": 1,
+	})
+	if err != nil || result == nil || result.IsError || !strings.Contains(toolResultText(result), "第 1/1 页") || !strings.Contains(toolResultText(result), "last_scan_at=never") {
+		t.Fatalf("query asset result=%#v err=%v", result, err)
+	}
+	result, _, err = server.CallTool(ctx, builtin.ToolQueryAssets, map[string]interface{}{"page_size": agentAssetPageSizeMax + 1})
+	if err != nil || result == nil || !result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("oversized page was accepted: result=%#v err=%v", result, err)
+	}
+
+	conversation, err := db.CreateConversation("asset scan", database.ConversationCreateMeta{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.AssignResourceToUser(user.ID, "conversation", conversation.ID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.CreateVulnerability(&database.Vulnerability{ConversationID: conversation.ID, Title: "finding", Severity: "high", Target: "192.0.2.42"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	scanCtx := mcp.WithMCPConversationID(ctx, conversation.ID)
+	result, _, err = server.CallTool(scanCtx, builtin.ToolCompleteAssetScan, map[string]interface{}{"id": id})
+	if err != nil || result == nil || result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("complete scan result=%#v err=%v", result, err)
+	}
+	scanned, err := db.GetAsset(id, database.RBACListAccess{UserID: user.ID, Scope: database.RBACScopeAssigned})
+	if err != nil || scanned.LastScanAt == nil || scanned.LastScanConversationID != conversation.ID || scanned.VulnerabilityCount != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("scan fields not updated: %#v err=%v", scanned, err)
+	}
+
+	result, _, err = server.CallTool(ctx, builtin.ToolDeleteAsset, map[string]interface{}{"id": id})
+	if err != nil || result == nil || result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("delete asset result=%#v err=%v", result, err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.GetAsset(id, database.RBACListAccess{Scope: database.RBACScopeAll}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("asset still exists after delete")
+	}
+}
+
+func toolResultText(result *mcp.ToolResult) string {
+	var b strings.Builder
+	if result == nil {
+		return ""
+	}
+	for _, content := range result.Content {
+		b.WriteString(content.Text)
+	}
+	return b.String()
+}
+
+func TestAssetReadToolsRespectConversationProjectScope(t *testing.T) {
+	db, err := database.NewDB(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "asset-project-scope.db"), zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+
+	projectA, err := db.CreateProject(&database.Project{Name: "Project A"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	projectB, err := db.CreateProject(&database.Project{Name: "Project B"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	assets := []*database.Asset{
+		{ProjectID: projectA.ID, IP: "192.0.2.10", Protocol: "https"},
+		{ProjectID: projectB.ID, IP: "192.0.2.20", Protocol: "https"},
+		{IP: "192.0.2.30", Protocol: "https"},
+	}
+	if result, err := db.UpsertAssets(assets, "", true); err != nil || result.Created != len(assets) {
+		t.Fatalf("seed assets result=%#v err=%v", result, err)
+	}
+
+	bound, err := db.CreateConversation("bound", database.ConversationCreateMeta{ProjectID: projectA.ID})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	unbound, err := db.CreateConversation("unbound", database.ConversationCreateMeta{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	principal := authctx.NewPrincipal("admin", "admin", database.RBACScopeAll, map[string]bool{"asset:read": true})
+	ctx := authctx.WithPrincipal(context.Background(), principal)
+	server := mcp.NewServer(zap.NewNop())
+	server.SetToolAuthorizer(mcpToolAuthorizer(db))
+	registerAssetTools(server, db, zap.NewNop())
+
+	boundCtx := mcp.WithMCPConversationID(ctx, bound.ID)
+	result, _, err := server.CallTool(boundCtx, builtin.ToolQueryAssets, map[string]interface{}{})
+	text := toolResultText(result)
+	if err != nil || result == nil || result.IsError || !strings.Contains(text, assets[0].ID) || strings.Contains(text, assets[1].ID) || strings.Contains(text, assets[2].ID) {
+		t.Fatalf("bound query escaped project scope: result=%#v text=%q err=%v", result, text, err)
+	}
+
+	// Even an explicit foreign project_id cannot override the conversation boundary.
+	result, _, err = server.CallTool(boundCtx, builtin.ToolQueryAssets, map[string]interface{}{"project_id": projectB.ID})
+	text = toolResultText(result)
+	if err != nil || result == nil || result.IsError || !strings.Contains(text, assets[0].ID) || strings.Contains(text, assets[1].ID) {
+		t.Fatalf("project_id overrode conversation scope: result=%#v text=%q err=%v", result, text, err)
+	}
+
+	result, _, err = server.CallTool(boundCtx, builtin.ToolGetAsset, map[string]interface{}{"id": assets[1].ID})
+	if err != nil || result == nil || !result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("bound get read a foreign-project asset: result=%#v err=%v", result, err)
+	}
+
+	unboundCtx := mcp.WithMCPConversationID(ctx, unbound.ID)
+	result, _, err = server.CallTool(unboundCtx, builtin.ToolQueryAssets, map[string]interface{}{"page_size": 10})
+	text = toolResultText(result)
+	if err != nil || result == nil || result.IsError || !strings.Contains(text, assets[0].ID) || !strings.Contains(text, assets[1].ID) || !strings.Contains(text, assets[2].ID) {
+		t.Fatalf("unbound query did not retain all-assets behavior: result=%#v text=%q err=%v", result, text, err)
+	}
+}

internal/app/c2_tools.go

@@ -4,11 +4,13 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
+	"path/filepath"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/agent"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/authctx"
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/c2"
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/database"
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/mcp"
@@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ func registerC2Tools(mcpServer *mcp.Server, c2Manager *c2.Manager, logger *zap.L
 	registerC2EventTool(mcpServer, c2Manager, logger)
 	registerC2ProfileTool(mcpServer, c2Manager, logger)
 	registerC2FileTool(mcpServer, c2Manager, logger)
-	logger.Info("C2 MCP tools registered (8 unified tools)")
+	logger.Debug("C2 MCP tools registered (8 unified tools)")
 }
 
 func makeC2Result(data interface{}, err error) (*mcp.ToolResult, error) {
@@ -66,16 +68,16 @@ tcp_reverse 默认仅接受 CSB1 加密 Beacon（AES-GCM + ImplantToken）才登
 		InputSchema: map[string]interface{}{
 			"type": "object",
 			"properties": map[string]interface{}{
-				"action":      map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "操作: list/get/create/update/start/stop/delete", "enum": []string{"list", "get", "create", "update", "start", "stop", "delete"}},
+				"action":        map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "操作: list/get/create/update/start/stop/delete", "enum": []string{"list", "get", "create", "update", "start", "stop", "delete"}},
-				"listener_id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "监听器 ID（get/update/start/stop/delete 需要）"},
+				"listener_id":   map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "监听器 ID（get/update/start/stop/delete 需要）"},
-				"name":        map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "监听器名称（create/update）"},
+				"name":          map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "监听器名称（create/update）"},
-				"type":        map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "监听器类型（create）", "enum": []string{"tcp_reverse", "http_beacon", "https_beacon", "websocket"}},
+				"type":          map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "监听器类型（create）", "enum": []string{"tcp_reverse", "http_beacon", "https_beacon", "websocket"}},
 				"bind_host":     map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "绑定地址，默认 127.0.0.1；外网监听常用 0.0.0.0"},
 				"callback_host": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "可选：植入端/Payload 回连主机名（公网 IP 或域名）。写入 config_json；生成 oneliner/beacon 时优先于 bind_host。update 时传入空字符串可清除"},
-				"bind_port":   map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "description": fmt.Sprintf("绑定端口（create 必填）。须 ≠ %d（当前本服务 Web/API 端口，配置 server.port）", webListenPort), "minimum": 1, "maximum": 65535},
+				"bind_port":     map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "description": fmt.Sprintf("绑定端口（create 必填）。须 ≠ %d（当前本服务 Web/API 端口，配置 server.port）", webListenPort), "minimum": 1, "maximum": 65535},
-				"profile_id":  map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Malleable Profile ID"},
+				"profile_id":    map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Malleable Profile ID"},
-				"remark":      map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "备注"},
+				"remark":        map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "备注"},
-				"config":      map[string]interface{}{"type": "object", "description": "高级配置（beacon 路径/TLS/OPSEC 等），create/update 可用。tcp_reverse 可选 allow_legacy_shell:true 允许未加密经典 shell（默认 false）"},
+				"config":        map[string]interface{}{"type": "object", "description": "高级配置（beacon 路径/TLS/OPSEC 等），create/update 可用。tcp_reverse 可选 allow_legacy_shell:true 允许未加密经典 shell（默认 false）"},
 			},
 			"required": []string{"action"},
 		},
@@ -85,7 +87,7 @@ tcp_reverse 默认仅接受 CSB1 加密 Beacon（AES-GCM + ImplantToken）才登
 
 		switch action {
 		case "list":
-			listeners, err := m.DB().ListC2Listeners()
+			listeners, err := m.DB().ListC2ListenersForAccess(c2ToolAccess(ctx))
 			if err != nil {
 				return makeC2Result(nil, err)
 			}
@@ -128,6 +130,10 @@ tcp_reverse 默认仅接受 CSB1 加密 Beacon（AES-GCM + ImplantToken）才登
 			if err != nil {
 				return makeC2Result(nil, err)
 			}
+			if principal, ok := authctx.PrincipalFromContext(ctx); ok {
+				_ = m.DB().SetResourceOwner("c2_listener", listener.ID, principal.UserID)
+				_ = m.DB().AssignResourceToUser(principal.UserID, "c2_listener", listener.ID)
+			}
 			implantToken := listener.ImplantToken
 			listener.EncryptionKey = ""
 			listener.ImplantToken = ""
@@ -264,7 +270,7 @@ func registerC2SessionTool(s *mcp.Server, m *c2.Manager, l *zap.Logger) {
 			if v, ok := params["suspicious"].(bool); ok && v {
 				filter.Suspicious = true
 			}
-			sessions, err := m.DB().ListC2Sessions(filter)
+			sessions, err := m.DB().ListC2SessionsForAccess(filter, c2ToolAccess(ctx))
 			return makeC2Result(map[string]interface{}{"sessions": sessions, "count": len(sessions)}, err)
 
 		case "get":
@@ -494,7 +500,7 @@ func registerC2TaskManageTool(s *mcp.Server, m *c2.Manager, l *zap.Logger) {
 			if limit := int(getFloat64(params, "limit")); limit > 0 {
 				filter.Limit = limit
 			}
-			tasks, err := m.DB().ListC2Tasks(filter)
+			tasks, err := m.DB().ListC2TasksForAccess(filter, c2ToolAccess(ctx))
 			return makeC2Result(map[string]interface{}{"tasks": tasks, "count": len(tasks)}, err)
 
 		case "cancel":
@@ -602,6 +608,9 @@ func registerC2PayloadTool(s *mcp.Server, m *c2.Manager, l *zap.Logger, webListe
 			if err != nil {
 				return makeC2Result(nil, err)
 			}
+			if principal, ok := authctx.PrincipalFromContext(ctx); ok {
+				_ = m.DB().RecordC2PayloadArtifact(filepath.Base(result.OutputPath), result.PayloadID, result.ListenerID, principal.UserID)
+			}
 			return makeC2Result(map[string]interface{}{
 				"payload_id": result.PayloadID, "download_path": result.DownloadPath,
 				"os": result.OS, "arch": result.Arch, "size_bytes": result.SizeBytes,
@@ -648,11 +657,19 @@ func registerC2EventTool(s *mcp.Server, m *c2.Manager, l *zap.Logger) {
 				filter.Since = &t
 			}
 		}
-		events, err := m.DB().ListC2Events(filter)
+		events, err := m.DB().ListC2EventsForAccess(filter, c2ToolAccess(ctx))
 		return makeC2Result(map[string]interface{}{"events": events, "count": len(events)}, err)
 	})
 }
 
+func c2ToolAccess(ctx context.Context) database.RBACListAccess {
+	principal, ok := authctx.PrincipalFromContext(ctx)
+	if !ok {
+		return database.RBACListAccess{Scope: database.RBACScopeAssigned}
+	}
+	return database.RBACListAccess{UserID: principal.UserID, Scope: principal.ScopeFor("c2:read")}
+}
+
 // ============================================================================
 // c2_profile — Malleable Profile 管理工具（新增）
 // ============================================================================

internal/app/cors_security_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+)
+
+func TestCORSMiddlewareAllowsSameOriginAndRejectsForeignOrigin(t *testing.T) {
+	gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
+	router := gin.New()
+	router.Use(corsMiddleware(nil))
+	router.GET("/test", func(c *gin.Context) { c.Status(http.StatusNoContent) })
+
+	same := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://app.example/test", nil)
+	same.Host = "app.example"
+	same.Header.Set("Origin", "http://app.example")
+	sameW := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	router.ServeHTTP(sameW, same)
+	if sameW.Code != http.StatusNoContent || sameW.Header().Get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin") != "http://app.example" {
+		t.Fatalf("same-origin response = %d, allow-origin=%q", sameW.Code, sameW.Header().Get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin"))
+	}
+
+	foreign := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://app.example/test", nil)
+	foreign.Host = "app.example"
+	foreign.Header.Set("Origin", "https://evil.example")
+	foreignW := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	router.ServeHTTP(foreignW, foreign)
+	if foreignW.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("foreign-origin response = %d, want %d", foreignW.Code, http.StatusForbidden)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCORSMiddlewareAllowsBrowserExtensionWithoutConfiguration(t *testing.T) {
+	gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
+	router := gin.New()
+	router.Use(corsMiddleware(nil))
+	router.POST("/api/auth/login", func(c *gin.Context) { c.Status(http.StatusNoContent) })
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodOptions, "https://server.example/api/auth/login", nil)
+	req.Host = "server.example"
+	req.Header.Set("Origin", "chrome-extension://abcdefghijklmnopabcdefghijklmnop")
+	req.Header.Set("Access-Control-Request-Method", http.MethodPost)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	if w.Code != http.StatusNoContent {
+		t.Fatalf("preflight response = %d, want %d", w.Code, http.StatusNoContent)
+	}
+	if got := w.Header().Get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin"); got != "chrome-extension://abcdefghijklmnopabcdefghijklmnop" {
+		t.Fatalf("allow-origin = %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCORSMiddlewareRejectsInvalidExtensionOrigins(t *testing.T) {
+	gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
+	for _, origin := range []string{
+		"chrome-extension://too-short",
+		"chrome-extension://qrstuvwxyzabcdefqrstuvwxyzabcdef",
+		"chrome-extension://abcdefghijklmnopabcdefghijklmnop:8443",
+		"moz-extension://abcdefghijklmnopabcdefghijklmnop",
+	} {
+		t.Run(origin, func(t *testing.T) {
+			router := gin.New()
+			router.Use(corsMiddleware(nil))
+			router.GET("/test", func(c *gin.Context) { c.Status(http.StatusNoContent) })
+
+			req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://server.example/test", nil)
+			req.Host = "server.example"
+			req.Header.Set("Origin", origin)
+			w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+			router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+			if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+				t.Fatalf("response = %d, want %d", w.Code, http.StatusForbidden)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCORSMiddlewareRejectsUnsafeConfiguredEntries(t *testing.T) {
+	gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
+	for _, configured := range []string{
+		"*",
+		"null",
+		"https://trusted.example/extra",
+		"https://trusted.example?trusted=true",
+	} {
+		t.Run(configured, func(t *testing.T) {
+			router := gin.New()
+			router.Use(corsMiddleware([]string{configured}))
+			router.GET("/test", func(c *gin.Context) { c.Status(http.StatusNoContent) })
+
+			req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://server.example/test", nil)
+			req.Host = "server.example"
+			req.Header.Set("Origin", "https://trusted.example")
+			w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+			router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+			if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+				t.Fatalf("response = %d, want %d", w.Code, http.StatusForbidden)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

internal/app/mcp_authorization.go

@@ -0,0 +1,292 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/agent"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/authctx"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/database"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/mcp"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/mcp/builtin"
+)
+
+func mcpToolAuthorizer(db *database.DB) func(context.Context, string, map[string]interface{}) error {
+	return func(ctx context.Context, toolName string, args map[string]interface{}) error {
+		principal, ok := authctx.PrincipalFromContext(ctx)
+		if !ok {
+			return fmt.Errorf("missing authenticated principal")
+		}
+		require := func(permission string) error {
+			if !principal.HasPermission(permission) {
+				return fmt.Errorf("missing permission %s", permission)
+			}
+			return nil
+		}
+		resource := func(permission, resourceType, argument string) error {
+			if err := require(permission); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			id := mcpAuthorizationString(args, argument)
+			if id == "" || db == nil || !db.UserCanAccessResource(principal.UserID, principal.ScopeFor(permission), resourceType, id) {
+				return fmt.Errorf("no access to %s %s", resourceType, id)
+			}
+			return nil
+		}
+		toolExecutionResource := func(permission string) error {
+			if err := require(permission); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			id := mcpAuthorizationString(args, "execution_id")
+			if id == "" || db == nil || !db.UserCanAccessToolExecution(principal.UserID, principal.ScopeFor(permission), id) {
+				return fmt.Errorf("no access to tool execution %s", id)
+			}
+			return nil
+		}
+
+		switch toolName {
+		case builtin.ToolWebshellExec, builtin.ToolWebshellFileWrite:
+			return resource("webshell:write", "webshell", "connection_id")
+		case builtin.ToolWebshellFileList, builtin.ToolWebshellFileRead:
+			return resource("webshell:read", "webshell", "connection_id")
+		case builtin.ToolManageWebshellList:
+			return require("webshell:read")
+		case builtin.ToolManageWebshellAdd:
+			return require("webshell:write")
+		case builtin.ToolManageWebshellUpdate, builtin.ToolManageWebshellTest:
+			return resource("webshell:write", "webshell", "connection_id")
+		case builtin.ToolManageWebshellDelete:
+			return resource("webshell:delete", "webshell", "connection_id")
+		case builtin.ToolRecordVulnerability:
+			if err := require("vulnerability:write"); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			conversationID := mcpAuthorizationString(args, "conversation_id")
+			if conversationID == "" {
+				conversationID = mcpAuthorizationConversationID(ctx)
+			}
+			if conversationID == "" || db == nil || !db.UserCanAccessResource(principal.UserID, principal.ScopeFor("vulnerability:write"), "conversation", conversationID) {
+				return fmt.Errorf("no access to conversation %s", conversationID)
+			}
+			return nil
+		case builtin.ToolListVulnerabilities:
+			if err := require("vulnerability:read"); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			conversationID := mcpAuthorizationConversationID(ctx)
+			if conversationID == "" || db == nil || !db.UserCanAccessResource(principal.UserID, principal.ScopeFor("vulnerability:read"), "conversation", conversationID) {
+				return fmt.Errorf("no access to conversation %s", conversationID)
+			}
+			return nil
+		case builtin.ToolGetVulnerability:
+			return resource("vulnerability:read", "vulnerability", "id")
+		case builtin.ToolQueryAssets:
+			return require("asset:read")
+		case builtin.ToolGetAsset:
+			return resource("asset:read", "asset", "id")
+		case builtin.ToolCreateAsset:
+			if err := require("asset:write"); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			if projectID := mcpAuthorizationString(args, "project_id"); projectID != "" && (db == nil || !db.UserCanAccessResource(principal.UserID, principal.ScopeFor("asset:write"), "project", projectID)) {
+				return fmt.Errorf("no access to project %s", projectID)
+			}
+			return nil
+		case builtin.ToolUpdateAsset, builtin.ToolCompleteAssetScan:
+			if err := resource("asset:write", "asset", "id"); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			if toolName == builtin.ToolCompleteAssetScan {
+				conversationID := mcpAuthorizationConversationID(ctx)
+				if conversationID == "" || db == nil || !db.UserCanAccessResource(principal.UserID, principal.ScopeFor("asset:write"), "conversation", conversationID) {
+					return fmt.Errorf("no access to conversation %s", conversationID)
+				}
+				return nil
+			}
+			if projectID := mcpAuthorizationString(args, "project_id"); projectID != "" && (db == nil || !db.UserCanAccessResource(principal.UserID, principal.ScopeFor("asset:write"), "project", projectID)) {
+				return fmt.Errorf("no access to project %s", projectID)
+			}
+			return nil
+		case builtin.ToolDeleteAsset:
+			return resource("asset:delete", "asset", "id")
+		case builtin.ToolUpsertProjectFact, builtin.ToolDeprecateProjectFact, builtin.ToolRestoreProjectFact:
+			return authorizeProjectTool(ctx, principal, db, "project:write")
+		case builtin.ToolGetProjectFact, builtin.ToolListProjectFacts, builtin.ToolSearchProjectFacts:
+			return authorizeProjectTool(ctx, principal, db, "project:read")
+		case builtin.ToolListKnowledgeRiskTypes, builtin.ToolSearchKnowledgeBase:
+			return require("knowledge:read")
+		case builtin.ToolAnalyzeImage:
+			return require("agent:execute")
+		case builtin.ToolGetToolExecution, builtin.ToolWaitToolExecution:
+			return toolExecutionResource("monitor:read")
+		case builtin.ToolCancelToolExecution:
+			return toolExecutionResource("monitor:write")
+		case builtin.ToolBatchTaskList:
+			return require("tasks:read")
+		case builtin.ToolBatchTaskGet:
+			return resource("tasks:read", "batch_task", "queue_id")
+		case builtin.ToolBatchTaskCreate:
+			if err := require("tasks:write"); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			if projectID := mcpAuthorizationString(args, "project_id"); projectID != "" && (db == nil || !db.UserCanAccessResource(principal.UserID, principal.ScopeFor("tasks:write"), "project", projectID)) {
+				return fmt.Errorf("no access to project %s", projectID)
+			}
+			return nil
+		case builtin.ToolBatchTaskDelete, builtin.ToolBatchTaskRemove:
+			return resource("tasks:delete", "batch_task", "queue_id")
+		case builtin.ToolBatchTaskStart, builtin.ToolBatchTaskRerun, builtin.ToolBatchTaskPause,
+			builtin.ToolBatchTaskUpdateMetadata, builtin.ToolBatchTaskUpdateSchedule,
+			builtin.ToolBatchTaskScheduleEnabled, builtin.ToolBatchTaskAdd, builtin.ToolBatchTaskUpdate:
+			return resource("tasks:write", "batch_task", "queue_id")
+		case builtin.ToolC2Listener:
+			return authorizeC2Action(principal, db, args, "c2_listener", "listener_id")
+		case builtin.ToolC2Session, builtin.ToolC2Task, builtin.ToolC2File:
+			if toolName == builtin.ToolC2File && mcpAuthorizationString(args, "action") == "get_result" {
+				return authorizeC2Action(principal, db, args, "c2_task", "task_id")
+			}
+			return authorizeC2Action(principal, db, args, "c2_session", "session_id")
+		case builtin.ToolC2TaskManage:
+			return authorizeC2Action(principal, db, args, "c2_task", "task_id")
+		case builtin.ToolC2Payload:
+			return resource("c2:write", "c2_listener", "listener_id")
+		case builtin.ToolC2Event:
+			if id := mcpAuthorizationString(args, "session_id"); id != "" {
+				return resource("c2:read", "c2_session", "session_id")
+			}
+			if principal.ScopeFor("c2:read") != database.RBACScopeAll {
+				return fmt.Errorf("unfiltered C2 event list requires global scope")
+			}
+			return require("c2:read")
+		case builtin.ToolC2Profile:
+			// Profiles are process-global and do not yet have an owner. Writes are
+			// therefore reserved for global scope; reads require c2:read.
+			if mcpAuthorizationString(args, "action") == "list" || mcpAuthorizationString(args, "action") == "get" {
+				return require("c2:read")
+			}
+			permission := "c2:write"
+			if mcpAuthorizationString(args, "action") == "delete" {
+				permission = "c2:delete"
+			}
+			if principal.ScopeFor(permission) != database.RBACScopeAll {
+				return fmt.Errorf("C2 profile mutation requires global scope")
+			}
+			if mcpAuthorizationString(args, "action") == "delete" {
+				return require("c2:delete")
+			}
+			return require("c2:write")
+		default:
+			if builtin.IsBuiltinTool(toolName) {
+				return fmt.Errorf("no authorization policy registered for builtin tool %s", toolName)
+			}
+			if principal.HasPermission("agent:local-execute") {
+				return nil
+			}
+			return fmt.Errorf("missing agent:local-execute")
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func externalMCPToolAuthorizer() func(context.Context, string, map[string]interface{}) error {
+	return func(ctx context.Context, toolName string, _ map[string]interface{}) error {
+		principal, ok := authctx.PrincipalFromContext(ctx)
+		if !ok {
+			return fmt.Errorf("missing authenticated principal")
+		}
+		if !principal.HasPermission("mcp:external:execute") {
+			return fmt.Errorf("missing permission mcp:external:execute")
+		}
+		if principal.ScopeFor("mcp:external:execute") != database.RBACScopeAll {
+			return fmt.Errorf("external MCP invocation requires global scope")
+		}
+		if strings.TrimSpace(toolName) == "" {
+			return fmt.Errorf("missing external tool name")
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+}
+
+func authorizeC2Action(principal authctx.Principal, db *database.DB, args map[string]interface{}, resourceType, argument string) error {
+	action := mcpAuthorizationString(args, "action")
+	permission := "c2:write"
+	if action == "list" || action == "get" || action == "get_result" || action == "wait" {
+		permission = "c2:read"
+	} else if action == "delete" || action == "delete_batch" {
+		permission = "c2:delete"
+	}
+	if !principal.HasPermission(permission) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("missing permission %s", permission)
+	}
+	id := mcpAuthorizationString(args, argument)
+	if action == "delete_batch" {
+		ids := mcpAuthorizationStrings(args, argument+"s")
+		if len(ids) == 0 {
+			return fmt.Errorf("missing resource identifiers %ss", argument)
+		}
+		for _, candidate := range ids {
+			if db == nil || !db.UserCanAccessResource(principal.UserID, principal.ScopeFor(permission), resourceType, candidate) {
+				return fmt.Errorf("no access to %s %s", resourceType, candidate)
+			}
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	if id == "" {
+		if action == "create" || action == "list" {
+			return nil
+		}
+		return fmt.Errorf("missing resource identifier %s", argument)
+	}
+	if db == nil || !db.UserCanAccessResource(principal.UserID, principal.ScopeFor(permission), resourceType, id) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("no access to %s %s", resourceType, id)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func mcpAuthorizationStrings(args map[string]interface{}, key string) []string {
+	values := []string{}
+	switch raw := args[key].(type) {
+	case []string:
+		for _, value := range raw {
+			if value = strings.TrimSpace(value); value != "" {
+				values = append(values, value)
+			}
+		}
+	case []interface{}:
+		for _, item := range raw {
+			if value, ok := item.(string); ok {
+				if value = strings.TrimSpace(value); value != "" {
+					values = append(values, value)
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return values
+}
+
+func authorizeProjectTool(ctx context.Context, principal authctx.Principal, db *database.DB, permission string) error {
+	if !principal.HasPermission(permission) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("missing permission %s", permission)
+	}
+	conversationID := mcpAuthorizationConversationID(ctx)
+	if conversationID == "" || db == nil || !db.UserCanAccessResource(principal.UserID, principal.ScopeFor(permission), "conversation", conversationID) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("no access to conversation %s", conversationID)
+	}
+	projectID, err := db.GetConversationProjectID(conversationID)
+	if err != nil || strings.TrimSpace(projectID) == "" || !db.UserCanAccessResource(principal.UserID, principal.ScopeFor(permission), "project", projectID) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("no access to project %s", projectID)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func mcpAuthorizationConversationID(ctx context.Context) string {
+	if id := strings.TrimSpace(agent.ConversationIDFromContext(ctx)); id != "" {
+		return id
+	}
+	return strings.TrimSpace(mcp.MCPConversationIDFromContext(ctx))
+}
+
+func mcpAuthorizationString(args map[string]interface{}, key string) string {
+	value, _ := args[key].(string)
+	return strings.TrimSpace(value)
+}

internal/app/mcp_authorization_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/authctx"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/database"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/mcp"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/mcp/builtin"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/security"
+
+	"go.uber.org/zap"
+)
+
+func TestMCPToolAuthorizerEnforcesPermissionAndResource(t *testing.T) {
+	db, err := database.NewDB(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "mcp-authz.db"), zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	user, err := db.CreateRBACUser("mcp-user", "MCP User", "hash", true, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, id := range []string{"ws_allowed", "ws_hidden"} {
+		if err := db.CreateWebshellConnection(&database.WebShellConnection{ID: id, URL: "http://127.0.0.1/" + id, Type: "php", Method: "post", CmdParam: "cmd", CreatedAt: time.Now()}); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	if err := db.AssignResourceToUser(user.ID, "webshell", "ws_allowed"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	principal := authctx.NewPrincipal(user.ID, user.Username, database.RBACScopeAssigned, map[string]bool{"mcp:write": true, "webshell:write": true})
+	ctx := authctx.WithPrincipal(context.Background(), principal)
+	authorize := mcpToolAuthorizer(db)
+	if err := authorize(ctx, builtin.ToolWebshellExec, map[string]interface{}{"connection_id": "ws_allowed"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("allowed resource denied: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := authorize(ctx, builtin.ToolWebshellExec, map[string]interface{}{"connection_id": "ws_hidden"}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("foreign webshell resource was allowed")
+	}
+	if err := authorize(ctx, builtin.ToolManageWebshellDelete, map[string]interface{}{"connection_id": "ws_allowed"}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("delete without webshell:delete was allowed")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEveryBuiltinMCPToolHasExplicitAuthorizationPolicy(t *testing.T) {
+	db, err := database.NewDB(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "mcp-policy-inventory.db"), zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	permissions := map[string]bool{}
+	for permission := range security.PermissionCatalog {
+		permissions[permission] = true
+	}
+	ctx := authctx.WithPrincipal(context.Background(), authctx.NewPrincipal("admin", "admin", database.RBACScopeAll, permissions))
+	authorize := mcpToolAuthorizer(db)
+	args := map[string]interface{}{
+		"action": "get", "connection_id": "x", "queue_id": "x", "listener_id": "x",
+		"session_id": "x", "task_id": "x", "id": "x", "conversation_id": "x", "execution_id": "x",
+	}
+	for _, toolName := range builtin.GetAllBuiltinTools() {
+		err := authorize(ctx, toolName, args)
+		if err != nil && strings.Contains(err.Error(), "no authorization policy registered") {
+			t.Errorf("builtin tool %s has no explicit policy", toolName)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMCPExecutionControlAuthorizationUsesExecutionScope(t *testing.T) {
+	db, err := database.NewDB(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "mcp-exec-authz.db"), zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	user, err := db.CreateRBACUser("exec-user", "Exec User", "hash", true, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.SaveToolExecution(&mcp.ToolExecution{
+		ID:          "exec-owned",
+		ToolName:    "lab::slow",
+		Status:      "running",
+		StartTime:   time.Now(),
+		OwnerUserID: user.ID,
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.SaveToolExecution(&mcp.ToolExecution{
+		ID:        "exec-hidden",
+		ToolName:  "lab::slow",
+		Status:    "running",
+		StartTime: time.Now(),
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	principal := authctx.NewPrincipal(user.ID, user.Username, database.RBACScopeAssigned, map[string]bool{"monitor:read": true, "monitor:write": true})
+	ctx := authctx.WithPrincipal(context.Background(), principal)
+	authorize := mcpToolAuthorizer(db)
+	if err := authorize(ctx, builtin.ToolWaitToolExecution, map[string]interface{}{"execution_id": "exec-owned"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("owned execution denied: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := authorize(ctx, builtin.ToolCancelToolExecution, map[string]interface{}{"execution_id": "exec-hidden"}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("foreign execution was allowed")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMCPAssetToolAuthorizationUsesAssetPermissionsAndScope(t *testing.T) {
+	db, err := database.NewDB(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "mcp-asset-authz.db"), zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	user, err := db.CreateRBACUser("asset-user", "Asset User", "hash", true, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	owned := &database.Asset{IP: "192.0.2.10", Port: 443, Protocol: "https"}
+	hidden := &database.Asset{IP: "192.0.2.20", Port: 443, Protocol: "https"}
+	if _, err := db.UpsertAssets([]*database.Asset{owned}, user.ID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.UpsertAssets([]*database.Asset{hidden}, ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	permissions := map[string]bool{"asset:read": true, "asset:write": true}
+	ctx := authctx.WithPrincipal(context.Background(), authctx.NewPrincipal(user.ID, user.Username, database.RBACScopeAssigned, permissions))
+	authorize := mcpToolAuthorizer(db)
+	if err := authorize(ctx, builtin.ToolQueryAssets, nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("asset query denied: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := authorize(ctx, builtin.ToolGetAsset, map[string]interface{}{"id": owned.ID}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("owned asset denied: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := authorize(ctx, builtin.ToolGetAsset, map[string]interface{}{"id": hidden.ID}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("unassigned asset was readable")
+	}
+	if err := authorize(ctx, builtin.ToolUpdateAsset, map[string]interface{}{"id": owned.ID}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("owned asset update denied: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := authorize(ctx, builtin.ToolDeleteAsset, map[string]interface{}{"id": owned.ID}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("asset delete without asset:delete was allowed")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestExternalMCPRequiresDedicatedPermission(t *testing.T) {
+	authorize := externalMCPToolAuthorizer()
+	ctx := authctx.WithPrincipal(context.Background(), authctx.NewPrincipal("u1", "user", database.RBACScopeAssigned, map[string]bool{"agent:execute": true}))
+	if err := authorize(ctx, "server::tool", nil); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("agent:execute alone authorized an external MCP tool")
+	}
+	ctx = authctx.WithPrincipal(context.Background(), authctx.NewPrincipal("u1", "user", database.RBACScopeAll, map[string]bool{"mcp:external:execute": true}))
+	if err := authorize(ctx, "server::tool", nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("dedicated external MCP permission rejected: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestConfiguredCommandToolRequiresLocalExecutePermission(t *testing.T) {
+	authorize := mcpToolAuthorizer(nil)
+	agentOnly := authctx.WithPrincipal(context.Background(), authctx.NewPrincipal("u1", "user", database.RBACScopeAssigned, map[string]bool{"agent:execute": true}))
+	if err := authorize(agentOnly, "nmap_scan", nil); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("agent:execute alone authorized a configured command tool")
+	}
+	local := authctx.WithPrincipal(context.Background(), authctx.NewPrincipal("u1", "user", database.RBACScopeAssigned, map[string]bool{"agent:local-execute": true}))
+	if err := authorize(local, "nmap_scan", nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("agent:local-execute rejected: %v", err)
+	}
+}

internal/app/mcp_http_auth_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/config"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/database"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/mcp"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/security"
+
+	"go.uber.org/zap"
+)
+
+func TestStandaloneMCPPrefersUserRBACAndDisablesGlobalTokenByDefault(t *testing.T) {
+	db, err := database.NewDB(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "mcp-http-auth.db"), zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
+	auth := security.NewAuthManager(12)
+	if _, err := auth.AttachRBACStore(db); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	hash, err := security.HashPassword("admin-secret")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.UpdateRBACAdminPassword(hash); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	token, _, err := auth.Authenticate("admin", "admin-secret")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	server := mcp.NewServer(zap.NewNop())
+	server.SetToolAuthorizer(mcpToolAuthorizer(db))
+	a := &App{config: &config.Config{MCP: config.MCPConfig{AuthHeader: "X-MCP-Token", AuthHeaderValue: "static-secret"}}, auth: auth, mcpServer: server}
+	body := []byte(`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/list"}`)
+
+	userReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/mcp", bytes.NewReader(body))
+	userReq.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
+	userW := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	a.mcpHandlerWithAuth(userW, userReq)
+	if userW.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("user bearer status = %d: %s", userW.Code, userW.Body.String())
+	}
+
+	staticReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/mcp", bytes.NewReader(body))
+	staticReq.Header.Set("X-MCP-Token", "static-secret")
+	staticW := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	a.mcpHandlerWithAuth(staticW, staticReq)
+	if staticW.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("global static token status = %d, want 401", staticW.Code)
+	}
+}

internal/app/project_fact_tools.go

@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ func registerProjectFactTools(mcpServer *mcp.Server, db *database.DB, cfg *confi
 					"description": "可选：关联的漏洞记录 ID",
 				},
 				"links": map[string]interface{}{
-					"type": "array",
+					"type":        "array",
 					"description": "可选：关系边（from → 当前 fact）。finding 至少 1 条 {from:target/*, type:discovered_on}；finding 上记录 exploit 用 {from:exploit/*, type:exploits}。省略保留已有边；传 [] 清空全部关系边。",
 					"items": map[string]interface{}{
 						"type": "object",
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ func registerProjectFactTools(mcpServer *mcp.Server, db *database.DB, cfg *confi
 	})
 
 	if logger != nil {
-		logger.Info("项目黑板 MCP 工具注册成功")
+		logger.Debug("项目黑板 MCP 工具注册成功")
 	}
 }
 

internal/app/vulnerability_tools.go

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/agent"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/authctx"
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/database"
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/mcp"
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/mcp/builtin"
@@ -189,7 +190,7 @@ func registerVulnerabilityTools(mcpServer *mcp.Server, db *database.DB, logger *
 	registerListVulnerabilitiesTool(mcpServer, db, logger)
 	registerGetVulnerabilityTool(mcpServer, db, logger)
 	if logger != nil {
-		logger.Info("漏洞 MCP 工具注册成功", zap.Strings("tools", []string{
+		logger.Debug("漏洞 MCP 工具注册成功", zap.Strings("tools", []string{
 			builtin.ToolRecordVulnerability,
 			builtin.ToolListVulnerabilities,
 			builtin.ToolGetVulnerability,
@@ -200,7 +201,7 @@ func registerVulnerabilityTools(mcpServer *mcp.Server, db *database.DB, logger *
 func registerRecordVulnerabilityTool(mcpServer *mcp.Server, db *database.DB, logger *zap.Logger) {
 	tool := mcp.Tool{
 		Name:             builtin.ToolRecordVulnerability,
-		Description:      "记录发现的漏洞详情到漏洞管理系统。必须按“仅看本记录即可复现”的标准填写：目标、触发点、前置条件、复现步骤、证据/POC、实际影响、修复建议和复测方式。边渗透边记录：每验证出一条可复现漏洞后立即调用，勿等会话结束。记录前可先 list_vulnerabilities 避免重复。",
+		Description:      "记录发现的漏洞详情到漏洞管理系统。必须按“仅看本记录即可复现”的标准填写：目标、漏洞类型、触发点、复现步骤、证据/POC、实际影响和修复建议；前置条件与复测方式为推荐填写项。边渗透边记录：每验证出一条可复现漏洞后立即调用，勿等会话结束。记录前可先 list_vulnerabilities 避免重复。",
 		ShortDescription: "记录可复现的漏洞详情到漏洞管理系统",
 		InputSchema: map[string]interface{}{
 			"type": "object",
@@ -228,7 +229,7 @@ func registerRecordVulnerabilityTool(mcpServer *mcp.Server, db *database.DB, log
 				},
 				"preconditions": map[string]interface{}{
 					"type":        "string",
-					"description": "前置条件：登录状态、权限、账号、Header/Cookie、特定数据、网络位置、环境/版本等；无前置条件写“无”。",
+					"description": "前置条件（推荐填写）：登录状态、权限、账号、Header/Cookie、特定数据、网络位置、环境/版本等；无前置条件可写“无”。",
 				},
 				"reproduction_steps": map[string]interface{}{
 					"type":        "string",
@@ -248,7 +249,7 @@ func registerRecordVulnerabilityTool(mcpServer *mcp.Server, db *database.DB, log
 				},
 				"retest_notes": map[string]interface{}{
 					"type":        "string",
-					"description": "复测方式：修复后如何验证漏洞已关闭，包括应返回的状态码、错误信息或访问控制结果。",
+					"description": "复测方式（推荐填写）：修复后如何验证漏洞已关闭，包括应返回的状态码、错误信息或访问控制结果。",
 				},
 			},
 			"required": []string{"title", "description", "severity", "vulnerability_type", "target", "reproduction_steps", "evidence", "impact", "recommendation"},
@@ -281,7 +282,7 @@ func registerRecordVulnerabilityTool(mcpServer *mcp.Server, db *database.DB, log
 			return textResult(fmt.Sprintf("错误: severity 必须是 critical、high、medium、low 或 info 之一，当前值: %s", severity), true), nil
 		}
 		if missing := missingVulnerabilityReproFields(args); len(missing) > 0 {
-			return textResult("错误: 漏洞记录缺少复现所需信息，请补充后再记录：\n- "+strings.Join(missing, "\n- ")+"\n\n最佳实践：漏洞管理中的单条记录应独立包含目标、前置条件、复现步骤、证据/POC、影响和修复/复测方式。", true), nil
+			return textResult("错误: 漏洞记录缺少必填信息，请补充后再记录：\n- "+strings.Join(missing, "\n- ")+"\n\n必填项用于确保单条记录可独立复现；前置条件和复测方式为推荐填写项。", true), nil
 		}
 
 		projectID := ""
@@ -313,6 +314,11 @@ func registerRecordVulnerabilityTool(mcpServer *mcp.Server, db *database.DB, log
 			}
 			return textResult(fmt.Sprintf("记录漏洞失败: %v", err), true), nil
 		}
+		if principal, ok := authctx.PrincipalFromContext(ctx); ok {
+			_ = db.SetResourceOwner("vulnerability", created.ID, principal.UserID)
+			_ = db.AssignResourceToUser(principal.UserID, "vulnerability", created.ID)
+		}
+		db.NotifyVulnerabilityCreated(created)
 
 		if logger != nil {
 			logger.Info("漏洞记录成功",

internal/audit/service.go

@@ -63,7 +63,12 @@ func (s *Service) Record(c *gin.Context, e Entry) {
 		}
 	}
 	if strings.TrimSpace(e.Actor) == "" {
-		e.Actor = "admin"
+		if c != nil {
+			e.Actor = strings.TrimSpace(c.GetString(security.ContextUsernameKey))
+		}
+		if e.Actor == "" {
+			e.Actor = "admin"
+		}
 	}
 	maxDetail := s.cfg.Audit.MaxDetailBytesEffective()
 	detail := SanitizeDetail(e.Detail, maxDetail)

internal/authctx/principal.go

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+package authctx
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// Principal is the immutable authorization identity propagated beyond the
+// transport layer into Agent, MCP and background task contexts.
+type Principal struct {
+	UserID           string
+	Username         string
+	Permissions      map[string]bool
+	PermissionScopes map[string]string
+	Scope            string
+}
+
+type principalContextKey struct{}
+
+func NewPrincipal(userID, username, scope string, permissions map[string]bool) Principal {
+	return NewPrincipalWithScopes(userID, username, scope, permissions, nil)
+}
+
+func NewPrincipalWithScopes(userID, username, scope string, permissions map[string]bool, permissionScopes map[string]string) Principal {
+	permissionCopy := make(map[string]bool, len(permissions))
+	scopeCopy := make(map[string]string, len(permissionScopes))
+	for permission, allowed := range permissions {
+		if allowed {
+			permissionCopy[permission] = true
+			if permissionScope := strings.TrimSpace(permissionScopes[permission]); permissionScope != "" {
+				scopeCopy[permission] = permissionScope
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return Principal{
+		UserID: strings.TrimSpace(userID), Username: strings.TrimSpace(username),
+		Scope: strings.TrimSpace(scope), Permissions: permissionCopy, PermissionScopes: scopeCopy,
+	}
+}
+
+func WithPrincipal(ctx context.Context, principal Principal) context.Context {
+	if ctx == nil {
+		ctx = context.Background()
+	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(principal.UserID) == "" {
+		return ctx
+	}
+	return context.WithValue(ctx, principalContextKey{}, principal)
+}
+
+func PrincipalFromContext(ctx context.Context) (Principal, bool) {
+	if ctx == nil {
+		return Principal{}, false
+	}
+	principal, ok := ctx.Value(principalContextKey{}).(Principal)
+	return principal, ok && strings.TrimSpace(principal.UserID) != ""
+}
+
+func (p Principal) HasPermission(permission string) bool {
+	return p.Permissions[strings.TrimSpace(permission)]
+}
+
+// ScopeFor returns the scope attached to the permission that authorizes the
+// current action. Falling back to Scope keeps explicit service principals and
+// legacy callers compatible without reintroducing cross-role scope widening.
+func (p Principal) ScopeFor(permission string) string {
+	permission = strings.TrimSpace(permission)
+	if scope := strings.TrimSpace(p.PermissionScopes[permission]); scope != "" {
+		return scope
+	}
+	return strings.TrimSpace(p.Scope)
+}

internal/c2/payload_builder.go

@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
 	"os"
-	"strconv"
 	"os/exec"
 	"path/filepath"
+	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"text/template"
 
@@ -173,15 +173,16 @@ func (b *PayloadBuilder) BuildBeacon(in PayloadBuilderInput) (*BuildResult, erro
 	}
 
 	// 交叉编译
+	payloadID := "p_" + strings.ReplaceAll(uuid.New().String(), "-", "")[:14]
 	binName := strings.TrimSpace(in.OutputName)
 	if binName == "" {
-		binName = fmt.Sprintf("beacon_%s_%s", goos, goarch)
+		binName = fmt.Sprintf("beacon_%s_%s_%s", goos, goarch, payloadID)
 	}
 	if goos == "windows" && !strings.HasSuffix(binName, ".exe") {
 		binName += ".exe"
 	}
 	binPath := filepath.Join(b.outputDir, binName)
-	
+
 	if err := os.MkdirAll(b.outputDir, 0755); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("mkdir output: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -214,7 +215,6 @@ func (b *PayloadBuilder) BuildBeacon(in PayloadBuilderInput) (*BuildResult, erro
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("stat output: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	payloadID := "p_" + strings.ReplaceAll(uuid.New().String(), "-", "")[:14]
 	return &BuildResult{
 		PayloadID:    payloadID,
 		ListenerID:   listener.ID,

internal/config/config.go

@@ -2,15 +2,17 @@ package config
 
 import (
 	"crypto/rand"
-	"encoding/base64"
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
+	"io/fs"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/termout"
+
 	"gopkg.in/yaml.v3"
 )
 
@@ -21,6 +23,9 @@ type Config struct {
 	MCP         MCPConfig             `yaml:"mcp"`
 	OpenAI      OpenAIConfig          `yaml:"openai"`
 	FOFA        FofaConfig            `yaml:"fofa,omitempty" json:"fofa,omitempty"`
+	ZoomEye     SpaceSearchConfig     `yaml:"zoomeye,omitempty" json:"zoomeye,omitempty"`
+	Quake       SpaceSearchConfig     `yaml:"quake,omitempty" json:"quake,omitempty"`
+	Shodan      SpaceSearchConfig     `yaml:"shodan,omitempty" json:"shodan,omitempty"`
 	Agent       AgentConfig           `yaml:"agent"`
 	Hitl        HitlConfig            `yaml:"hitl,omitempty" json:"hitl,omitempty"`
 	Security    SecurityConfig        `yaml:"security"`
@@ -41,6 +46,24 @@ type Config struct {
 	Vision      VisionConfig          `yaml:"vision,omitempty" json:"vision,omitempty"`
 }
 
+type EnsureLocalConfigResult struct {
+	Created     bool
+	ExamplePath string
+}
+
+const (
+	DefaultMaxCompletionTokens                        = 16384
+	DefaultMaxToolArgumentsBytes                      = 65536
+	DefaultMaxShellCommandBytes                       = 65536
+	DefaultModelOutputRepairMaxAttempts               = 1
+	DefaultSummarizationUserIntentLedgerMaxRunes      = 96000
+	DefaultSummarizationUserIntentLedgerEntryMaxRunes = 16000
+	DefaultLatestUserMessageMaxRunes                  = 48000
+	DefaultLatestUserMessageHeadRunes                 = 24000
+	DefaultLatestUserMessageTailRunes                 = 24000
+	DefaultSummarizationOutputReserveTokens           = 8192
+)
+
 // ProjectConfig 项目黑板（跨对话共享事实）配置。
 type ProjectConfig struct {
 	Enabled                 bool   `yaml:"enabled" json:"enabled"`
@@ -232,6 +255,12 @@ func (c MultiAgentEinoCallbacksConfig) EinoCallbacksMaxOutputSummaryRunes() int
 
 // MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig optional Eino ADK middleware and Deep / supervisor tuning.
 type MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig struct {
+	// MaxToolArgumentsBytes hard-rejects oversized model-generated tool arguments before execution.
+	MaxToolArgumentsBytes int `yaml:"max_tool_arguments_bytes,omitempty" json:"max_tool_arguments_bytes,omitempty"`
+	// MaxShellCommandBytes applies a stricter limit to exec/execute command strings.
+	MaxShellCommandBytes int `yaml:"max_shell_command_bytes,omitempty" json:"max_shell_command_bytes,omitempty"`
+	// ModelOutputRepairMaxAttempts limits consecutive model-output repair attempts.
+	ModelOutputRepairMaxAttempts int `yaml:"model_output_repair_max_attempts,omitempty" json:"model_output_repair_max_attempts,omitempty"`
 	// PatchToolCalls inserts placeholder tool results for dangling assistant tool_calls (nil = enabled).
 	PatchToolCalls *bool `yaml:"patch_tool_calls,omitempty" json:"patch_tool_calls,omitempty"`
 	// ToolSearch enables dynamictool/toolsearch: hide tail tools until model calls tool_search (reduces prompt tools).
@@ -253,8 +282,20 @@ type MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig struct {
 	ReductionSubAgents         bool     `yaml:"reduction_sub_agents,omitempty" json:"reduction_sub_agents,omitempty"` // also attach to sub-agents
 	// SummarizationTriggerRatio controls summarization trigger threshold as max_total_tokens * ratio (default 0.8).
 	SummarizationTriggerRatio float64 `yaml:"summarization_trigger_ratio,omitempty" json:"summarization_trigger_ratio,omitempty"`
+	// SummarizationOutputReserveTokens reserves completion headroom for the summarization model call (default 8192).
+	SummarizationOutputReserveTokens int `yaml:"summarization_output_reserve_tokens,omitempty" json:"summarization_output_reserve_tokens,omitempty"`
 	// SummarizationEmitInternalEvents controls middleware internal event emission (default true).
 	SummarizationEmitInternalEvents *bool `yaml:"summarization_emit_internal_events,omitempty" json:"summarization_emit_internal_events,omitempty"`
+	// SummarizationUserIntentLedgerMaxRunes caps the DB-backed immutable user input ledger injected into model context.
+	SummarizationUserIntentLedgerMaxRunes int `yaml:"summarization_user_intent_ledger_max_runes,omitempty" json:"summarization_user_intent_ledger_max_runes,omitempty"`
+	// SummarizationUserIntentLedgerEntryMaxRunes caps each user message entry inside the immutable user input ledger.
+	SummarizationUserIntentLedgerEntryMaxRunes int `yaml:"summarization_user_intent_ledger_entry_max_runes,omitempty" json:"summarization_user_intent_ledger_entry_max_runes,omitempty"`
+	// LatestUserMessageMaxRunes caps the current user turn inserted into model context; full text is persisted as an artifact when capped.
+	LatestUserMessageMaxRunes int `yaml:"latest_user_message_max_runes,omitempty" json:"latest_user_message_max_runes,omitempty"`
+	// LatestUserMessageHeadRunes keeps the head preview for an oversized current user turn.
+	LatestUserMessageHeadRunes int `yaml:"latest_user_message_head_runes,omitempty" json:"latest_user_message_head_runes,omitempty"`
+	// LatestUserMessageTailRunes keeps the tail preview for an oversized current user turn.
+	LatestUserMessageTailRunes int `yaml:"latest_user_message_tail_runes,omitempty" json:"latest_user_message_tail_runes,omitempty"`
 	// SummarizationRetryMaxAttempts 已废弃：summarization 与 run loop 共用 run_retry_max_attempts 及 isEinoTransientRunError。
 	SummarizationRetryMaxAttempts int `yaml:"summarization_retry_max_attempts,omitempty" json:"summarization_retry_max_attempts,omitempty"`
 	// PlanExecuteUserInputBudgetRatio caps planner/replanner/executor userInput prompt budget ratio (default 0.35).
@@ -271,7 +312,7 @@ type MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig struct {
 	DeepOutputKey string `yaml:"deep_output_key,omitempty" json:"deep_output_key,omitempty"`
 	// DeepModelRetryMaxRetries 已废弃：临时错误统一由 run loop 内 isEinoTransientRunError + run_retry_max_attempts 处理。
 	DeepModelRetryMaxRetries int `yaml:"deep_model_retry_max_retries,omitempty" json:"deep_model_retry_max_retries,omitempty"`
-	// RunRetryMaxAttempts > 0：429/5xx/网络抖动时可退避重试次数（run loop 与 summarization 共用）；0=默认 10。
+	// RunRetryMaxAttempts > 0：408/409/425/429/5xx/网络抖动时可退避重试次数（run loop 与 summarization 共用）；0=默认 4。
 	RunRetryMaxAttempts int `yaml:"run_retry_max_attempts,omitempty" json:"run_retry_max_attempts,omitempty"`
 	// RunRetryMaxBackoffSec 单次退避上限秒数；0=默认 30。
 	RunRetryMaxBackoffSec int `yaml:"run_retry_max_backoff_sec,omitempty" json:"run_retry_max_backoff_sec,omitempty"`
@@ -281,6 +322,27 @@ type MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig struct {
 	TaskToolDescriptionPrefix string `yaml:"task_tool_description_prefix,omitempty" json:"task_tool_description_prefix,omitempty"`
 }
 
+func (c MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig) MaxToolArgumentsBytesEffective() int {
+	if c.MaxToolArgumentsBytes > 0 {
+		return c.MaxToolArgumentsBytes
+	}
+	return DefaultMaxToolArgumentsBytes
+}
+
+func (c MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig) MaxShellCommandBytesEffective() int {
+	if c.MaxShellCommandBytes > 0 {
+		return c.MaxShellCommandBytes
+	}
+	return DefaultMaxShellCommandBytes
+}
+
+func (c MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig) ModelOutputRepairMaxAttemptsEffective() int {
+	if c.ModelOutputRepairMaxAttempts > 0 {
+		return c.ModelOutputRepairMaxAttempts
+	}
+	return DefaultModelOutputRepairMaxAttempts
+}
+
 func (c MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig) SummarizationTriggerRatioEffective() float64 {
 	v := c.SummarizationTriggerRatio
 	if v <= 0 {
@@ -295,6 +357,13 @@ func (c MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig) SummarizationTriggerRatioEffective() flo
 	return v
 }
 
+func (c MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig) SummarizationOutputReserveTokensEffective() int {
+	if c.SummarizationOutputReserveTokens > 0 {
+		return c.SummarizationOutputReserveTokens
+	}
+	return DefaultSummarizationOutputReserveTokens
+}
+
 func (c MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig) SummarizationEmitInternalEventsEffective() bool {
 	if c.SummarizationEmitInternalEvents != nil {
 		return *c.SummarizationEmitInternalEvents
@@ -302,6 +371,41 @@ func (c MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig) SummarizationEmitInternalEventsEffective
 	return true
 }
 
+func (c MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig) SummarizationUserIntentLedgerMaxRunesEffective() int {
+	if c.SummarizationUserIntentLedgerMaxRunes > 0 {
+		return c.SummarizationUserIntentLedgerMaxRunes
+	}
+	return DefaultSummarizationUserIntentLedgerMaxRunes
+}
+
+func (c MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig) SummarizationUserIntentLedgerEntryMaxRunesEffective() int {
+	if c.SummarizationUserIntentLedgerEntryMaxRunes > 0 {
+		return c.SummarizationUserIntentLedgerEntryMaxRunes
+	}
+	return DefaultSummarizationUserIntentLedgerEntryMaxRunes
+}
+
+func (c MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig) LatestUserMessageMaxRunesEffective() int {
+	if c.LatestUserMessageMaxRunes > 0 {
+		return c.LatestUserMessageMaxRunes
+	}
+	return DefaultLatestUserMessageMaxRunes
+}
+
+func (c MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig) LatestUserMessageHeadRunesEffective() int {
+	if c.LatestUserMessageHeadRunes > 0 {
+		return c.LatestUserMessageHeadRunes
+	}
+	return DefaultLatestUserMessageHeadRunes
+}
+
+func (c MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig) LatestUserMessageTailRunesEffective() int {
+	if c.LatestUserMessageTailRunes > 0 {
+		return c.LatestUserMessageTailRunes
+	}
+	return DefaultLatestUserMessageTailRunes
+}
+
 func (c MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig) PlanExecuteUserInputBudgetRatioEffective() float64 {
 	v := c.PlanExecuteUserInputBudgetRatio
 	if v <= 0 {
@@ -398,14 +502,19 @@ type MultiAgentSubConfig struct {
 
 // MultiAgentPublic 返回给前端的精简信息（不含子代理指令全文）。
 type MultiAgentPublic struct {
-	Enabled                               bool     `json:"enabled"`
+	Enabled                                    bool     `json:"enabled"`
-	RobotDefaultAgentMode                 string   `json:"robot_default_agent_mode,omitempty"`
+	RobotDefaultAgentMode                      string   `json:"robot_default_agent_mode,omitempty"`
-	BatchUseMultiAgent                    bool     `json:"batch_use_multi_agent"`
+	BatchUseMultiAgent                         bool     `json:"batch_use_multi_agent"`
-	SubAgentCount                         int      `json:"sub_agent_count"`
+	SubAgentCount                              int      `json:"sub_agent_count"`
-	Orchestration                         string   `json:"orchestration,omitempty"`
+	Orchestration                              string   `json:"orchestration,omitempty"`
-	PlanExecuteLoopMaxIterations          int      `json:"plan_execute_loop_max_iterations"`
+	PlanExecuteLoopMaxIterations               int      `json:"plan_execute_loop_max_iterations"`
-	ToolSearchAlwaysVisibleTools          []string `json:"tool_search_always_visible_tools,omitempty"`
+	SummarizationUserIntentLedgerMaxRunes      int      `json:"summarization_user_intent_ledger_max_runes"`
-	ToolSearchAlwaysVisibleEffectiveTools []string `json:"tool_search_always_visible_effective_tools,omitempty"`
+	SummarizationUserIntentLedgerEntryMaxRunes int      `json:"summarization_user_intent_ledger_entry_max_runes"`
+	LatestUserMessageMaxRunes                  int      `json:"latest_user_message_max_runes"`
+	LatestUserMessageHeadRunes                 int      `json:"latest_user_message_head_runes"`
+	LatestUserMessageTailRunes                 int      `json:"latest_user_message_tail_runes"`
+	ToolSearchAlwaysVisibleTools               []string `json:"tool_search_always_visible_tools,omitempty"`
+	ToolSearchAlwaysVisibleEffectiveTools      []string `json:"tool_search_always_visible_effective_tools,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // NormalizeAgentMode 解析代理模式（eino_single | deep | plan_execute | supervisor）；空值默认 eino_single。
@@ -445,10 +554,15 @@ func NormalizeMultiAgentOrchestration(s string) string {
 
 // MultiAgentAPIUpdate 设置页/API 仅更新多代理标量字段；写入 YAML 时不覆盖 sub_agents 等块。
 type MultiAgentAPIUpdate struct {
-	Enabled                      bool   `json:"enabled"`
+	Enabled                                    bool   `json:"enabled"`
-	RobotDefaultAgentMode        string `json:"robot_default_agent_mode,omitempty"`
+	RobotDefaultAgentMode                      string `json:"robot_default_agent_mode,omitempty"`
-	BatchUseMultiAgent           bool   `json:"batch_use_multi_agent"`
+	BatchUseMultiAgent                         bool   `json:"batch_use_multi_agent"`
-	PlanExecuteLoopMaxIterations *int   `json:"plan_execute_loop_max_iterations,omitempty"`
+	PlanExecuteLoopMaxIterations               *int   `json:"plan_execute_loop_max_iterations,omitempty"`
+	SummarizationUserIntentLedgerMaxRunes      *int   `json:"summarization_user_intent_ledger_max_runes,omitempty"`
+	SummarizationUserIntentLedgerEntryMaxRunes *int   `json:"summarization_user_intent_ledger_entry_max_runes,omitempty"`
+	LatestUserMessageMaxRunes                  *int   `json:"latest_user_message_max_runes,omitempty"`
+	LatestUserMessageHeadRunes                 *int   `json:"latest_user_message_head_runes,omitempty"`
+	LatestUserMessageTailRunes                 *int   `json:"latest_user_message_tail_runes,omitempty"`
 	// 指针区分「JSON 未传该字段」与「传空数组要清空」；省略时不应覆盖 YAML 中的常驻工具白名单。
 	ToolSearchAlwaysVisibleTools *[]string `json:"tool_search_always_visible_tools,omitempty"`
 }
@@ -468,14 +582,50 @@ type RobotsConfig struct {
 
 // RobotWechatConfig 微信 iLink 机器人配置（个人微信 ClawBot / iLink 协议）
 type RobotWechatConfig struct {
-	Enabled       bool   `yaml:"enabled" json:"enabled"`
+	Enabled       bool                     `yaml:"enabled" json:"enabled"`
-	BotToken      string `yaml:"bot_token,omitempty" json:"bot_token,omitempty"`
+	BotToken      string                   `yaml:"bot_token,omitempty" json:"bot_token,omitempty"`
-	ILinkBotID    string `yaml:"ilink_bot_id,omitempty" json:"ilink_bot_id,omitempty"`
+	ILinkBotID    string                   `yaml:"ilink_bot_id,omitempty" json:"ilink_bot_id,omitempty"`
-	ILinkUserID   string `yaml:"ilink_user_id,omitempty" json:"ilink_user_id,omitempty"`
+	ILinkUserID   string                   `yaml:"ilink_user_id,omitempty" json:"ilink_user_id,omitempty"`
-	BaseURL       string `yaml:"base_url,omitempty" json:"base_url,omitempty"`               // 默认 https://ilinkai.weixin.qq.com
+	BaseURL       string                   `yaml:"base_url,omitempty" json:"base_url,omitempty"`               // 默认 https://ilinkai.weixin.qq.com
-	BotType       string `yaml:"bot_type,omitempty" json:"bot_type,omitempty"`               // get_bot_qrcode 参数，默认 3
+	BotType       string                   `yaml:"bot_type,omitempty" json:"bot_type,omitempty"`               // get_bot_qrcode 参数，默认 3
-	BotAgent      string `yaml:"bot_agent,omitempty" json:"bot_agent,omitempty"`             // base_info.bot_agent
+	BotAgent      string                   `yaml:"bot_agent,omitempty" json:"bot_agent,omitempty"`             // base_info.bot_agent
-	GetUpdatesBuf string `yaml:"get_updates_buf,omitempty" json:"get_updates_buf,omitempty"` // 长轮询游标（运行时）
+	GetUpdatesBuf string                   `yaml:"get_updates_buf,omitempty" json:"get_updates_buf,omitempty"` // 长轮询游标（运行时）
+	Auth          RobotAuthorizationConfig `yaml:"auth,omitempty" json:"auth,omitempty"`
+}
+
+const (
+	RobotAuthModeUserBinding    = "user_binding"
+	RobotAuthModeServiceAccount = "service_account"
+)
+
+// RobotAuthorizationConfig controls how a verified platform sender becomes
+// an RBAC principal. service_account is intentionally fail-closed unless an
+// explicit non-admin service user and sender allowlist are both configured.
+type RobotAuthorizationConfig struct {
+	Mode                 string   `yaml:"mode,omitempty" json:"mode,omitempty"`
+	ServiceUserID        string   `yaml:"service_user_id,omitempty" json:"service_user_id,omitempty"`
+	AllowedExternalUsers []string `yaml:"allowed_external_users,omitempty" json:"allowed_external_users,omitempty"`
+}
+
+func (c RobotAuthorizationConfig) EffectiveMode() string {
+	mode := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(c.Mode))
+	if mode == "" {
+		return RobotAuthModeUserBinding
+	}
+	return mode
+}
+
+func (c RobotAuthorizationConfig) ExternalUserAllowed(externalUserID string) bool {
+	externalUserID = strings.TrimSpace(externalUserID)
+	if externalUserID == "" {
+		return false
+	}
+	for _, allowed := range c.AllowedExternalUsers {
+		if strings.TrimSpace(allowed) == externalUserID {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
 }
 
 // RobotSessionConfig 机器人会话隔离策略
@@ -493,12 +643,13 @@ func (c RobotSessionConfig) StrictUserIdentityEnabled() bool {
 
 // RobotWecomConfig 企业微信机器人配置
 type RobotWecomConfig struct {
-	Enabled        bool   `yaml:"enabled" json:"enabled"`
+	Enabled        bool                     `yaml:"enabled" json:"enabled"`
-	Token          string `yaml:"token" json:"token"`                       // 回调 URL 校验 Token
+	Token          string                   `yaml:"token" json:"token"`                       // 回调 URL 校验 Token
-	EncodingAESKey string `yaml:"encoding_aes_key" json:"encoding_aes_key"` // EncodingAESKey
+	EncodingAESKey string                   `yaml:"encoding_aes_key" json:"encoding_aes_key"` // EncodingAESKey
-	CorpID         string `yaml:"corp_id" json:"corp_id"`                   // 企业 ID
+	CorpID         string                   `yaml:"corp_id" json:"corp_id"`                   // 企业 ID
-	Secret         string `yaml:"secret" json:"secret"`                     // 应用 Secret
+	Secret         string                   `yaml:"secret" json:"secret"`                     // 应用 Secret
-	AgentID        int64  `yaml:"agent_id" json:"agent_id"`                 // 应用 AgentId
+	AgentID        int64                    `yaml:"agent_id" json:"agent_id"`                 // 应用 AgentId
+	Auth           RobotAuthorizationConfig `yaml:"auth,omitempty" json:"auth,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // ValidateWecomConfig 校验企业微信机器人配置；启用时必须配置 token，否则回调无法防伪造。
@@ -514,55 +665,145 @@ func ValidateWecomConfig(w RobotWecomConfig) error {
 
 // RobotDingtalkConfig 钉钉机器人配置
 type RobotDingtalkConfig struct {
-	Enabled                     bool   `yaml:"enabled" json:"enabled"`
+	Enabled                     bool                     `yaml:"enabled" json:"enabled"`
-	ClientID                    string `yaml:"client_id" json:"client_id"`                                           // 应用 Key (AppKey)
+	ClientID                    string                   `yaml:"client_id" json:"client_id"`                                           // 应用 Key (AppKey)
-	ClientSecret                string `yaml:"client_secret" json:"client_secret"`                                   // 应用 Secret
+	ClientSecret                string                   `yaml:"client_secret" json:"client_secret"`                                   // 应用 Secret
-	AllowConversationIDFallback bool   `yaml:"allow_conversation_id_fallback" json:"allow_conversation_id_fallback"` // sender_id 缺失时是否允许回退到会话 ID
+	AllowConversationIDFallback bool                     `yaml:"allow_conversation_id_fallback" json:"allow_conversation_id_fallback"` // sender_id 缺失时是否允许回退到会话 ID
+	Auth                        RobotAuthorizationConfig `yaml:"auth,omitempty" json:"auth,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // RobotLarkConfig 飞书机器人配置
 type RobotLarkConfig struct {
-	Enabled             bool   `yaml:"enabled" json:"enabled"`
+	Enabled             bool                     `yaml:"enabled" json:"enabled"`
-	AppID               string `yaml:"app_id" json:"app_id"`                                 // 应用 App ID
+	AppID               string                   `yaml:"app_id" json:"app_id"`                                 // 应用 App ID
-	AppSecret           string `yaml:"app_secret" json:"app_secret"`                         // 应用 App Secret
+	AppSecret           string                   `yaml:"app_secret" json:"app_secret"`                         // 应用 App Secret
-	VerifyToken         string `yaml:"verify_token" json:"verify_token"`                     // 事件订阅 Verification Token（可选）
+	VerifyToken         string                   `yaml:"verify_token" json:"verify_token"`                     // 事件订阅 Verification Token（可选）
-	AllowChatIDFallback bool   `yaml:"allow_chat_id_fallback" json:"allow_chat_id_fallback"` // 用户 ID 缺失时是否允许回退到 chat_id
+	AllowChatIDFallback bool                     `yaml:"allow_chat_id_fallback" json:"allow_chat_id_fallback"` // 用户 ID 缺失时是否允许回退到 chat_id
+	Auth                RobotAuthorizationConfig `yaml:"auth,omitempty" json:"auth,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // RobotTelegramConfig Telegram 机器人配置（Bot API 长轮询）
 type RobotTelegramConfig struct {
-	Enabled            bool   `yaml:"enabled" json:"enabled"`
+	Enabled            bool                     `yaml:"enabled" json:"enabled"`
-	BotToken           string `yaml:"bot_token" json:"bot_token"`
+	BotToken           string                   `yaml:"bot_token" json:"bot_token"`
-	BotUsername        string `yaml:"bot_username,omitempty" json:"bot_username,omitempty"` // 可选，用于群聊 @ 识别；留空则启动时 getMe
+	BotUsername        string                   `yaml:"bot_username,omitempty" json:"bot_username,omitempty"` // 可选，用于群聊 @ 识别；留空则启动时 getMe
-	AllowGroupMessages bool   `yaml:"allow_group_messages" json:"allow_group_messages"`     // 群聊中仅响应 @ 机器人
+	AllowGroupMessages bool                     `yaml:"allow_group_messages" json:"allow_group_messages"`     // 群聊中仅响应 @ 机器人
-	UpdateOffset       int64  `yaml:"update_offset,omitempty" json:"update_offset,omitempty"`
+	UpdateOffset       int64                    `yaml:"update_offset,omitempty" json:"update_offset,omitempty"`
+	Auth               RobotAuthorizationConfig `yaml:"auth,omitempty" json:"auth,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // RobotSlackConfig Slack 机器人配置（Socket Mode，无需公网回调）
 type RobotSlackConfig struct {
-	Enabled  bool   `yaml:"enabled" json:"enabled"`
+	Enabled  bool                     `yaml:"enabled" json:"enabled"`
-	BotToken string `yaml:"bot_token" json:"bot_token"` // xoxb-
+	BotToken string                   `yaml:"bot_token" json:"bot_token"` // xoxb-
-	AppToken string `yaml:"app_token" json:"app_token"` // xapp-（connections:write）
+	AppToken string                   `yaml:"app_token" json:"app_token"` // xapp-（connections:write）
+	Auth     RobotAuthorizationConfig `yaml:"auth,omitempty" json:"auth,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // RobotDiscordConfig Discord 机器人配置（Gateway WebSocket）
 type RobotDiscordConfig struct {
-	Enabled            bool   `yaml:"enabled" json:"enabled"`
+	Enabled            bool                     `yaml:"enabled" json:"enabled"`
-	BotToken           string `yaml:"bot_token" json:"bot_token"`
+	BotToken           string                   `yaml:"bot_token" json:"bot_token"`
-	AllowGuildMessages bool   `yaml:"allow_guild_messages" json:"allow_guild_messages"` // 服务器频道中仅响应 @ 机器人
+	AllowGuildMessages bool                     `yaml:"allow_guild_messages" json:"allow_guild_messages"` // 服务器频道中仅响应 @ 机器人
+	Auth               RobotAuthorizationConfig `yaml:"auth,omitempty" json:"auth,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // RobotQQConfig QQ 机器人配置（QQ 开放平台 WebSocket）
 type RobotQQConfig struct {
-	Enabled      bool   `yaml:"enabled" json:"enabled"`
+	Enabled      bool                     `yaml:"enabled" json:"enabled"`
-	AppID        string `yaml:"app_id" json:"app_id"`
+	AppID        string                   `yaml:"app_id" json:"app_id"`
-	ClientSecret string `yaml:"client_secret" json:"client_secret"`
+	ClientSecret string                   `yaml:"client_secret" json:"client_secret"`
-	Sandbox      bool   `yaml:"sandbox" json:"sandbox"` // 沙箱环境（上线前测试）
+	Sandbox      bool                     `yaml:"sandbox" json:"sandbox"` // 沙箱环境（上线前测试）
+	Auth         RobotAuthorizationConfig `yaml:"auth,omitempty" json:"auth,omitempty"`
+}
+
+func (c RobotsConfig) AuthorizationFor(platform string) RobotAuthorizationConfig {
+	switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(platform)) {
+	case "wechat":
+		return c.Wechat.Auth
+	case "wecom":
+		return c.Wecom.Auth
+	case "dingtalk":
+		return c.Dingtalk.Auth
+	case "lark":
+		return c.Lark.Auth
+	case "telegram":
+		return c.Telegram.Auth
+	case "slack":
+		return c.Slack.Auth
+	case "discord":
+		return c.Discord.Auth
+	case "qq":
+		return c.QQ.Auth
+	default:
+		return RobotAuthorizationConfig{}
+	}
+}
+
+func ValidateRobotAuthorization(c RobotAuthorizationConfig, path string) error {
+	switch c.EffectiveMode() {
+	case RobotAuthModeUserBinding:
+		return nil
+	case RobotAuthModeServiceAccount:
+		serviceUserID := strings.TrimSpace(c.ServiceUserID)
+		if serviceUserID == "" {
+			return fmt.Errorf("%s.auth.service_user_id 不能为空", path)
+		}
+		if len(c.AllowedExternalUsers) == 0 {
+			return fmt.Errorf("%s.auth.allowed_external_users 至少配置一个真实发送者", path)
+		}
+		seen := map[string]bool{}
+		for _, userID := range c.AllowedExternalUsers {
+			userID = strings.TrimSpace(userID)
+			if userID == "" || userID == "*" {
+				return fmt.Errorf("%s.auth.allowed_external_users 不允许空值或通配符", path)
+			}
+			if seen[userID] {
+				return fmt.Errorf("%s.auth.allowed_external_users 包含重复用户", path)
+			}
+			seen[userID] = true
+		}
+		return nil
+	default:
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s.auth.mode 仅支持 user_binding 或 service_account", path)
+	}
+}
+
+func ValidateRobotsAuthorization(c RobotsConfig) error {
+	items := []struct {
+		path string
+		auth RobotAuthorizationConfig
+	}{
+		{"robots.wechat", c.Wechat.Auth}, {"robots.wecom", c.Wecom.Auth},
+		{"robots.dingtalk", c.Dingtalk.Auth}, {"robots.lark", c.Lark.Auth},
+		{"robots.telegram", c.Telegram.Auth}, {"robots.slack", c.Slack.Auth},
+		{"robots.discord", c.Discord.Auth}, {"robots.qq", c.QQ.Auth},
+	}
+	for _, item := range items {
+		if err := ValidateRobotAuthorization(item.auth, item.path); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (c RobotsConfig) ServiceAccountUserIDs() map[string]string {
+	out := map[string]string{}
+	for _, platform := range []string{"wechat", "wecom", "dingtalk", "lark", "telegram", "slack", "discord", "qq"} {
+		auth := c.AuthorizationFor(platform)
+		if auth.EffectiveMode() == RobotAuthModeServiceAccount {
+			out[platform] = strings.TrimSpace(auth.ServiceUserID)
+		}
+	}
+	return out
 }
 
 type ServerConfig struct {
 	Host string `yaml:"host" json:"host"`
 	Port int    `yaml:"port" json:"port"`
+	// CORSAllowedOrigins contains additional, exact origins that may call the API.
+	// Same-origin browser requests are always allowed. Wildcards are intentionally unsupported.
+	CORSAllowedOrigins []string `yaml:"cors_allowed_origins,omitempty" json:"cors_allowed_origins,omitempty"`
 	// TLSEnabled 为 true 时主 Web UI 使用 HTTPS；现代浏览器在同源下会协商 HTTP/2，缓解 HTTP/1.1 每源并发连接数限制。
 	TLSEnabled bool `yaml:"tls_enabled,omitempty" json:"tls_enabled,omitempty"`
 	// TLSCertPath / TLSKeyPath 非空时从 PEM 文件加载证书（生产环境推荐）。
@@ -580,26 +821,36 @@ type LogConfig struct {
 }
 
 type MCPConfig struct {
-	Enabled         bool   `yaml:"enabled"`
+	Enabled           bool   `yaml:"enabled"`
-	Host            string `yaml:"host"`
+	Host              string `yaml:"host"`
-	Port            int    `yaml:"port"`
+	Port              int    `yaml:"port"`
-	AuthHeader      string `yaml:"auth_header,omitempty"`       // 鉴权 header 名，留空表示不鉴权
+	AuthHeader        string `yaml:"auth_header,omitempty"`         // 可选的全局服务凭证 header；普通调用优先使用用户 Bearer Token
-	AuthHeaderValue string `yaml:"auth_header_value,omitempty"` // 鉴权 header 值，需与请求中该 header 一致
+	AuthHeaderValue   string `yaml:"auth_header_value,omitempty"`   // 全局服务凭证，仅 allow_global_access=true 时接受
+	AllowGlobalAccess bool   `yaml:"allow_global_access,omitempty"` // 静态服务密钥是否映射为全局服务身份（默认关闭）
 }
 
 type OpenAIConfig struct {
-	Provider       string `yaml:"provider,omitempty" json:"provider,omitempty"` // API 提供商: "openai"(默认) 或 "claude"，claude 时自动桥接为 Anthropic Messages API
+	Provider            string `yaml:"provider,omitempty" json:"provider,omitempty"` // API 提供商: "openai"(默认) 或 "claude"，claude 时自动桥接为 Anthropic Messages API
-	APIKey         string `yaml:"api_key" json:"api_key"`
+	APIKey              string `yaml:"api_key" json:"api_key"`
-	BaseURL        string `yaml:"base_url" json:"base_url"`
+	BaseURL             string `yaml:"base_url" json:"base_url"`
-	Model          string `yaml:"model" json:"model"`
+	Model               string `yaml:"model" json:"model"`
-	MaxTotalTokens int    `yaml:"max_total_tokens,omitempty" json:"max_total_tokens,omitempty"`
+	MaxTotalTokens      int    `yaml:"max_total_tokens,omitempty" json:"max_total_tokens,omitempty"`
+	MaxCompletionTokens int    `yaml:"max_completion_tokens,omitempty" json:"max_completion_tokens,omitempty"`
 	// Reasoning 控制 Eino ChatModel 的 thinking / reasoning_effort / output_config 等（Eino 单/多代理路径生效）。
 	Reasoning OpenAIReasoningConfig `yaml:"reasoning,omitempty" json:"reasoning,omitempty"`
 }
 
+func (c OpenAIConfig) MaxCompletionTokensEffective() int {
+	if c.MaxCompletionTokens > 0 {
+		return c.MaxCompletionTokens
+	}
+	return DefaultMaxCompletionTokens
+}
+
 // OpenAIReasoningConfig 全局默认与网关 profile（对话页可通过 ChatRequest.reasoning 覆盖，受 AllowClientReasoning 约束）。
 type OpenAIReasoningConfig struct {
-	// Mode: auto（默认）| on | off | default（与 auto 相同）。off 时不向模型附加推理扩展字段。
+	// Mode: auto（默认）| on | off | default（与 auto 相同）。
+	// off 在 OpenAI/Claude profile 下省略推理字段；DeepSeek profile 下发送 thinking.type=disabled（其默认开启思考）。
 	Mode string `yaml:"mode,omitempty" json:"mode,omitempty"`
 	// Effort: low | medium | high | max | xhigh；max/xhigh 为不同网关最高档命名，原样下发、不互转。空表示不单独指定强度。
 	Effort string `yaml:"effort,omitempty" json:"effort,omitempty"`
@@ -608,6 +859,7 @@ type OpenAIReasoningConfig struct {
 	// Profile: auto | deepseek_compat | openai_compat | output_config_effort
 	Profile string `yaml:"profile,omitempty" json:"profile,omitempty"`
 	// ExtraRequestFields 合并进 Chat Completions 根 JSON（管理员用；与自动字段同名时后者覆盖）。
+	// Mode=off 时会移除其中的推理控制字段，但保留其他扩展字段；DeepSeek profile 随后补充显式关闭开关。
 	ExtraRequestFields map[string]interface{} `yaml:"extra_request_fields,omitempty" json:"extra_request_fields,omitempty"`
 }
 
@@ -638,12 +890,16 @@ func (c OpenAIReasoningConfig) AllowClientReasoningEffective() bool {
 }
 
 type FofaConfig struct {
-	// Email 为 FOFA 账号邮箱；APIKey 为 FOFA API Key（建议使用只读权限的 Key）
+	// APIKey 为 FOFA API Key（建议使用只读权限的 Key）
-	Email   string `yaml:"email,omitempty" json:"email,omitempty"`
 	APIKey  string `yaml:"api_key,omitempty" json:"api_key,omitempty"`
 	BaseURL string `yaml:"base_url,omitempty" json:"base_url,omitempty"` // 默认 https://fofa.info/api/v1/search/all
 }
 
+type SpaceSearchConfig struct {
+	APIKey  string `yaml:"api_key,omitempty" json:"api_key,omitempty"`
+	BaseURL string `yaml:"base_url,omitempty" json:"base_url,omitempty"`
+}
+
 type SecurityConfig struct {
 	Tools               []ToolConfig `yaml:"tools,omitempty"`                 // 向后兼容：支持在主配置文件中定义工具
 	ToolsDir            string       `yaml:"tools_dir,omitempty"`             // 工具配置文件目录（新方式）
@@ -656,8 +912,13 @@ type DatabaseConfig struct {
 }
 
 type AgentConfig struct {
-	MaxIterations      int `yaml:"max_iterations" json:"max_iterations"`
+	MaxIterations                      int `yaml:"max_iterations" json:"max_iterations"`
-	ToolTimeoutMinutes int `yaml:"tool_timeout_minutes" json:"tool_timeout_minutes"` // 单次工具执行最大时长（分钟），超时自动终止，防止长时间挂起；0 表示不限制（不推荐）
+	ToolTimeoutMinutes                 int `yaml:"tool_timeout_minutes" json:"tool_timeout_minutes"`                                     // 单次工具执行最大时长（分钟），超时自动终止，防止长时间挂起；0 表示不限制（不推荐）
+	ToolWaitTimeoutSeconds             int `yaml:"tool_wait_timeout_seconds" json:"tool_wait_timeout_seconds"`                           // 工具本轮等待秒数；到时返回 execution_id，worker 继续后台执行；0 表示等到完成
+	ExternalMCPMaxConcurrentPerServer  int `yaml:"external_mcp_max_concurrent_per_server" json:"external_mcp_max_concurrent_per_server"` // 单个外部 MCP server 同时运行的工具数；0 表示默认 2
+	ExternalMCPMaxConcurrentTotal      int `yaml:"external_mcp_max_concurrent_total" json:"external_mcp_max_concurrent_total"`           // 所有外部 MCP 工具全局并发；0 表示默认 16
+	ExternalMCPCircuitFailureThreshold int `yaml:"external_mcp_circuit_failure_threshold" json:"external_mcp_circuit_failure_threshold"` // 单个 MCP server 连续失败多少次后打开熔断；0 表示默认 3；负数关闭
+	ExternalMCPCircuitCooldownSeconds  int `yaml:"external_mcp_circuit_cooldown_seconds" json:"external_mcp_circuit_cooldown_seconds"`   // 熔断后冷却秒数；0 表示默认 60
 	// ShellNoOutputTimeoutSeconds execute/exec 无任何 stdout/stderr 时的空闲终止秒数（通用防挂死，不维护命令黑名单）；0=默认 300（5 分钟）；-1=关闭。
 	ShellNoOutputTimeoutSeconds int `yaml:"shell_no_output_timeout_seconds" json:"shell_no_output_timeout_seconds"`
 	// WorkspaceRootDir 会话工作目录根路径（curl/wget 下载、read_file/glob/grep 本地分析）；空=tmp/workspace，其下按 projects/{id} 或 conversations/{id} 隔离。
@@ -724,6 +985,9 @@ func (h HitlConfig) AuditModelEffective(main OpenAIConfig) OpenAIConfig {
 	if am.MaxTotalTokens > 0 {
 		out.MaxTotalTokens = am.MaxTotalTokens
 	}
+	if am.MaxCompletionTokens > 0 {
+		out.MaxCompletionTokens = am.MaxCompletionTokens
+	}
 	return out
 }
 
@@ -800,11 +1064,7 @@ func normalizeHitlModeForPrompt(mode string) string {
 }
 
 type AuthConfig struct {
-	Password                    string `yaml:"password" json:"password"`
+	SessionDurationHours int `yaml:"session_duration_hours" json:"session_duration_hours"`
-	SessionDurationHours        int    `yaml:"session_duration_hours" json:"session_duration_hours"`
-	GeneratedPassword           string `yaml:"-" json:"-"`
-	GeneratedPasswordPersisted  bool   `yaml:"-" json:"-"`
-	GeneratedPasswordPersistErr string `yaml:"-" json:"-"`
 }
 
 // MonitorConfig MCP 状态监控（tool_executions）保留策略。
@@ -964,23 +1224,9 @@ func Load(path string) (*Config, error) {
 	if cfg.Audit.MaxDetailBytes <= 0 {
 		cfg.Audit.MaxDetailBytes = 8192
 	}
-	if strings.TrimSpace(cfg.Auth.Password) == "" {
+	if err := validateModelOutputLimits(cfg.OpenAI, cfg.MultiAgent.EinoMiddleware); err != nil {
-		password, err := generateStrongPassword(24)
+		return nil, err
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("生成默认密码失败: %w", err)
-		}
-
-		cfg.Auth.Password = password
-		cfg.Auth.GeneratedPassword = password
-
-		if err := PersistAuthPassword(path, password); err != nil {
-			cfg.Auth.GeneratedPasswordPersisted = false
-			cfg.Auth.GeneratedPasswordPersistErr = err.Error()
-		} else {
-			cfg.Auth.GeneratedPasswordPersisted = true
-		}
 	}
-
 	// 如果配置了工具目录，从目录加载工具配置
 	if cfg.Security.ToolsDir != "" {
 		inlineTools := append([]ToolConfig(nil), cfg.Security.Tools...)
@@ -1036,170 +1282,83 @@ func Load(path string) (*Config, error) {
 	if err := ValidateWecomConfig(cfg.Robots.Wecom); err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
+	if err := ValidateRobotsAuthorization(cfg.Robots); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
 
 	return &cfg, nil
 }
 
-func generateStrongPassword(length int) (string, error) {
+func validateModelOutputLimits(openAI OpenAIConfig, mw MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig) error {
-	if length <= 0 {
+	if openAI.MaxCompletionTokens < 0 {
-		length = 24
+		return fmt.Errorf("openai.max_completion_tokens 必须为正数")
 	}
-
+	if mw.MaxToolArgumentsBytes < 0 {
-	bytesLen := length
+		return fmt.Errorf("multi_agent.eino_middleware.max_tool_arguments_bytes 必须为正数")
-	randomBytes := make([]byte, bytesLen)
-	if _, err := rand.Read(randomBytes); err != nil {
-		return "", err
 	}
-
+	if mw.MaxShellCommandBytes < 0 {
-	password := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(randomBytes)
+		return fmt.Errorf("multi_agent.eino_middleware.max_shell_command_bytes 必须为正数")
-	if len(password) > length {
-		password = password[:length]
 	}
-	return password, nil
+	if mw.ModelOutputRepairMaxAttempts < 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("multi_agent.eino_middleware.model_output_repair_max_attempts 必须为正数")
+	}
+	if mw.MaxShellCommandBytesEffective() > mw.MaxToolArgumentsBytesEffective() {
+		return fmt.Errorf("multi_agent.eino_middleware.max_shell_command_bytes 不能大于 max_tool_arguments_bytes")
+	}
+	return nil
 }
 
-func PersistAuthPassword(path, password string) error {
+func EnsureLocalConfig(path string) (EnsureLocalConfigResult, error) {
-	data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	path = strings.TrimSpace(path)
-	if err != nil {
+	if path == "" {
-		return err
+		path = "config.yaml"
 	}
 
-	lines := strings.Split(string(data), "\n")
+	if _, err := os.Stat(path); err == nil {
-	inAuthBlock := false
+		return EnsureLocalConfigResult{}, nil
-	authIndent := -1
+	} else if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		return EnsureLocalConfigResult{}, fmt.Errorf("检查配置文件失败: %w", err)
+	}
 
-	for i, line := range lines {
+	examplePath := filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(path), "config.example.yaml")
-		trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(line)
+	if _, err := os.Stat(examplePath); err != nil {
-		if !inAuthBlock {
+		if os.IsNotExist(err) {
-			if strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, "auth:") {
+			if alt := "config.example.yaml"; examplePath != alt {
-				inAuthBlock = true
+				if _, altErr := os.Stat(alt); altErr == nil {
-				authIndent = len(line) - len(strings.TrimLeft(line, " "))
+					examplePath = alt
-			}
+				} else {
-			continue
+					return EnsureLocalConfigResult{}, fmt.Errorf("配置文件 %s 不存在，且未找到模板 %s", path, examplePath)
-		}
-
-		if trimmed == "" || strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, "#") {
-			continue
-		}
-
-		leadingSpaces := len(line) - len(strings.TrimLeft(line, " "))
-		if leadingSpaces <= authIndent {
-			// 离开 auth 块
-			inAuthBlock = false
-			authIndent = -1
-			// 继续寻找其它 auth 块（理论上没有）
-			if strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, "auth:") {
-				inAuthBlock = true
-				authIndent = leadingSpaces
-			}
-			continue
-		}
-
-		if strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(line), "password:") {
-			prefix := line[:len(line)-len(strings.TrimLeft(line, " "))]
-			comment := ""
-			if idx := yamlLineCommentIndex(line); idx >= 0 {
-				comment = strings.TrimRight(line[idx:], " ")
-			}
-
-			newLine := fmt.Sprintf("%spassword: %s", prefix, quoteYAMLString(password))
-			if comment != "" {
-				if !strings.HasPrefix(comment, " ") {
-					newLine += " "
 				}
-				newLine += comment
+			} else {
+				return EnsureLocalConfigResult{}, fmt.Errorf("配置文件 %s 不存在，且未找到模板 %s", path, examplePath)
 			}
-			lines[i] = newLine
-			break
-		}
-	}
-
-	return os.WriteFile(path, []byte(strings.Join(lines, "\n")), 0644)
-}
-
-func quoteYAMLString(value string) string {
-	node := yaml.Node{
-		Kind:  yaml.ScalarNode,
-		Tag:   "!!str",
-		Style: yaml.DoubleQuotedStyle,
-		Value: value,
-	}
-	data, err := yaml.Marshal(&node)
-	if err != nil {
-		return strconv.Quote(value)
-	}
-	return strings.TrimSuffix(string(data), "\n")
-}
-
-func yamlLineCommentIndex(line string) int {
-	inSingleQuote := false
-	inDoubleQuote := false
-	escaped := false
-
-	for i, r := range line {
-		if inDoubleQuote {
-			if escaped {
-				escaped = false
-				continue
-			}
-			if r == '\\' {
-				escaped = true
-				continue
-			}
-			if r == '"' {
-				inDoubleQuote = false
-			}
-			continue
-		}
-		if inSingleQuote {
-			if r == '\'' {
-				inSingleQuote = false
-			}
-			continue
-		}
-
-		switch r {
-		case '"':
-			inDoubleQuote = true
-		case '\'':
-			inSingleQuote = true
-		case '#':
-			if i == 0 || isYAMLWhitespace(line[i-1]) {
-				return i
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	return -1
-}
-
-func isYAMLWhitespace(b byte) bool {
-	return b == ' ' || b == '\t'
-}
-
-func PrintGeneratedPasswordWarning(password string, persisted bool, persistErr string) {
-	if strings.TrimSpace(password) == "" {
-		return
-	}
-
-	if persisted {
-		fmt.Println("[CyberStrikeAI] ✅ 已为您自动生成并写入 Web 登录密码。")
-	} else {
-		if persistErr != "" {
-			fmt.Printf("[CyberStrikeAI] ⚠️ 无法自动写入配置文件中的密码: %s\n", persistErr)
 		} else {
-			fmt.Println("[CyberStrikeAI] ⚠️ 无法自动写入配置文件中的密码。")
+			return EnsureLocalConfigResult{}, fmt.Errorf("检查配置模板失败: %w", err)
 		}
-		fmt.Println("请手动将以下随机密码写入 config.yaml 的 auth.password：")
 	}
 
-	fmt.Println("----------------------------------------------------------------")
+	data, err := os.ReadFile(examplePath)
-	fmt.Println("CyberStrikeAI Auto-Generated Web Password")
+	if err != nil {
-	fmt.Printf("Password: %s\n", password)
+		return EnsureLocalConfigResult{}, fmt.Errorf("读取配置模板失败: %w", err)
-	fmt.Println("WARNING: Anyone with this password can fully control CyberStrikeAI.")
+	}
-	fmt.Println("Please store it securely and change it in config.yaml as soon as possible.")
+
-	fmt.Println("警告：持有此密码的人将拥有对 CyberStrikeAI 的完全控制权限。")
+	if dir := filepath.Dir(path); dir != "." && dir != "" {
-	fmt.Println("请妥善保管，并尽快在 config.yaml 中修改 auth.password！")
+		if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0700); err != nil {
-	fmt.Println("----------------------------------------------------------------")
+			return EnsureLocalConfigResult{}, fmt.Errorf("创建配置目录失败: %w", err)
+		}
+	}
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, data, fs.FileMode(0600)); err != nil {
+		return EnsureLocalConfigResult{}, fmt.Errorf("创建配置文件失败: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	return EnsureLocalConfigResult{
+		Created:     true,
+		ExamplePath: examplePath,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+func PrintBootstrapAdminPassword(password string) {
+	termout.PrintBootstrapAdminCredentials(password)
 }
 
 // generateRandomToken 生成用于 MCP 鉴权的随机字符串（64 位十六进制）
@@ -1268,9 +1427,10 @@ func persistMCPAuth(path string, mcp *MCPConfig) error {
 	return os.WriteFile(path, []byte(strings.Join(lines, "\n")), 0644)
 }
 
-// EnsureMCPAuth 在 MCP 启用且 auth_header_value 为空时，自动生成随机密钥并写回配置
+// EnsureMCPAuth only provisions the privileged static service credential when
+// global service access was explicitly enabled.
 func EnsureMCPAuth(path string, cfg *Config) error {
-	if !cfg.MCP.Enabled || strings.TrimSpace(cfg.MCP.AuthHeaderValue) != "" {
+	if !cfg.MCP.Enabled || !cfg.MCP.AllowGlobalAccess || strings.TrimSpace(cfg.MCP.AuthHeaderValue) != "" {
 		return nil
 	}
 	token, err := generateRandomToken()
@@ -1294,8 +1454,9 @@ func PrintMCPConfigJSON(mcp MCPConfig) {
 		hostForURL = "localhost"
 	}
 	url := fmt.Sprintf("http://%s:%d/mcp", hostForURL, mcp.Port)
-	headers := map[string]string{}
+	headers := map[string]string{"Authorization": "Bearer <USER_SESSION_TOKEN>"}
-	if mcp.AuthHeader != "" {
+	if mcp.AllowGlobalAccess && mcp.AuthHeader != "" {
+		delete(headers, "Authorization")
 		headers[mcp.AuthHeader] = mcp.AuthHeaderValue
 	}
 	serverEntry := map[string]interface{}{
@@ -1555,19 +1716,25 @@ func Default() *Config {
 			Output: "stdout",
 		},
 		MCP: MCPConfig{
-			Enabled: true,
+			Enabled: false,
-			Host:    "0.0.0.0",
+			Host:    "127.0.0.1",
 			Port:    8081,
 		},
 		OpenAI: OpenAIConfig{
-			BaseURL:        "https://api.openai.com/v1",
+			BaseURL:             "https://api.openai.com/v1",
-			Model:          "gpt-4",
+			Model:               "gpt-4",
-			MaxTotalTokens: 120000,
+			MaxTotalTokens:      120000,
+			MaxCompletionTokens: DefaultMaxCompletionTokens,
 		},
 		Agent: AgentConfig{
-			MaxIterations:               30,  // 默认最大迭代次数
+			MaxIterations:                      30,  // 默认最大迭代次数
-			ToolTimeoutMinutes:          10,  // 单次工具执行默认最多 10 分钟，避免异常长时间占用
+			ToolTimeoutMinutes:                 10,  // 单次工具执行默认最多 10 分钟，避免异常长时间占用
-			ShellNoOutputTimeoutSeconds: 300, // execute/exec 无新输出空闲终止（秒）；-1 关闭
+			ToolWaitTimeoutSeconds:             60,  // 外部 MCP 工具单轮最多等待 60 秒，超时后返回 execution_id 可继续等待
+			ExternalMCPMaxConcurrentPerServer:  2,   // 单个外部 MCP server 默认最多 2 个工具同时执行
+			ExternalMCPMaxConcurrentTotal:      16,  // 外部 MCP 工具全局默认最多 16 个同时执行
+			ExternalMCPCircuitFailureThreshold: 3,   // 单个 server 连续 3 次失败后临时熔断
+			ExternalMCPCircuitCooldownSeconds:  60,  // 熔断默认冷却 60 秒
+			ShellNoOutputTimeoutSeconds:        300, // execute/exec 无新输出空闲终止（秒）；-1 关闭
 		},
 		Security: SecurityConfig{
 			Tools:    []ToolConfig{}, // 工具配置应该从 config.yaml 或 tools/ 目录加载
@@ -1789,7 +1956,7 @@ type RoleConfig struct {
 	Icon            string   `yaml:"icon,omitempty" json:"icon,omitempty"`                         // 角色图标（可选）
 	Tools           []string `yaml:"tools,omitempty" json:"tools,omitempty"`                       // 关联的工具列表（toolKey格式，如 "toolName" 或 "mcpName::toolName"）
 	MCPs            []string `yaml:"mcps,omitempty" json:"mcps,omitempty"`                         // 向后兼容：关联的MCP服务器列表（已废弃，使用tools替代）
-	WorkflowID      string   `yaml:"workflow_id,omitempty" json:"workflow_id,omitempty"`           // 可选：绑定图编排流程 ID
+	WorkflowID      string   `yaml:"workflow_id,omitempty" json:"workflow_id,omitempty"`           // 可选：绑定工作流 ID
 	WorkflowVersion string   `yaml:"workflow_version,omitempty" json:"workflow_version,omitempty"` // latest 或具体版本号；空等同 latest
 	WorkflowPolicy  string   `yaml:"workflow_policy,omitempty" json:"workflow_policy,omitempty"`   // auto | off；空且 workflow_id 非空时按 auto
 	Enabled         bool     `yaml:"enabled" json:"enabled"`                                       // 是否启用

internal/config/config_test.go

@@ -7,68 +7,71 @@ import (
 	"testing"
 )
 
-func TestPersistAuthPasswordQuotesYAMLSpecialCharacters(t *testing.T) {
+func TestEnsureLocalConfigCreatesFromExample(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	examplePath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.example.yaml")
+	configPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yaml")
+
+	example := []byte(`auth:
+  session_duration_hours: 12
+server:
+  host: 127.0.0.1
+  port: 8080
+`)
+	if err := os.WriteFile(examplePath, example, 0644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write example: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	result, err := EnsureLocalConfig(configPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("EnsureLocalConfig: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !result.Created {
+		t.Fatal("Created = false, want true")
+	}
+	if result.ExamplePath != examplePath {
+		t.Fatalf("ExamplePath = %q, want %q", result.ExamplePath, examplePath)
+	}
+
+	cfg, err := Load(configPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Load generated config: %v", err)
+	}
+	if cfg.Auth.SessionDurationHours != 12 {
+		t.Fatalf("SessionDurationHours = %d, want 12", cfg.Auth.SessionDurationHours)
+	}
+
+	second, err := EnsureLocalConfig(configPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("EnsureLocalConfig existing: %v", err)
+	}
+	if second.Created {
+		t.Fatal("Created = true for existing config, want false")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadIgnoresLegacyAuthPasswordField(t *testing.T) {
 	dir := t.TempDir()
 	path := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yaml")
 	initial := strings.Join([]string{
-		"server:",
-		"  host: 0.0.0.0",
 		"auth:",
-		"  password: old-password # Web 登录密码",
+		`  password: "legacy-password"`,
 		"  session_duration_hours: 12",
-		"log:",
+		"server:",
-		"  level: info",
+		"  host: 127.0.0.1",
+		"  port: 8080",
 		"",
 	}, "\n")
 	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(initial), 0644); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("write config: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	want := `@abc:def # still password`
-	if err := PersistAuthPassword(path, want); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("PersistAuthPassword: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("read config: %v", err)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(string(data), `password: "@abc:def # still password" # Web 登录密码`) {
-		t.Fatalf("password was not safely quoted or comment was not preserved:\n%s", data)
-	}
-
 	cfg, err := Load(path)
 	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Load after PersistAuthPassword: %v", err)
+		t.Fatalf("Load: %v", err)
 	}
-	if cfg.Auth.Password != want {
+	if cfg.Auth.SessionDurationHours != 12 {
-		t.Fatalf("Auth.Password = %q, want %q", cfg.Auth.Password, want)
+		t.Fatalf("SessionDurationHours = %d, want 12", cfg.Auth.SessionDurationHours)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestPersistAuthPasswordDoesNotTreatQuotedHashAsComment(t *testing.T) {
-	dir := t.TempDir()
-	path := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yaml")
-	initial := strings.Join([]string{
-		"auth:",
-		`  password: "old#password"`,
-		"  session_duration_hours: 12",
-		"",
-	}, "\n")
-	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(initial), 0644); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("write config: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	if err := PersistAuthPassword(path, "new-password"); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("PersistAuthPassword: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("read config: %v", err)
-	}
-	if strings.Contains(string(data), "#password") {
-		t.Fatalf("old quoted password fragment was incorrectly preserved as a comment:\n%s", data)
 	}
 }
 
@@ -91,3 +94,79 @@ func TestHitlAuditModelEffectiveFallsBackToMainConfig(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("expected audit model override, got %q", got.Model)
 	}
 }
+
+func TestSummarizationUserIntentLedgerRunesEffective(t *testing.T) {
+	var zero MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig
+	if got := zero.SummarizationUserIntentLedgerMaxRunesEffective(); got != DefaultSummarizationUserIntentLedgerMaxRunes {
+		t.Fatalf("default ledger max runes = %d, want %d", got, DefaultSummarizationUserIntentLedgerMaxRunes)
+	}
+	if got := zero.SummarizationUserIntentLedgerEntryMaxRunesEffective(); got != DefaultSummarizationUserIntentLedgerEntryMaxRunes {
+		t.Fatalf("default ledger entry max runes = %d, want %d", got, DefaultSummarizationUserIntentLedgerEntryMaxRunes)
+	}
+
+	custom := MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig{
+		SummarizationUserIntentLedgerMaxRunes:      12345,
+		SummarizationUserIntentLedgerEntryMaxRunes: 2345,
+	}
+	if got := custom.SummarizationUserIntentLedgerMaxRunesEffective(); got != 12345 {
+		t.Fatalf("custom ledger max runes = %d", got)
+	}
+	if got := custom.SummarizationUserIntentLedgerEntryMaxRunesEffective(); got != 2345 {
+		t.Fatalf("custom ledger entry max runes = %d", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSummarizationOutputReserveTokensEffective(t *testing.T) {
+	var zero MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig
+	if got := zero.SummarizationOutputReserveTokensEffective(); got != DefaultSummarizationOutputReserveTokens {
+		t.Fatalf("default output reserve = %d, want %d", got, DefaultSummarizationOutputReserveTokens)
+	}
+	custom := MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig{SummarizationOutputReserveTokens: 4096}
+	if got := custom.SummarizationOutputReserveTokensEffective(); got != 4096 {
+		t.Fatalf("custom output reserve = %d", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestModelOutputLimitDefaultsAndValidation(t *testing.T) {
+	if got := (OpenAIConfig{}).MaxCompletionTokensEffective(); got != DefaultMaxCompletionTokens {
+		t.Fatalf("max completion default=%d", got)
+	}
+	mw := MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig{}
+	if mw.MaxToolArgumentsBytesEffective() != 65536 || mw.MaxShellCommandBytesEffective() != 65536 || mw.ModelOutputRepairMaxAttemptsEffective() != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected guard defaults: %+v", mw)
+	}
+	if err := validateModelOutputLimits(OpenAIConfig{}, MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig{MaxShellCommandBytes: 100, MaxToolArgumentsBytes: 99}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("shell limit greater than generic limit must fail")
+	}
+	if err := validateModelOutputLimits(OpenAIConfig{MaxCompletionTokens: -1}, MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig{}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("negative completion limit must fail")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLatestUserMessageRunesEffective(t *testing.T) {
+	var zero MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig
+	if got := zero.LatestUserMessageMaxRunesEffective(); got != DefaultLatestUserMessageMaxRunes {
+		t.Fatalf("default latest user max runes = %d, want %d", got, DefaultLatestUserMessageMaxRunes)
+	}
+	if got := zero.LatestUserMessageHeadRunesEffective(); got != DefaultLatestUserMessageHeadRunes {
+		t.Fatalf("default latest user head runes = %d, want %d", got, DefaultLatestUserMessageHeadRunes)
+	}
+	if got := zero.LatestUserMessageTailRunesEffective(); got != DefaultLatestUserMessageTailRunes {
+		t.Fatalf("default latest user tail runes = %d, want %d", got, DefaultLatestUserMessageTailRunes)
+	}
+
+	custom := MultiAgentEinoMiddlewareConfig{
+		LatestUserMessageMaxRunes:  100,
+		LatestUserMessageHeadRunes: 40,
+		LatestUserMessageTailRunes: 60,
+	}
+	if got := custom.LatestUserMessageMaxRunesEffective(); got != 100 {
+		t.Fatalf("custom latest user max runes = %d", got)
+	}
+	if got := custom.LatestUserMessageHeadRunesEffective(); got != 40 {
+		t.Fatalf("custom latest user head runes = %d", got)
+	}
+	if got := custom.LatestUserMessageTailRunesEffective(); got != 60 {
+		t.Fatalf("custom latest user tail runes = %d", got)
+	}
+}

internal/config/robots_validate_test.go

@@ -43,3 +43,27 @@ func TestValidateWecomConfig(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+func TestValidateRobotAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name    string
+		cfg     RobotAuthorizationConfig
+		wantErr bool
+	}{
+		{name: "default user binding", cfg: RobotAuthorizationConfig{}, wantErr: false},
+		{name: "explicit user binding", cfg: RobotAuthorizationConfig{Mode: RobotAuthModeUserBinding}, wantErr: false},
+		{name: "service account", cfg: RobotAuthorizationConfig{Mode: RobotAuthModeServiceAccount, ServiceUserID: "svc-1", AllowedExternalUsers: []string{"t:x|u:y"}}, wantErr: false},
+		{name: "missing service user", cfg: RobotAuthorizationConfig{Mode: RobotAuthModeServiceAccount, AllowedExternalUsers: []string{"t:x|u:y"}}, wantErr: true},
+		{name: "admin allowed with exact sender", cfg: RobotAuthorizationConfig{Mode: RobotAuthModeServiceAccount, ServiceUserID: "admin", AllowedExternalUsers: []string{"t:x|u:y"}}, wantErr: false},
+		{name: "allowlist required", cfg: RobotAuthorizationConfig{Mode: RobotAuthModeServiceAccount, ServiceUserID: "svc-1"}, wantErr: true},
+		{name: "wildcard forbidden", cfg: RobotAuthorizationConfig{Mode: RobotAuthModeServiceAccount, ServiceUserID: "svc-1", AllowedExternalUsers: []string{"*"}}, wantErr: true},
+		{name: "unknown mode", cfg: RobotAuthorizationConfig{Mode: "open"}, wantErr: true},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			if err := ValidateRobotAuthorization(tt.cfg, "robots.lark"); (err != nil) != tt.wantErr {
+				t.Fatalf("ValidateRobotAuthorization() error=%v wantErr=%v", err, tt.wantErr)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

internal/config/server_https_bootstrap.go

@@ -44,3 +44,17 @@ func ApplyDevHTTPSBootstrap(cfg *Config) {
 	}
 	cfg.Server.TLSAutoSelfSign = true
 }
+
+// ApplyPlainHTTPBootstrap 供 --http / 一键脚本使用：强制主站使用明文 HTTP。
+// 它会覆盖配置文件中的 TLS 开关、自签证书以及证书路径，避免 --http 仍被配置中的 HTTPS 选项重新启用。
+func ApplyPlainHTTPBootstrap(cfg *Config) {
+	if cfg == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	cfg.Server.TLSEnabled = false
+	cfg.Server.TLSAutoSelfSign = false
+	cfg.Server.TLSCertPath = ""
+	cfg.Server.TLSKeyPath = ""
+	disabled := false
+	cfg.Server.TLSHTTPRedirect = &disabled
+}

internal/config/server_https_bootstrap_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+package config
+
+import "testing"
+
+func TestApplyPlainHTTPBootstrapDisablesConfiguredTLS(t *testing.T) {
+	enabled := true
+	cfg := &Config{
+		Server: ServerConfig{
+			TLSEnabled:      true,
+			TLSAutoSelfSign: true,
+			TLSCertPath:     "/tmp/server.crt",
+			TLSKeyPath:      "/tmp/server.key",
+			TLSHTTPRedirect: &enabled,
+		},
+	}
+
+	ApplyPlainHTTPBootstrap(cfg)
+
+	if MainWebUIUsesHTTPS(&cfg.Server) {
+		t.Fatal("expected --http bootstrap to disable main web UI HTTPS")
+	}
+	if ServerHTTPRedirectEnabled(&cfg.Server) {
+		t.Fatal("expected --http bootstrap to disable HTTP to HTTPS redirect")
+	}
+	if cfg.Server.TLSCertPath != "" || cfg.Server.TLSKeyPath != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("expected TLS cert paths to be cleared, got cert=%q key=%q", cfg.Server.TLSCertPath, cfg.Server.TLSKeyPath)
+	}
+	if cfg.Server.TLSHTTPRedirect == nil || *cfg.Server.TLSHTTPRedirect {
+		t.Fatal("expected TLSHTTPRedirect to be explicitly disabled")
+	}
+}

internal/database/asset_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,444 @@
+package database
+
+import (
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"go.uber.org/zap"
+)
+
+func TestAssetURLNormalizationAndValidation(t *testing.T) {
+	db, err := NewDB(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "asset-validation.db"), zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+
+	asset := &Asset{Host: "https://例子.测试/path", Tags: []string{" prod ", "prod"}}
+	result, err := db.UpsertAssets([]*Asset{asset}, "")
+	if err != nil || result.Created != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("URL asset was not created: result=%#v err=%v", result, err)
+	}
+	if asset.Domain != "xn--fsqu00a.xn--0zwm56d" || asset.Protocol != "https" || asset.Port != 443 {
+		t.Fatalf("URL fields were not normalized: %#v", asset)
+	}
+	if len(asset.Tags) != 1 || asset.Tags[0] != "prod" {
+		t.Fatalf("tags were not normalized: %#v", asset.Tags)
+	}
+
+	invalid := []*Asset{
+		{IP: "999.1.1.1", Status: "active"},
+		{Domain: "bad_domain.example", Status: "active"},
+		{Domain: "example.com", Port: 70000, Status: "active"},
+		{Domain: "example.com", Protocol: "HTTP 1.1", Status: "active"},
+		{Domain: "example.com", Status: "deleted"},
+	}
+	for _, candidate := range invalid {
+		if _, err := db.UpsertAssets([]*Asset{candidate}, ""); err == nil {
+			t.Fatalf("invalid asset unexpectedly accepted: %#v", candidate)
+		}
+	}
+
+	for _, host := range []string{"123", "not a formal target", "https://", "https://user:password@example.com"} {
+		result, err := db.UpsertAssets([]*Asset{{Host: host}}, "")
+		if err != nil || result.Created != 1 {
+			t.Fatalf("opaque asset address %q was not accepted: result=%#v err=%v", host, result, err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAssetValidationRejectsOversizedTags(t *testing.T) {
+	db, err := NewDB(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "asset-tag-validation.db"), zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	_, err = db.UpsertAssets([]*Asset{{Domain: "example.com", Tags: []string{strings.Repeat("x", 65)}}}, "")
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "标签") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected tag validation error, got %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestFofaAssetIgnoresInvalidOptionalStructuredFields(t *testing.T) {
+	db, err := NewDB(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "fofa-asset-validation.db"), zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+
+	asset := &Asset{
+		Host:     "https://203.0.113.59:8443",
+		IP:       "203.0.113.59",
+		Domain:   "provider_specific_invalid_domain_59",
+		Port:     8443,
+		Protocol: "https",
+		Source:   "fofa",
+	}
+	result, err := db.UpsertAssets([]*Asset{asset}, "")
+	if err != nil || result.Created != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("FOFA asset with dirty optional domain was not created: result=%#v err=%v", result, err)
+	}
+	if asset.Domain != "" || asset.IP != "203.0.113.59" {
+		t.Fatalf("FOFA structured fields were not sanitized: %#v", asset)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAssetUpsertDeduplicatesAndUpdates(t *testing.T) {
+	db, err := NewDB(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "assets.db"), zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+
+	first := &Asset{Host: "https://example.com", Domain: "Example.COM", Port: 443, Protocol: "HTTPS", Title: "Old", Source: "fofa"}
+	result, err := db.UpsertAssets([]*Asset{first}, "user-a")
+	if err != nil || result.Created != 1 || result.Updated != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("first upsert = %#v, %v", result, err)
+	}
+	second := &Asset{Domain: "example.com", Port: 443, Protocol: "https", Title: "New", Server: "nginx", Source: "fofa"}
+	result, err = db.UpsertAssets([]*Asset{second}, "user-a")
+	if err != nil || result.Created != 0 || result.Updated != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("second upsert = %#v, %v", result, err)
+	}
+	assets, total, err := db.ListAssets(20, 0, AssetListFilter{}, RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll})
+	if err != nil || total != 1 || len(assets) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("list assets total=%d len=%d err=%v", total, len(assets), err)
+	}
+	if assets[0].Title != "New" || assets[0].Server != "nginx" || assets[0].Protocol != "https" {
+		t.Fatalf("asset not refreshed: %#v", assets[0])
+	}
+	stats, err := db.GetAssetStats(RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll})
+	if err != nil || stats["total"] != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("stats=%#v err=%v", stats, err)
+	}
+	coverage, ok := stats["coverage"].(map[string]interface{})
+	if !ok || coverage["never_scanned"] != 1 || coverage["rate"] != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("coverage=%#v", stats["coverage"])
+	}
+	assetTrend, ok := stats["asset_trend"].([]map[string]interface{})
+	if !ok || len(assetTrend) != 30 {
+		t.Fatalf("asset trend=%#v", stats["asset_trend"])
+	}
+	riskTrend, ok := stats["risk_trend"].([]map[string]interface{})
+	if !ok || len(riskTrend) != 30 {
+		t.Fatalf("risk trend=%#v", stats["risk_trend"])
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAssetAccessFiltersOwners(t *testing.T) {
+	db, err := NewDB(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "assets-access.db"), zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	now := time.Now()
+	if _, err := db.Exec(`INSERT INTO rbac_users (id,username,display_name,password_hash,enabled,is_builtin,created_at,updated_at) VALUES ('user-a','user-a','User A','hash',1,0,?,?)`, now, now); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.UpsertAssets([]*Asset{{IP: "10.0.0.1", Port: 80, Protocol: "http"}}, "user-a"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	_, total, err := db.ListAssets(20, 0, AssetListFilter{}, RBACListAccess{UserID: "user-b", Scope: RBACScopeAssigned})
+	if err != nil || total != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected cross-user assets: total=%d err=%v", total, err)
+	}
+	_, total, err = db.ListAssets(20, 0, AssetListFilter{}, RBACListAccess{UserID: "user-a", Scope: RBACScopeOwn})
+	if err != nil || total != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("owner cannot list asset: total=%d err=%v", total, err)
+	}
+	assets, _, err := db.ListAssets(1, 0, AssetListFilter{}, RBACListAccess{UserID: "user-a", Scope: RBACScopeAssigned})
+	if err != nil || len(assets) != 1 || !db.UserCanAccessResource("user-a", RBACScopeAssigned, "asset", assets[0].ID) {
+		t.Fatalf("creator assignment missing: assets=%d err=%v", len(assets), err)
+	}
+	options, err := db.ListAssignableRBACResources("asset", "10.0.0.1", 10)
+	if err != nil || len(options) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("asset resource picker: options=%#v err=%v", options, err)
+	}
+	project, err := db.CreateProject(&Project{Name: "Alpha", Status: "active"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.SetResourceOwner("project", project.ID, "user-b"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	asset := assets[0]
+	asset.ProjectID = project.ID
+	if err := db.UpdateAsset(asset.ID, asset, RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	projectAssets, total, err := db.ListAssets(20, 0, AssetListFilter{ProjectID: project.ID}, RBACListAccess{UserID: "user-b", Scope: RBACScopeOwn})
+	if err != nil || total != 1 || len(projectAssets) != 1 || projectAssets[0].ProjectName != "Alpha" {
+		t.Fatalf("project-bound asset access failed: total=%d assets=%#v err=%v", total, projectAssets, err)
+	}
+	if !db.UserCanAccessResource("user-b", RBACScopeOwn, "asset", asset.ID) {
+		t.Fatal("project owner cannot access bound asset")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestUpdateAssetsProjectIsAtomicAndScoped(t *testing.T) {
+	db, err := NewDB(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "asset-batch-project.db"), zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+
+	project, err := db.CreateProject(&Project{Name: "Batch Project", Status: "active"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.UpsertAssets([]*Asset{
+		{IP: "192.0.2.1", Port: 80, Protocol: "http"},
+		{IP: "192.0.2.2", Port: 443, Protocol: "https"},
+	}, "owner-a"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	assets, _, err := db.ListAssets(10, 0, AssetListFilter{}, RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll})
+	if err != nil || len(assets) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("list assets: len=%d err=%v", len(assets), err)
+	}
+	ids := []string{assets[0].ID, assets[1].ID}
+	updated, err := db.UpdateAssetsProject(ids, project.ID, RBACListAccess{UserID: "owner-a", Scope: RBACScopeOwn})
+	if err != nil || updated != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("batch bind: updated=%d err=%v", updated, err)
+	}
+	for _, id := range ids {
+		asset, err := db.GetAsset(id, RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll})
+		if err != nil || asset.ProjectID != project.ID {
+			t.Fatalf("asset %s was not bound: asset=%#v err=%v", id, asset, err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if _, err := db.UpdateAssetsProject([]string{ids[0], "missing"}, "", RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("partial batch update unexpectedly succeeded")
+	}
+	asset, err := db.GetAsset(ids[0], RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll})
+	if err != nil || asset.ProjectID != project.ID {
+		t.Fatalf("failed batch changed an asset: asset=%#v err=%v", asset, err)
+	}
+
+	updated, err = db.UpdateAssetsProject(ids, "", RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll})
+	if err != nil || updated != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("batch unbind: updated=%d err=%v", updated, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAssetAdvancedFiltersAndBulkMetadata(t *testing.T) {
+	db, err := NewDB(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "asset-advanced.db"), zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+
+	project, err := db.CreateProject(&Project{Name: "Production", Status: "active"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	input := []*Asset{
+		{ProjectID: project.ID, Domain: "critical.example.com", Port: 443, Protocol: "https", Country: "CN", ResponsiblePerson: "Alice", Department: "Security", BusinessSystem: "Portal", Environment: "production", Criticality: "critical", Tags: []string{"internet"}},
+		{ProjectID: project.ID, Domain: "dev.example.com", Port: 8080, Protocol: "http", Country: "US", Environment: "development", Criticality: "low"},
+	}
+	if result, err := db.UpsertAssets(input, "", true); err != nil || result.Created != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("create assets: result=%#v err=%v", result, err)
+	}
+	conversation, err := db.CreateConversation("critical scan", ConversationCreateMeta{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.MarkAssetScanned(input[0].ID, conversation.ID, "", "", RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.CreateVulnerability(&Vulnerability{ConversationID: conversation.ID, Title: "critical finding", Severity: "critical", Target: input[0].Domain}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	minVulns := 1
+	items, total, err := db.ListAssets(20, 0, AssetListFilter{
+		Status: "active", RiskLevel: "critical", MinVulnerabilities: &minVulns,
+		Country: "cn", Environment: "production", Criticality: "critical",
+		SortBy: "vulnerability_count", SortOrder: "desc",
+	}, RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll})
+	if err != nil || total != 1 || len(items) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("advanced query: total=%d items=%#v err=%v", total, items, err)
+	}
+	if items[0].ResponsiblePerson != "Alice" || items[0].BusinessSystem != "Portal" || items[0].VulnerabilityCount != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("metadata did not round-trip: %#v", items[0])
+	}
+
+	status := "inactive"
+	owner := "Bob"
+	environment := "staging"
+	updated, err := db.UpdateAssetsBulk([]string{input[0].ID, input[1].ID}, AssetBulkPatch{
+		Status: &status, ResponsiblePerson: &owner, Environment: &environment,
+		AddTags: []string{"review"}, RemoveTags: []string{"internet"},
+	}, RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll})
+	if err != nil || updated != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("bulk update: updated=%d err=%v", updated, err)
+	}
+	for _, id := range []string{input[0].ID, input[1].ID} {
+		item, err := db.GetAsset(id, RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll})
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if item.Status != "inactive" || item.ResponsiblePerson != "Bob" || item.Environment != "staging" || len(item.Tags) != 1 || item.Tags[0] != "review" {
+			t.Fatalf("unexpected bulk metadata: %#v", item)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestListAssetsForOperationAndBatchDelete(t *testing.T) {
+	db, err := NewDB(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "asset-selection.db"), zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	for i := 1; i <= 3; i++ {
+		if _, err := db.UpsertAssets([]*Asset{{IP: "198.51.100." + strconv.Itoa(i), Port: 443, Protocol: "https", Tags: []string{"selected"}}}, "", true); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	items, total, err := db.ListAssetsForOperation(10, AssetListFilter{Tag: "selected"}, RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll})
+	if err != nil || total != 3 || len(items) != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("selection: total=%d len=%d err=%v", total, len(items), err)
+	}
+	ids := make([]string, 0, len(items))
+	for _, item := range items {
+		ids = append(ids, item.ID)
+	}
+	deleted, err := db.DeleteAssets(ids, RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll})
+	if err != nil || deleted != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("batch delete: deleted=%d err=%v", deleted, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMergeAssetsIsAtomic(t *testing.T) {
+	db, err := NewDB(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "asset-merge.db"), zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	input := []*Asset{
+		{Domain: "merge.example.com", Port: 80, Protocol: "http", Title: "Primary", Tags: []string{"one"}},
+		{Domain: "merge.example.com", Port: 443, Protocol: "https", ResponsiblePerson: "Alice", Tags: []string{"two"}},
+	}
+	if _, err := db.UpsertAssets(input, "", true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	primary, err := db.GetAsset(input[0].ID, RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	primary.ResponsiblePerson = "Alice"
+	primary.Tags = []string{"one", "two"}
+	merged, err := db.MergeAssets(primary, []string{input[1].ID}, RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll}, RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll})
+	if err != nil || merged != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("merge: merged=%d err=%v", merged, err)
+	}
+	items, total, err := db.ListAssets(10, 0, AssetListFilter{}, RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll})
+	if err != nil || total != 1 || len(items) != 1 || items[0].ResponsiblePerson != "Alice" || len(items[0].Tags) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected merged asset: total=%d items=%#v err=%v", total, items, err)
+	}
+
+	before := items[0].Title
+	items[0].Title = "Must roll back"
+	if _, err := db.MergeAssets(items[0], []string{"missing"}, RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll}, RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("merge with missing duplicate unexpectedly succeeded")
+	}
+	after, err := db.GetAsset(items[0].ID, RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll})
+	if err != nil || after.Title != before {
+		t.Fatalf("failed merge was not atomic: asset=%#v err=%v", after, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAssetScanLinkReturnsTimeAndRelatedVulnerabilities(t *testing.T) {
+	db, err := NewDB(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "asset-scan.db"), zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+
+	if _, err := db.UpsertAssets([]*Asset{{IP: "192.0.2.10", Port: 443, Protocol: "https"}}, ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	assets, _, err := db.ListAssets(10, 0, AssetListFilter{}, RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll})
+	if err != nil || len(assets) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("list assets: len=%d err=%v", len(assets), err)
+	}
+	conv, err := db.CreateConversation("asset scan", ConversationCreateMeta{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.MarkAssetScanned(assets[0].ID, conv.ID, "", "", RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.CreateVulnerability(&Vulnerability{ConversationID: conv.ID, Title: "finding", Severity: "high", Target: "192.0.2.10"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	linked, err := db.GetAsset(assets[0].ID, RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if linked.LastScanAt == nil || linked.LastScanConversationID != conv.ID || linked.VulnerabilityCount != 1 || linked.RiskLevel != "high" {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected scan metadata: %#v", linked)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.Exec(`UPDATE vulnerabilities SET status='fixed' WHERE conversation_id=?`, conv.ID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	resolved, err := db.GetAsset(assets[0].ID, RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if resolved.VulnerabilityCount != 1 || resolved.RiskLevel != "normal" {
+		t.Fatalf("resolved finding should remain in history without raising current risk: %#v", resolved)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAssetListFlexibleFiltersAndOldestScanPagination(t *testing.T) {
+	db, err := NewDB(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "asset-query.db"), zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+
+	assets := []*Asset{
+		{IP: "192.0.2.1", Port: 443, Protocol: "https", Source: "fofa", Tags: []string{"prod"}},
+		{IP: "192.0.2.2", Port: 80, Protocol: "http", Source: "manual", Tags: []string{"prod", "legacy"}},
+		{Domain: "never.example.com", Port: 443, Protocol: "https", Source: "manual", Tags: []string{"prod"}},
+	}
+	if _, err := db.UpsertAssets(assets, ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	old := time.Now().Add(-90 * 24 * time.Hour).UTC()
+	recent := time.Now().Add(-24 * time.Hour).UTC()
+	if _, err := db.Exec(`UPDATE assets SET last_scan_at=? WHERE id=?`, old, assets[0].ID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.Exec(`UPDATE assets SET last_scan_at=? WHERE id=?`, recent, assets[1].ID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	access := RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll}
+	firstPage, total, err := db.ListAssets(2, 0, AssetListFilter{Tag: "prod", SortBy: "last_scan_at", SortOrder: "asc"}, access)
+	if err != nil || total != 3 || len(firstPage) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("oldest scan page: total=%d len=%d err=%v", total, len(firstPage), err)
+	}
+	if firstPage[0].ID != assets[2].ID || firstPage[0].LastScanAt != nil || firstPage[1].ID != assets[0].ID {
+		t.Fatalf("expected never-scanned then oldest scanned asset, got %#v", firstPage)
+	}
+	secondPage, _, err := db.ListAssets(2, 2, AssetListFilter{Tag: "prod", SortBy: "last_scan_at", SortOrder: "asc"}, access)
+	if err != nil || len(secondPage) != 1 || secondPage[0].ID != assets[1].ID {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected second page: %#v err=%v", secondPage, err)
+	}
+
+	never, total, err := db.ListAssets(20, 0, AssetListFilter{ScanState: "never"}, access)
+	if err != nil || total != 1 || len(never) != 1 || never[0].ID != assets[2].ID {
+		t.Fatalf("never-scanned filter: total=%d assets=%#v err=%v", total, never, err)
+	}
+	port := 443
+	filtered, total, err := db.ListAssets(20, 0, AssetListFilter{Source: "fofa", Port: &port, LastScanBefore: &recent}, access)
+	if err != nil || total != 1 || len(filtered) != 1 || filtered[0].ID != assets[0].ID {
+		t.Fatalf("structured filters: total=%d assets=%#v err=%v", total, filtered, err)
+	}
+}

internal/database/audit.go

@@ -9,41 +9,47 @@ import (
 
 // AuditLog platform operation audit record.
 type AuditLog struct {
-	ID           string                 `json:"id"`
+	ID                string                 `json:"id"`
-	CreatedAt    time.Time              `json:"createdAt"`
+	CreatedAt         time.Time              `json:"createdAt"`
-	Level        string                 `json:"level"`
+	Level             string                 `json:"level"`
-	Category     string                 `json:"category"`
+	Category          string                 `json:"category"`
-	Action       string                 `json:"action"`
+	Action            string                 `json:"action"`
-	Result       string                 `json:"result"`
+	Result            string                 `json:"result"`
-	Actor        string                 `json:"actor"`
+	Actor             string                 `json:"actor"`
-	SessionHint  string                 `json:"sessionHint,omitempty"`
+	SessionHint       string                 `json:"sessionHint,omitempty"`
-	ClientIP     string                 `json:"clientIp,omitempty"`
+	ClientIP          string                 `json:"clientIp,omitempty"`
-	UserAgent    string                 `json:"userAgent,omitempty"`
+	UserAgent         string                 `json:"userAgent,omitempty"`
-	ResourceType string                 `json:"resourceType,omitempty"`
+	ResourceType      string                 `json:"resourceType,omitempty"`
-	ResourceID   string                 `json:"resourceId,omitempty"`
+	ResourceID        string                 `json:"resourceId,omitempty"`
-	ResourceAvailable *bool             `json:"resourceAvailable,omitempty"` // API-only: whether linked resource still exists
+	ResourceAvailable *bool                  `json:"resourceAvailable,omitempty"` // API-only: whether linked resource still exists
-	Message      string                 `json:"message"`
+	Message           string                 `json:"message"`
-	Detail       map[string]interface{} `json:"detail,omitempty"`
+	Detail            map[string]interface{} `json:"detail,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // ListAuditLogsFilter query parameters.
 type ListAuditLogsFilter struct {
-	Level        string
+	Actor         string
-	Category     string
+	Level         string
-	Action       string
+	Category      string
-	Result       string
+	Action        string
-	Query        string
+	Result        string
-	ResourceType string
+	Query         string
-	ResourceID   string
+	ResourceType  string
-	Since        *time.Time
+	ResourceID    string
-	Until        *time.Time
+	RelatedUserID string
-	Limit        int
+	Since         *time.Time
-	Offset       int
+	Until         *time.Time
+	Limit         int
+	Offset        int
 }
 
 func buildAuditLogsWhere(filter ListAuditLogsFilter) (string, []interface{}) {
 	conditions := []string{"1=1"}
 	args := []interface{}{}
+	if filter.Actor != "" {
+		conditions = append(conditions, "actor = ?")
+		args = append(args, filter.Actor)
+	}
 	if filter.Level != "" {
 		conditions = append(conditions, "level = ?")
 		args = append(args, filter.Level)
@@ -68,6 +74,10 @@ func buildAuditLogsWhere(filter ListAuditLogsFilter) (string, []interface{}) {
 		conditions = append(conditions, "resource_id = ?")
 		args = append(args, filter.ResourceID)
 	}
+	if relatedUserID := strings.TrimSpace(filter.RelatedUserID); relatedUserID != "" {
+		conditions = append(conditions, `(resource_id = ? OR detail_json LIKE ? OR detail_json LIKE ?)`)
+		args = append(args, relatedUserID, `%"user_id":"`+relatedUserID+`"%`, `%"userId":"`+relatedUserID+`"%`)
+	}
 	if filter.Since != nil {
 		conditions = append(conditions, sqliteEpochGE("created_at", ">="))
 		args = append(args, formatSQLiteUTC(*filter.Since))
@@ -78,8 +88,8 @@ func buildAuditLogsWhere(filter ListAuditLogsFilter) (string, []interface{}) {
 	}
 	if q := strings.TrimSpace(filter.Query); q != "" {
 		like := "%" + q + "%"
-		conditions = append(conditions, "(message LIKE ? OR resource_id LIKE ? OR action LIKE ? OR category LIKE ?)")
+		conditions = append(conditions, "(message LIKE ? OR resource_id LIKE ? OR action LIKE ? OR category LIKE ? OR detail_json LIKE ?)")
-		args = append(args, like, like, like, like)
+		args = append(args, like, like, like, like, like)
 	}
 	return strings.Join(conditions, " AND "), args
 }

internal/database/audit_time_test.go

@@ -31,6 +31,19 @@ func TestBuildAuditLogsWhere_timeFilterSQL(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestBuildAuditLogsWhere_relatedUserID(t *testing.T) {
+	where, args := buildAuditLogsWhere(ListAuditLogsFilter{Category: "rbac", RelatedUserID: "user-123"})
+	if !strings.Contains(where, "resource_id = ?") || !strings.Contains(where, "detail_json LIKE ?") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected related-user predicates, got %q", where)
+	}
+	if len(args) != 4 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected category plus 3 related-user args, got %#v", args)
+	}
+	if args[1] != "user-123" || args[2] != `%"user_id":"user-123"%` || args[3] != `%"userId":"user-123"%` {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected related-user args: %#v", args)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestListAuditLogs_timeFilterMixedStorageFormats(t *testing.T) {
 	root, err := os.Getwd()
 	if err != nil {

internal/database/batch_task.go

@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ func (db *DB) GetBatchQueue(queueID string) (*BatchTaskQueueRow, error) {
 // GetAllBatchQueues 获取所有批量任务队列
 func (db *DB) GetAllBatchQueues() ([]*BatchTaskQueueRow, error) {
 	rows, err := db.Query(
-		"SELECT "+batchQueueSelectColumns+" FROM batch_task_queues ORDER BY created_at DESC",
+		"SELECT " + batchQueueSelectColumns + " FROM batch_task_queues ORDER BY created_at DESC",
 	)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("查询批量任务队列列表失败: %w", err)
@@ -168,6 +168,10 @@ func (db *DB) GetAllBatchQueues() ([]*BatchTaskQueueRow, error) {
 
 // ListBatchQueues 列出批量任务队列（支持筛选和分页）
 func (db *DB) ListBatchQueues(limit, offset int, status, keyword string) ([]*BatchTaskQueueRow, error) {
+	return db.ListBatchQueuesForAccess(limit, offset, status, keyword, "", "")
+}
+
+func (db *DB) ListBatchQueuesForAccess(limit, offset int, status, keyword, userID, scope string) ([]*BatchTaskQueueRow, error) {
 	query := "SELECT " + batchQueueSelectColumns + " FROM batch_task_queues WHERE 1=1"
 	args := []interface{}{}
 
@@ -182,6 +186,26 @@ func (db *DB) ListBatchQueues(limit, offset int, status, keyword string) ([]*Bat
 		query += " AND (id LIKE ? OR title LIKE ?)"
 		args = append(args, "%"+keyword+"%", "%"+keyword+"%")
 	}
+	userID = strings.TrimSpace(userID)
+	if userID != "" && scope != RBACScopeAll {
+		query += ` AND (
+			owner_user_id = ?
+			OR EXISTS (
+				SELECT 1 FROM rbac_resource_assignments ra
+				WHERE ra.user_id = ? AND ra.resource_type = 'batch_task' AND ra.resource_id = batch_task_queues.id
+			)
+			OR (
+				project_id IS NOT NULL AND project_id <> '' AND (
+					EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM projects p WHERE p.id = batch_task_queues.project_id AND p.owner_user_id = ?)
+					OR EXISTS (
+						SELECT 1 FROM rbac_resource_assignments pra
+						WHERE pra.user_id = ? AND pra.resource_type = 'project' AND pra.resource_id = batch_task_queues.project_id
+					)
+				)
+			)
+		)`
+		args = append(args, userID, userID, userID, userID)
+	}
 
 	query += " ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT ? OFFSET ?"
 	args = append(args, limit, offset)
@@ -216,6 +240,10 @@ func (db *DB) ListBatchQueues(limit, offset int, status, keyword string) ([]*Bat
 
 // CountBatchQueues 统计批量任务队列总数（支持筛选条件）
 func (db *DB) CountBatchQueues(status, keyword string) (int, error) {
+	return db.CountBatchQueuesForAccess(status, keyword, "", "")
+}
+
+func (db *DB) CountBatchQueuesForAccess(status, keyword, userID, scope string) (int, error) {
 	query := "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM batch_task_queues WHERE 1=1"
 	args := []interface{}{}
 
@@ -230,6 +258,26 @@ func (db *DB) CountBatchQueues(status, keyword string) (int, error) {
 		query += " AND (id LIKE ? OR title LIKE ?)"
 		args = append(args, "%"+keyword+"%", "%"+keyword+"%")
 	}
+	userID = strings.TrimSpace(userID)
+	if userID != "" && scope != RBACScopeAll {
+		query += ` AND (
+			owner_user_id = ?
+			OR EXISTS (
+				SELECT 1 FROM rbac_resource_assignments ra
+				WHERE ra.user_id = ? AND ra.resource_type = 'batch_task' AND ra.resource_id = batch_task_queues.id
+			)
+			OR (
+				project_id IS NOT NULL AND project_id <> '' AND (
+					EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM projects p WHERE p.id = batch_task_queues.project_id AND p.owner_user_id = ?)
+					OR EXISTS (
+						SELECT 1 FROM rbac_resource_assignments pra
+						WHERE pra.user_id = ? AND pra.resource_type = 'project' AND pra.resource_id = batch_task_queues.project_id
+					)
+				)
+			)
+		)`
+		args = append(args, userID, userID, userID, userID)
+	}
 
 	var count int
 	err := db.QueryRow(query, args...).Scan(&count)

internal/database/c2.go

@@ -45,20 +45,21 @@ func validC2TextIDForDelete(id string) bool {
 
 // C2Listener 监听器实体
 type C2Listener struct {
-	ID            string    `json:"id"`
+	ID            string     `json:"id"`
-	Name          string    `json:"name"`
+	Name          string     `json:"name"`
-	Type          string    `json:"type"`           // tcp_reverse|http_beacon|https_beacon|websocket|dns
+	Type          string     `json:"type"`       // tcp_reverse|http_beacon|https_beacon|websocket|dns
-	BindHost      string    `json:"bindHost"`       // 默认 127.0.0.1
+	BindHost      string     `json:"bindHost"`   // 默认 127.0.0.1
-	BindPort      int       `json:"bindPort"`       // 1-65535
+	BindPort      int        `json:"bindPort"`   // 1-65535
-	ProfileID     string    `json:"profileId"`      // 可空：关联 c2_profiles.id
+	ProfileID     string     `json:"profileId"`  // 可空：关联 c2_profiles.id
-	EncryptionKey string    `json:"-"`              // base64(AES-256)，前端不返回
+	EncryptionKey string     `json:"-"`          // base64(AES-256)，前端不返回
-	ImplantToken  string    `json:"-"`              // beacon 携带的鉴权 token，前端不返回
+	ImplantToken  string     `json:"-"`          // beacon 携带的鉴权 token，前端不返回
-	Status        string    `json:"status"`         // stopped|running|error
+	Status        string     `json:"status"`     // stopped|running|error
-	ConfigJSON    string    `json:"configJson"`     // TLS 证书路径 / URI 模式 / 上限并发 等
+	ConfigJSON    string     `json:"configJson"` // TLS 证书路径 / URI 模式 / 上限并发 等
-	Remark        string    `json:"remark"`
+	Remark        string     `json:"remark"`
-	CreatedAt     time.Time `json:"createdAt"`
+	OwnerUserID   string     `json:"ownerUserId,omitempty"`
+	CreatedAt     time.Time  `json:"createdAt"`
 	StartedAt     *time.Time `json:"startedAt,omitempty"`
-	LastError     string    `json:"lastError,omitempty"`
+	LastError     string     `json:"lastError,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // C2Session 已上线会话
@@ -132,17 +133,17 @@ type C2Event struct {
 
 // C2Profile Malleable Profile
 type C2Profile struct {
-	ID                    string                 `json:"id"`
+	ID              string                 `json:"id"`
-	Name                  string                 `json:"name"`
+	Name            string                 `json:"name"`
-	UserAgent             string                 `json:"userAgent"`
+	UserAgent       string                 `json:"userAgent"`
-	URIs                  []string               `json:"uris"`
+	URIs            []string               `json:"uris"`
-	RequestHeaders        map[string]string      `json:"requestHeaders,omitempty"`
+	RequestHeaders  map[string]string      `json:"requestHeaders,omitempty"`
-	ResponseHeaders       map[string]string      `json:"responseHeaders,omitempty"`
+	ResponseHeaders map[string]string      `json:"responseHeaders,omitempty"`
-	BodyTemplate          string                 `json:"bodyTemplate"`
+	BodyTemplate    string                 `json:"bodyTemplate"`
-	JitterMinMS           int                    `json:"jitterMinMs"`
+	JitterMinMS     int                    `json:"jitterMinMs"`
-	JitterMaxMS           int                    `json:"jitterMaxMs"`
+	JitterMaxMS     int                    `json:"jitterMaxMs"`
-	Extra                 map[string]interface{} `json:"extra,omitempty"`
+	Extra           map[string]interface{} `json:"extra,omitempty"`
-	CreatedAt             time.Time              `json:"createdAt"`
+	CreatedAt       time.Time              `json:"createdAt"`
 }
 
 // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -165,12 +166,12 @@ func (db *DB) CreateC2Listener(l *C2Listener) error {
 	}
 	query := `
 		INSERT INTO c2_listeners (id, name, type, bind_host, bind_port, profile_id, encryption_key,
-			implant_token, status, config_json, remark, created_at, started_at, last_error)
+			implant_token, status, config_json, remark, owner_user_id, created_at, started_at, last_error)
-		VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+		VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
 	`
 	_, err := db.Exec(query,
 		l.ID, l.Name, l.Type, l.BindHost, l.BindPort, l.ProfileID, l.EncryptionKey,
-		l.ImplantToken, l.Status, l.ConfigJSON, l.Remark, l.CreatedAt, l.StartedAt, l.LastError,
+		l.ImplantToken, l.Status, l.ConfigJSON, l.Remark, l.OwnerUserID, l.CreatedAt, l.StartedAt, l.LastError,
 	)
 	if err != nil {
 		db.logger.Error("创建 C2 监听器失败", zap.Error(err), zap.String("id", l.ID))
@@ -190,12 +191,12 @@ func (db *DB) UpdateC2Listener(l *C2Listener) error {
 	query := `
 		UPDATE c2_listeners SET
 			name = ?, type = ?, bind_host = ?, bind_port = ?, profile_id = ?, encryption_key = ?,
-			implant_token = ?, status = ?, config_json = ?, remark = ?, started_at = ?, last_error = ?
+			implant_token = ?, status = ?, config_json = ?, remark = ?, owner_user_id = ?, started_at = ?, last_error = ?
 		WHERE id = ?
 	`
 	res, err := db.Exec(query,
 		l.Name, l.Type, l.BindHost, l.BindPort, l.ProfileID, l.EncryptionKey,
-		l.ImplantToken, l.Status, l.ConfigJSON, l.Remark, l.StartedAt, l.LastError, l.ID,
+		l.ImplantToken, l.Status, l.ConfigJSON, l.Remark, l.OwnerUserID, l.StartedAt, l.LastError, l.ID,
 	)
 	if err != nil {
 		db.logger.Error("更新 C2 监听器失败", zap.Error(err), zap.String("id", l.ID))
@@ -231,7 +232,7 @@ func (db *DB) GetC2Listener(id string) (*C2Listener, error) {
 		SELECT id, name, type, bind_host, bind_port, COALESCE(profile_id, ''),
 			COALESCE(encryption_key, ''), COALESCE(implant_token, ''), status,
 			COALESCE(config_json, '{}'), COALESCE(remark, ''),
-			created_at, started_at, COALESCE(last_error, '')
+			COALESCE(owner_user_id, ''), created_at, started_at, COALESCE(last_error, '')
 		FROM c2_listeners WHERE id = ?
 	`
 	var l C2Listener
@@ -240,7 +241,7 @@ func (db *DB) GetC2Listener(id string) (*C2Listener, error) {
 		&l.ID, &l.Name, &l.Type, &l.BindHost, &l.BindPort, &l.ProfileID,
 		&l.EncryptionKey, &l.ImplantToken, &l.Status,
 		&l.ConfigJSON, &l.Remark,
-		&l.CreatedAt, &startedAt, &l.LastError,
+		&l.OwnerUserID, &l.CreatedAt, &startedAt, &l.LastError,
 	)
 	if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
 		return nil, nil
@@ -261,7 +262,7 @@ func (db *DB) ListC2Listeners() ([]*C2Listener, error) {
 		SELECT id, name, type, bind_host, bind_port, COALESCE(profile_id, ''),
 			COALESCE(encryption_key, ''), COALESCE(implant_token, ''), status,
 			COALESCE(config_json, '{}'), COALESCE(remark, ''),
-			created_at, started_at, COALESCE(last_error, '')
+			COALESCE(owner_user_id, ''), created_at, started_at, COALESCE(last_error, '')
 		FROM c2_listeners ORDER BY created_at DESC
 	`
 	rows, err := db.Query(query)
@@ -277,6 +278,47 @@ func (db *DB) ListC2Listeners() ([]*C2Listener, error) {
 			&l.ID, &l.Name, &l.Type, &l.BindHost, &l.BindPort, &l.ProfileID,
 			&l.EncryptionKey, &l.ImplantToken, &l.Status,
 			&l.ConfigJSON, &l.Remark,
+			&l.OwnerUserID, &l.CreatedAt, &startedAt, &l.LastError,
+		); err != nil {
+			db.logger.Warn("扫描 c2_listeners 行失败", zap.Error(err))
+			continue
+		}
+		if startedAt.Valid {
+			t := startedAt.Time
+			l.StartedAt = &t
+		}
+		list = append(list, &l)
+	}
+	return list, rows.Err()
+}
+
+// ListC2ListenersForAccess lists listeners visible to the resolved RBAC scope.
+func (db *DB) ListC2ListenersForAccess(access RBACListAccess) ([]*C2Listener, error) {
+	conditions := []string{"1=1"}
+	args := []interface{}{}
+	appendC2ListenerAccessFilter(&conditions, &args, access)
+	query := `
+		SELECT id, name, type, bind_host, bind_port, COALESCE(profile_id, ''),
+			COALESCE(encryption_key, ''), COALESCE(implant_token, ''), status,
+			COALESCE(config_json, '{}'), COALESCE(remark, ''),
+			COALESCE(owner_user_id, ''), created_at, started_at, COALESCE(last_error, '')
+		FROM c2_listeners
+		WHERE ` + strings.Join(conditions, " AND ") + `
+		ORDER BY created_at DESC
+	`
+	rows, err := db.Query(query, args...)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+	var list []*C2Listener
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var l C2Listener
+		var startedAt sql.NullTime
+		if err := rows.Scan(
+			&l.ID, &l.Name, &l.Type, &l.BindHost, &l.BindPort, &l.ProfileID,
+			&l.EncryptionKey, &l.ImplantToken, &l.Status,
+			&l.ConfigJSON, &l.Remark, &l.OwnerUserID,
 			&l.CreatedAt, &startedAt, &l.LastError,
 		); err != nil {
 			db.logger.Warn("扫描 c2_listeners 行失败", zap.Error(err))
@@ -291,6 +333,26 @@ func (db *DB) ListC2Listeners() ([]*C2Listener, error) {
 	return list, rows.Err()
 }
 
+func appendC2ListenerAccessFilter(conditions *[]string, args *[]interface{}, access RBACListAccess) {
+	if access.Scope == RBACScopeAll {
+		return
+	}
+	if access.UserID == "" {
+		*conditions = append(*conditions, "1=0")
+		return
+	}
+	clauses := []string{"owner_user_id = ?"}
+	*args = append(*args, access.UserID)
+	if access.Scope == RBACScopeAssigned {
+		clauses = append(clauses, `EXISTS (
+			SELECT 1 FROM rbac_resource_assignments ra
+			WHERE ra.user_id = ? AND ra.resource_type = 'c2_listener' AND ra.resource_id = c2_listeners.id
+		)`)
+		*args = append(*args, access.UserID)
+	}
+	*conditions = append(*conditions, "("+strings.Join(clauses, " OR ")+")")
+}
+
 // DeleteC2Listener 级联删除（会话/任务/文件/事件随之消失）
 func (db *DB) DeleteC2Listener(id string) error {
 	res, err := db.Exec(`DELETE FROM c2_listeners WHERE id = ?`, id)
@@ -550,6 +612,109 @@ func (db *DB) ListC2Sessions(filter ListC2SessionsFilter) ([]*C2Session, error)
 	return list, rows.Err()
 }
 
+// ListC2SessionsForAccess lists sessions whose parent listener is visible.
+func (db *DB) ListC2SessionsForAccess(filter ListC2SessionsFilter, access RBACListAccess) ([]*C2Session, error) {
+	conditions, args := buildC2SessionsWhere(filter)
+	appendC2SessionAccessFilter(&conditions, &args, access)
+	query := `
+		SELECT id, listener_id, implant_uuid, COALESCE(hostname,''), COALESCE(username,''),
+			COALESCE(os,''), COALESCE(arch,''), COALESCE(pid, 0), COALESCE(process_name,''),
+			COALESCE(is_admin, 0), COALESCE(internal_ip,''), COALESCE(external_ip,''),
+			COALESCE(user_agent,''), COALESCE(sleep_seconds, 5), COALESCE(jitter_percent, 0),
+			status, first_seen_at, last_check_in, COALESCE(metadata_json, '{}'),
+			COALESCE(note, '')
+		FROM c2_sessions
+		WHERE ` + strings.Join(conditions, " AND ") + `
+		ORDER BY last_check_in DESC
+	`
+	if filter.Limit > 0 {
+		query += fmt.Sprintf(" LIMIT %d", filter.Limit)
+	}
+	rows, err := db.Query(query, args...)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+	return db.scanC2SessionRows(rows)
+}
+
+func buildC2SessionsWhere(filter ListC2SessionsFilter) ([]string, []interface{}) {
+	conditions := []string{"1=1"}
+	args := []interface{}{}
+	if filter.ListenerID != "" {
+		conditions = append(conditions, "listener_id = ?")
+		args = append(args, filter.ListenerID)
+	}
+	if filter.Status != "" {
+		conditions = append(conditions, "status = ?")
+		args = append(args, filter.Status)
+	}
+	if filter.OS != "" {
+		conditions = append(conditions, "os = ?")
+		args = append(args, filter.OS)
+	}
+	if filter.Search != "" {
+		conditions = append(conditions, "(hostname LIKE ? OR username LIKE ? OR internal_ip LIKE ?)")
+		kw := "%" + filter.Search + "%"
+		args = append(args, kw, kw, kw)
+	}
+	if filter.Suspicious {
+		conditions = append(conditions, `status = 'dead' AND (
+			hostname LIKE 'tcp_%' OR LOWER(COALESCE(username,'')) = 'unknown' OR COALESCE(pid, 0) = 0
+		)`)
+	}
+	return conditions, args
+}
+
+func (db *DB) scanC2SessionRows(rows *sql.Rows) ([]*C2Session, error) {
+	var list []*C2Session
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var s C2Session
+		var isAdminInt int
+		var metadataJSON string
+		if err := rows.Scan(
+			&s.ID, &s.ListenerID, &s.ImplantUUID, &s.Hostname, &s.Username,
+			&s.OS, &s.Arch, &s.PID, &s.ProcessName,
+			&isAdminInt, &s.InternalIP, &s.ExternalIP,
+			&s.UserAgent, &s.SleepSeconds, &s.JitterPercent,
+			&s.Status, &s.FirstSeenAt, &s.LastCheckIn, &metadataJSON,
+			&s.Note,
+		); err != nil {
+			db.logger.Warn("扫描 c2_sessions 行失败", zap.Error(err))
+			continue
+		}
+		s.IsAdmin = isAdminInt != 0
+		if metadataJSON != "" && metadataJSON != "{}" {
+			_ = json.Unmarshal([]byte(metadataJSON), &s.Metadata)
+		}
+		list = append(list, &s)
+	}
+	return list, rows.Err()
+}
+
+func appendC2SessionAccessFilter(conditions *[]string, args *[]interface{}, access RBACListAccess) {
+	if access.Scope == RBACScopeAll {
+		return
+	}
+	if access.UserID == "" {
+		*conditions = append(*conditions, "1=0")
+		return
+	}
+	clauses := []string{`EXISTS (
+		SELECT 1 FROM c2_listeners
+		WHERE c2_listeners.id = c2_sessions.listener_id AND c2_listeners.owner_user_id = ?
+	)`}
+	*args = append(*args, access.UserID)
+	if access.Scope == RBACScopeAssigned {
+		clauses = append(clauses, `EXISTS (
+			SELECT 1 FROM rbac_resource_assignments ra
+			WHERE ra.user_id = ? AND ra.resource_type = 'c2_listener' AND ra.resource_id = c2_sessions.listener_id
+		)`)
+		*args = append(*args, access.UserID)
+	}
+	*conditions = append(*conditions, "("+strings.Join(clauses, " OR ")+")")
+}
+
 // DeleteC2Session 级联删除其 tasks/files
 func (db *DB) DeleteC2Session(id string) error {
 	res, err := db.Exec(`DELETE FROM c2_sessions WHERE id = ?`, id)
@@ -601,6 +766,29 @@ func (db *DB) DeleteC2SessionsByIDs(ids []string) (int64, error) {
 	return res.RowsAffected()
 }
 
+func (db *DB) DeleteC2SessionsByIDsForAccess(ids []string, access RBACListAccess) (int64, error) {
+	if access.Scope == RBACScopeAll {
+		return db.DeleteC2SessionsByIDs(ids)
+	}
+	clean := cleanC2IDs(ids)
+	if len(clean) == 0 {
+		return 0, ErrNoValidC2SessionIDs
+	}
+	placeholders := strings.Repeat("?,", len(clean)-1) + "?"
+	args := make([]interface{}, 0, len(clean)+2)
+	for _, id := range clean {
+		args = append(args, id)
+	}
+	conditions := []string{"id IN (" + placeholders + ")"}
+	appendC2SessionAccessFilter(&conditions, &args, access)
+	query := `DELETE FROM c2_sessions WHERE ` + strings.Join(conditions, " AND ")
+	res, err := db.Exec(query, args...)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	return res.RowsAffected()
+}
+
 // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // CRUD：C2 任务
 // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -778,6 +966,39 @@ func buildC2TasksWhere(filter ListC2TasksFilter) (where string, args []interface
 	return strings.Join(conditions, " AND "), args
 }
 
+func appendC2TaskAccessFilter(conditions *[]string, args *[]interface{}, access RBACListAccess) {
+	if access.Scope == RBACScopeAll {
+		return
+	}
+	if access.UserID == "" {
+		*conditions = append(*conditions, "1=0")
+		return
+	}
+	clauses := []string{`EXISTS (
+		SELECT 1 FROM c2_sessions s
+		JOIN c2_listeners l ON l.id = s.listener_id
+		WHERE s.id = c2_tasks.session_id AND l.owner_user_id = ?
+	)`}
+	*args = append(*args, access.UserID)
+	if access.Scope == RBACScopeAssigned {
+		clauses = append(clauses, `EXISTS (
+			SELECT 1 FROM c2_sessions s
+			JOIN rbac_resource_assignments ra ON ra.resource_id = s.listener_id
+			WHERE s.id = c2_tasks.session_id
+				AND ra.user_id = ? AND ra.resource_type = 'c2_listener'
+		)`)
+		*args = append(*args, access.UserID)
+	}
+	*conditions = append(*conditions, "("+strings.Join(clauses, " OR ")+")")
+}
+
+func buildC2TasksWhereForAccess(filter ListC2TasksFilter, access RBACListAccess) (string, []interface{}) {
+	where, args := buildC2TasksWhere(filter)
+	conditions := []string{where}
+	appendC2TaskAccessFilter(&conditions, &args, access)
+	return strings.Join(conditions, " AND "), args
+}
+
 // CountC2Tasks 与 ListC2Tasks 相同过滤条件下的记录总数
 func (db *DB) CountC2Tasks(filter ListC2TasksFilter) (int64, error) {
 	where, args := buildC2TasksWhere(filter)
@@ -787,6 +1008,14 @@ func (db *DB) CountC2Tasks(filter ListC2TasksFilter) (int64, error) {
 	return n, err
 }
 
+func (db *DB) CountC2TasksForAccess(filter ListC2TasksFilter, access RBACListAccess) (int64, error) {
+	where, args := buildC2TasksWhereForAccess(filter, access)
+	query := `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM c2_tasks WHERE ` + where
+	var n int64
+	err := db.QueryRow(query, args...).Scan(&n)
+	return n, err
+}
+
 // CountC2TasksQueuedOrPending 统计 queued/pending 状态任务数（仪表盘「待审任务」）
 func (db *DB) CountC2TasksQueuedOrPending(sessionID string) (int64, error) {
 	conditions := []string{"status IN ('queued', 'pending')"}
@@ -801,6 +1030,15 @@ func (db *DB) CountC2TasksQueuedOrPending(sessionID string) (int64, error) {
 	return n, err
 }
 
+func (db *DB) CountC2TasksQueuedOrPendingForAccess(sessionID string, access RBACListAccess) (int64, error) {
+	filter := ListC2TasksFilter{SessionID: sessionID}
+	where, args := buildC2TasksWhereForAccess(filter, access)
+	query := `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM c2_tasks WHERE status IN ('queued', 'pending') AND ` + where
+	var n int64
+	err := db.QueryRow(query, args...).Scan(&n)
+	return n, err
+}
+
 // ListC2Tasks 任务列表，按创建时间倒序
 func (db *DB) ListC2Tasks(filter ListC2TasksFilter) ([]*C2Task, error) {
 	where, args := buildC2TasksWhere(filter)
@@ -866,6 +1104,74 @@ func (db *DB) ListC2Tasks(filter ListC2TasksFilter) ([]*C2Task, error) {
 	return list, rows.Err()
 }
 
+func (db *DB) ListC2TasksForAccess(filter ListC2TasksFilter, access RBACListAccess) ([]*C2Task, error) {
+	where, args := buildC2TasksWhereForAccess(filter, access)
+	query := `
+		SELECT id, session_id, task_type, COALESCE(payload_json, '{}'),
+			status, COALESCE(result_text, ''), COALESCE(result_blob_path, ''),
+			COALESCE(error, ''), COALESCE(source, 'manual'),
+			COALESCE(conversation_id, ''), COALESCE(approval_status, ''),
+			created_at, sent_at, started_at, completed_at, COALESCE(duration_ms, 0)
+		FROM c2_tasks
+		WHERE ` + where + `
+		ORDER BY created_at DESC
+	`
+	limit := filter.Limit
+	offset := filter.Offset
+	if offset < 0 {
+		offset = 0
+	}
+	if limit > 0 {
+		if limit > 1000 {
+			limit = 1000
+		}
+		query += ` LIMIT ? OFFSET ?`
+		args = append(args, limit, offset)
+	}
+	rows, err := db.Query(query, args...)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+	return db.scanC2TaskRows(rows)
+}
+
+func (db *DB) scanC2TaskRows(rows *sql.Rows) ([]*C2Task, error) {
+	var list []*C2Task
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var t C2Task
+		var payloadJSON string
+		var sentAt, startedAt, completedAt sql.NullTime
+		if err := rows.Scan(
+			&t.ID, &t.SessionID, &t.TaskType, &payloadJSON,
+			&t.Status, &t.ResultText, &t.ResultBlobPath,
+			&t.Error, &t.Source,
+			&t.ConversationID, &t.ApprovalStatus,
+			&t.CreatedAt, &sentAt, &startedAt, &completedAt, &t.DurationMS,
+		); err != nil {
+			db.logger.Warn("扫描 c2_tasks 行失败", zap.Error(err))
+			continue
+		}
+		if payloadJSON != "" && payloadJSON != "{}" {
+			_ = json.Unmarshal([]byte(payloadJSON), &t.Payload)
+		}
+		if sentAt.Valid {
+			x := sentAt.Time
+			t.SentAt = &x
+		}
+		if startedAt.Valid {
+			x := startedAt.Time
+			t.StartedAt = &x
+		}
+		if completedAt.Valid {
+			x := completedAt.Time
+			t.CompletedAt = &x
+		}
+		list = append(list, &t)
+	}
+	return list, rows.Err()
+}
+
 // PopQueuedC2Tasks 取出某会话所有 queued/approved 任务（用于 beacon 拉取），原子置为 sent
 func (db *DB) PopQueuedC2Tasks(sessionID string, limit int) ([]*C2Task, error) {
 	if limit <= 0 {
@@ -978,6 +1284,29 @@ func (db *DB) DeleteC2TasksByIDs(ids []string) (int64, error) {
 	return res.RowsAffected()
 }
 
+func (db *DB) DeleteC2TasksByIDsForAccess(ids []string, access RBACListAccess) (int64, error) {
+	if access.Scope == RBACScopeAll {
+		return db.DeleteC2TasksByIDs(ids)
+	}
+	clean := cleanC2IDs(ids)
+	if len(clean) == 0 {
+		return 0, ErrNoValidC2TaskIDs
+	}
+	placeholders := strings.Repeat("?,", len(clean)-1) + "?"
+	args := make([]interface{}, 0, len(clean)+2)
+	for _, id := range clean {
+		args = append(args, id)
+	}
+	conditions := []string{"id IN (" + placeholders + ")"}
+	appendC2TaskAccessFilter(&conditions, &args, access)
+	query := `DELETE FROM c2_tasks WHERE ` + strings.Join(conditions, " AND ")
+	res, err := db.Exec(query, args...)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	return res.RowsAffected()
+}
+
 // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // CRUD：C2 文件
 // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -1024,6 +1353,27 @@ func (db *DB) ListC2FilesBySession(sessionID string) ([]*C2File, error) {
 	return list, rows.Err()
 }
 
+func cleanC2IDs(ids []string) []string {
+	const maxBatch = 500
+	if len(ids) > maxBatch {
+		ids = ids[:maxBatch]
+	}
+	clean := make([]string, 0, len(ids))
+	seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(ids))
+	for _, id := range ids {
+		id = strings.TrimSpace(id)
+		if !validC2TextIDForDelete(id) {
+			continue
+		}
+		if _, ok := seen[id]; ok {
+			continue
+		}
+		seen[id] = struct{}{}
+		clean = append(clean, id)
+	}
+	return clean
+}
+
 // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // CRUD：C2 事件审计
 // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -1037,7 +1387,9 @@ func (db *DB) AppendC2Event(e *C2Event) error {
 		return errors.New("event id is required")
 	}
 	if e.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
-		e.CreatedAt = time.Now()
+		e.CreatedAt = time.Now().UTC()
+	} else {
+		e.CreatedAt = e.CreatedAt.UTC()
 	}
 	if strings.TrimSpace(e.Level) == "" {
 		e.Level = "info"
@@ -1052,7 +1404,7 @@ func (db *DB) AppendC2Event(e *C2Event) error {
 		INSERT INTO c2_events (id, level, category, session_id, task_id, message, data_json, created_at)
 		VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
 	`
-	_, err := db.Exec(query, e.ID, e.Level, e.Category, e.SessionID, e.TaskID, e.Message, dataJSON, e.CreatedAt)
+	_, err := db.Exec(query, e.ID, e.Level, e.Category, e.SessionID, e.TaskID, e.Message, dataJSON, formatSQLiteUTC(e.CreatedAt))
 	return err
 }
 
@@ -1087,12 +1439,62 @@ func buildC2EventsWhere(filter ListC2EventsFilter) (where string, args []interfa
 		args = append(args, filter.TaskID)
 	}
 	if filter.Since != nil {
-		conditions = append(conditions, "created_at >= ?")
+		conditions = append(conditions, sqliteEpochGE("created_at", ">="))
-		args = append(args, *filter.Since)
+		args = append(args, formatSQLiteUTC(*filter.Since))
 	}
 	return strings.Join(conditions, " AND "), args
 }
 
+func appendC2EventAccessFilter(conditions *[]string, args *[]interface{}, access RBACListAccess) {
+	if access.Scope == RBACScopeAll {
+		return
+	}
+	if access.UserID == "" {
+		*conditions = append(*conditions, "1=0")
+		return
+	}
+	clauses := []string{`EXISTS (
+		SELECT 1 FROM c2_sessions s
+		JOIN c2_listeners l ON l.id = s.listener_id
+		WHERE s.id = c2_events.session_id AND l.owner_user_id = ?
+	)`}
+	*args = append(*args, access.UserID)
+	if access.Scope == RBACScopeAssigned {
+		clauses = append(clauses, `EXISTS (
+			SELECT 1 FROM c2_sessions s
+			JOIN rbac_resource_assignments ra ON ra.resource_id = s.listener_id
+			WHERE s.id = c2_events.session_id
+				AND ra.user_id = ? AND ra.resource_type = 'c2_listener'
+		)`)
+		*args = append(*args, access.UserID)
+	}
+	clauses = append(clauses, `EXISTS (
+		SELECT 1 FROM c2_tasks t
+		JOIN c2_sessions s ON s.id = t.session_id
+		JOIN c2_listeners l ON l.id = s.listener_id
+		WHERE t.id = c2_events.task_id AND l.owner_user_id = ?
+	)`)
+	*args = append(*args, access.UserID)
+	if access.Scope == RBACScopeAssigned {
+		clauses = append(clauses, `EXISTS (
+			SELECT 1 FROM c2_tasks t
+			JOIN c2_sessions s ON s.id = t.session_id
+			JOIN rbac_resource_assignments ra ON ra.resource_id = s.listener_id
+			WHERE t.id = c2_events.task_id
+				AND ra.user_id = ? AND ra.resource_type = 'c2_listener'
+		)`)
+		*args = append(*args, access.UserID)
+	}
+	*conditions = append(*conditions, "("+strings.Join(clauses, " OR ")+")")
+}
+
+func buildC2EventsWhereForAccess(filter ListC2EventsFilter, access RBACListAccess) (string, []interface{}) {
+	where, args := buildC2EventsWhere(filter)
+	conditions := []string{where}
+	appendC2EventAccessFilter(&conditions, &args, access)
+	return strings.Join(conditions, " AND "), args
+}
+
 // CountC2Events 与 ListC2Events 相同过滤条件下的记录总数
 func (db *DB) CountC2Events(filter ListC2EventsFilter) (int64, error) {
 	where, args := buildC2EventsWhere(filter)
@@ -1102,6 +1504,41 @@ func (db *DB) CountC2Events(filter ListC2EventsFilter) (int64, error) {
 	return n, err
 }
 
+func (db *DB) CountC2EventsForAccess(filter ListC2EventsFilter, access RBACListAccess) (int64, error) {
+	where, args := buildC2EventsWhereForAccess(filter, access)
+	query := `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM c2_events WHERE ` + where
+	var n int64
+	err := db.QueryRow(query, args...).Scan(&n)
+	return n, err
+}
+
+// CountC2EventsByLevelForAccess 与 ListC2Events 相同过滤条件下按级别统计
+func (db *DB) CountC2EventsByLevelForAccess(filter ListC2EventsFilter, access RBACListAccess) (map[string]int64, error) {
+	where, args := buildC2EventsWhereForAccess(filter, access)
+	query := `SELECT level, COUNT(*) FROM c2_events WHERE ` + where + ` GROUP BY level`
+	rows, err := db.Query(query, args...)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+	counts := map[string]int64{
+		"info":     0,
+		"warn":     0,
+		"critical": 0,
+	}
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var level string
+		var n int64
+		if err := rows.Scan(&level, &n); err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		if _, ok := counts[level]; ok {
+			counts[level] = n
+		}
+	}
+	return counts, rows.Err()
+}
+
 // ListC2Events 事件查询，按创建时间倒序
 func (db *DB) ListC2Events(filter ListC2EventsFilter) ([]*C2Event, error) {
 	where, args := buildC2EventsWhere(filter)
@@ -1143,6 +1580,50 @@ func (db *DB) ListC2Events(filter ListC2EventsFilter) ([]*C2Event, error) {
 	return list, rows.Err()
 }
 
+func (db *DB) ListC2EventsForAccess(filter ListC2EventsFilter, access RBACListAccess) ([]*C2Event, error) {
+	where, args := buildC2EventsWhereForAccess(filter, access)
+	limit := filter.Limit
+	if limit <= 0 || limit > 1000 {
+		limit = 200
+	}
+	offset := filter.Offset
+	if offset < 0 {
+		offset = 0
+	}
+	query := `
+		SELECT id, level, category, COALESCE(session_id, ''), COALESCE(task_id, ''),
+			message, COALESCE(data_json, ''), created_at
+		FROM c2_events
+		WHERE ` + where + `
+		ORDER BY created_at DESC
+		LIMIT ? OFFSET ?
+	`
+	args = append(args, limit, offset)
+	rows, err := db.Query(query, args...)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+	return scanC2EventRows(rows)
+}
+
+func scanC2EventRows(rows *sql.Rows) ([]*C2Event, error) {
+	var list []*C2Event
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var e C2Event
+		var dataJSON string
+		if err := rows.Scan(&e.ID, &e.Level, &e.Category, &e.SessionID, &e.TaskID,
+			&e.Message, &dataJSON, &e.CreatedAt); err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		if dataJSON != "" {
+			_ = json.Unmarshal([]byte(dataJSON), &e.Data)
+		}
+		list = append(list, &e)
+	}
+	return list, rows.Err()
+}
+
 // DeleteC2EventsByIDs 按主键批量删除事件，返回实际删除行数
 func (db *DB) DeleteC2EventsByIDs(ids []string) (int64, error) {
 	if len(ids) == 0 {
@@ -1181,6 +1662,29 @@ func (db *DB) DeleteC2EventsByIDs(ids []string) (int64, error) {
 	return res.RowsAffected()
 }
 
+func (db *DB) DeleteC2EventsByIDsForAccess(ids []string, access RBACListAccess) (int64, error) {
+	if access.Scope == RBACScopeAll {
+		return db.DeleteC2EventsByIDs(ids)
+	}
+	clean := cleanC2IDs(ids)
+	if len(clean) == 0 {
+		return 0, ErrNoValidC2EventIDs
+	}
+	placeholders := strings.Repeat("?,", len(clean)-1) + "?"
+	args := make([]interface{}, 0, len(clean)+4)
+	for _, id := range clean {
+		args = append(args, id)
+	}
+	conditions := []string{"id IN (" + placeholders + ")"}
+	appendC2EventAccessFilter(&conditions, &args, access)
+	query := `DELETE FROM c2_events WHERE ` + strings.Join(conditions, " AND ")
+	res, err := db.Exec(query, args...)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	return res.RowsAffected()
+}
+
 // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // CRUD：C2 Malleable Profile
 // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

internal/database/c2_payload.go

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+package database
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func (db *DB) RecordC2PayloadArtifact(filename, payloadID, listenerID, ownerUserID string) error {
+	filename = strings.TrimSpace(filename)
+	if filename == "" || strings.TrimSpace(listenerID) == "" || strings.TrimSpace(ownerUserID) == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	_, err := db.Exec(`
+		INSERT INTO c2_payload_artifacts(filename, payload_id, listener_id, owner_user_id, created_at)
+		VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+		ON CONFLICT(filename) DO UPDATE SET payload_id=excluded.payload_id, listener_id=excluded.listener_id, owner_user_id=excluded.owner_user_id, created_at=excluded.created_at
+	`, filename, payloadID, listenerID, ownerUserID, time.Now())
+	return err
+}
+
+func (db *DB) UserCanAccessC2Payload(userID, scope, filename string) bool {
+	if scope == RBACScopeAll {
+		return true
+	}
+	var listenerID, ownerUserID string
+	if err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT listener_id, owner_user_id FROM c2_payload_artifacts WHERE filename = ?`, strings.TrimSpace(filename)).Scan(&listenerID, &ownerUserID); err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	return ownerUserID == strings.TrimSpace(userID) || db.UserCanAccessResource(userID, scope, "c2_listener", listenerID)
+}

internal/database/chat_upload.go

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+package database
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func (db *DB) UpsertChatUploadArtifact(relativePath, conversationID, ownerUserID string) error {
+	relativePath = strings.TrimSpace(relativePath)
+	conversationID = strings.TrimSpace(conversationID)
+	ownerUserID = strings.TrimSpace(ownerUserID)
+	if relativePath == "" || conversationID == "" || ownerUserID == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	_, err := db.Exec(`
+		INSERT INTO chat_upload_artifacts(relative_path, conversation_id, owner_user_id, created_at)
+		VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)
+		ON CONFLICT(relative_path) DO UPDATE SET conversation_id=excluded.conversation_id, owner_user_id=excluded.owner_user_id
+	`, relativePath, conversationID, ownerUserID, time.Now())
+	return err
+}
+
+func (db *DB) GetChatUploadArtifact(relativePath string) (conversationID, ownerUserID string, ok bool) {
+	err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT conversation_id, owner_user_id FROM chat_upload_artifacts WHERE relative_path = ?`, strings.TrimSpace(relativePath)).Scan(&conversationID, &ownerUserID)
+	return conversationID, ownerUserID, err == nil
+}
+
+func (db *DB) DeleteChatUploadArtifactPath(relativePath string) error {
+	path := strings.Trim(strings.TrimSpace(relativePath), "/")
+	if path == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	_, err := db.Exec(`DELETE FROM chat_upload_artifacts WHERE relative_path = ? OR relative_path LIKE ? ESCAPE '\'`, path, escapeLikePrefix(path)+"/%")
+	return err
+}
+
+func (db *DB) RenameChatUploadArtifactPath(oldPath, newPath string) error {
+	oldPath = strings.Trim(strings.TrimSpace(oldPath), "/")
+	newPath = strings.Trim(strings.TrimSpace(newPath), "/")
+	if oldPath == "" || newPath == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	_, err := db.Exec(`
+		UPDATE chat_upload_artifacts
+		SET relative_path = CASE
+			WHEN relative_path = ? THEN ?
+			ELSE ? || substr(relative_path, length(?) + 1)
+		END
+		WHERE relative_path = ? OR relative_path LIKE ? ESCAPE '\'
+	`, oldPath, newPath, newPath, oldPath, oldPath, escapeLikePrefix(oldPath)+"/%")
+	return err
+}
+
+func escapeLikePrefix(value string) string {
+	return strings.NewReplacer(`\`, `\\`, `%`, `\%`, `_`, `\_`).Replace(value)
+}

internal/database/conversation.go

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ type Conversation struct {
 	ID        string    `json:"id"`
 	Title     string    `json:"title"`
 	ProjectID string    `json:"projectId,omitempty"`
+	RoleName  string    `json:"roleName,omitempty"`
 	Pinned    bool      `json:"pinned"`
 	CreatedAt time.Time `json:"createdAt"`
 	UpdatedAt time.Time `json:"updatedAt"`
@@ -57,29 +58,30 @@ func (db *DB) CreateConversationWithWebshell(webshellConnectionID, title string,
 			return nil, err
 		}
 	}
+	roleName := normalizeConversationRoleName(meta.RoleName)
 
 	var err error
 	wsID := strings.TrimSpace(webshellConnectionID)
 	switch {
 	case wsID != "" && projectID != "":
 		_, err = db.Exec(
-			"INSERT INTO conversations (id, title, created_at, updated_at, webshell_connection_id, project_id) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
+			"INSERT INTO conversations (id, title, created_at, updated_at, webshell_connection_id, project_id, role_name) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
-			id, title, now, now, wsID, projectID,
+			id, title, now, now, wsID, projectID, roleName,
 		)
 	case wsID != "":
 		_, err = db.Exec(
-			"INSERT INTO conversations (id, title, created_at, updated_at, webshell_connection_id) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
+			"INSERT INTO conversations (id, title, created_at, updated_at, webshell_connection_id, role_name) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
-			id, title, now, now, wsID,
+			id, title, now, now, wsID, roleName,
 		)
 	case projectID != "":
 		_, err = db.Exec(
-			"INSERT INTO conversations (id, title, created_at, updated_at, project_id) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
+			"INSERT INTO conversations (id, title, created_at, updated_at, project_id, role_name) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
-			id, title, now, now, projectID,
+			id, title, now, now, projectID, roleName,
 		)
 	default:
 		_, err = db.Exec(
-			"INSERT INTO conversations (id, title, created_at, updated_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+			"INSERT INTO conversations (id, title, created_at, updated_at, role_name) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
-			id, title, now, now,
+			id, title, now, now, roleName,
 		)
 	}
 	if err != nil {
@@ -90,6 +92,7 @@ func (db *DB) CreateConversationWithWebshell(webshellConnectionID, title string,
 		ID:        id,
 		Title:     title,
 		ProjectID: projectID,
+		RoleName:  roleName,
 		CreatedAt: now,
 		UpdatedAt: now,
 	}
@@ -236,10 +239,11 @@ func (db *DB) GetConversation(id string) (*Conversation, error) {
 	var pinned int
 
 	var projectID sql.NullString
+	var roleName sql.NullString
 	err := db.QueryRow(
-		"SELECT id, title, pinned, created_at, updated_at, project_id FROM conversations WHERE id = ?",
+		"SELECT id, title, pinned, created_at, updated_at, project_id, role_name FROM conversations WHERE id = ?",
 		id,
-	).Scan(&conv.ID, &conv.Title, &pinned, &createdAt, &updatedAt, &projectID)
+	).Scan(&conv.ID, &conv.Title, &pinned, &createdAt, &updatedAt, &projectID, &roleName)
 	if err != nil {
 		if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("对话不存在")
@@ -249,6 +253,9 @@ func (db *DB) GetConversation(id string) (*Conversation, error) {
 	if projectID.Valid {
 		conv.ProjectID = strings.TrimSpace(projectID.String)
 	}
+	if roleName.Valid {
+		conv.RoleName = normalizeConversationRoleName(roleName.String)
+	}
 
 	// 尝试多种时间格式解析
 	var err1, err2 error
@@ -322,10 +329,11 @@ func (db *DB) GetConversationLite(id string) (*Conversation, error) {
 	var pinned int
 
 	var projectID sql.NullString
+	var roleName sql.NullString
 	err := db.QueryRow(
-		"SELECT id, title, pinned, created_at, updated_at, project_id FROM conversations WHERE id = ?",
+		"SELECT id, title, pinned, created_at, updated_at, project_id, role_name FROM conversations WHERE id = ?",
 		id,
-	).Scan(&conv.ID, &conv.Title, &pinned, &createdAt, &updatedAt, &projectID)
+	).Scan(&conv.ID, &conv.Title, &pinned, &createdAt, &updatedAt, &projectID, &roleName)
 	if err != nil {
 		if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("对话不存在")
@@ -335,6 +343,9 @@ func (db *DB) GetConversationLite(id string) (*Conversation, error) {
 	if projectID.Valid {
 		conv.ProjectID = strings.TrimSpace(projectID.String)
 	}
+	if roleName.Valid {
+		conv.RoleName = normalizeConversationRoleName(roleName.String)
+	}
 
 	// 尝试多种时间格式解析
 	var err1, err2 error
@@ -365,6 +376,26 @@ func (db *DB) GetConversationLite(id string) (*Conversation, error) {
 	return &conv, nil
 }
 
+func normalizeConversationRoleName(roleName string) string {
+	roleName = strings.TrimSpace(roleName)
+	if roleName == "" {
+		return "默认"
+	}
+	return roleName
+}
+
+func (db *DB) SetConversationRoleName(id, roleName string) error {
+	roleName = normalizeConversationRoleName(roleName)
+	_, err := db.Exec(
+		"UPDATE conversations SET role_name = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE id = ?",
+		roleName, time.Now(), id,
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("更新对话角色失败: %w", err)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 func conversationProjectIDColumn(alias string) string {
 	if alias != "" {
 		return alias + ".project_id"
@@ -384,6 +415,31 @@ func appendConversationProjectFilter(where string, args []interface{}, projectID
 	return where + fmt.Sprintf(" AND %s = ?", col), append(args, pid)
 }
 
+func appendConversationAccessFilter(where string, args []interface{}, userID, scope, alias string) (string, []interface{}) {
+	userID = strings.TrimSpace(userID)
+	if userID == "" || scope == RBACScopeAll {
+		return where, args
+	}
+	prefix := ""
+	if alias != "" {
+		prefix = alias + "."
+	}
+	where += fmt.Sprintf(` AND (%sowner_user_id = ? OR EXISTS (
+		SELECT 1 FROM rbac_resource_assignments ra
+		WHERE ra.user_id = ? AND ra.resource_type = 'conversation' AND ra.resource_id = %sid
+	) OR EXISTS (
+		SELECT 1 FROM projects p
+		WHERE p.id = %sproject_id AND (
+			p.owner_user_id = ? OR EXISTS (
+				SELECT 1 FROM rbac_resource_assignments pra
+				WHERE pra.user_id = ? AND pra.resource_type = 'project' AND pra.resource_id = p.id
+			)
+		)
+	))`, prefix, prefix, prefix)
+	args = append(args, userID, userID, userID, userID)
+	return where, args
+}
+
 // CountConversations 统计对话数量。
 func (db *DB) CountConversations(search, projectID string) (int, error) {
 	var count int
@@ -410,6 +466,33 @@ func (db *DB) CountConversations(search, projectID string) (int, error) {
 	return count, nil
 }
 
+func (db *DB) CountConversationsForAccess(search, projectID, userID, scope string) (int, error) {
+	var count int
+	var err error
+	if search != "" {
+		searchPattern := "%" + search + "%"
+		where := ` WHERE (c.title LIKE ?
+			    OR EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM messages m WHERE m.conversation_id = c.id AND m.content LIKE ?))`
+		args := []interface{}{searchPattern, searchPattern}
+		where, args = appendConversationProjectFilter(where, args, projectID, "c")
+		where, args = appendConversationAccessFilter(where, args, userID, scope, "c")
+		err = db.QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM conversations c`+where, args...).Scan(&count)
+	} else {
+		where := ""
+		args := []interface{}{}
+		where, args = appendConversationProjectFilter(where, args, projectID, "")
+		where, args = appendConversationAccessFilter(where, args, userID, scope, "")
+		if where != "" {
+			where = " WHERE" + strings.TrimPrefix(where, " AND")
+		}
+		err = db.QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM conversations`+where, args...).Scan(&count)
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("统计对话失败: %w", err)
+	}
+	return count, nil
+}
+
 func conversationOrderClause(sortBy, tableAlias string) string {
 	col := "updated_at"
 	if strings.TrimSpace(strings.ToLower(sortBy)) == "created_at" {
@@ -437,7 +520,7 @@ func (db *DB) ListConversations(limit, offset int, search, sortBy, projectID str
 		where, args = appendConversationProjectFilter(where, args, projectID, "c")
 		args = append(args, limit, offset)
 		rows, err = db.Query(
-			`SELECT c.id, c.title, COALESCE(c.pinned, 0), c.created_at, c.updated_at, c.project_id
+			`SELECT c.id, c.title, COALESCE(c.pinned, 0), c.created_at, c.updated_at, c.project_id, c.role_name
 			 FROM conversations c`+where+`
 			 `+orderClause+`
 			 LIMIT ? OFFSET ?`,
@@ -453,7 +536,7 @@ func (db *DB) ListConversations(limit, offset int, search, sortBy, projectID str
 		}
 		args = append(args, limit, offset)
 		rows, err = db.Query(
-			"SELECT id, title, COALESCE(pinned, 0), created_at, updated_at, project_id FROM conversations"+where+" "+orderClause+" LIMIT ? OFFSET ?",
+			"SELECT id, title, COALESCE(pinned, 0), created_at, updated_at, project_id, role_name FROM conversations"+where+" "+orderClause+" LIMIT ? OFFSET ?",
 			args...,
 		)
 	}
@@ -462,22 +545,67 @@ func (db *DB) ListConversations(limit, offset int, search, sortBy, projectID str
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("查询对话列表失败: %w", err)
 	}
 	defer rows.Close()
+	return scanConversationRows(rows)
+}
 
+func (db *DB) ListConversationsForAccess(limit, offset int, search, sortBy, projectID, userID, scope string) ([]*Conversation, error) {
+	if scope == RBACScopeAll || strings.TrimSpace(userID) == "" {
+		return db.ListConversations(limit, offset, search, sortBy, projectID)
+	}
+	var rows *sql.Rows
+	var err error
+	if search != "" {
+		searchPattern := "%" + search + "%"
+		orderClause := conversationOrderClause(sortBy, "c")
+		where := ` WHERE (c.title LIKE ?
+			    OR EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM messages m WHERE m.conversation_id = c.id AND m.content LIKE ?))`
+		args := []interface{}{searchPattern, searchPattern}
+		where, args = appendConversationProjectFilter(where, args, projectID, "c")
+		where, args = appendConversationAccessFilter(where, args, userID, scope, "c")
+		args = append(args, limit, offset)
+		rows, err = db.Query(
+			`SELECT c.id, c.title, COALESCE(c.pinned, 0), c.created_at, c.updated_at, c.project_id, c.role_name
+			 FROM conversations c`+where+`
+			 `+orderClause+`
+			 LIMIT ? OFFSET ?`, args...)
+	} else {
+		orderClause := conversationOrderClause(sortBy, "")
+		where := ""
+		args := []interface{}{}
+		where, args = appendConversationProjectFilter(where, args, projectID, "")
+		where, args = appendConversationAccessFilter(where, args, userID, scope, "")
+		if where != "" {
+			where = " WHERE" + strings.TrimPrefix(where, " AND")
+		}
+		args = append(args, limit, offset)
+		rows, err = db.Query(
+			"SELECT id, title, COALESCE(pinned, 0), created_at, updated_at, project_id, role_name FROM conversations"+where+" "+orderClause+" LIMIT ? OFFSET ?",
+			args...)
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("查询对话列表失败: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+	return scanConversationRows(rows)
+}
+
+func scanConversationRows(rows *sql.Rows) ([]*Conversation, error) {
 	var conversations []*Conversation
 	for rows.Next() {
 		var conv Conversation
 		var createdAt, updatedAt string
 		var pinned int
 		var projectID sql.NullString
-
+		var roleName sql.NullString
-		if err := rows.Scan(&conv.ID, &conv.Title, &pinned, &createdAt, &updatedAt, &projectID); err != nil {
+		if err := rows.Scan(&conv.ID, &conv.Title, &pinned, &createdAt, &updatedAt, &projectID, &roleName); err != nil {
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("扫描对话失败: %w", err)
 		}
 		if projectID.Valid {
 			conv.ProjectID = strings.TrimSpace(projectID.String)
 		}
-
+		if roleName.Valid {
-		// 尝试多种时间格式解析
+			conv.RoleName = normalizeConversationRoleName(roleName.String)
+		}
 		var err1, err2 error
 		conv.CreatedAt, err1 = time.Parse("2006-01-02 15:04:05.999999999-07:00", createdAt)
 		if err1 != nil {
@@ -486,7 +614,6 @@ func (db *DB) ListConversations(limit, offset int, search, sortBy, projectID str
 		if err1 != nil {
 			conv.CreatedAt, _ = time.Parse(time.RFC3339, createdAt)
 		}
-
 		conv.UpdatedAt, err2 = time.Parse("2006-01-02 15:04:05.999999999-07:00", updatedAt)
 		if err2 != nil {
 			conv.UpdatedAt, err2 = time.Parse("2006-01-02 15:04:05", updatedAt)
@@ -494,13 +621,10 @@ func (db *DB) ListConversations(limit, offset int, search, sortBy, projectID str
 		if err2 != nil {
 			conv.UpdatedAt, _ = time.Parse(time.RFC3339, updatedAt)
 		}
-
 		conv.Pinned = pinned != 0
-
 		conversations = append(conversations, &conv)
 	}
-
+	return conversations, rows.Err()
-	return conversations, nil
 }
 
 const ungroupedConversationsSQL = `
@@ -521,6 +645,18 @@ func (db *DB) CountUngroupedConversations(projectID string) (int, error) {
 	return count, nil
 }
 
+func (db *DB) CountUngroupedConversationsForAccess(projectID, userID, scope string) (int, error) {
+	where := ungroupedConversationsSQL
+	args := []interface{}{}
+	where, args = appendConversationProjectFilter(where, args, projectID, "c")
+	where, args = appendConversationAccessFilter(where, args, userID, scope, "c")
+	var count int
+	if err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) `+where, args...).Scan(&count); err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("统计未分组对话失败: %w", err)
+	}
+	return count, nil
+}
+
 // ListUngroupedConversations 列出不在任何分组中的对话（最近对话侧栏）。
 func (db *DB) ListUngroupedConversations(limit, offset int, sortBy, projectID string) ([]*Conversation, error) {
 	orderClause := conversationOrderClause(sortBy, "c")
@@ -529,7 +665,7 @@ func (db *DB) ListUngroupedConversations(limit, offset int, sortBy, projectID st
 	where, args = appendConversationProjectFilter(where, args, projectID, "c")
 	args = append(args, limit, offset)
 	rows, err := db.Query(
-		`SELECT c.id, c.title, COALESCE(c.pinned, 0), c.created_at, c.updated_at, c.project_id `+
+		`SELECT c.id, c.title, COALESCE(c.pinned, 0), c.created_at, c.updated_at, c.project_id, c.role_name `+
 			where+`
 		 `+orderClause+`
 		 LIMIT ? OFFSET ?`,
@@ -539,43 +675,31 @@ func (db *DB) ListUngroupedConversations(limit, offset int, sortBy, projectID st
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("查询未分组对话失败: %w", err)
 	}
 	defer rows.Close()
+	return scanConversationRows(rows)
+}
 
-	var conversations []*Conversation
+func (db *DB) ListUngroupedConversationsForAccess(limit, offset int, sortBy, projectID, userID, scope string) ([]*Conversation, error) {
-	for rows.Next() {
+	if scope == RBACScopeAll || strings.TrimSpace(userID) == "" {
-		var conv Conversation
+		return db.ListUngroupedConversations(limit, offset, sortBy, projectID)
-		var createdAt, updatedAt string
-		var pinned int
-		var projectID sql.NullString
-
-		if err := rows.Scan(&conv.ID, &conv.Title, &pinned, &createdAt, &updatedAt, &projectID); err != nil {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("扫描对话失败: %w", err)
-		}
-		if projectID.Valid {
-			conv.ProjectID = strings.TrimSpace(projectID.String)
-		}
-
-		var err1, err2 error
-		conv.CreatedAt, err1 = time.Parse("2006-01-02 15:04:05.999999999-07:00", createdAt)
-		if err1 != nil {
-			conv.CreatedAt, err1 = time.Parse("2006-01-02 15:04:05", createdAt)
-		}
-		if err1 != nil {
-			conv.CreatedAt, _ = time.Parse(time.RFC3339, createdAt)
-		}
-
-		conv.UpdatedAt, err2 = time.Parse("2006-01-02 15:04:05.999999999-07:00", updatedAt)
-		if err2 != nil {
-			conv.UpdatedAt, err2 = time.Parse("2006-01-02 15:04:05", updatedAt)
-		}
-		if err2 != nil {
-			conv.UpdatedAt, _ = time.Parse(time.RFC3339, updatedAt)
-		}
-
-		conv.Pinned = pinned != 0
-		conversations = append(conversations, &conv)
 	}
-
+	orderClause := conversationOrderClause(sortBy, "c")
-	return conversations, rows.Err()
+	where := ungroupedConversationsSQL
+	args := []interface{}{}
+	where, args = appendConversationProjectFilter(where, args, projectID, "c")
+	where, args = appendConversationAccessFilter(where, args, userID, scope, "c")
+	args = append(args, limit, offset)
+	rows, err := db.Query(
+		`SELECT c.id, c.title, COALESCE(c.pinned, 0), c.created_at, c.updated_at, c.project_id, c.role_name `+
+			where+`
+		 `+orderClause+`
+		 LIMIT ? OFFSET ?`,
+		args...,
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("查询未分组对话失败: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+	return scanConversationRows(rows)
 }
 
 // GetConversationTitle 获取对话标题（轻量查询，不加载消息）
@@ -698,6 +822,19 @@ func (db *DB) einoReductionBaseDir() string {
 	return filepath.Join("tmp", "reduction")
 }
 
+// EinoReductionBaseDir returns the configured reduction cache root.
+func (db *DB) EinoReductionBaseDir() string {
+	return db.einoReductionBaseDir()
+}
+
+// ConversationArtifactsBaseDir returns the conversation-scoped artifacts root.
+func (db *DB) ConversationArtifactsBaseDir() string {
+	if db == nil {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return strings.TrimSpace(db.conversationArtifactsDir)
+}
+
 func (db *DB) einoWorkspaceBaseDir() string {
 	if db == nil {
 		return ""
@@ -1144,6 +1281,12 @@ ORDER BY created_at ASC, rowid ASC`, assistantMessageID)
 
 // AddProcessDetail 添加过程详情事件
 func (db *DB) AddProcessDetail(messageID, conversationID, eventType, message string, data interface{}) error {
+	_, err := db.AddProcessDetailWithID(messageID, conversationID, eventType, message, data)
+	return err
+}
+
+// AddProcessDetailWithID 添加过程详情事件并返回记录 ID。
+func (db *DB) AddProcessDetailWithID(messageID, conversationID, eventType, message string, data interface{}) (string, error) {
 	id := uuid.New().String()
 
 	var dataJSON string
@@ -1161,10 +1304,10 @@ func (db *DB) AddProcessDetail(messageID, conversationID, eventType, message str
 		id, messageID, conversationID, eventType, message, dataJSON, time.Now(),
 	)
 	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("添加过程详情失败: %w", err)
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("添加过程详情失败: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	return nil
+	return id, nil
 }
 
 // GetProcessDetails 获取消息的过程详情
@@ -1203,11 +1346,45 @@ func (db *DB) GetProcessDetails(messageID string) ([]ProcessDetail, error) {
 	return details, nil
 }
 
+// GetProcessDetailByID 获取单条过程详情。
+func (db *DB) GetProcessDetailByID(id string) (*ProcessDetail, error) {
+	var detail ProcessDetail
+	var createdAt string
+	err := db.QueryRow(
+		"SELECT id, message_id, conversation_id, event_type, message, data, created_at FROM process_details WHERE id = ?",
+		id,
+	).Scan(&detail.ID, &detail.MessageID, &detail.ConversationID, &detail.EventType, &detail.Message, &detail.Data, &createdAt)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("查询过程详情失败: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	var parseErr error
+	detail.CreatedAt, parseErr = time.Parse("2006-01-02 15:04:05.999999999-07:00", createdAt)
+	if parseErr != nil {
+		detail.CreatedAt, parseErr = time.Parse("2006-01-02 15:04:05", createdAt)
+	}
+	if parseErr != nil {
+		detail.CreatedAt, _ = time.Parse(time.RFC3339, createdAt)
+	}
+	return &detail, nil
+}
+
 // ProcessDetailsSummary 过程详情摘要（用于折叠态展示，避免全量加载）。
 type ProcessDetailsSummary struct {
-	Total          int `json:"total"`
+	Total           int                           `json:"total"`
-	IterationCount int `json:"iterationCount"`
+	IterationCount  int                           `json:"iterationCount"`
-	MaxIteration   int `json:"maxIteration"`
+	MaxIteration    int                           `json:"maxIteration"`
+	ToolCount       int                           `json:"toolCount"`
+	ToolExecutions  []ProcessDetailsToolExecution `json:"toolExecutions,omitempty"`
+	MCPExecutionIDs []string                      `json:"mcpExecutionIds,omitempty"`
+}
+
+type ProcessDetailsToolExecution struct {
+	ProcessDetailID string `json:"processDetailId,omitempty"`
+	ToolName        string `json:"toolName,omitempty"`
+	ToolCallID      string `json:"toolCallId,omitempty"`
+	ExecutionID     string `json:"executionId,omitempty"`
+	Status          string `json:"status,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // GetProcessDetailsSummary 统计消息的过程详情数量与迭代轮次。
@@ -1225,6 +1402,144 @@ func (db *DB) GetProcessDetailsSummary(messageID string) (*ProcessDetailsSummary
 		return summary, nil
 	}
 
+	if err := db.QueryRow(
+		"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM process_details WHERE message_id = ? AND event_type = 'tool_call'",
+		messageID,
+	).Scan(&summary.ToolCount); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("统计工具调用详情失败: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	execRows, err := db.Query(
+		"SELECT id, event_type, data FROM process_details WHERE message_id = ? AND event_type IN ('tool_call', 'tool_result') ORDER BY created_at ASC, rowid ASC",
+		messageID,
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("查询工具执行摘要失败: %w", err)
+	}
+	seenExecIDs := make(map[string]bool)
+	// A provider may reuse a fallback toolCallId across streaming rounds. Keep a
+	// FIFO per ID instead of a single index so every persisted call gets at most
+	// one result. Results without an ID fall back to the oldest unmatched call.
+	toolIndexesByCallID := make(map[string][]int)
+	lastMatchedToolIndexByCallID := make(map[string]int)
+	matchedToolIndexes := make([]bool, 0)
+	nextUnmatchedToolIdx := 0
+	for execRows.Next() {
+		var detailID string
+		var eventType string
+		var dataJSON string
+		if err := execRows.Scan(&detailID, &eventType, &dataJSON); err != nil {
+			execRows.Close()
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("扫描工具执行摘要失败: %w", err)
+		}
+		if dataJSON == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		var payload map[string]interface{}
+		if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(dataJSON), &payload); err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		toolName, _ := payload["toolName"].(string)
+		toolName = strings.TrimSpace(toolName)
+		toolCallID, _ := payload["toolCallId"].(string)
+		toolCallID = strings.TrimSpace(toolCallID)
+		execID, _ := payload["executionId"].(string)
+		execID = strings.TrimSpace(execID)
+		status := ""
+		if eventType == "tool_result" {
+			if success, ok := payload["success"].(bool); ok {
+				if success {
+					status = "completed"
+				} else {
+					status = "failed"
+				}
+			} else if isErr, ok := payload["isError"].(bool); ok && isErr {
+				status = "failed"
+			}
+		}
+		if eventType == "tool_call" {
+			summary.ToolExecutions = append(summary.ToolExecutions, ProcessDetailsToolExecution{
+				ProcessDetailID: strings.TrimSpace(detailID),
+				ToolName:        toolName,
+				ToolCallID:      toolCallID,
+				// This summary is reconstructed from persisted history, not live
+				// execution state. Until a matching result is found the honest state
+				// is "result_missing", never "running".
+				Status: "result_missing",
+			})
+			matchedToolIndexes = append(matchedToolIndexes, false)
+			if toolCallID != "" {
+				toolIndexesByCallID[toolCallID] = append(toolIndexesByCallID[toolCallID], len(summary.ToolExecutions)-1)
+			}
+		}
+		if eventType == "tool_result" {
+			idx := -1
+			if toolCallID != "" {
+				queue := toolIndexesByCallID[toolCallID]
+				for len(queue) > 0 {
+					candidate := queue[0]
+					queue = queue[1:]
+					if candidate >= 0 && candidate < len(matchedToolIndexes) && !matchedToolIndexes[candidate] {
+						idx = candidate
+						break
+					}
+				}
+				toolIndexesByCallID[toolCallID] = queue
+				if idx < 0 {
+					// Multiple persisted result events for one call (for example an
+					// agent-facing reduced result replacing an earlier preview) update
+					// that call instead of consuming an unrelated FIFO entry.
+					if previous, ok := lastMatchedToolIndexByCallID[toolCallID]; ok {
+						idx = previous
+					}
+				}
+			}
+			if idx < 0 {
+				for nextUnmatchedToolIdx < len(matchedToolIndexes) && matchedToolIndexes[nextUnmatchedToolIdx] {
+					nextUnmatchedToolIdx++
+				}
+				if nextUnmatchedToolIdx < len(matchedToolIndexes) {
+					idx = nextUnmatchedToolIdx
+					nextUnmatchedToolIdx++
+				}
+			}
+			if idx >= 0 && idx < len(summary.ToolExecutions) {
+				matchedToolIndexes[idx] = true
+				if toolCallID != "" {
+					lastMatchedToolIndexByCallID[toolCallID] = idx
+				}
+				if summary.ToolExecutions[idx].ToolName == "" {
+					summary.ToolExecutions[idx].ToolName = toolName
+				}
+				if summary.ToolExecutions[idx].ToolCallID == "" {
+					summary.ToolExecutions[idx].ToolCallID = toolCallID
+				}
+				summary.ToolExecutions[idx].ExecutionID = execID
+				if status != "" {
+					summary.ToolExecutions[idx].Status = status
+				}
+			} else {
+				summary.ToolExecutions = append(summary.ToolExecutions, ProcessDetailsToolExecution{
+					ProcessDetailID: strings.TrimSpace(detailID),
+					ToolName:        toolName,
+					ToolCallID:      toolCallID,
+					ExecutionID:     execID,
+					Status:          status,
+				})
+				matchedToolIndexes = append(matchedToolIndexes, true)
+			}
+		}
+		if execID != "" && !seenExecIDs[execID] {
+			seenExecIDs[execID] = true
+			summary.MCPExecutionIDs = append(summary.MCPExecutionIDs, execID)
+		}
+	}
+	if err := execRows.Err(); err != nil {
+		execRows.Close()
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("遍历工具执行摘要失败: %w", err)
+	}
+	execRows.Close()
+
 	rows, err := db.Query(
 		"SELECT data FROM process_details WHERE message_id = ? AND event_type = 'iteration' ORDER BY created_at ASC, rowid ASC",
 		messageID,
@@ -1304,6 +1619,36 @@ func (db *DB) GetProcessDetailsPage(messageID string, limit, offset int) ([]Proc
 	return details, total, nil
 }
 
+// GetProcessDetailOffset 返回某条过程详情在所属消息详情流中的零基 offset。
+func (db *DB) GetProcessDetailOffset(messageID, detailID string) (int, error) {
+	messageID = strings.TrimSpace(messageID)
+	detailID = strings.TrimSpace(detailID)
+	if messageID == "" || detailID == "" {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("messageID and detailID are required")
+	}
+	var createdAt string
+	var rowID int64
+	if err := db.QueryRow(
+		"SELECT created_at, rowid FROM process_details WHERE message_id = ? AND id = ?",
+		messageID, detailID,
+	).Scan(&createdAt, &rowID); err != nil {
+		if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
+			return 0, fmt.Errorf("过程详情不存在")
+		}
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("查询过程详情锚点失败: %w", err)
+	}
+	var offset int
+	if err := db.QueryRow(
+		`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM process_details
+		 WHERE message_id = ?
+		   AND (created_at < ? OR (created_at = ? AND rowid < ?))`,
+		messageID, createdAt, createdAt, rowID,
+	).Scan(&offset); err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("计算过程详情锚点位置失败: %w", err)
+	}
+	return offset, nil
+}
+
 // GetProcessDetailsByConversation 获取对话的所有过程详情（按消息分组）
 func (db *DB) GetProcessDetailsByConversation(conversationID string) (map[string][]ProcessDetail, error) {
 	rows, err := db.Query(

internal/database/conversation_create_meta.go

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ type ConversationCreateMeta struct {
 	Source               string
 	WebShellConnectionID string
 	ProjectID            string
+	RoleName             string
 	ClientIP             string
 	SessionHint          string
 }

internal/database/database.go

@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ type DB struct {
 	checkpointDone           chan struct{}
 	closeOnce                sync.Once
 	closeErr                 error
+	vulnerabilityCreatedHook func(*Vulnerability)
 }
 
 // startPassiveCheckpointLoop 启动后台 PASSIVE checkpoint 循环。
@@ -113,10 +114,10 @@ func (db *DB) runPassiveCheckpoint(trigger string) {
 		return
 	}
 	if busy > 0 {
-		db.logger.Info("SQLite PASSIVE checkpoint 完成（部分推进）", fields...)
+		db.logger.Debug("SQLite PASSIVE checkpoint 完成（部分推进）", fields...)
 		return
 	}
-	db.logger.Info("SQLite PASSIVE checkpoint 完成（成功）", fields...)
+	db.logger.Debug("SQLite PASSIVE checkpoint 完成（成功）", fields...)
 }
 
 // NewDB 创建数据库连接
@@ -182,6 +183,7 @@ func (db *DB) initTables() error {
 		title TEXT NOT NULL,
 		created_at DATETIME NOT NULL,
 		updated_at DATETIME NOT NULL,
+		role_name TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '默认',
 		last_react_input TEXT,
 		last_react_output TEXT
 	);`
@@ -225,6 +227,12 @@ func (db *DB) initTables() error {
 		start_time DATETIME NOT NULL,
 		end_time DATETIME,
 		duration_ms INTEGER,
+		partial_output TEXT,
+		partial_output_bytes INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+		partial_output_truncated INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+		partial_output_updated_at DATETIME,
+		owner_user_id TEXT,
+		conversation_id TEXT,
 		created_at DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
 	);`
 
@@ -300,6 +308,7 @@ func (db *DB) initTables() error {
 		id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
 		name TEXT NOT NULL,
 		icon TEXT,
+		owner_user_id TEXT,
 		created_at DATETIME NOT NULL,
 		updated_at DATETIME NOT NULL
 	);`
@@ -322,6 +331,7 @@ func (db *DB) initTables() error {
 		session_key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
 		conversation_id TEXT NOT NULL,
 		role_name TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '默认',
+		agent_mode TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'eino_single',
 		updated_at DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
 		FOREIGN KEY (conversation_id) REFERENCES conversations(id) ON DELETE CASCADE
 	);`
@@ -400,6 +410,48 @@ func (db *DB) initTables() error {
 		FOREIGN KEY (conversation_id) REFERENCES conversations(id) ON DELETE SET NULL
 	);`
 
+	createAssetsTable := `
+	CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS assets (
+		id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+		dedup_key TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE, project_id TEXT,
+		host TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '', ip TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '', port INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+		domain TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '', protocol TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '', title TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+		server TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '', country TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '', province TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '', city TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+		responsible_person TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '', department TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '', business_system TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+		environment TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '', criticality TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+		source TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'manual', source_query TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '', status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'active',
+		tags_json TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '[]', first_seen_at DATETIME NOT NULL, last_seen_at DATETIME NOT NULL,
+		created_at DATETIME NOT NULL, updated_at DATETIME NOT NULL, owner_user_id TEXT,
+		FOREIGN KEY (project_id) REFERENCES projects(id) ON DELETE SET NULL
+	);`
+
+	createVulnerabilityAlertSubscriptionsTable := `
+	CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS vulnerability_alert_subscriptions (
+		user_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+		enabled INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+		min_severity TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'high',
+		created_at DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+		updated_at DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+		FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES rbac_users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE
+	);`
+	createVulnerabilityAlertDeliveriesTable := `
+	CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS vulnerability_alert_deliveries (
+		id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+		vulnerability_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+		user_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+		platform TEXT NOT NULL,
+		external_user_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+		status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'pending',
+		attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+		next_attempt_at DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+		last_error TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+		created_at DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+		updated_at DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+		UNIQUE(vulnerability_id, platform, external_user_id),
+		FOREIGN KEY (vulnerability_id) REFERENCES vulnerabilities(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+		FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES rbac_users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE
+	);`
+
 	// 创建批量任务队列表
 	createBatchTaskQueuesTable := `
 	CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS batch_task_queues (
@@ -478,6 +530,7 @@ func (db *DB) initTables() error {
 		status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'stopped',
 		config_json TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}',
 		remark TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+		owner_user_id TEXT,
 		created_at DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
 		started_at DATETIME,
 		last_error TEXT
@@ -634,6 +687,28 @@ func (db *DB) initTables() error {
 		FOREIGN KEY (run_id) REFERENCES workflow_runs(id) ON DELETE CASCADE
 	);`
 
+	createWorkflowPackageInspectionsTable := `
+	CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS workflow_package_inspections (
+		id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, package_hash TEXT NOT NULL, manifest_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+		workflow_payload_json TEXT NOT NULL, inspection_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+		source_workflow_id TEXT NOT NULL, source_revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+		source_content_hash TEXT NOT NULL, source_graph_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
+		local_conflict_state TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (local_conflict_state IN ('none','identical','id_conflict')),
+		local_workflow_id TEXT, local_content_hash TEXT, local_graph_hash TEXT,
+		created_by TEXT NOT NULL, status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'ready' CHECK (status IN ('ready','consumed','expired')),
+		created_at DATETIME NOT NULL, expires_at DATETIME NOT NULL, consumed_at DATETIME
+	);`
+	createWorkflowPackageImportsTable := `
+	CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS workflow_package_imports (
+		id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, inspection_id TEXT NOT NULL, request_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
+		idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL, actor_user_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+		action TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (action IN ('create','keep_existing','overwrite','rename')),
+		source_workflow_id TEXT NOT NULL, target_workflow_id TEXT NOT NULL, resulting_workflow_id TEXT,
+		result TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (result IN ('created','overwritten','renamed','kept_existing','skipped_identical','failed')),
+		error_code TEXT, error_message TEXT, created_at DATETIME NOT NULL, applied_at DATETIME,
+		FOREIGN KEY (inspection_id) REFERENCES workflow_package_inspections(id)
+	);`
+
 	// 创建索引
 	createIndexes := `
 	CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_messages_conversation_id ON messages(conversation_id);
@@ -660,6 +735,13 @@ func (db *DB) initTables() error {
 	CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_vulnerabilities_severity ON vulnerabilities(severity);
 	CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_vulnerabilities_status ON vulnerabilities(status);
 	CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_vulnerabilities_created_at ON vulnerabilities(created_at);
+	CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_assets_last_seen ON assets(last_seen_at);
+	CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_assets_last_scan ON assets(last_scan_at);
+	CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_assets_ip ON assets(ip);
+	CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_assets_domain ON assets(domain);
+	CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_assets_status ON assets(status);
+	CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_assets_owner ON assets(owner_user_id);
+	CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_assets_project ON assets(project_id);
 	CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_projects_status ON projects(status);
 	CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_projects_updated_at ON projects(updated_at);
 	CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_project_facts_project_id ON project_facts(project_id);
@@ -698,6 +780,9 @@ func (db *DB) initTables() error {
 	CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_workflow_runs_conversation ON workflow_runs(conversation_id);
 	CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_workflow_runs_status ON workflow_runs(status);
 	CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_workflow_node_runs_run ON workflow_node_runs(run_id);
+	CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_workflow_package_inspections_creator_expiry ON workflow_package_inspections(created_by, expires_at);
+	CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS uq_workflow_package_imports_actor_key ON workflow_package_imports(actor_user_id, idempotency_key);
+	CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS uq_workflow_package_imports_inspection_success ON workflow_package_imports(inspection_id) WHERE result IN ('created','overwritten','renamed','kept_existing','skipped_identical');
 	`
 
 	if _, err := db.Exec(createConversationsTable); err != nil {
@@ -746,6 +831,9 @@ func (db *DB) initTables() error {
 	if _, err := db.Exec(createRobotUserSessionsTable); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("创建robot_user_sessions表失败: %w", err)
 	}
+	if err := db.migrateRobotUserSessionsTable(); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("迁移robot_user_sessions表失败: %w", err)
+	}
 
 	if _, err := db.Exec(createProjectsTable); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("创建projects表失败: %w", err)
@@ -762,6 +850,12 @@ func (db *DB) initTables() error {
 	if _, err := db.Exec(createVulnerabilitiesTable); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("创建vulnerabilities表失败: %w", err)
 	}
+	if _, err := db.Exec(createAssetsTable); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("创建assets表失败: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := db.migrateAssetsTable(); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("迁移assets表失败: %w", err)
+	}
 
 	if _, err := db.Exec(createBatchTaskQueuesTable); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("创建batch_task_queues表失败: %w", err)
@@ -783,10 +877,22 @@ func (db *DB) initTables() error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("创建audit_logs表失败: %w", err)
 	}
 
+	if err := db.initRBACTables(); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("创建RBAC表失败: %w", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.Exec(createVulnerabilityAlertSubscriptionsTable); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("创建漏洞提醒订阅表失败: %w", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.Exec(createVulnerabilityAlertDeliveriesTable); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("创建漏洞提醒投递表失败: %w", err)
+	}
+
 	for tableName, ddl := range map[string]string{
-		"workflow_definitions": createWorkflowDefinitionsTable,
+		"workflow_definitions":         createWorkflowDefinitionsTable,
-		"workflow_runs":        createWorkflowRunsTable,
+		"workflow_runs":                createWorkflowRunsTable,
-		"workflow_node_runs":   createWorkflowNodeRunsTable,
+		"workflow_node_runs":           createWorkflowNodeRunsTable,
+		"workflow_package_inspections": createWorkflowPackageInspectionsTable,
+		"workflow_package_imports":     createWorkflowPackageImportsTable,
 	} {
 		if _, err := db.Exec(ddl); err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("创建%s表失败: %w", tableName, err)
@@ -853,12 +959,78 @@ func (db *DB) initTables() error {
 	if err := db.migrateWorkflowRunsTable(); err != nil {
 		db.logger.Warn("迁移workflow_runs表失败", zap.Error(err))
 	}
+	if err := db.migrateToolExecutionsPartialOutputColumns(); err != nil {
+		db.logger.Warn("迁移tool_executions partial output字段失败", zap.Error(err))
+	}
+	if err := db.migrateRBACOwnershipColumns(); err != nil {
+		db.logger.Warn("迁移RBAC资源归属字段失败", zap.Error(err))
+	}
 
 	if _, err := db.Exec(createIndexes); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("创建索引失败: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	db.logger.Info("数据库表初始化完成")
+	db.logger.Debug("数据库表初始化完成")
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (db *DB) migrateRobotUserSessionsTable() error {
+	var count int
+	if err := db.QueryRow("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM pragma_table_info('robot_user_sessions') WHERE name='agent_mode'").Scan(&count); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if count == 0 {
+		_, err := db.Exec("ALTER TABLE robot_user_sessions ADD COLUMN agent_mode TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'eino_single'")
+		return err
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (db *DB) migrateToolExecutionsPartialOutputColumns() error {
+	for _, col := range []struct {
+		name string
+		stmt string
+	}{
+		{"partial_output", "ALTER TABLE tool_executions ADD COLUMN partial_output TEXT"},
+		{"partial_output_bytes", "ALTER TABLE tool_executions ADD COLUMN partial_output_bytes INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0"},
+		{"partial_output_truncated", "ALTER TABLE tool_executions ADD COLUMN partial_output_truncated INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0"},
+		{"partial_output_updated_at", "ALTER TABLE tool_executions ADD COLUMN partial_output_updated_at DATETIME"},
+	} {
+		if err := db.addColumnIfMissing("tool_executions", col.name, col.stmt); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// migrateAssetsTable keeps databases created by the first asset-management release compatible.
+func (db *DB) migrateAssetsTable() error {
+	columns := []struct {
+		name string
+		ddl  string
+	}{
+		{"project_id", "ALTER TABLE assets ADD COLUMN project_id TEXT"},
+		{"last_scan_at", "ALTER TABLE assets ADD COLUMN last_scan_at DATETIME"},
+		{"last_scan_conversation_id", "ALTER TABLE assets ADD COLUMN last_scan_conversation_id TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''"},
+		{"last_scan_queue_id", "ALTER TABLE assets ADD COLUMN last_scan_queue_id TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''"},
+		{"last_scan_task_id", "ALTER TABLE assets ADD COLUMN last_scan_task_id TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''"},
+		{"responsible_person", "ALTER TABLE assets ADD COLUMN responsible_person TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''"},
+		{"department", "ALTER TABLE assets ADD COLUMN department TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''"},
+		{"business_system", "ALTER TABLE assets ADD COLUMN business_system TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''"},
+		{"environment", "ALTER TABLE assets ADD COLUMN environment TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''"},
+		{"criticality", "ALTER TABLE assets ADD COLUMN criticality TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''"},
+	}
+	for _, column := range columns {
+		var count int
+		if err := db.QueryRow("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM pragma_table_info('assets') WHERE name=?", column.name).Scan(&count); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if count == 0 {
+			if _, err := db.Exec(column.ddl); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+	}
 	return nil
 }
 
@@ -980,6 +1152,21 @@ func (db *DB) migrateConversationsTable() error {
 		}
 	}
 
+	// 检查 role_name 字段是否存在（对话绑定的业务角色，用于历史任务切换时恢复角色上下文）
+	err = db.QueryRow("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM pragma_table_info('conversations') WHERE name='role_name'").Scan(&count)
+	if err != nil {
+		if _, addErr := db.Exec("ALTER TABLE conversations ADD COLUMN role_name TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '默认'"); addErr != nil {
+			errMsg := strings.ToLower(addErr.Error())
+			if !strings.Contains(errMsg, "duplicate column") && !strings.Contains(errMsg, "already exists") {
+				db.logger.Warn("添加role_name字段失败", zap.Error(addErr))
+			}
+		}
+	} else if count == 0 {
+		if _, err := db.Exec("ALTER TABLE conversations ADD COLUMN role_name TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '默认'"); err != nil {
+			db.logger.Warn("添加role_name字段失败", zap.Error(err))
+		}
+	}
+
 	return nil
 }
 

internal/database/group.go

@@ -10,20 +10,28 @@ import (
 
 // ConversationGroup 对话分组
 type ConversationGroup struct {
-	ID        string    `json:"id"`
+	ID          string    `json:"id"`
-	Name      string    `json:"name"`
+	Name        string    `json:"name"`
-	Icon      string    `json:"icon"`
+	Icon        string    `json:"icon"`
-	Pinned    bool      `json:"pinned"`
+	Pinned      bool      `json:"pinned"`
-	CreatedAt time.Time `json:"createdAt"`
+	CreatedAt   time.Time `json:"createdAt"`
-	UpdatedAt time.Time `json:"updatedAt"`
+	UpdatedAt   time.Time `json:"updatedAt"`
+	OwnerUserID string    `json:"-"`
 }
 
 // GroupExistsByName 检查分组名称是否已存在
 func (db *DB) GroupExistsByName(name string, excludeID string) (bool, error) {
+	return db.groupExistsByNameForOwner(name, excludeID, "")
+}
+
+func (db *DB) groupExistsByNameForOwner(name, excludeID, ownerUserID string) (bool, error) {
 	var count int
 	var err error
-
+	if ownerUserID != "" && excludeID != "" {
-	if excludeID != "" {
+		err = db.QueryRow("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM conversation_groups WHERE name = ? AND owner_user_id = ? AND id != ?", name, ownerUserID, excludeID).Scan(&count)
+	} else if ownerUserID != "" {
+		err = db.QueryRow("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM conversation_groups WHERE name = ? AND owner_user_id = ?", name, ownerUserID).Scan(&count)
+	} else if excludeID != "" {
 		err = db.QueryRow(
 			"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM conversation_groups WHERE name = ? AND id != ?",
 			name, excludeID,
@@ -43,9 +51,13 @@ func (db *DB) GroupExistsByName(name string, excludeID string) (bool, error) {
 }
 
 // CreateGroup 创建分组
-func (db *DB) CreateGroup(name, icon string) (*ConversationGroup, error) {
+func (db *DB) CreateGroup(name, icon string, owners ...string) (*ConversationGroup, error) {
+	ownerUserID := ""
+	if len(owners) > 0 {
+		ownerUserID = owners[0]
+	}
 	// 检查名称是否已存在
-	exists, err := db.GroupExistsByName(name, "")
+	exists, err := db.groupExistsByNameForOwner(name, "", ownerUserID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
@@ -61,27 +73,39 @@ func (db *DB) CreateGroup(name, icon string) (*ConversationGroup, error) {
 	}
 
 	_, err = db.Exec(
-		"INSERT INTO conversation_groups (id, name, icon, pinned, created_at, updated_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
+		"INSERT INTO conversation_groups (id, name, icon, pinned, owner_user_id, created_at, updated_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
-		id, name, icon, 0, now, now,
+		id, name, icon, 0, ownerUserID, now, now,
 	)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("创建分组失败: %w", err)
 	}
 
 	return &ConversationGroup{
-		ID:        id,
+		ID:          id,
-		Name:      name,
+		Name:        name,
-		Icon:      icon,
+		Icon:        icon,
-		Pinned:    false,
+		Pinned:      false,
-		CreatedAt: now,
+		CreatedAt:   now,
-		UpdatedAt: now,
+		UpdatedAt:   now,
+		OwnerUserID: ownerUserID,
 	}, nil
 }
 
 // ListGroups 列出所有分组
 func (db *DB) ListGroups() ([]*ConversationGroup, error) {
+	return db.ListGroupsForAccess("", RBACScopeAll)
+}
+
+func (db *DB) ListGroupsForAccess(userID, scope string) ([]*ConversationGroup, error) {
+	query := "SELECT id, name, icon, COALESCE(pinned, 0), COALESCE(owner_user_id, ''), created_at, updated_at FROM conversation_groups"
+	args := []interface{}{}
+	if scope != RBACScopeAll {
+		query += " WHERE owner_user_id = ?"
+		args = append(args, userID)
+	}
+	query += " ORDER BY COALESCE(pinned, 0) DESC, created_at ASC"
 	rows, err := db.Query(
-		"SELECT id, name, icon, COALESCE(pinned, 0), created_at, updated_at FROM conversation_groups ORDER BY COALESCE(pinned, 0) DESC, created_at ASC",
+		query, args...,
 	)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("查询分组列表失败: %w", err)
@@ -94,7 +118,7 @@ func (db *DB) ListGroups() ([]*ConversationGroup, error) {
 		var createdAt, updatedAt string
 		var pinned int
 
-		if err := rows.Scan(&group.ID, &group.Name, &group.Icon, &pinned, &createdAt, &updatedAt); err != nil {
+		if err := rows.Scan(&group.ID, &group.Name, &group.Icon, &pinned, &group.OwnerUserID, &createdAt, &updatedAt); err != nil {
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("扫描分组失败: %w", err)
 		}
 
@@ -131,9 +155,9 @@ func (db *DB) GetGroup(id string) (*ConversationGroup, error) {
 	var pinned int
 
 	err := db.QueryRow(
-		"SELECT id, name, icon, COALESCE(pinned, 0), created_at, updated_at FROM conversation_groups WHERE id = ?",
+		"SELECT id, name, icon, COALESCE(pinned, 0), COALESCE(owner_user_id, ''), created_at, updated_at FROM conversation_groups WHERE id = ?",
 		id,
-	).Scan(&group.ID, &group.Name, &group.Icon, &pinned, &createdAt, &updatedAt)
+	).Scan(&group.ID, &group.Name, &group.Icon, &pinned, &group.OwnerUserID, &createdAt, &updatedAt)
 	if err != nil {
 		if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("分组不存在")
@@ -164,10 +188,23 @@ func (db *DB) GetGroup(id string) (*ConversationGroup, error) {
 	return &group, nil
 }
 
+func (db *DB) UserCanAccessGroup(userID, scope, groupID string) bool {
+	if scope == RBACScopeAll {
+		return true
+	}
+	var count int
+	err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM conversation_groups WHERE id = ? AND owner_user_id = ?`, groupID, userID).Scan(&count)
+	return err == nil && count > 0
+}
+
 // UpdateGroup 更新分组
 func (db *DB) UpdateGroup(id, name, icon string) error {
+	existing, err := db.GetGroup(id)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
 	// 检查名称是否已存在（排除当前分组）
-	exists, err := db.GroupExistsByName(name, id)
+	exists, err := db.groupExistsByNameForOwner(name, id, existing.OwnerUserID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}

internal/database/monitor.go

@@ -43,11 +43,19 @@ func (db *DB) SaveToolExecution(exec *mcp.ToolExecution) error {
 	if exec.Duration > 0 {
 		durationMs = sql.NullInt64{Int64: exec.Duration.Milliseconds(), Valid: true}
 	}
+	var partialUpdatedAt sql.NullTime
+	if exec.PartialOutputUpdatedAt != nil {
+		partialUpdatedAt = sql.NullTime{Time: *exec.PartialOutputUpdatedAt, Valid: true}
+	}
+	partialTruncated := 0
+	if exec.PartialOutputTruncated {
+		partialTruncated = 1
+	}
 
 	query := `
 		INSERT OR REPLACE INTO tool_executions 
-		(id, tool_name, arguments, status, result, error, start_time, end_time, duration_ms, created_at)
+		(id, tool_name, arguments, status, result, error, start_time, end_time, duration_ms, partial_output, partial_output_bytes, partial_output_truncated, partial_output_updated_at, owner_user_id, conversation_id, created_at)
-		VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+		VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
 	`
 
 	_, err = db.Exec(query,
@@ -60,6 +68,12 @@ func (db *DB) SaveToolExecution(exec *mcp.ToolExecution) error {
 		exec.StartTime,
 		endTime,
 		durationMs,
+		sqlNullString(exec.PartialOutput),
+		exec.PartialOutputBytes,
+		partialTruncated,
+		partialUpdatedAt,
+		strings.TrimSpace(exec.OwnerUserID),
+		strings.TrimSpace(exec.ConversationID),
 		time.Now(),
 	)
 
@@ -88,8 +102,19 @@ func (db *DB) UpdateToolExecutionResult(id string, result *mcp.ToolResult) error
 	return err
 }
 
+func sqlNullString(s string) sql.NullString {
+	if s == "" {
+		return sql.NullString{}
+	}
+	return sql.NullString{String: s, Valid: true}
+}
+
 // CountToolExecutions 统计工具执行记录总数
 func (db *DB) CountToolExecutions(status, toolName string) (int, error) {
+	return db.CountToolExecutionsForAccess(status, toolName, RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll})
+}
+
+func (db *DB) CountToolExecutionsForAccess(status, toolName string, access RBACListAccess) (int, error) {
 	query := `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM tool_executions`
 	args := []interface{}{}
 	conditions := []string{}
@@ -108,6 +133,7 @@ func (db *DB) CountToolExecutions(status, toolName string) (int, error) {
 			query += ` AND ` + conditions[i]
 		}
 	}
+	query, args = appendToolExecutionAccessSQL(query, args, access, len(conditions) > 0)
 	var count int
 	err := db.QueryRow(query, args...).Scan(&count)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -135,7 +161,7 @@ func (db *DB) LoadToolExecutionsWithPagination(offset, limit int, status, toolNa
 	}
 
 	query := `
-		SELECT id, tool_name, arguments, status, result, error, start_time, end_time, duration_ms
+		SELECT id, tool_name, arguments, status, result, error, start_time, end_time, duration_ms, COALESCE(owner_user_id, ''), COALESCE(conversation_id, '')
 		FROM tool_executions
 	`
 	args := []interface{}{}
@@ -183,6 +209,8 @@ func (db *DB) LoadToolExecutionsWithPagination(offset, limit int, status, toolNa
 			&exec.StartTime,
 			&endTime,
 			&durationMs,
+			&exec.OwnerUserID,
+			&exec.ConversationID,
 		)
 		if err != nil {
 			db.logger.Warn("加载执行记录失败", zap.Error(err))
@@ -258,7 +286,8 @@ type ToolStatsSummaryResult struct {
 	TopTools []*mcp.ToolStats
 }
 
-// LoadToolStatsSummary 聚合统计信息，仅返回汇总与 Top N 工具（避免全量 map 传输）
+// LoadToolStatsSummary 聚合统计信息，仅返回汇总与 Top N 工具（避免全量 map 传输）。
+// 监控页的失败口径只包含真实失败/异常终止；用户主动取消的 cancelled 保留在总调用中，不计入失败。
 func (db *DB) LoadToolStatsSummary(topN int) (*ToolStatsSummaryResult, error) {
 	if topN <= 0 {
 		topN = 6
@@ -273,19 +302,19 @@ func (db *DB) LoadToolStatsSummary(topN int) (*ToolStatsSummaryResult, error) {
 
 	summaryQuery := `
 		SELECT COUNT(*),
-			COALESCE(SUM(total_calls), 0),
+			COALESCE(SUM(CASE WHEN status = 'completed' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END), 0),
-			COALESCE(SUM(success_calls), 0),
+			COALESCE(SUM(CASE WHEN status IN ('failed', 'hard_timeout', 'orphaned') THEN 1 ELSE 0 END), 0),
-			COALESCE(SUM(failed_calls), 0),
+			MAX(start_time),
-			MAX(last_call_time)
+			COUNT(DISTINCT tool_name)
-		FROM tool_stats
+		FROM tool_executions
 	`
 	var lastCallRaw sql.NullString
 	err := db.QueryRow(summaryQuery).Scan(
-		&result.Summary.ToolCount,
 		&result.Summary.TotalCalls,
 		&result.Summary.SuccessCalls,
 		&result.Summary.FailedCalls,
 		&lastCallRaw,
+		&result.Summary.ToolCount,
 	)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -301,9 +330,13 @@ func (db *DB) LoadToolStatsSummary(topN int) (*ToolStatsSummaryResult, error) {
 	}
 
 	topQuery := `
-		SELECT tool_name, total_calls, success_calls, failed_calls, last_call_time
+		SELECT tool_name,
-		FROM tool_stats
+			COUNT(*) AS total_calls,
-		WHERE total_calls > 0
+			SUM(CASE WHEN status = 'completed' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END) AS success_calls,
+			SUM(CASE WHEN status IN ('failed', 'hard_timeout', 'orphaned') THEN 1 ELSE 0 END) AS failed_calls,
+			MAX(start_time) AS last_call_time
+		FROM tool_executions
+		GROUP BY tool_name
 		ORDER BY total_calls DESC, tool_name ASC
 		LIMIT ?
 	`
@@ -315,7 +348,7 @@ func (db *DB) LoadToolStatsSummary(topN int) (*ToolStatsSummaryResult, error) {
 
 	for rows.Next() {
 		var stat mcp.ToolStats
-		var lastCallTime sql.NullTime
+		var lastCallTime sql.NullString
 		if err := rows.Scan(
 			&stat.ToolName,
 			&stat.TotalCalls,
@@ -327,7 +360,8 @@ func (db *DB) LoadToolStatsSummary(topN int) (*ToolStatsSummaryResult, error) {
 			continue
 		}
 		if lastCallTime.Valid {
-			stat.LastCallTime = &lastCallTime.Time
+			parsed := parseDBTime(lastCallTime.String)
+			stat.LastCallTime = &parsed
 		}
 		result.TopTools = append(result.TopTools, &stat)
 	}
@@ -335,8 +369,62 @@ func (db *DB) LoadToolStatsSummary(topN int) (*ToolStatsSummaryResult, error) {
 	return result, nil
 }
 
+func (db *DB) LoadToolStatsSummaryForAccess(topN int, access RBACListAccess) (*ToolStatsSummaryResult, error) {
+	if access.Scope == RBACScopeAll {
+		return db.LoadToolStatsSummary(topN)
+	}
+	if topN <= 0 {
+		topN = 6
+	}
+	if topN > 100 {
+		topN = 100
+	}
+	result := &ToolStatsSummaryResult{TopTools: make([]*mcp.ToolStats, 0, topN)}
+	fromSQL, args := appendToolExecutionAccessSQL(` FROM tool_executions`, nil, access, false)
+	var lastCall sql.NullString
+	err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*),
+		COALESCE(SUM(CASE WHEN status = 'completed' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END), 0),
+		COALESCE(SUM(CASE WHEN status IN ('failed', 'hard_timeout', 'orphaned') THEN 1 ELSE 0 END), 0),
+		MAX(start_time), COUNT(DISTINCT tool_name)`+fromSQL, args...).Scan(
+		&result.Summary.TotalCalls, &result.Summary.SuccessCalls, &result.Summary.FailedCalls,
+		&lastCall, &result.Summary.ToolCount,
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if lastCall.Valid {
+		parsed := parseDBTime(lastCall.String)
+		result.Summary.LastCallTime = &parsed
+	}
+	rows, err := db.Query(`SELECT tool_name, COUNT(*),
+		SUM(CASE WHEN status = 'completed' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END),
+		SUM(CASE WHEN status IN ('failed', 'hard_timeout', 'orphaned') THEN 1 ELSE 0 END), MAX(start_time)`+
+		fromSQL+` GROUP BY tool_name ORDER BY COUNT(*) DESC, tool_name ASC LIMIT ?`, append(args, topN)...)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var stat mcp.ToolStats
+		var last sql.NullString
+		if err := rows.Scan(&stat.ToolName, &stat.TotalCalls, &stat.SuccessCalls, &stat.FailedCalls, &last); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		if last.Valid {
+			parsed := parseDBTime(last.String)
+			stat.LastCallTime = &parsed
+		}
+		result.TopTools = append(result.TopTools, &stat)
+	}
+	return result, rows.Err()
+}
+
 // LoadToolExecutionListPage 分页加载执行记录列表（不含 arguments/result，供监控列表使用）
 func (db *DB) LoadToolExecutionListPage(offset, limit int, status, toolName string) ([]*mcp.ToolExecution, error) {
+	return db.LoadToolExecutionListPageForAccess(offset, limit, status, toolName, RBACListAccess{Scope: RBACScopeAll})
+}
+
+func (db *DB) LoadToolExecutionListPageForAccess(offset, limit int, status, toolName string, access RBACListAccess) ([]*mcp.ToolExecution, error) {
 	if limit <= 0 {
 		limit = 20
 	}
@@ -345,11 +433,13 @@ func (db *DB) LoadToolExecutionListPage(offset, limit int, status, toolName stri
 	}
 
 	query := `
-		SELECT id, tool_name, status, start_time, end_time, duration_ms
+		SELECT id, tool_name, status, start_time, end_time, duration_ms, COALESCE(owner_user_id, ''), COALESCE(conversation_id, '')
 		FROM tool_executions
 	`
 	whereSQL, args := toolExecutionsFilterSQL(status, toolName)
-	query += whereSQL + ` ORDER BY start_time DESC LIMIT ? OFFSET ?`
+	query += whereSQL
+	query, args = appendToolExecutionAccessSQL(query, args, access, whereSQL != "")
+	query += ` ORDER BY start_time DESC LIMIT ? OFFSET ?`
 	args = append(args, limit, offset)
 
 	rows, err := db.Query(query, args...)
@@ -371,6 +461,8 @@ func (db *DB) LoadToolExecutionListPage(offset, limit int, status, toolName stri
 			&exec.StartTime,
 			&endTime,
 			&durationMs,
+			&exec.OwnerUserID,
+			&exec.ConversationID,
 		); err != nil {
 			db.logger.Warn("加载执行记录列表失败", zap.Error(err))
 			continue
@@ -387,10 +479,37 @@ func (db *DB) LoadToolExecutionListPage(offset, limit int, status, toolName stri
 	return executions, nil
 }
 
+func appendToolExecutionAccessSQL(query string, args []interface{}, access RBACListAccess, hasWhere bool) (string, []interface{}) {
+	if access.Scope == RBACScopeAll {
+		return query, args
+	}
+	userID := strings.TrimSpace(access.UserID)
+	joiner := " WHERE "
+	if hasWhere {
+		joiner = " AND "
+	}
+	if userID == "" {
+		return query + joiner + "1=0", args
+	}
+	query += joiner + `(
+		owner_user_id = ?
+		OR (conversation_id IS NOT NULL AND conversation_id <> '' AND (
+			EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM conversations c WHERE c.id = tool_executions.conversation_id AND c.owner_user_id = ?)
+			OR EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM rbac_resource_assignments ra WHERE ra.user_id = ? AND ra.resource_type = 'conversation' AND ra.resource_id = tool_executions.conversation_id)
+			OR EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM conversations c JOIN projects p ON p.id = c.project_id WHERE c.id = tool_executions.conversation_id AND p.owner_user_id = ?)
+			OR EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM conversations c JOIN rbac_resource_assignments pra ON pra.resource_id = c.project_id WHERE c.id = tool_executions.conversation_id AND pra.user_id = ? AND pra.resource_type = 'project')
+		))
+	)`
+	args = append(args, userID, userID, userID, userID, userID)
+	return query, args
+}
+
 // GetToolExecution 根据ID获取单条工具执行记录
 func (db *DB) GetToolExecution(id string) (*mcp.ToolExecution, error) {
 	query := `
-		SELECT id, tool_name, arguments, status, result, error, start_time, end_time, duration_ms
+		SELECT id, tool_name, arguments, status, result, error, start_time, end_time, duration_ms,
+		       COALESCE(partial_output, ''), COALESCE(partial_output_bytes, 0), COALESCE(partial_output_truncated, 0), partial_output_updated_at,
+		       COALESCE(owner_user_id, ''), COALESCE(conversation_id, '')
 		FROM tool_executions
 		WHERE id = ?
 	`
@@ -403,6 +522,8 @@ func (db *DB) GetToolExecution(id string) (*mcp.ToolExecution, error) {
 	var errorText sql.NullString
 	var endTime sql.NullTime
 	var durationMs sql.NullInt64
+	var partialTruncated int
+	var partialUpdatedAt sql.NullTime
 
 	err := row.Scan(
 		&exec.ID,
@@ -414,6 +535,12 @@ func (db *DB) GetToolExecution(id string) (*mcp.ToolExecution, error) {
 		&exec.StartTime,
 		&endTime,
 		&durationMs,
+		&exec.PartialOutput,
+		&exec.PartialOutputBytes,
+		&partialTruncated,
+		&partialUpdatedAt,
+		&exec.OwnerUserID,
+		&exec.ConversationID,
 	)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -444,11 +571,38 @@ func (db *DB) GetToolExecution(id string) (*mcp.ToolExecution, error) {
 	if durationMs.Valid {
 		exec.Duration = time.Duration(durationMs.Int64) * time.Millisecond
 	}
+	exec.PartialOutputTruncated = partialTruncated != 0
+	if partialUpdatedAt.Valid {
+		exec.PartialOutputUpdatedAt = &partialUpdatedAt.Time
+	}
 
 	return &exec, nil
 }
 
-// CancelOrphanedRunningToolExecutions 将仍为 running 的记录批量标记为 cancelled（如进程重启后无对应执行协程）。
+// UserCanAccessToolExecution enforces ownership for monitor detail and mutation
+// endpoints. Legacy records without an owner or conversation fail closed for
+// non-global users.
+func (db *DB) UserCanAccessToolExecution(userID, scope, executionID string) bool {
+	userID = strings.TrimSpace(userID)
+	executionID = strings.TrimSpace(executionID)
+	if userID == "" || executionID == "" {
+		return false
+	}
+	if scope == RBACScopeAll {
+		return true
+	}
+	var ownerUserID, conversationID sql.NullString
+	if err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT owner_user_id, conversation_id FROM tool_executions WHERE id = ?`, executionID).Scan(&ownerUserID, &conversationID); err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(ownerUserID.String) == userID {
+		return true
+	}
+	conversation := strings.TrimSpace(conversationID.String)
+	return conversation != "" && db.UserCanAccessResource(userID, scope, "conversation", conversation)
+}
+
+// CancelOrphanedRunningToolExecutions 将仍为 running 的记录批量标记为 orphaned（如进程重启后无对应执行协程）。
 func (db *DB) CancelOrphanedRunningToolExecutions(endTime time.Time, errMsg string) (int64, error) {
 	errMsg = strings.TrimSpace(errMsg)
 	if errMsg == "" {
@@ -456,7 +610,7 @@ func (db *DB) CancelOrphanedRunningToolExecutions(endTime time.Time, errMsg stri
 	}
 	query := `
 		UPDATE tool_executions
-		SET status = 'cancelled',
+		SET status = 'orphaned',
 		    error = ?,
 		    end_time = ?,
 		    duration_ms = MAX(0, CAST((julianday(?) - julianday(start_time)) * 86400000 AS INTEGER))
@@ -469,7 +623,7 @@ func (db *DB) CancelOrphanedRunningToolExecutions(endTime time.Time, errMsg stri
 	return res.RowsAffected()
 }
 
-// FinalizeStaleRunningToolExecutions 将「非活跃且超过 minAge」的 running 记录标记为 cancelled。
+// FinalizeStaleRunningToolExecutions 将「非活跃且超过 minAge」的 running 记录标记为 orphaned。
 // activeIDs 为当前进程内仍登记 cancel 的 executionId；不在集合内且已超时的视为孤儿记录。
 func (db *DB) FinalizeStaleRunningToolExecutions(endTime time.Time, minAge time.Duration, activeIDs map[string]struct{}, errMsg string) (int64, error) {
 	errMsg = strings.TrimSpace(errMsg)
@@ -522,7 +676,7 @@ func (db *DB) FinalizeStaleRunningToolExecutions(endTime time.Time, minAge time.
 		}
 		res, err := db.Exec(`
 			UPDATE tool_executions
-			SET status = 'cancelled', error = ?, end_time = ?, duration_ms = ?
+			SET status = 'orphaned', error = ?, end_time = ?, duration_ms = ?
 			WHERE id = ? AND status = 'running'
 		`, errMsg, endTime, durationMs, row.id)
 		if err != nil {
@@ -584,7 +738,7 @@ func (db *DB) GetToolExecutionsByIds(ids []string) ([]*mcp.ToolExecution, error)
 	}
 
 	query := `
-		SELECT id, tool_name, arguments, status, result, error, start_time, end_time, duration_ms
+		SELECT id, tool_name, arguments, status, result, error, start_time, end_time, duration_ms, COALESCE(owner_user_id, ''), COALESCE(conversation_id, '')
 		FROM tool_executions
 		WHERE id IN (` + strings.Join(placeholders, ",") + `)
 	`
@@ -614,6 +768,8 @@ func (db *DB) GetToolExecutionsByIds(ids []string) ([]*mcp.ToolExecution, error)
 			&exec.StartTime,
 			&endTime,
 			&durationMs,
+			&exec.OwnerUserID,
+			&exec.ConversationID,
 		)
 		if err != nil {
 			db.logger.Warn("加载执行记录失败", zap.Error(err))
@@ -696,7 +852,7 @@ func (db *DB) PurgeToolExecutionsBefore(cutoff time.Time) (int64, error) {
 		}
 		delta.totalCalls += count
 		switch status {
-		case "failed", "cancelled":
+		case "failed", "hard_timeout", "orphaned":
 			delta.failedCalls += count
 		case "completed":
 			delta.successCalls += count
@@ -852,7 +1008,7 @@ func (db *DB) LoadCallsTimeline(since time.Time, dailyBuckets bool) ([]CallsTime
 		query = `
 			SELECT date(start_time, 'localtime') AS bucket,
 				COUNT(*) AS total,
-				SUM(CASE WHEN status IN ('failed', 'cancelled') THEN 1 ELSE 0 END) AS failed
+				SUM(CASE WHEN status IN ('failed', 'hard_timeout', 'orphaned') THEN 1 ELSE 0 END) AS failed
 			FROM tool_executions
 			WHERE start_time >= ?
 			GROUP BY bucket
@@ -862,7 +1018,7 @@ func (db *DB) LoadCallsTimeline(since time.Time, dailyBuckets bool) ([]CallsTime
 		query = `
 			SELECT strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:00:00', start_time, 'localtime') AS bucket,
 				COUNT(*) AS total,
-				SUM(CASE WHEN status IN ('failed', 'cancelled') THEN 1 ELSE 0 END) AS failed
+				SUM(CASE WHEN status IN ('failed', 'hard_timeout', 'orphaned') THEN 1 ELSE 0 END) AS failed
 			FROM tool_executions
 			WHERE start_time >= ?
 			GROUP BY bucket

internal/database/monitor_reconcile_test.go

@@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ func TestCancelOrphanedRunningToolExecutions(t *testing.T) {
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("GetToolExecution: %v", err)
 	}
-	if got.Status != "cancelled" {
+	if got.Status != "orphaned" {
-		t.Fatalf("expected cancelled, got %s", got.Status)
+		t.Fatalf("expected orphaned, got %s", got.Status)
 	}
 	if got.EndTime == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected end_time to be set")
@@ -88,8 +88,8 @@ func TestFinalizeStaleRunningToolExecutions_skipsActive(t *testing.T) {
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("GetToolExecution stale: %v", err)
 	}
-	if stale.Status != "cancelled" {
+	if stale.Status != "orphaned" {
-		t.Fatalf("stale expected cancelled, got %s", stale.Status)
+		t.Fatalf("stale expected orphaned, got %s", stale.Status)
 	}
 
 	activeExec, err := db.GetToolExecution("active")

internal/database/monitor_summary_test.go

@@ -84,3 +84,49 @@ func TestLoadToolStatsSummaryAndListPage(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	}
 }
+
+func TestLoadToolStatsSummaryDoesNotCountCancelledAsFailed(t *testing.T) {
+	dbPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "monitor-cancelled-summary.db")
+	db, err := NewDB(dbPath, zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("NewDB: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+
+	now := time.Now()
+	for i, status := range []string{"completed", "cancelled", "failed"} {
+		exec := &mcp.ToolExecution{
+			ID:        fmt.Sprintf("exec-%d", i),
+			ToolName:  "exec",
+			Arguments: map[string]interface{}{},
+			Status:    status,
+			StartTime: now.Add(time.Duration(i) * time.Second),
+		}
+		end := exec.StartTime.Add(time.Second)
+		exec.EndTime = &end
+		exec.Duration = time.Second
+		if err := db.SaveToolExecution(exec); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("SaveToolExecution(%s): %v", status, err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	summary, err := db.LoadToolStatsSummary(1)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("LoadToolStatsSummary: %v", err)
+	}
+	if summary.Summary.TotalCalls != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("totalCalls = %d, want 3", summary.Summary.TotalCalls)
+	}
+	if summary.Summary.SuccessCalls != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("successCalls = %d, want 1", summary.Summary.SuccessCalls)
+	}
+	if summary.Summary.FailedCalls != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("failedCalls = %d, want 1", summary.Summary.FailedCalls)
+	}
+	if len(summary.TopTools) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("top tools = %d, want 1", len(summary.TopTools))
+	}
+	if summary.TopTools[0].FailedCalls != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("top tool failedCalls = %d, want 1", summary.TopTools[0].FailedCalls)
+	}
+}

internal/database/process_details_summary_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+package database
+
+import (
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"go.uber.org/zap"
+)
+
+func TestProcessDetailsSummaryPairsMixedIdentifiedAndIDLessResults(t *testing.T) {
+	db, conversationID, messageID := setupProcessDetailsSummaryTest(t)
+	for _, id := range []string{"call-1", "call-2", "call-3", "call-4"} {
+		if err := db.AddProcessDetail(messageID, conversationID, "tool_call", "call", map[string]interface{}{
+			"toolName": "http-framework-test", "toolCallId": id,
+		}); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("AddProcessDetail(tool_call): %v", err)
+		}
+	}
+	results := []map[string]interface{}{
+		{"toolName": "http-framework-test", "toolCallId": "call-1", "success": true},
+		{"toolName": "http-framework-test", "toolCallId": "call-2", "success": true},
+		{"toolName": "http-framework-test", "success": true},
+		{"toolName": "http-framework-test", "success": true},
+	}
+	for _, result := range results {
+		if err := db.AddProcessDetail(messageID, conversationID, "tool_result", "result", result); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("AddProcessDetail(tool_result): %v", err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	summary, err := db.GetProcessDetailsSummary(messageID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("GetProcessDetailsSummary: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(summary.ToolExecutions) != 4 {
+		t.Fatalf("tool executions = %d, want 4", len(summary.ToolExecutions))
+	}
+	for i, execution := range summary.ToolExecutions {
+		if execution.Status != "completed" {
+			t.Fatalf("execution %d status = %q, want completed", i, execution.Status)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestProcessDetailsSummaryPairsRepeatedToolCallIDsFIFO(t *testing.T) {
+	db, conversationID, messageID := setupProcessDetailsSummaryTest(t)
+	for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
+		if err := db.AddProcessDetail(messageID, conversationID, "tool_call", "call", map[string]interface{}{
+			"toolName": "execute", "toolCallId": "legacy-reused-id",
+		}); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("AddProcessDetail(tool_call): %v", err)
+		}
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
+		if err := db.AddProcessDetail(messageID, conversationID, "tool_result", "result", map[string]interface{}{
+			"toolName": "execute", "toolCallId": "legacy-reused-id", "success": true,
+		}); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("AddProcessDetail(tool_result): %v", err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	summary, err := db.GetProcessDetailsSummary(messageID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("GetProcessDetailsSummary: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(summary.ToolExecutions) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("tool executions = %d, want 2", len(summary.ToolExecutions))
+	}
+	for i, execution := range summary.ToolExecutions {
+		if execution.Status != "completed" {
+			t.Fatalf("execution %d status = %q, want completed", i, execution.Status)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestProcessDetailsSummaryDoesNotReportPersistedOrphanAsRunning(t *testing.T) {
+	db, conversationID, messageID := setupProcessDetailsSummaryTest(t)
+	if err := db.AddProcessDetail(messageID, conversationID, "tool_call", "call", map[string]interface{}{
+		"toolName": "execute", "toolCallId": "orphan",
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("AddProcessDetail(tool_call): %v", err)
+	}
+	summary, err := db.GetProcessDetailsSummary(messageID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("GetProcessDetailsSummary: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(summary.ToolExecutions) != 1 || summary.ToolExecutions[0].Status != "result_missing" {
+		t.Fatalf("tool executions = %#v, want result_missing", summary.ToolExecutions)
+	}
+}
+
+func setupProcessDetailsSummaryTest(t *testing.T) (*DB, string, string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	db, err := NewDB(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "process-details.db"), zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("NewDB: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
+	conversation, err := db.CreateConversation("process details", ConversationCreateMeta{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateConversation: %v", err)
+	}
+	message, err := db.AddMessage(conversation.ID, "assistant", "done", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("AddMessage: %v", err)
+	}
+	return db, conversation.ID, message.ID
+}

internal/database/project.go

@@ -58,11 +58,11 @@ type ProjectFact struct {
 
 // ProjectFactListFilter 事实列表筛选。
 type ProjectFactListFilter struct {
-	Category                string
+	Category               string
-	Confidence              string
+	Confidence             string
-	Search                  string
+	Search                 string
-	RelatedVulnerabilityID  string
+	RelatedVulnerabilityID string
-	ExcludeDeprecated       bool // 为 true 时排除 confidence=deprecated
+	ExcludeDeprecated      bool // 为 true 时排除 confidence=deprecated
 }
 
 // CreateProject 创建项目。
@@ -143,6 +143,19 @@ func appendProjectListFilters(query string, args []interface{}, status, search s
 	return query, args
 }
 
+func appendProjectAccessFilter(query string, args []interface{}, userID, scope string) (string, []interface{}) {
+	userID = strings.TrimSpace(userID)
+	if userID == "" || scope == RBACScopeAll {
+		return query, args
+	}
+	query += ` AND (owner_user_id = ? OR EXISTS (
+		SELECT 1 FROM rbac_resource_assignments ra
+		WHERE ra.user_id = ? AND ra.resource_type = 'project' AND ra.resource_id = projects.id
+	))`
+	args = append(args, userID, userID)
+	return query, args
+}
+
 // CountProjects 统计项目数量。
 func (db *DB) CountProjects(status, search string) (int, error) {
 	query := `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM projects WHERE 1=1`
@@ -155,6 +168,18 @@ func (db *DB) CountProjects(status, search string) (int, error) {
 	return count, nil
 }
 
+func (db *DB) CountProjectsForAccess(status, search, userID, scope string) (int, error) {
+	query := `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM projects WHERE 1=1`
+	args := []interface{}{}
+	query, args = appendProjectListFilters(query, args, status, search)
+	query, args = appendProjectAccessFilter(query, args, userID, scope)
+	var count int
+	if err := db.QueryRow(query, args...).Scan(&count); err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("统计项目失败: %w", err)
+	}
+	return count, nil
+}
+
 // ListProjects 列出项目。
 func (db *DB) ListProjects(status, search string, limit, offset int) ([]*Project, error) {
 	if limit <= 0 {
@@ -189,6 +214,42 @@ func (db *DB) ListProjects(status, search string, limit, offset int) ([]*Project
 	return out, rows.Err()
 }
 
+func (db *DB) ListProjectsForAccess(status, search string, limit, offset int, userID, scope string) ([]*Project, error) {
+	if scope == RBACScopeAll || strings.TrimSpace(userID) == "" {
+		return db.ListProjects(status, search, limit, offset)
+	}
+	if limit <= 0 {
+		limit = 50
+	}
+	query := `SELECT id, name, COALESCE(description,''), COALESCE(scope_json,''), status, pinned, created_at, updated_at
+		FROM projects WHERE 1=1`
+	args := []interface{}{}
+	query, args = appendProjectListFilters(query, args, status, search)
+	query, args = appendProjectAccessFilter(query, args, userID, scope)
+	query += " ORDER BY pinned DESC, updated_at DESC LIMIT ? OFFSET ?"
+	args = append(args, limit, offset)
+
+	rows, err := db.Query(query, args...)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("列出项目失败: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+	var out []*Project
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var p Project
+		var pinned int
+		var createdAt, updatedAt string
+		if err := rows.Scan(&p.ID, &p.Name, &p.Description, &p.ScopeJSON, &p.Status, &pinned, &createdAt, &updatedAt); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		p.Pinned = pinned != 0
+		p.CreatedAt = parseDBTime(createdAt)
+		p.UpdatedAt = parseDBTime(updatedAt)
+		out = append(out, &p)
+	}
+	return out, rows.Err()
+}
+
 // UpdateProject 更新项目。
 func (db *DB) UpdateProject(p *Project) error {
 	p.UpdatedAt = time.Now()
@@ -207,6 +268,9 @@ func (db *DB) DeleteProject(id string) error {
 	if _, err := db.Exec(`UPDATE vulnerabilities SET project_id = NULL WHERE project_id = ?`, id); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("解除漏洞项目关联失败: %w", err)
 	}
+	if _, err := db.Exec(`UPDATE assets SET project_id = NULL WHERE project_id = ?`, id); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("解除资产项目关联失败: %w", err)
+	}
 	_, err := db.Exec(`DELETE FROM projects WHERE id = ?`, id)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("删除项目失败: %w", err)

internal/database/project_dashboard.go

@@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ type ProjectDashboardSummary struct {
 
 // GetProjectDashboardSummary 聚合跨项目近期事实（仅活跃项目、排除 deprecated）。
 func (db *DB) GetProjectDashboardSummary(factLimit int) (*ProjectDashboardSummary, error) {
+	return db.GetProjectDashboardSummaryForAccess(factLimit, "", "")
+}
+
+func (db *DB) GetProjectDashboardSummaryForAccess(factLimit int, userID, scope string) (*ProjectDashboardSummary, error) {
 	if factLimit <= 0 {
 		factLimit = 5
 	}
@@ -44,25 +48,42 @@ func (db *DB) GetProjectDashboardSummary(factLimit int) (*ProjectDashboardSummar
 		RecentFacts: []ProjectDashboardFact{},
 	}
 
-	if err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM projects WHERE status = 'active'`).Scan(&out.Totals.ActiveProjects); err != nil {
+	projectAccess := ""
+	args := []interface{}{}
+	userID = strings.TrimSpace(userID)
+	if userID != "" && scope != RBACScopeAll {
+		projectAccess = ` AND (
+			p.owner_user_id = ?
+			OR EXISTS (
+				SELECT 1 FROM rbac_resource_assignments ra
+				WHERE ra.user_id = ? AND ra.resource_type = 'project' AND ra.resource_id = p.id
+			)
+		)`
+		args = append(args, userID, userID)
+	}
+
+	if err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM projects p WHERE p.status = 'active'`+projectAccess, args...).Scan(&out.Totals.ActiveProjects); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("统计活跃项目失败: %w", err)
 	}
 	if err := db.QueryRow(
 		`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM project_facts f
 		 INNER JOIN projects p ON p.id = f.project_id
-		 WHERE f.confidence != 'deprecated' AND p.status = 'active'`,
+		 WHERE f.confidence != 'deprecated' AND p.status = 'active'`+projectAccess,
+		args...,
 	).Scan(&out.Totals.TotalFacts); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("统计事实失败: %w", err)
 	}
 
+	queryArgs := append([]interface{}{}, args...)
+	queryArgs = append(queryArgs, factLimit)
 	rows, err := db.Query(
 		`SELECT f.id, f.project_id, p.name, f.fact_key, f.category, f.summary, f.confidence, f.pinned, f.updated_at
 		 FROM project_facts f
 		 INNER JOIN projects p ON p.id = f.project_id
-		 WHERE f.confidence != 'deprecated' AND p.status = 'active'
+		 WHERE f.confidence != 'deprecated' AND p.status = 'active'`+projectAccess+`
 		 ORDER BY f.pinned DESC, f.updated_at DESC
 		 LIMIT ?`,
-		factLimit,
+		queryArgs...,
 	)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("查询近期事实失败: %w", err)

internal/database/project_stats.go

@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ func (db *DB) ListConversationsByProjectID(projectID string, limit, offset int)
 		limit = 100
 	}
 	rows, err := db.Query(
-		`SELECT id, title, COALESCE(pinned, 0), created_at, updated_at, project_id
+		`SELECT id, title, COALESCE(pinned, 0), created_at, updated_at, project_id, role_name
 		 FROM conversations WHERE project_id = ? ORDER BY updated_at DESC LIMIT ? OFFSET ?`,
 		projectID, limit, offset,
 	)
@@ -99,12 +99,16 @@ func (db *DB) ListConversationsByProjectID(projectID string, limit, offset int)
 		var createdAt, updatedAt string
 		var pinned int
 		var pid sql.NullString
-		if err := rows.Scan(&conv.ID, &conv.Title, &pinned, &createdAt, &updatedAt, &pid); err != nil {
+		var roleName sql.NullString
+		if err := rows.Scan(&conv.ID, &conv.Title, &pinned, &createdAt, &updatedAt, &pid, &roleName); err != nil {
 			return nil, err
 		}
 		if pid.Valid {
 			conv.ProjectID = strings.TrimSpace(pid.String)
 		}
+		if roleName.Valid {
+			conv.RoleName = normalizeConversationRoleName(roleName.String)
+		}
 		conv.CreatedAt = parseDBTime(createdAt)
 		conv.UpdatedAt = parseDBTime(updatedAt)
 		conv.Pinned = pinned != 0

internal/database/rbac_access_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,621 @@
+package database
+
+import (
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/mcp"
+
+	"go.uber.org/zap"
+)
+
+func newRBACTestDB(t *testing.T) *DB {
+	t.Helper()
+	db, err := NewDB(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "rbac.db"), zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("NewDB: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
+	return db
+}
+
+func TestRBACToolExecutionOwnershipAccess(t *testing.T) {
+	db := newRBACTestDB(t)
+	for _, exec := range []*mcp.ToolExecution{
+		{ID: "exec-u1", ToolName: "one", Status: "completed", StartTime: time.Now(), OwnerUserID: "u1"},
+		{ID: "exec-u2", ToolName: "two", Status: "completed", StartTime: time.Now(), OwnerUserID: "u2"},
+		{ID: "exec-legacy", ToolName: "legacy", Status: "completed", StartTime: time.Now()},
+	} {
+		if err := db.SaveToolExecution(exec); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	access := RBACListAccess{UserID: "u1", Scope: RBACScopeAssigned}
+	rows, err := db.LoadToolExecutionListPageForAccess(0, 20, "", "", access)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(rows) != 1 || rows[0].ID != "exec-u1" {
+		t.Fatalf("rows = %#v, want only exec-u1", rows)
+	}
+	summary, err := db.LoadToolStatsSummaryForAccess(10, access)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if summary.Summary.TotalCalls != 1 || summary.Summary.ToolCount != 1 || len(summary.TopTools) != 1 || summary.TopTools[0].ToolName != "one" {
+		t.Fatalf("scoped summary = %#v", summary)
+	}
+	if !db.UserCanAccessToolExecution("u1", RBACScopeAssigned, "exec-u1") {
+		t.Fatal("owner could not access execution")
+	}
+	if db.UserCanAccessToolExecution("u1", RBACScopeAssigned, "exec-u2") {
+		t.Fatal("foreign execution was accessible")
+	}
+	if db.UserCanAccessToolExecution("u1", RBACScopeAssigned, "exec-legacy") {
+		t.Fatal("ownerless legacy execution did not fail closed")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRBACGroupAndUploadOwnership(t *testing.T) {
+	db := newRBACTestDB(t)
+	group1, err := db.CreateGroup("u1 group", "", "u1")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	group2, err := db.CreateGroup("u2 group", "", "u2")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	groups, err := db.ListGroupsForAccess("u1", RBACScopeAssigned)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(groups) != 1 || groups[0].ID != group1.ID {
+		t.Fatalf("groups = %#v, want only %s (not %s)", groups, group1.ID, group2.ID)
+	}
+	if db.UserCanAccessGroup("u1", RBACScopeAssigned, group2.ID) {
+		t.Fatal("foreign group was accessible")
+	}
+
+	conversation, err := db.CreateConversation("upload", ConversationCreateMeta{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.UpsertChatUploadArtifact("2026-07-10/"+conversation.ID+"/a.txt", conversation.ID, "u1"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if conv, owner, ok := db.GetChatUploadArtifact("2026-07-10/" + conversation.ID + "/a.txt"); !ok || conv != conversation.ID || owner != "u1" {
+		t.Fatalf("artifact = conv=%q owner=%q ok=%v", conv, owner, ok)
+	}
+	if err := db.RenameChatUploadArtifactPath("2026-07-10/"+conversation.ID+"/a.txt", "2026-07-10/"+conversation.ID+"/b.txt"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, _, ok := db.GetChatUploadArtifact("2026-07-10/" + conversation.ID + "/b.txt"); !ok {
+		t.Fatal("renamed artifact metadata missing")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSystemRoleBootstrapDoesNotLeakManagementReadPermissions(t *testing.T) {
+	db := newRBACTestDB(t)
+	catalog := map[string]string{
+		"auth:self": "self", "project:read": "projects", "project:write": "project writes",
+		"agent:local-execute": "local tools",
+		"rbac:read":           "rbac", "config:read": "config", "audit:read": "audit", "terminal:execute": "terminal",
+		"mcp:execute": "invoke", "mcp:write": "manage", "mcp:external:execute": "external invoke",
+		"workflow:execute": "run", "workflow:write": "manage definitions", "knowledge:write": "manage knowledge",
+	}
+	if err := db.BootstrapRBAC("hash", catalog); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	viewer, err := db.CreateRBACUser("viewer-policy", "Viewer", "hash", true, []string{RBACSystemRoleViewer})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	viewerAccess, err := db.ResolveRBACAccess(viewer.ID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !viewerAccess.Permissions["project:read"] || viewerAccess.Permissions["rbac:read"] || viewerAccess.Permissions["config:read"] || viewerAccess.Permissions["audit:read"] {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected viewer permissions: %#v", viewerAccess.Permissions)
+	}
+	auditor, err := db.CreateRBACUser("auditor-policy", "Auditor", "hash", true, []string{RBACSystemRoleAuditor})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	auditorAccess, err := db.ResolveRBACAccess(auditor.ID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !auditorAccess.Permissions["audit:read"] || auditorAccess.Permissions["config:read"] || auditorAccess.Permissions["rbac:read"] {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected auditor permissions: %#v", auditorAccess.Permissions)
+	}
+	operator, err := db.CreateRBACUser("operator-policy", "Operator", "hash", true, []string{RBACSystemRoleOperator})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	operatorAccess, err := db.ResolveRBACAccess(operator.ID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !operatorAccess.Permissions["mcp:execute"] || operatorAccess.Permissions["mcp:write"] || operatorAccess.Permissions["mcp:external:execute"] {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected operator MCP permissions: %#v", operatorAccess.Permissions)
+	}
+	if !operatorAccess.Permissions["workflow:execute"] || operatorAccess.Permissions["workflow:write"] || operatorAccess.Permissions["knowledge:write"] {
+		t.Fatalf("operator received global definition mutation permissions: %#v", operatorAccess.Permissions)
+	}
+	if !operatorAccess.Permissions["agent:local-execute"] {
+		t.Fatalf("operator is missing explicit local tool permission: %#v", operatorAccess.Permissions)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPermissionScopeDoesNotWidenAcrossUnrelatedRoles(t *testing.T) {
+	db := newRBACTestDB(t)
+	catalog := map[string]string{"auth:self": "self", "project:read": "read", "project:write": "write", "audit:read": "audit"}
+	if err := db.BootstrapRBAC("hash", catalog); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	ownWrite, err := db.UpsertRBACRole("", "own-writer", "", RBACScopeOwn, []string{"project:write"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	user, err := db.CreateRBACUser("mixed-scope", "Mixed", "hash", true, []string{RBACSystemRoleAuditor, ownWrite.ID})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	access, err := db.ResolveRBACAccess(user.ID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if access.Scope != RBACScopeAll {
+		t.Fatalf("compatibility scope = %q, want all", access.Scope)
+	}
+	if got := access.PermissionScopes["project:read"]; got != RBACScopeAll {
+		t.Fatalf("project:read scope = %q, want all", got)
+	}
+	if got := access.PermissionScopes["project:write"]; got != RBACScopeOwn {
+		t.Fatalf("project:write scope widened to %q, want own", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRoleRejectsUnknownPermission(t *testing.T) {
+	db := newRBACTestDB(t)
+	if err := db.BootstrapRBAC("hash", map[string]string{"auth:self": "self"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.UpsertRBACRole("", "future-role", "", RBACScopeAssigned, []string{"future:permission"}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("unknown permission was persisted")
+	}
+	if _, err := db.Exec(`INSERT INTO rbac_permissions (key, description, created_at) VALUES ('stale:permission', '', ?)`, time.Now()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.BootstrapRBAC("hash", map[string]string{"auth:self": "self"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var count int
+	if err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM rbac_permissions WHERE key = 'stale:permission'`).Scan(&count); err != nil || count != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("stale permission survived bootstrap: count=%d err=%v", count, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRBACProjectAndConversationListAccess(t *testing.T) {
+	db := newRBACTestDB(t)
+	p1, _ := db.CreateProject(&Project{Name: "visible"})
+	p2, _ := db.CreateProject(&Project{Name: "hidden"})
+	if err := db.SetResourceOwner("project", p1.ID, "u1"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	c1, _ := db.CreateConversation("visible conv", ConversationCreateMeta{ProjectID: p1.ID})
+	c2, _ := db.CreateConversation("hidden conv", ConversationCreateMeta{ProjectID: p2.ID})
+	_ = db.SetResourceOwner("conversation", c1.ID, "u1")
+	_ = db.SetResourceOwner("conversation", c2.ID, "u2")
+
+	projects, err := db.ListProjectsForAccess("", "", 50, 0, "u1", RBACScopeOwn)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(projects) != 1 || projects[0].ID != p1.ID {
+		t.Fatalf("projects = %#v, want only %s", projects, p1.ID)
+	}
+
+	convs, err := db.ListConversationsForAccess(50, 0, "", "", "", "u1", RBACScopeOwn)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(convs) != 1 || convs[0].ID != c1.ID {
+		t.Fatalf("conversations = %#v, want only %s", convs, c1.ID)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRBACVulnerabilityAccessInheritsProject(t *testing.T) {
+	db := newRBACTestDB(t)
+	user, err := db.CreateRBACUser("u1", "User 1", "hash", true, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	p1, _ := db.CreateProject(&Project{Name: "visible"})
+	p2, _ := db.CreateProject(&Project{Name: "hidden"})
+	if err := db.AssignResourceToUser(user.ID, "project", p1.ID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	v1, _ := db.CreateVulnerability(&Vulnerability{ProjectID: p1.ID, Title: "v1", Severity: "high"})
+	v2, _ := db.CreateVulnerability(&Vulnerability{ProjectID: p2.ID, Title: "v2", Severity: "high"})
+
+	items, err := db.ListVulnerabilitiesForAccess(50, 0, VulnerabilityListFilter{}, RBACListAccess{UserID: user.ID, Scope: RBACScopeAssigned})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(items) != 1 || items[0].ID != v1.ID {
+		t.Fatalf("vulnerabilities = %#v, want only %s; hidden %s", items, v1.ID, v2.ID)
+	}
+	if !db.UserCanAccessResource(user.ID, RBACScopeAssigned, "vulnerability", v1.ID) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected project assignment to allow vulnerability detail")
+	}
+	if db.UserCanAccessResource(user.ID, RBACScopeAssigned, "vulnerability", v2.ID) {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected access to hidden vulnerability")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRBACConversationAccessInheritsProject(t *testing.T) {
+	db := newRBACTestDB(t)
+	user, err := db.CreateRBACUser("project-member", "Project Member", "hash", true, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	project, err := db.CreateProject(&Project{Name: "assigned project"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	conversation, err := db.CreateConversation("project conversation", ConversationCreateMeta{ProjectID: project.ID})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.AssignResourceToUser(user.ID, "project", project.ID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	rows, err := db.ListConversationsForAccess(50, 0, "", "", "", user.ID, RBACScopeAssigned)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(rows) != 1 || rows[0].ID != conversation.ID {
+		t.Fatalf("conversations = %#v, want project conversation %s", rows, conversation.ID)
+	}
+	if !db.UserCanAccessResource(user.ID, RBACScopeAssigned, "conversation", conversation.ID) {
+		t.Fatal("expected project assignment to allow conversation detail")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRBACBatchResourceAssignmentValidationAndAtomicity(t *testing.T) {
+	db := newRBACTestDB(t)
+	user, err := db.CreateRBACUser("batch-member", "Batch Member", "hash", true, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	p1, err := db.CreateProject(&Project{Name: "p1"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	p2, err := db.CreateProject(&Project{Name: "p2"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	p3, err := db.CreateProject(&Project{Name: "p3"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	options, err := db.ListAssignableRBACResources("project", "p1", 50)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(options) != 1 || options[0].ID != p1.ID || options[0].Label != "p1" {
+		t.Fatalf("resource options = %#v, want p1", options)
+	}
+	firstPage, err := db.ListAssignableRBACResourcesPage("project", "", 2, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	secondPage, err := db.ListAssignableRBACResourcesPage("project", "", 2, 2)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(firstPage) != 2 || len(secondPage) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("paged resource options = %d + %d, want 2 + 1", len(firstPage), len(secondPage))
+	}
+	seen := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, option := range append(firstPage, secondPage...) {
+		seen[option.ID] = true
+	}
+	if !seen[p1.ID] || !seen[p2.ID] || !seen[p3.ID] {
+		t.Fatalf("paged resource options missed resources: %#v", seen)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.ListAssignableRBACResources("secret_table", "", 50); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected unsupported picker resource type to fail")
+	}
+
+	if _, err := db.AssignResourcesToUser(user.ID, "unknown_type", []string{p1.ID}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected unsupported resource type to fail")
+	}
+	if _, err := db.AssignResourcesToUser(user.ID, "project", []string{p1.ID, "missing-project"}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected missing resource to fail the entire batch")
+	}
+	rows, err := db.ListRBACResourceAssignments(user.ID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(rows) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("partial grants persisted after failed batch: %#v", rows)
+	}
+
+	created, err := db.AssignResourcesToUser(user.ID, "project", []string{p1.ID, p1.ID, p2.ID})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if created != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("created = %d, want 2 unique grants", created)
+	}
+	created, err = db.AssignResourcesToUser(user.ID, "project", []string{p1.ID, p2.ID})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if created != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("idempotent retry created = %d, want 0", created)
+	}
+	rows, err = db.ListRBACResourceAssignments(user.ID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(rows) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("assignment count = %d, want 2", len(rows))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRBACWebshellAndBatchListAccess(t *testing.T) {
+	db := newRBACTestDB(t)
+	ws1 := WebShellConnection{ID: "ws_visible", URL: "http://a", Type: "php", Method: "post", CreatedAt: time.Now()}
+	ws2 := WebShellConnection{ID: "ws_hidden", URL: "http://b", Type: "php", Method: "post", CreatedAt: time.Now()}
+	if err := db.CreateWebshellConnection(&ws1); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.CreateWebshellConnection(&ws2); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	_ = db.SetResourceOwner("webshell", ws1.ID, "u1")
+	_ = db.SetResourceOwner("webshell", ws2.ID, "u2")
+	webshells, err := db.ListWebshellConnectionsForAccess("u1", RBACScopeOwn)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(webshells) != 1 || webshells[0].ID != ws1.ID {
+		t.Fatalf("webshells = %#v, want only %s", webshells, ws1.ID)
+	}
+
+	if err := db.CreateBatchQueue("q_visible", "visible", "", "eino_single", "manual", "", nil, "", 1, []map[string]interface{}{{"id": "t1", "message": "a"}}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.CreateBatchQueue("q_hidden", "hidden", "", "eino_single", "manual", "", nil, "", 1, []map[string]interface{}{{"id": "t2", "message": "b"}}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	_ = db.SetResourceOwner("batch_task", "q_visible", "u1")
+	_ = db.SetResourceOwner("batch_task", "q_hidden", "u2")
+	queues, err := db.ListBatchQueuesForAccess(50, 0, "all", "", "u1", RBACScopeOwn)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(queues) != 1 || queues[0].ID != "q_visible" {
+		t.Fatalf("queues = %#v, want only q_visible", queues)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRBACC2AccessInheritsListener(t *testing.T) {
+	db := newRBACTestDB(t)
+	now := time.Now()
+	l1 := &C2Listener{ID: "l_visible", Name: "visible", Type: "http_beacon", BindHost: "127.0.0.1", BindPort: 9001, OwnerUserID: "u1", CreatedAt: now}
+	l2 := &C2Listener{ID: "l_hidden", Name: "hidden", Type: "http_beacon", BindHost: "127.0.0.1", BindPort: 9002, OwnerUserID: "u2", CreatedAt: now}
+	if err := db.CreateC2Listener(l1); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.CreateC2Listener(l2); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.UpsertC2Session(&C2Session{ID: "s_visible", ListenerID: l1.ID, ImplantUUID: "implant-visible", Status: "active", FirstSeenAt: now, LastCheckIn: now}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.UpsertC2Session(&C2Session{ID: "s_hidden", ListenerID: l2.ID, ImplantUUID: "implant-hidden", Status: "active", FirstSeenAt: now, LastCheckIn: now}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.CreateC2Task(&C2Task{ID: "t_visible", SessionID: "s_visible", TaskType: "shell", Status: "queued", CreatedAt: now}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.CreateC2Task(&C2Task{ID: "t_hidden", SessionID: "s_hidden", TaskType: "shell", Status: "queued", CreatedAt: now}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.AppendC2Event(&C2Event{ID: "e_visible", Level: "info", Category: "task", SessionID: "s_visible", TaskID: "t_visible", Message: "visible", CreatedAt: now}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.AppendC2Event(&C2Event{ID: "e_hidden", Level: "info", Category: "task", SessionID: "s_hidden", TaskID: "t_hidden", Message: "hidden", CreatedAt: now}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	access := RBACListAccess{UserID: "u1", Scope: RBACScopeOwn}
+	listeners, err := db.ListC2ListenersForAccess(access)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(listeners) != 1 || listeners[0].ID != l1.ID {
+		t.Fatalf("listeners = %#v, want only %s", listeners, l1.ID)
+	}
+	sessions, err := db.ListC2SessionsForAccess(ListC2SessionsFilter{}, access)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(sessions) != 1 || sessions[0].ID != "s_visible" {
+		t.Fatalf("sessions = %#v, want only s_visible", sessions)
+	}
+	tasks, err := db.ListC2TasksForAccess(ListC2TasksFilter{}, access)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(tasks) != 1 || tasks[0].ID != "t_visible" {
+		t.Fatalf("tasks = %#v, want only t_visible", tasks)
+	}
+	events, err := db.ListC2EventsForAccess(ListC2EventsFilter{}, access)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(events) != 1 || events[0].ID != "e_visible" {
+		t.Fatalf("events = %#v, want only e_visible", events)
+	}
+	if !db.UserCanAccessResource("u1", RBACScopeOwn, "c2_task", "t_visible") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected listener ownership to allow task detail")
+	}
+	if db.UserCanAccessResource("u1", RBACScopeOwn, "c2_task", "t_hidden") {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected access to hidden task")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRBACC2AssignedDeleteIsScoped(t *testing.T) {
+	db := newRBACTestDB(t)
+	user, err := db.CreateRBACUser("u1", "User 1", "hash", true, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	now := time.Now()
+	if err := db.CreateC2Listener(&C2Listener{ID: "l_assigned", Name: "assigned", Type: "http_beacon", BindHost: "127.0.0.1", BindPort: 9001, CreatedAt: now}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.CreateC2Listener(&C2Listener{ID: "l_hidden", Name: "hidden", Type: "http_beacon", BindHost: "127.0.0.1", BindPort: 9002, CreatedAt: now}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.AssignResourceToUser(user.ID, "c2_listener", "l_assigned"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, row := range []struct {
+		sessionID string
+		listener  string
+		taskID    string
+		eventID   string
+	}{
+		{"s_assigned", "l_assigned", "t_assigned", "e_assigned"},
+		{"s_hidden", "l_hidden", "t_hidden", "e_hidden"},
+	} {
+		if err := db.UpsertC2Session(&C2Session{ID: row.sessionID, ListenerID: row.listener, ImplantUUID: row.sessionID + "_uuid", Status: "active", FirstSeenAt: now, LastCheckIn: now}); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if err := db.CreateC2Task(&C2Task{ID: row.taskID, SessionID: row.sessionID, TaskType: "shell", Status: "queued", CreatedAt: now}); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if err := db.AppendC2Event(&C2Event{ID: row.eventID, Level: "info", Category: "task", SessionID: row.sessionID, TaskID: row.taskID, Message: row.eventID, CreatedAt: now}); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	access := RBACListAccess{UserID: user.ID, Scope: RBACScopeAssigned}
+	n, err := db.DeleteC2TasksByIDsForAccess([]string{"t_assigned", "t_hidden"}, access)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if n != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("deleted tasks = %d, want 1", n)
+	}
+	if task, _ := db.GetC2Task("t_hidden"); task == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("hidden task was deleted")
+	}
+	n, err = db.DeleteC2EventsByIDsForAccess([]string{"e_assigned", "e_hidden"}, access)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if n != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("deleted events = %d, want 1", n)
+	}
+	hiddenEvents, err := db.ListC2Events(ListC2EventsFilter{TaskID: "t_hidden"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(hiddenEvents) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("hidden event count = %d, want 1", len(hiddenEvents))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRBACAssignmentLabelsAndWeakTitles(t *testing.T) {
+	db := newRBACTestDB(t)
+	user, err := db.CreateRBACUser("label-member", "Label Member", "hash", true, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	project, err := db.CreateProject(&Project{Name: "Alpha Project"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	conversation, err := db.CreateConversation("1", ConversationCreateMeta{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.AssignResourcesToUser(user.ID, "project", []string{project.ID}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	options, err := db.ListAssignableRBACResources("conversation", "", 10)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(options) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("expected conversation options")
+	}
+	for _, option := range options {
+		if option.ID == conversation.ID && !strings.Contains(option.Label, "1 ·") {
+			t.Fatalf("weak conversation label = %q, want suffix with short id", option.Label)
+		}
+	}
+
+	rows, err := db.ListRBACResourceAssignments(user.ID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(rows) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("assignments = %#v, want 1", rows)
+	}
+	if rows[0].ResourceLabel != "Alpha Project" {
+		t.Fatalf("assignment label = %q, want Alpha Project", rows[0].ResourceLabel)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDeleteRBACResourceAssignmentWithDetails(t *testing.T) {
+	db := newRBACTestDB(t)
+	user, err := db.CreateRBACUser("revoke-member", "Revoke Member", "hash", true, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	project, err := db.CreateProject(&Project{Name: "Revoked Project"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.AssignResourcesToUser(user.ID, "project", []string{project.ID}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	rows, err := db.ListRBACResourceAssignments(user.ID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(rows) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("assignments = %#v, want 1", rows)
+	}
+
+	deleted, err := db.DeleteRBACResourceAssignmentWithDetails(rows[0].ID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if deleted.ID != rows[0].ID || deleted.UserID != user.ID || deleted.ResourceType != "project" || deleted.ResourceID != project.ID {
+		t.Fatalf("deleted assignment = %#v", deleted)
+	}
+	remaining, err := db.ListRBACResourceAssignments(user.ID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(remaining) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("remaining assignments = %#v, want none", remaining)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.DeleteRBACResourceAssignmentWithDetails(rows[0].ID); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("second delete unexpectedly succeeded")
+	}
+}

internal/database/robot_identity.go

@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+package database
+
+import (
+	"database/sql"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/google/uuid"
+)
+
+// RobotUserBinding maps one tenant-scoped platform identity to one RBAC user.
+// external_user_id must be derived from the verified platform event, never
+// from user-controlled message content.
+type RobotUserBinding struct {
+	ID             string    `json:"id"`
+	Platform       string    `json:"platform"`
+	ExternalUserID string    `json:"externalUserId"`
+	RBACUserID     string    `json:"rbacUserId"`
+	Enabled        bool      `json:"enabled"`
+	CreatedAt      time.Time `json:"createdAt"`
+	UpdatedAt      time.Time `json:"updatedAt"`
+}
+
+func normalizeRobotIdentity(platform, externalUserID string) (string, string, error) {
+	platform = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(platform))
+	externalUserID = strings.TrimSpace(externalUserID)
+	if platform == "" || externalUserID == "" {
+		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("robot platform and external user identity are required")
+	}
+	return platform, externalUserID, nil
+}
+
+func (db *DB) CreateRobotBindingCode(userID, codeHash string, expiresAt time.Time) error {
+	userID = strings.TrimSpace(userID)
+	codeHash = strings.TrimSpace(codeHash)
+	if userID == "" || codeHash == "" || !expiresAt.After(time.Now()) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("invalid robot binding code")
+	}
+	now := time.Now()
+	tx, err := db.Begin()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }()
+	// Keep only the newest active code per user and remove expired/used secrets.
+	if _, err = tx.Exec(`DELETE FROM robot_binding_codes WHERE rbac_user_id = ? OR expires_at <= ? OR used_at IS NOT NULL`, userID, now); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if _, err = tx.Exec(`INSERT INTO robot_binding_codes (code_hash, rbac_user_id, expires_at, created_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)`, codeHash, userID, expiresAt, now); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return tx.Commit()
+}
+
+// ConsumeRobotBindingCode atomically consumes a single-use code and binds the
+// verified platform identity. Existing bindings are deliberately replaced so
+// users can recover from stale or incorrect associations with a fresh code.
+func (db *DB) ConsumeRobotBindingCode(platform, externalUserID, codeHash string) (*RBACUser, error) {
+	platform, externalUserID, err := normalizeRobotIdentity(platform, externalUserID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	codeHash = strings.TrimSpace(codeHash)
+	if codeHash == "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("binding code is required")
+	}
+	tx, err := db.Begin()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }()
+
+	var userID string
+	now := time.Now()
+	if err = tx.QueryRow(`
+		SELECT c.rbac_user_id
+		FROM robot_binding_codes c
+		JOIN rbac_users u ON u.id = c.rbac_user_id
+		WHERE c.code_hash = ? AND c.used_at IS NULL AND c.expires_at > ? AND u.enabled = 1
+	`, codeHash, now).Scan(&userID); err != nil {
+		if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("binding code is invalid or expired")
+		}
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	result, err := tx.Exec(`UPDATE robot_binding_codes SET used_at = ? WHERE code_hash = ? AND used_at IS NULL`, now, codeHash)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if affected, _ := result.RowsAffected(); affected != 1 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("binding code has already been used")
+	}
+	if _, err = tx.Exec(`
+		INSERT INTO robot_user_bindings (id, platform, external_user_id, rbac_user_id, enabled, created_at, updated_at)
+		VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, 1, ?, ?)
+		ON CONFLICT(platform, external_user_id) DO UPDATE SET
+			rbac_user_id = excluded.rbac_user_id,
+			enabled = 1,
+			updated_at = excluded.updated_at
+	`, uuid.New().String(), platform, externalUserID, userID, now, now); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if err = tx.Commit(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return db.GetRBACUserByID(userID)
+}
+
+func (db *DB) ResolveRobotRBACAccess(platform, externalUserID string) (*RBACAccess, error) {
+	platform, externalUserID, err := normalizeRobotIdentity(platform, externalUserID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	var userID string
+	err = db.QueryRow(`
+		SELECT b.rbac_user_id
+		FROM robot_user_bindings b
+		JOIN rbac_users u ON u.id = b.rbac_user_id
+		WHERE b.platform = ? AND b.external_user_id = ? AND b.enabled = 1 AND u.enabled = 1
+	`, platform, externalUserID).Scan(&userID)
+	if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("robot identity is not bound")
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return db.ResolveRBACAccess(userID)
+}
+
+func (db *DB) ListRobotUserBindings(userID string) ([]RobotUserBinding, error) {
+	rows, err := db.Query(`
+		SELECT id, platform, external_user_id, rbac_user_id, enabled, created_at, updated_at
+		FROM robot_user_bindings WHERE rbac_user_id = ? ORDER BY updated_at DESC
+	`, strings.TrimSpace(userID))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+	var out []RobotUserBinding
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var b RobotUserBinding
+		var enabled int
+		var createdAt, updatedAt string
+		if err := rows.Scan(&b.ID, &b.Platform, &b.ExternalUserID, &b.RBACUserID, &enabled, &createdAt, &updatedAt); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		b.Enabled = enabled != 0
+		b.CreatedAt = parseDBTime(createdAt)
+		b.UpdatedAt = parseDBTime(updatedAt)
+		out = append(out, b)
+	}
+	return out, rows.Err()
+}
+
+func (db *DB) DeleteRobotUserBindingForUser(bindingID, userID string) error {
+	result, err := db.Exec(`DELETE FROM robot_user_bindings WHERE id = ? AND rbac_user_id = ?`, strings.TrimSpace(bindingID), strings.TrimSpace(userID))
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if affected, _ := result.RowsAffected(); affected != 1 {
+		return sql.ErrNoRows
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (db *DB) DeleteRobotIdentityBinding(platform, externalUserID string) error {
+	platform, externalUserID, err := normalizeRobotIdentity(platform, externalUserID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	_, err = db.Exec(`DELETE FROM robot_user_bindings WHERE platform = ? AND external_user_id = ?`, platform, externalUserID)
+	return err
+}

internal/database/robot_identity_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+package database_test
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/database"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/security"
+
+	"go.uber.org/zap"
+)
+
+func TestRobotBindingCodeIsSingleUseAndPermissionsAreResolvedLive(t *testing.T) {
+	db, err := database.NewDB(t.TempDir()+"/robot-identity.db", zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
+	if err := db.BootstrapRBAC("hash", security.PermissionCatalog); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	user, err := db.CreateRBACUser("bound-user", "Bound User", "hash", true, []string{database.RBACSystemRoleOperator})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.CreateRobotBindingCode(user.ID, "code-hash", time.Now().Add(time.Minute)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	bound, err := db.ConsumeRobotBindingCode("LARK", "t:tenant|u:user", "code-hash")
+	if err != nil || bound.ID != user.ID {
+		t.Fatalf("consume binding code: user=%v err=%v", bound, err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.ConsumeRobotBindingCode("lark", "t:tenant|u:other", "code-hash"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("single-use binding code was accepted twice")
+	}
+	access, err := db.ResolveRobotRBACAccess("lark", "t:tenant|u:user")
+	if err != nil || !access.Permissions["agent:execute"] {
+		t.Fatalf("resolved access does not include live role permissions: %#v err=%v", access, err)
+	}
+	disabled := false
+	if err := db.UpdateRBACUser(user.ID, user.DisplayName, &disabled, nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.ResolveRobotRBACAccess("lark", "t:tenant|u:user"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("disabled RBAC user retained robot access")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRobotBindingCodeExpiryAndOwnerScopedRevocation(t *testing.T) {
+	db, err := database.NewDB(t.TempDir()+"/robot-revoke.db", zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
+	if err := db.BootstrapRBAC("hash", security.PermissionCatalog); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	u1, _ := db.CreateRBACUser("binding-owner", "Owner", "hash", true, nil)
+	u2, _ := db.CreateRBACUser("binding-other", "Other", "hash", true, nil)
+	now := time.Now()
+	if _, err := db.Exec(`INSERT INTO robot_binding_codes (code_hash, rbac_user_id, expires_at, created_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)`, "expired-hash", u1.ID, now.Add(-time.Minute), now.Add(-2*time.Minute)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.ConsumeRobotBindingCode("wecom", "t:corp|u:expired", "expired-hash"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expired binding code was accepted")
+	}
+	if err := db.CreateRobotBindingCode(u1.ID, "valid-hash", time.Now().Add(time.Minute)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.ConsumeRobotBindingCode("wecom", "t:corp|u:one", "valid-hash"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	bindings, err := db.ListRobotUserBindings(u1.ID)
+	if err != nil || len(bindings) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("bindings=%v err=%v", bindings, err)
+	}
+	if err := db.DeleteRobotUserBindingForUser(bindings[0].ID, u2.ID); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("another user revoked a binding they do not own")
+	}
+	if _, err := db.ResolveRobotRBACAccess("wecom", "t:corp|u:one"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unauthorized revocation changed binding: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := db.DeleteRobotUserBindingForUser(bindings[0].ID, u1.ID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.ResolveRobotRBACAccess("wecom", "t:corp|u:one"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("revoked binding still resolves")
+	}
+}

internal/database/robot_session.go

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ type RobotSessionBinding struct {
 	SessionKey     string
 	ConversationID string
 	RoleName       string
+	AgentMode      string
 	UpdatedAt      time.Time
 }
 
@@ -24,9 +25,9 @@ func (db *DB) GetRobotSessionBinding(sessionKey string) (*RobotSessionBinding, e
 	var b RobotSessionBinding
 	var updatedAt string
 	err := db.QueryRow(
-		"SELECT session_key, conversation_id, role_name, updated_at FROM robot_user_sessions WHERE session_key = ?",
+		"SELECT session_key, conversation_id, role_name, agent_mode, updated_at FROM robot_user_sessions WHERE session_key = ?",
 		sessionKey,
-	).Scan(&b.SessionKey, &b.ConversationID, &b.RoleName, &updatedAt)
+	).Scan(&b.SessionKey, &b.ConversationID, &b.RoleName, &b.AgentMode, &updatedAt)
 	if err != nil {
 		if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
 			return nil, nil
@@ -43,28 +44,36 @@ func (db *DB) GetRobotSessionBinding(sessionKey string) (*RobotSessionBinding, e
 	if strings.TrimSpace(b.RoleName) == "" {
 		b.RoleName = "默认"
 	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(b.AgentMode) == "" {
+		b.AgentMode = "eino_single"
+	}
 	return &b, nil
 }
 
 // UpsertRobotSessionBinding 写入或更新机器人会话绑定（包含角色）。
-func (db *DB) UpsertRobotSessionBinding(sessionKey, conversationID, roleName string) error {
+func (db *DB) UpsertRobotSessionBinding(sessionKey, conversationID, roleName, agentMode string) error {
 	sessionKey = strings.TrimSpace(sessionKey)
 	conversationID = strings.TrimSpace(conversationID)
 	roleName = strings.TrimSpace(roleName)
+	agentMode = strings.TrimSpace(agentMode)
 	if sessionKey == "" || conversationID == "" {
 		return nil
 	}
 	if roleName == "" {
 		roleName = "默认"
 	}
+	if agentMode == "" {
+		agentMode = "eino_single"
+	}
 	_, err := db.Exec(`
-		INSERT INTO robot_user_sessions (session_key, conversation_id, role_name, updated_at)
+		INSERT INTO robot_user_sessions (session_key, conversation_id, role_name, agent_mode, updated_at)
-		VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)
+		VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
 		ON CONFLICT(session_key) DO UPDATE SET
 			conversation_id = excluded.conversation_id,
 			role_name = excluded.role_name,
+			agent_mode = excluded.agent_mode,
 			updated_at = excluded.updated_at
-	`, sessionKey, conversationID, roleName, time.Now())
+	`, sessionKey, conversationID, roleName, agentMode, time.Now())
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("写入机器人会话绑定失败: %w", err)
 	}

internal/database/vulnerability.go

@@ -23,6 +23,11 @@ type VulnerabilityListFilter struct {
 	TaskTag         string
 }
 
+type RBACListAccess struct {
+	UserID string
+	Scope  string
+}
+
 func escapeVulnerabilityLikePattern(s string) string {
 	s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, `\`, `\\`)
 	s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, `%`, `\%`)
@@ -89,6 +94,40 @@ func (f VulnerabilityListFilter) appendWhere(query string, args []interface{}) (
 	return query, args
 }
 
+func appendVulnerabilityAccessFilter(query string, args []interface{}, access RBACListAccess) (string, []interface{}) {
+	userID := strings.TrimSpace(access.UserID)
+	if userID == "" || access.Scope == RBACScopeAll {
+		return query, args
+	}
+	query += ` AND (
+		owner_user_id = ?
+		OR EXISTS (
+			SELECT 1 FROM rbac_resource_assignments ra
+			WHERE ra.user_id = ? AND ra.resource_type = 'vulnerability' AND ra.resource_id = vulnerabilities.id
+		)
+		OR (
+			project_id IS NOT NULL AND project_id <> '' AND (
+				EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM projects p WHERE p.id = vulnerabilities.project_id AND p.owner_user_id = ?)
+				OR EXISTS (
+					SELECT 1 FROM rbac_resource_assignments pra
+					WHERE pra.user_id = ? AND pra.resource_type = 'project' AND pra.resource_id = vulnerabilities.project_id
+				)
+			)
+		)
+		OR (
+			conversation_id IS NOT NULL AND conversation_id <> '' AND (
+				EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM conversations c WHERE c.id = vulnerabilities.conversation_id AND c.owner_user_id = ?)
+				OR EXISTS (
+					SELECT 1 FROM rbac_resource_assignments cra
+					WHERE cra.user_id = ? AND cra.resource_type = 'conversation' AND cra.resource_id = vulnerabilities.conversation_id
+				)
+			)
+		)
+	)`
+	args = append(args, userID, userID, userID, userID, userID, userID)
+	return query, args
+}
+
 // Vulnerability 漏洞
 type Vulnerability struct {
 	ID              string    `json:"id"`
@@ -152,7 +191,6 @@ func (db *DB) CreateVulnerability(vuln *Vulnerability) (*Vulnerability, error) {
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("创建漏洞失败: %w", err)
 	}
-
 	return vuln, nil
 }
 
@@ -190,6 +228,10 @@ func (db *DB) GetVulnerability(id string) (*Vulnerability, error) {
 
 // ListVulnerabilities 列出漏洞
 func (db *DB) ListVulnerabilities(limit, offset int, filter VulnerabilityListFilter) ([]*Vulnerability, error) {
+	return db.ListVulnerabilitiesForAccess(limit, offset, filter, RBACListAccess{})
+}
+
+func (db *DB) ListVulnerabilitiesForAccess(limit, offset int, filter VulnerabilityListFilter, access RBACListAccess) ([]*Vulnerability, error) {
 	query := `
 		SELECT id, COALESCE(conversation_id,''), COALESCE(project_id,''), title, description, severity, status, conversation_tag, task_tag,
 		       vulnerability_type, target,
@@ -203,6 +245,7 @@ func (db *DB) ListVulnerabilities(limit, offset int, filter VulnerabilityListFil
 	`
 	args := []interface{}{}
 	query, args = filter.appendWhere(query, args)
+	query, args = appendVulnerabilityAccessFilter(query, args, access)
 
 	query += " ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT ? OFFSET ?"
 	args = append(args, limit, offset)
@@ -235,9 +278,14 @@ func (db *DB) ListVulnerabilities(limit, offset int, filter VulnerabilityListFil
 
 // CountVulnerabilities 统计漏洞总数（支持筛选条件）
 func (db *DB) CountVulnerabilities(filter VulnerabilityListFilter) (int, error) {
+	return db.CountVulnerabilitiesForAccess(filter, RBACListAccess{})
+}
+
+func (db *DB) CountVulnerabilitiesForAccess(filter VulnerabilityListFilter, access RBACListAccess) (int, error) {
 	query := "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM vulnerabilities WHERE 1=1"
 	args := []interface{}{}
 	query, args = filter.appendWhere(query, args)
+	query, args = appendVulnerabilityAccessFilter(query, args, access)
 
 	var count int
 	err := db.QueryRow(query, args...).Scan(&count)
@@ -275,6 +323,10 @@ func (db *DB) UpdateVulnerability(id string, vuln *Vulnerability) error {
 
 // DeleteVulnerabilitiesByFilter 按筛选条件批量删除漏洞，返回实际删除条数
 func (db *DB) DeleteVulnerabilitiesByFilter(filter VulnerabilityListFilter) (int64, error) {
+	return db.DeleteVulnerabilitiesByFilterForAccess(filter, RBACListAccess{})
+}
+
+func (db *DB) DeleteVulnerabilitiesByFilterForAccess(filter VulnerabilityListFilter, access RBACListAccess) (int64, error) {
 	tx, err := db.Begin()
 	if err != nil {
 		return 0, fmt.Errorf("开启事务失败: %w", err)
@@ -284,6 +336,7 @@ func (db *DB) DeleteVulnerabilitiesByFilter(filter VulnerabilityListFilter) (int
 	where := "WHERE 1=1"
 	args := []interface{}{}
 	where, args = filter.appendWhere(where, args)
+	where, args = appendVulnerabilityAccessFilter(where, args, access)
 
 	clearQuery := `UPDATE project_facts SET related_vulnerability_id = NULL
 		WHERE related_vulnerability_id IN (SELECT id FROM vulnerabilities ` + where + `)`
@@ -329,11 +382,16 @@ func (db *DB) DeleteVulnerability(id string) error {
 
 // GetVulnerabilityStats 获取漏洞统计（筛选条件与 ListVulnerabilities / CountVulnerabilities 一致）
 func (db *DB) GetVulnerabilityStats(filter VulnerabilityListFilter) (map[string]interface{}, error) {
+	return db.GetVulnerabilityStatsForAccess(filter, RBACListAccess{})
+}
+
+func (db *DB) GetVulnerabilityStatsForAccess(filter VulnerabilityListFilter, access RBACListAccess) (map[string]interface{}, error) {
 	stats := make(map[string]interface{})
 
 	where := "WHERE 1=1"
 	args := []interface{}{}
 	where, args = filter.appendWhere(where, args)
+	where, args = appendVulnerabilityAccessFilter(where, args, access)
 
 	// 总漏洞数
 	var totalCount int
@@ -389,6 +447,10 @@ func (db *DB) GetVulnerabilityStats(filter VulnerabilityListFilter) (map[string]
 
 // GetVulnerabilityFilterOptions 获取漏洞筛选建议项
 func (db *DB) GetVulnerabilityFilterOptions() (map[string][]string, error) {
+	return db.GetVulnerabilityFilterOptionsForAccess(RBACListAccess{})
+}
+
+func (db *DB) GetVulnerabilityFilterOptionsForAccess(access RBACListAccess) (map[string][]string, error) {
 	collect := func(query string, args ...interface{}) ([]string, error) {
 		rows, err := db.Query(query, args...)
 		if err != nil {
@@ -409,31 +471,35 @@ func (db *DB) GetVulnerabilityFilterOptions() (map[string][]string, error) {
 		return items, nil
 	}
 
-	vulnIDs, err := collect(`SELECT DISTINCT id FROM vulnerabilities ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 500`)
+	where := "WHERE 1=1"
+	accessArgs := []interface{}{}
+	where, accessArgs = appendVulnerabilityAccessFilter(where, accessArgs, access)
+
+	vulnIDs, err := collect(`SELECT DISTINCT id FROM vulnerabilities `+where+` ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 500`, accessArgs...)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("查询漏洞ID建议失败: %w", err)
 	}
-	conversationIDs, err := collect(`SELECT DISTINCT conversation_id FROM vulnerabilities WHERE conversation_id IS NOT NULL AND conversation_id <> '' ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 500`)
+	conversationIDs, err := collect(`SELECT DISTINCT conversation_id FROM vulnerabilities `+where+` AND conversation_id IS NOT NULL AND conversation_id <> '' ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 500`, accessArgs...)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("查询会话ID建议失败: %w", err)
 	}
-	taskIDs, err := collect(`SELECT DISTINCT id FROM batch_tasks WHERE id <> '' ORDER BY rowid DESC LIMIT 500`)
+	taskIDs, err := collect(`SELECT DISTINCT bt.id FROM batch_tasks bt JOIN vulnerabilities ON bt.conversation_id = vulnerabilities.conversation_id `+where+` AND bt.id <> '' ORDER BY bt.rowid DESC LIMIT 500`, accessArgs...)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("查询任务ID建议失败: %w", err)
 	}
-	queueIDs, err := collect(`SELECT DISTINCT queue_id FROM batch_tasks WHERE queue_id <> '' ORDER BY rowid DESC LIMIT 500`)
+	queueIDs, err := collect(`SELECT DISTINCT bt.queue_id FROM batch_tasks bt JOIN vulnerabilities ON bt.conversation_id = vulnerabilities.conversation_id `+where+` AND bt.queue_id <> '' ORDER BY bt.rowid DESC LIMIT 500`, accessArgs...)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("查询队列ID建议失败: %w", err)
 	}
-	conversationTags, err := collect(`SELECT DISTINCT conversation_tag FROM vulnerabilities WHERE conversation_tag IS NOT NULL AND conversation_tag <> '' ORDER BY conversation_tag LIMIT 500`)
+	conversationTags, err := collect(`SELECT DISTINCT conversation_tag FROM vulnerabilities `+where+` AND conversation_tag IS NOT NULL AND conversation_tag <> '' ORDER BY conversation_tag LIMIT 500`, accessArgs...)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("查询对话标签建议失败: %w", err)
 	}
-	taskTags, err := collect(`SELECT DISTINCT task_tag FROM vulnerabilities WHERE task_tag IS NOT NULL AND task_tag <> '' ORDER BY task_tag LIMIT 500`)
+	taskTags, err := collect(`SELECT DISTINCT task_tag FROM vulnerabilities `+where+` AND task_tag IS NOT NULL AND task_tag <> '' ORDER BY task_tag LIMIT 500`, accessArgs...)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("查询任务标签建议失败: %w", err)
 	}
-	projectIDs, err := collect(`SELECT DISTINCT project_id FROM vulnerabilities WHERE project_id IS NOT NULL AND project_id <> '' ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 200`)
+	projectIDs, err := collect(`SELECT DISTINCT project_id FROM vulnerabilities `+where+` AND project_id IS NOT NULL AND project_id <> '' ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 200`, accessArgs...)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("查询项目ID建议失败: %w", err)
 	}

internal/database/vulnerability_alert.go

@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+package database
+
+import (
+	"database/sql"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// VulnerabilityAlertSubscription is the single source of truth shared by Web
+// settings and robot commands. Alerts are opt-in and user scoped.
+type VulnerabilityAlertSubscription struct {
+	UserID      string    `json:"user_id"`
+	Enabled     bool      `json:"enabled"`
+	MinSeverity string    `json:"min_severity"`
+	CreatedAt   time.Time `json:"created_at"`
+	UpdatedAt   time.Time `json:"updated_at"`
+}
+
+type VulnerabilityAlertRecipient struct {
+	UserID         string
+	Platform       string
+	ExternalUserID string
+}
+
+type VulnerabilityAlertDelivery struct {
+	ID             int64
+	Vulnerability  *Vulnerability
+	UserID         string
+	Platform       string
+	ExternalUserID string
+	Attempts       int
+}
+
+var vulnerabilitySeverityRank = map[string]int{
+	"info": 0, "low": 1, "medium": 2, "high": 3, "critical": 4,
+}
+
+func NormalizeVulnerabilityAlertSeverity(value string) (string, error) {
+	value = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(value))
+	if value == "" {
+		value = "high"
+	}
+	if _, ok := vulnerabilitySeverityRank[value]; !ok {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid minimum severity %q", value)
+	}
+	return value, nil
+}
+
+func (db *DB) GetVulnerabilityAlertSubscription(userID string) (*VulnerabilityAlertSubscription, error) {
+	userID = strings.TrimSpace(userID)
+	var sub VulnerabilityAlertSubscription
+	var enabled int
+	var createdAt, updatedAt string
+	err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT user_id, enabled, min_severity, created_at, updated_at
+		FROM vulnerability_alert_subscriptions WHERE user_id = ?`, userID).
+		Scan(&sub.UserID, &enabled, &sub.MinSeverity, &createdAt, &updatedAt)
+	if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
+		now := time.Now()
+		return &VulnerabilityAlertSubscription{UserID: userID, MinSeverity: "high", CreatedAt: now, UpdatedAt: now}, nil
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	sub.Enabled = enabled != 0
+	sub.CreatedAt = parseDBTime(createdAt)
+	sub.UpdatedAt = parseDBTime(updatedAt)
+	return &sub, nil
+}
+
+func (db *DB) UpsertVulnerabilityAlertSubscription(userID string, enabled bool, minSeverity string) (*VulnerabilityAlertSubscription, error) {
+	userID = strings.TrimSpace(userID)
+	if userID == "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("user id is required")
+	}
+	severity, err := NormalizeVulnerabilityAlertSeverity(minSeverity)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	now := time.Now()
+	_, err = db.Exec(`INSERT INTO vulnerability_alert_subscriptions
+		(user_id, enabled, min_severity, created_at, updated_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+		ON CONFLICT(user_id) DO UPDATE SET enabled = excluded.enabled,
+		min_severity = excluded.min_severity, updated_at = excluded.updated_at`,
+		userID, boolToInt(enabled), severity, now, now)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return db.GetVulnerabilityAlertSubscription(userID)
+}
+
+// ListVulnerabilityAlertRecipients applies the same RBAC ownership/assignment
+// boundaries as the vulnerability list, then expands only enabled robot bindings.
+func (db *DB) ListVulnerabilityAlertRecipients(vuln *Vulnerability) ([]VulnerabilityAlertRecipient, error) {
+	if vuln == nil {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	rank, ok := vulnerabilitySeverityRank[strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(vuln.Severity))]
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	rows, err := db.Query(`
+		SELECT DISTINCT s.user_id, b.platform, b.external_user_id, s.min_severity
+		FROM vulnerability_alert_subscriptions s
+		JOIN rbac_users u ON u.id = s.user_id AND u.enabled = 1
+		JOIN robot_user_bindings b ON b.rbac_user_id = s.user_id AND b.enabled = 1
+		WHERE s.enabled = 1 AND (
+			EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM vulnerabilities v WHERE v.id = ? AND v.owner_user_id = s.user_id)
+			OR EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM rbac_resource_assignments ra WHERE ra.user_id = s.user_id AND ra.resource_type = 'vulnerability' AND ra.resource_id = ?)
+			OR (? <> '' AND (EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM projects p WHERE p.id = ? AND p.owner_user_id = s.user_id)
+				OR EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM rbac_resource_assignments pra WHERE pra.user_id = s.user_id AND pra.resource_type = 'project' AND pra.resource_id = ?)))
+			OR (? <> '' AND (EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM conversations c WHERE c.id = ? AND c.owner_user_id = s.user_id)
+				OR EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM rbac_resource_assignments cra WHERE cra.user_id = s.user_id AND cra.resource_type = 'conversation' AND cra.resource_id = ?)))
+		)`, vuln.ID, vuln.ID, vuln.ProjectID, vuln.ProjectID, vuln.ProjectID,
+		vuln.ConversationID, vuln.ConversationID, vuln.ConversationID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+	out := make([]VulnerabilityAlertRecipient, 0)
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var recipient VulnerabilityAlertRecipient
+		var minimum string
+		if err := rows.Scan(&recipient.UserID, &recipient.Platform, &recipient.ExternalUserID, &minimum); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		if rank >= vulnerabilitySeverityRank[minimum] {
+			out = append(out, recipient)
+		}
+	}
+	return out, rows.Err()
+}
+
+func (db *DB) SetVulnerabilityCreatedHook(hook func(*Vulnerability)) {
+	db.vulnerabilityCreatedHook = hook
+}
+
+// NotifyVulnerabilityCreated must be called after resource ownership has been
+// committed. Delivery runs asynchronously and never delays the write path.
+func (db *DB) NotifyVulnerabilityCreated(vulnerability *Vulnerability) {
+	if db == nil || vulnerability == nil || db.vulnerabilityCreatedHook == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	created := *vulnerability
+	go db.vulnerabilityCreatedHook(&created)
+}
+
+func (db *DB) EnqueueVulnerabilityAlertDeliveries(vulnerabilityID string, recipients []VulnerabilityAlertRecipient) error {
+	now := time.Now()
+	tx, err := db.Begin()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }()
+	for _, r := range recipients {
+		if _, err := tx.Exec(`INSERT INTO vulnerability_alert_deliveries
+			(vulnerability_id, user_id, platform, external_user_id, status, attempts, next_attempt_at, created_at, updated_at)
+			VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, 'pending', 0, ?, ?, ?)
+			ON CONFLICT(vulnerability_id, platform, external_user_id) DO NOTHING`,
+			vulnerabilityID, r.UserID, r.Platform, r.ExternalUserID, now, now, now); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return tx.Commit()
+}
+
+func (db *DB) ListDueVulnerabilityAlertDeliveries(limit int) ([]VulnerabilityAlertDelivery, error) {
+	if limit <= 0 || limit > 100 {
+		limit = 50
+	}
+	rows, err := db.Query(`SELECT d.id, d.user_id, d.platform, d.external_user_id, d.attempts,
+		v.id, COALESCE(v.conversation_id,''), COALESCE(v.project_id,''), v.title, COALESCE(v.description,''),
+		v.severity, v.status, COALESCE(v.vulnerability_type,''), COALESCE(v.target,''),
+		COALESCE(v.impact,''), COALESCE(v.recommendation,''), v.created_at, v.updated_at
+		FROM vulnerability_alert_deliveries d JOIN vulnerabilities v ON v.id = d.vulnerability_id
+		WHERE d.status IN ('pending','retry') AND d.next_attempt_at <= ?
+		ORDER BY d.next_attempt_at, d.id LIMIT ?`, time.Now(), limit)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+	var out []VulnerabilityAlertDelivery
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var d VulnerabilityAlertDelivery
+		v := &Vulnerability{}
+		if err := rows.Scan(&d.ID, &d.UserID, &d.Platform, &d.ExternalUserID, &d.Attempts,
+			&v.ID, &v.ConversationID, &v.ProjectID, &v.Title, &v.Description, &v.Severity, &v.Status,
+			&v.Type, &v.Target, &v.Impact, &v.Recommendation, &v.CreatedAt, &v.UpdatedAt); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		d.Vulnerability = v
+		out = append(out, d)
+	}
+	return out, rows.Err()
+}
+
+func (db *DB) MarkVulnerabilityAlertDeliverySent(id int64) error {
+	_, err := db.Exec(`UPDATE vulnerability_alert_deliveries SET status='sent', attempts=attempts+1, last_error='', updated_at=? WHERE id=?`, time.Now(), id)
+	return err
+}
+
+func (db *DB) MarkVulnerabilityAlertDeliveryFailed(id int64, attempts int, sendErr error) error {
+	status := "retry"
+	if attempts >= 5 {
+		status = "failed"
+	}
+	delay := time.Minute * time.Duration(1<<min(attempts, 6))
+	message := ""
+	if sendErr != nil {
+		message = sendErr.Error()
+	}
+	_, err := db.Exec(`UPDATE vulnerability_alert_deliveries SET status=?, attempts=?, next_attempt_at=?, last_error=?, updated_at=? WHERE id=?`,
+		status, attempts, time.Now().Add(delay), message, time.Now(), id)
+	return err
+}

internal/database/vulnerability_alert_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+package database_test
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/database"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/security"
+
+	"go.uber.org/zap"
+)
+
+func TestVulnerabilityAlertSubscriptionIsOptInAndRBACScoped(t *testing.T) {
+	db, err := database.NewDB(t.TempDir()+"/alerts.db", zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
+	if err := db.BootstrapRBAC("hash", security.PermissionCatalog); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	owner, _ := db.CreateRBACUser("alert-owner", "Owner", "hash", true, []string{database.RBACSystemRoleOperator})
+	other, _ := db.CreateRBACUser("alert-other", "Other", "hash", true, []string{database.RBACSystemRoleOperator})
+
+	for i, pair := range []struct {
+		user     *database.RBACUser
+		external string
+	}{{owner, "owner"}, {other, "other"}} {
+		code := "code-" + string(rune('a'+i))
+		if err := db.CreateRobotBindingCode(pair.user.ID, code, time.Now().Add(time.Minute)); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if _, err := db.ConsumeRobotBindingCode("wecom", pair.external, code); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	defaultSub, err := db.GetVulnerabilityAlertSubscription(owner.ID)
+	if err != nil || defaultSub.Enabled || defaultSub.MinSeverity != "high" {
+		t.Fatalf("unsafe default: %#v %v", defaultSub, err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.UpsertVulnerabilityAlertSubscription(owner.ID, true, "high"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.UpsertVulnerabilityAlertSubscription(other.ID, true, "low"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	vuln, err := db.CreateVulnerability(&database.Vulnerability{Title: "owned", Severity: "high"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.SetResourceOwner("vulnerability", vuln.ID, owner.ID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	recipients, err := db.ListVulnerabilityAlertRecipients(vuln)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(recipients) != 1 || recipients[0].UserID != owner.ID || recipients[0].ExternalUserID != "owner" {
+		t.Fatalf("alert escaped RBAC boundary: %#v", recipients)
+	}
+	if err := db.EnqueueVulnerabilityAlertDeliveries(vuln.ID, recipients); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.EnqueueVulnerabilityAlertDeliveries(vuln.ID, recipients); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	deliveries, err := db.ListDueVulnerabilityAlertDeliveries(10)
+	if err != nil || len(deliveries) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("outbox is not durable/deduplicated: %#v %v", deliveries, err)
+	}
+	if err := db.MarkVulnerabilityAlertDeliverySent(deliveries[0].ID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	deliveries, _ = db.ListDueVulnerabilityAlertDeliveries(10)
+	if len(deliveries) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("sent delivery remained due: %#v", deliveries)
+	}
+
+	vuln.Severity = "medium"
+	recipients, err = db.ListVulnerabilityAlertRecipients(vuln)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(recipients) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("minimum severity was ignored: %#v", recipients)
+	}
+}

internal/database/webshell.go

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package database
 
 import (
 	"database/sql"
+	"strings"
 	"time"
 
 	"go.uber.org/zap"
@@ -59,13 +60,30 @@ func (db *DB) UpsertWebshellConnectionState(connectionID, stateJSON string) erro
 
 // ListWebshellConnections 列出所有 WebShell 连接，按创建时间倒序
 func (db *DB) ListWebshellConnections() ([]WebShellConnection, error) {
+	return db.ListWebshellConnectionsForAccess("", "")
+}
+
+func (db *DB) ListWebshellConnectionsForAccess(userID, scope string) ([]WebShellConnection, error) {
 	query := `
 		SELECT id, url, password, type, method, cmd_param, remark,
 			COALESCE(encoding, '') AS encoding, COALESCE(os, '') AS os, created_at
 		FROM webshell_connections
-		ORDER BY created_at DESC
+		WHERE 1=1
 	`
-	rows, err := db.Query(query)
+	args := []interface{}{}
+	userID = strings.TrimSpace(userID)
+	if userID != "" && scope != RBACScopeAll {
+		query += ` AND (
+			owner_user_id = ?
+			OR EXISTS (
+				SELECT 1 FROM rbac_resource_assignments ra
+				WHERE ra.user_id = ? AND ra.resource_type = 'webshell' AND ra.resource_id = webshell_connections.id
+			)
+		)`
+		args = append(args, userID, userID)
+	}
+	query += ` ORDER BY created_at DESC`
+	rows, err := db.Query(query, args...)
 	if err != nil {
 		db.logger.Error("查询 WebShell 连接列表失败", zap.Error(err))
 		return nil, err

internal/database/workflow_package.go

@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
+package database
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"database/sql"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+	"unicode"
+
+	"github.com/google/uuid"
+)
+
+type WorkflowPackageInspection struct {
+	ID, PackageHash, ManifestJSON, WorkflowPayloadJSON, InspectionJSON    string
+	SourceWorkflowID, SourceContentHash, SourceGraphHash                  string
+	SourceRevision                                                        int
+	LocalConflictState, LocalWorkflowID, LocalContentHash, LocalGraphHash string
+	CreatedBy, Status                                                     string
+	CreatedAt, ExpiresAt                                                  time.Time
+	ConsumedAt                                                            *time.Time
+}
+
+type WorkflowPackageImport struct {
+	ID, InspectionID, RequestHash, IdempotencyKey, ActorUserID      string
+	Action, SourceWorkflowID, TargetWorkflowID, ResultingWorkflowID string
+	Result, ErrorCode, ErrorMessage                                 string
+	CreatedAt                                                       time.Time
+	AppliedAt                                                       *time.Time
+}
+
+type WorkflowPackageApplyRequest struct {
+	InspectionID, RequestHash, IdempotencyKey, ActorUserID, Action, NewWorkflowID string
+	ConfirmOverwrite                                                              bool
+}
+
+type WorkflowPackageStoreError struct{ Code, Message string }
+
+func (e *WorkflowPackageStoreError) Error() string { return e.Code + ": " + e.Message }
+func workflowPackageStoreError(code, message string) error {
+	return &WorkflowPackageStoreError{code, message}
+}
+
+func (db *DB) CreateWorkflowPackageInspection(v *WorkflowPackageInspection) error {
+	if v == nil || strings.TrimSpace(v.ID) == "" || strings.TrimSpace(v.CreatedBy) == "" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("workflow package inspection is incomplete")
+	}
+	if v.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
+		v.CreatedAt = time.Now().UTC()
+	}
+	if v.ExpiresAt.IsZero() {
+		v.ExpiresAt = v.CreatedAt.Add(30 * time.Minute)
+	}
+	_, err := db.Exec(`INSERT INTO workflow_package_inspections (id,package_hash,manifest_json,workflow_payload_json,inspection_json,source_workflow_id,source_revision,source_content_hash,source_graph_hash,local_conflict_state,local_workflow_id,local_content_hash,local_graph_hash,created_by,status,created_at,expires_at) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)`, v.ID, v.PackageHash, v.ManifestJSON, v.WorkflowPayloadJSON, v.InspectionJSON, v.SourceWorkflowID, v.SourceRevision, v.SourceContentHash, v.SourceGraphHash, v.LocalConflictState, nullString(v.LocalWorkflowID), nullString(v.LocalContentHash), nullString(v.LocalGraphHash), v.CreatedBy, "ready", v.CreatedAt.UTC(), v.ExpiresAt.UTC())
+	return err
+}
+
+func (db *DB) GetWorkflowPackageInspection(id, actor string) (*WorkflowPackageInspection, error) {
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	_, _ = db.Exec(`UPDATE workflow_package_inspections SET status='expired' WHERE status='ready' AND expires_at <= ?`, now)
+	row, err := scanWorkflowPackageInspection(db.QueryRow(`SELECT id,package_hash,manifest_json,workflow_payload_json,inspection_json,source_workflow_id,source_revision,source_content_hash,source_graph_hash,local_conflict_state,COALESCE(local_workflow_id,''),COALESCE(local_content_hash,''),COALESCE(local_graph_hash,''),created_by,status,created_at,expires_at,consumed_at FROM workflow_package_inspections WHERE id=? AND created_by=?`, strings.TrimSpace(id), strings.TrimSpace(actor)))
+	if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	return row, err
+}
+
+func scanWorkflowPackageInspection(s interface{ Scan(...any) error }) (*WorkflowPackageInspection, error) {
+	var v WorkflowPackageInspection
+	var consumed sql.NullTime
+	err := s.Scan(&v.ID, &v.PackageHash, &v.ManifestJSON, &v.WorkflowPayloadJSON, &v.InspectionJSON, &v.SourceWorkflowID, &v.SourceRevision, &v.SourceContentHash, &v.SourceGraphHash, &v.LocalConflictState, &v.LocalWorkflowID, &v.LocalContentHash, &v.LocalGraphHash, &v.CreatedBy, &v.Status, &v.CreatedAt, &v.ExpiresAt, &consumed)
+	if consumed.Valid {
+		t := consumed.Time
+		v.ConsumedAt = &t
+	}
+	return &v, err
+}
+
+func (db *DB) GetWorkflowPackageImport(id, actor string) (*WorkflowPackageImport, error) {
+	v, err := scanWorkflowPackageImport(db.QueryRow(`SELECT id,inspection_id,request_hash,idempotency_key,actor_user_id,action,source_workflow_id,target_workflow_id,COALESCE(resulting_workflow_id,''),result,COALESCE(error_code,''),COALESCE(error_message,''),created_at,applied_at FROM workflow_package_imports WHERE id=? AND actor_user_id=?`, strings.TrimSpace(id), strings.TrimSpace(actor)))
+	if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	return v, err
+}
+func scanWorkflowPackageImport(s interface{ Scan(...any) error }) (*WorkflowPackageImport, error) {
+	var v WorkflowPackageImport
+	var applied sql.NullTime
+	err := s.Scan(&v.ID, &v.InspectionID, &v.RequestHash, &v.IdempotencyKey, &v.ActorUserID, &v.Action, &v.SourceWorkflowID, &v.TargetWorkflowID, &v.ResultingWorkflowID, &v.Result, &v.ErrorCode, &v.ErrorMessage, &v.CreatedAt, &applied)
+	if applied.Valid {
+		t := applied.Time
+		v.AppliedAt = &t
+	}
+	return &v, err
+}
+
+func (db *DB) ApplyWorkflowPackageImport(ctx context.Context, req WorkflowPackageApplyRequest) (*WorkflowPackageImport, bool, error) {
+	tx, err := db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, false, err
+	}
+	defer tx.Rollback()
+	var existingHash string
+	previous, prevErr := scanWorkflowPackageImport(tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT id,inspection_id,request_hash,idempotency_key,actor_user_id,action,source_workflow_id,target_workflow_id,COALESCE(resulting_workflow_id,''),result,COALESCE(error_code,''),COALESCE(error_message,''),created_at,applied_at FROM workflow_package_imports WHERE actor_user_id=? AND idempotency_key=?`, req.ActorUserID, req.IdempotencyKey))
+	if prevErr == nil {
+		existingHash = previous.RequestHash
+		if existingHash != req.RequestHash {
+			return nil, false, workflowPackageStoreError("WFPKG_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED", "幂等键已用于其他请求")
+		}
+		return previous, true, nil
+	}
+	if prevErr != sql.ErrNoRows {
+		return nil, false, prevErr
+	}
+	inspection, err := scanWorkflowPackageInspection(tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT id,package_hash,manifest_json,workflow_payload_json,inspection_json,source_workflow_id,source_revision,source_content_hash,source_graph_hash,local_conflict_state,COALESCE(local_workflow_id,''),COALESCE(local_content_hash,''),COALESCE(local_graph_hash,''),created_by,status,created_at,expires_at,consumed_at FROM workflow_package_inspections WHERE id=? AND created_by=?`, req.InspectionID, req.ActorUserID))
+	if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
+		return nil, false, workflowPackageStoreError("WFPKG_INSPECTION_NOT_FOUND", "预检不存在")
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, false, err
+	}
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	if !inspection.ExpiresAt.After(now) || inspection.Status == "expired" {
+		_, _ = tx.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE workflow_package_inspections SET status='expired' WHERE id=?`, inspection.ID)
+		return nil, false, workflowPackageStoreError("WFPKG_INSPECTION_EXPIRED", "预检已过期")
+	}
+	if inspection.Status != "ready" {
+		return nil, false, workflowPackageStoreError("WFPKG_INSPECTION_CONSUMED", "预检已被使用")
+	}
+	var payload struct {
+		ID          string `json:"id"`
+		Name        string `json:"name"`
+		Description string `json:"description"`
+		GraphJSON   string `json:"graph_json"`
+		Enabled     bool   `json:"enabled"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(inspection.WorkflowPayloadJSON), &payload); err != nil {
+		return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("decode inspection payload: %w", err)
+	}
+	targetID := inspection.SourceWorkflowID
+	if req.Action == "rename" {
+		targetID = strings.TrimSpace(req.NewWorkflowID)
+		if !validWorkflowPackageID(targetID) {
+			return nil, false, workflowPackageStoreError("WFPKG_INVALID_RENAME_ID", "新工作流 ID 无效")
+		}
+	}
+	sourceCurrent, err := scanWorkflowDefinition(tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, "SELECT "+workflowDefinitionColumns+" FROM workflow_definitions WHERE id=?", inspection.SourceWorkflowID))
+	if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
+		sourceCurrent = nil
+	} else if err != nil {
+		return nil, false, err
+	}
+	if err := checkWorkflowPackageSnapshot(inspection, sourceCurrent, inspection.SourceWorkflowID); err != nil {
+		return nil, false, err
+	}
+	current := sourceCurrent
+	if targetID != inspection.SourceWorkflowID {
+		current, err = scanWorkflowDefinition(tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, "SELECT "+workflowDefinitionColumns+" FROM workflow_definitions WHERE id=?", targetID))
+		if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
+			current = nil
+		} else if err != nil {
+			return nil, false, err
+		}
+	}
+	result := ""
+	resultingID := ""
+	switch req.Action {
+	case "create":
+		if inspection.LocalConflictState != "none" || current != nil {
+			return nil, false, workflowPackageStoreError("WFPKG_ID_CONFLICT", "目标工作流已存在")
+		}
+		result = "created"
+		resultingID = targetID
+	case "keep_existing":
+		if inspection.LocalConflictState == "none" {
+			return nil, false, workflowPackageStoreError("WFPKG_ID_CONFLICT", "当前预检不允许保留本地")
+		}
+		if inspection.LocalConflictState == "identical" {
+			result = "skipped_identical"
+		} else {
+			result = "kept_existing"
+		}
+		resultingID = targetID
+	case "overwrite":
+		if inspection.LocalConflictState != "id_conflict" {
+			return nil, false, workflowPackageStoreError("WFPKG_ID_CONFLICT", "当前预检不允许覆盖")
+		}
+		if !req.ConfirmOverwrite {
+			return nil, false, workflowPackageStoreError("WFPKG_OVERWRITE_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED", "覆盖需要确认")
+		}
+		result = "overwritten"
+		resultingID = targetID
+	case "rename":
+		if inspection.LocalConflictState != "id_conflict" || current != nil {
+			return nil, false, workflowPackageStoreError("WFPKG_ID_CONFLICT", "当前预检不允许另存")
+		}
+		result = "renamed"
+		resultingID = targetID
+	default:
+		return nil, false, workflowPackageStoreError("WFPKG_INVALID_ACTION", "导入动作无效")
+	}
+	if result == "created" || result == "renamed" {
+		_, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO workflow_definitions (id,name,description,version,graph_json,enabled,created_at,updated_at) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)`, resultingID, payload.Name, payload.Description, 1, payload.GraphJSON, boolToInt(payload.Enabled), now, now)
+	} else if result == "overwritten" {
+		_, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE workflow_definitions SET name=?,description=?,version=version+1,graph_json=?,enabled=?,updated_at=? WHERE id=?`, payload.Name, payload.Description, payload.GraphJSON, boolToInt(payload.Enabled), now, resultingID)
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, false, err
+	}
+	imp := &WorkflowPackageImport{ID: "wpii_" + strings.ReplaceAll(uuid.NewString(), "-", ""), InspectionID: inspection.ID, RequestHash: req.RequestHash, IdempotencyKey: req.IdempotencyKey, ActorUserID: req.ActorUserID, Action: req.Action, SourceWorkflowID: inspection.SourceWorkflowID, TargetWorkflowID: targetID, ResultingWorkflowID: resultingID, Result: result, CreatedAt: now, AppliedAt: &now}
+	_, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO workflow_package_imports (id,inspection_id,request_hash,idempotency_key,actor_user_id,action,source_workflow_id,target_workflow_id,resulting_workflow_id,result,created_at,applied_at) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)`, imp.ID, imp.InspectionID, imp.RequestHash, imp.IdempotencyKey, imp.ActorUserID, imp.Action, imp.SourceWorkflowID, imp.TargetWorkflowID, nullString(imp.ResultingWorkflowID), imp.Result, now, now)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, false, err
+	}
+	if _, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE workflow_package_inspections SET status='consumed',consumed_at=? WHERE id=? AND status='ready'`, now, inspection.ID); err != nil {
+		return nil, false, err
+	}
+	if err = tx.Commit(); err != nil {
+		return nil, false, err
+	}
+	return imp, false, nil
+}
+
+func checkWorkflowPackageSnapshot(i *WorkflowPackageInspection, current *WorkflowDefinition, targetID string) error {
+	if i.LocalConflictState == "none" {
+		if current != nil {
+			return workflowPackageStoreError("WFPKG_CONFLICT_CHANGED", "本地工作流已变化")
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	if current == nil || current.ID != i.LocalWorkflowID || current.ID != targetID {
+		return workflowPackageStoreError("WFPKG_CONFLICT_CHANGED", "本地工作流已变化")
+	}
+	content, graph := workflowDefinitionPackageHashes(current)
+	if content != i.LocalContentHash || graph != i.LocalGraphHash {
+		return workflowPackageStoreError("WFPKG_CONFLICT_CHANGED", "本地工作流已变化")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+func workflowDefinitionPackageHashes(w *WorkflowDefinition) (string, string) {
+	var g any
+	dec := json.NewDecoder(strings.NewReader(w.GraphJSON))
+	dec.UseNumber()
+	_ = dec.Decode(&g)
+	graph, _ := json.Marshal(g)
+	payload := struct {
+		ID          string `json:"id"`
+		Name        string `json:"name"`
+		Description string `json:"description,omitempty"`
+		Version     int    `json:"version"`
+		GraphJSON   string `json:"graph_json"`
+		Enabled     bool   `json:"enabled"`
+	}{w.ID, w.Name, w.Description, w.Version, string(graph), w.Enabled}
+	b, _ := json.Marshal(payload)
+	return workflowPackageHash(b), workflowPackageHash(graph)
+}
+func workflowPackageHash(b []byte) string {
+	s := sha256.Sum256(b)
+	return "sha256:" + hex.EncodeToString(s[:])
+}
+func validWorkflowPackageID(id string) bool {
+	if len(id) < 1 || len(id) > 128 {
+		return false
+	}
+	for _, r := range id {
+		if unicode.IsControl(r) {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func (db *DB) PurgeWorkflowPackageLifecycle(now time.Time) error {
+	now = now.UTC()
+	if _, err := db.Exec(`UPDATE workflow_package_inspections SET status='expired' WHERE status='ready' AND expires_at<=?`, now); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if _, err := db.Exec(`DELETE FROM workflow_package_inspections WHERE status='expired' AND expires_at<? AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM workflow_package_imports i WHERE i.inspection_id=workflow_package_inspections.id)`, now.Add(-24*time.Hour)); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	_, err := db.Exec(`DELETE FROM workflow_package_imports WHERE created_at<?`, now.AddDate(0, 0, -90))
+	return err
+}

internal/database/workflow_package_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+package database
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"go.uber.org/zap"
+)
+
+func TestWorkflowPackageApplyOverwriteIsTransactionalAndIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
+	db, err := NewDB(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "workflow-package.db"), zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
+	current := &WorkflowDefinition{ID: "wf-1", Name: "Local", Version: 12, GraphJSON: `{"nodes":[]}`, Enabled: true}
+	if err := db.UpsertWorkflowDefinition(current); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	current, _ = db.GetWorkflowDefinition("wf-1")
+	content, graph := workflowDefinitionPackageHashes(current)
+	payload, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"id": "wf-1", "name": "Imported", "description": "new", "version": 18, "graph_json": `{"nodes":[]}`, "enabled": false})
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	inspection := &WorkflowPackageInspection{ID: "wpi_test", PackageHash: "sha256:pkg", ManifestJSON: "{}", WorkflowPayloadJSON: string(payload), InspectionJSON: "{}", SourceWorkflowID: "wf-1", SourceRevision: 18, SourceContentHash: "sha256:src", SourceGraphHash: "sha256:graph", LocalConflictState: "id_conflict", LocalWorkflowID: "wf-1", LocalContentHash: content, LocalGraphHash: graph, CreatedBy: "user-1", CreatedAt: now, ExpiresAt: now.Add(time.Minute)}
+	if err := db.CreateWorkflowPackageInspection(inspection); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	req := WorkflowPackageApplyRequest{InspectionID: inspection.ID, RequestHash: "sha256:req", IdempotencyKey: "key-1", ActorUserID: "user-1", Action: "overwrite", ConfirmOverwrite: true}
+	imp, replayed, err := db.ApplyWorkflowPackageImport(context.Background(), req)
+	if err != nil || replayed || imp.Result != "overwritten" {
+		t.Fatalf("apply = %#v replay=%v err=%v", imp, replayed, err)
+	}
+	updated, _ := db.GetWorkflowDefinition("wf-1")
+	if updated.Version != 13 || updated.Name != "Imported" || updated.Enabled {
+		t.Fatalf("updated workflow = %#v", updated)
+	}
+	replay, replayed, err := db.ApplyWorkflowPackageImport(context.Background(), req)
+	if err != nil || !replayed || replay.ID != imp.ID {
+		t.Fatalf("replay = %#v replay=%v err=%v", replay, replayed, err)
+	}
+	gotInspection, err := db.GetWorkflowPackageInspection(inspection.ID, "user-1")
+	if err != nil || gotInspection.Status != "consumed" {
+		t.Fatalf("inspection=%#v err=%v", gotInspection, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWorkflowPackageApplyRejectsChangedConflictSnapshot(t *testing.T) {
+	db, err := NewDB(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "workflow-package-conflict.db"), zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
+	if err := db.UpsertWorkflowDefinition(&WorkflowDefinition{ID: "wf-2", Name: "Local", GraphJSON: `{"nodes":[]}`, Enabled: true}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	local, _ := db.GetWorkflowDefinition("wf-2")
+	content, graph := workflowDefinitionPackageHashes(local)
+	payload, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"id": "wf-2", "name": "Imported", "version": 2, "graph_json": `{"nodes":[]}`, "enabled": true})
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	inspection := &WorkflowPackageInspection{ID: "wpi_changed", PackageHash: "sha256:pkg", ManifestJSON: "{}", WorkflowPayloadJSON: string(payload), InspectionJSON: "{}", SourceWorkflowID: "wf-2", SourceRevision: 2, SourceContentHash: "sha256:src", SourceGraphHash: "sha256:graph", LocalConflictState: "id_conflict", LocalWorkflowID: "wf-2", LocalContentHash: content, LocalGraphHash: graph, CreatedBy: "user-1", CreatedAt: now, ExpiresAt: now.Add(time.Minute)}
+	if err := db.CreateWorkflowPackageInspection(inspection); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := db.UpsertWorkflowDefinition(&WorkflowDefinition{ID: "wf-2", Name: "Changed", GraphJSON: `{"nodes":[]}`, Enabled: true}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	_, _, err = db.ApplyWorkflowPackageImport(context.Background(), WorkflowPackageApplyRequest{InspectionID: inspection.ID, RequestHash: "sha256:req", IdempotencyKey: "key-2", ActorUserID: "user-1", Action: "overwrite", ConfirmOverwrite: true})
+	if e, ok := err.(*WorkflowPackageStoreError); !ok || e.Code != "WFPKG_CONFLICT_CHANGED" {
+		t.Fatalf("err=%v", err)
+	}
+}

internal/handler/agent.go

@@ -18,12 +18,14 @@ import (
 
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/agent"
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/audit"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/authctx"
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/config"
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/database"
-	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/reasoning"
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/mcp/builtin"
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/multiagent"
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/openai"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/reasoning"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/security"
 
 	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
 	"github.com/robfig/cron/v3"
@@ -188,8 +190,8 @@ type AgentHandler struct {
 	hitlWhitelistSaver       HitlToolWhitelistSaver
 	hitlStrategySaver        HitlAuditStrategySaver
 	hitlDefaultReviewerSaver HitlDefaultReviewerSaver
-	auditLLM           *openai.Client
+	auditLLM                 *openai.Client
-	audit              *audit.Service
+	audit                    *audit.Service
 }
 
 // SetAudit wires platform audit logging.
@@ -210,7 +212,7 @@ func (h *AgentHandler) CancelRunningTaskForConversation(conversationID string) {
 	if h == nil || conversationID == "" || h.tasks == nil {
 		return
 	}
-	h.cancelActiveMCPToolForConversation(conversationID)
+	h.cancelRunningMCPToolsForConversation(conversationID)
 	h.tasks.AbortActiveEinoExecute(conversationID, "")
 	if ok, err := h.tasks.CancelTask(conversationID, ErrTaskCancelled); ok {
 		h.logger.Info("已取消会话运行中任务", zap.String("conversationId", conversationID))
@@ -219,12 +221,13 @@ func (h *AgentHandler) CancelRunningTaskForConversation(conversationID string) {
 	}
 }
 
-func (h *AgentHandler) cancelActiveMCPToolForConversation(conversationID string) {
+func (h *AgentHandler) cancelRunningMCPToolsForConversation(conversationID string) {
-	if h == nil || h.tasks == nil || h.agent == nil {
+	if h == nil || h.agent == nil {
 		return
 	}
-	if execID := h.tasks.ActiveMCPExecutionID(conversationID); execID != "" {
+	n := h.agent.CancelRunningMCPToolsForConversation(conversationID, "会话已结束，自动终止仍在运行的工具")
-		h.agent.CancelMCPToolExecutionWithNote(execID, "")
+	if n > 0 && h.logger != nil {
+		h.logger.Info("已终止会话仍在运行的 MCP 工具", zap.String("conversationId", conversationID), zap.Int("count", n))
 	}
 }
 
@@ -264,7 +267,7 @@ func NewAgentHandler(agent *agent.Agent, db *database.DB, cfg *config.Config, lo
 		batchCronParser:  cron.NewParser(cron.Minute | cron.Hour | cron.Dom | cron.Month | cron.Dow | cron.Descriptor),
 		auditLLM:         openai.NewClient(llmCfg, llmHTTP, logger),
 	}
-	tm.SetToolCanceler(handler.cancelActiveMCPToolForConversation)
+	tm.SetToolCanceler(handler.cancelRunningMCPToolsForConversation)
 	if err := handler.hitlManager.EnsureSchema(); err != nil {
 		logger.Warn("初始化 HITL 表失败", zap.Error(err))
 	}
@@ -332,13 +335,13 @@ type ChatReasoningRequest struct {
 
 // ChatRequest 聊天请求
 type ChatRequest struct {
-	Message              string           `json:"message" binding:"required"`
+	Message              string                `json:"message" binding:"required"`
-	ConversationID       string           `json:"conversationId,omitempty"`
+	ConversationID       string                `json:"conversationId,omitempty"`
-	ProjectID            string           `json:"projectId,omitempty"` // 新对话绑定的项目（可选；未指定时可用 config.project.default_project_id）
+	ProjectID            string                `json:"projectId,omitempty"` // 新对话绑定的项目（可选；未指定时可用 config.project.default_project_id）
-	Role                 string           `json:"role,omitempty"` // 角色名称
+	Role                 string                `json:"role,omitempty"`      // 角色名称
-	Attachments          []ChatAttachment `json:"attachments,omitempty"`
+	Attachments          []ChatAttachment      `json:"attachments,omitempty"`
-	WebShellConnectionID string           `json:"webshellConnectionId,omitempty"` // WebShell 管理 - AI 助手：当前选中的连接 ID，仅使用 webshell_* 工具
+	WebShellConnectionID string                `json:"webshellConnectionId,omitempty"` // WebShell 管理 - AI 助手：当前选中的连接 ID，仅使用 webshell_* 工具
-	Hitl                 *HITLRequest     `json:"hitl,omitempty"`
+	Hitl                 *HITLRequest          `json:"hitl,omitempty"`
 	Reasoning            *ChatReasoningRequest `json:"reasoning,omitempty"`
 	// Orchestration 仅对 /api/multi-agent、/api/multi-agent/stream：deep | plan_execute | supervisor；空则等同 deep。机器人/批量等无请求体时由服务端默认 deep。/api/eino-agent* 不使用此字段。
 	Orchestration string `json:"orchestration,omitempty"`
@@ -727,7 +730,15 @@ func (h *AgentHandler) runRobotMultiAgentWithRetry(
 }
 
 // ProcessMessageForRobot 供机器人（企业微信/钉钉/飞书）调用：Eino 单/多代理执行路径（含 progressCallback、过程详情），仅不发送 SSE，最后返回完整回复
-func (h *AgentHandler) ProcessMessageForRobot(ctx context.Context, platform, conversationID, message, role string) (response string, convID string, err error) {
+func (h *AgentHandler) ProcessMessageForRobot(ctx context.Context, platform string, principal authctx.Principal, conversationID, message, role, agentMode string) (response string, convID string, err error) {
+	ownerUserID := strings.TrimSpace(principal.UserID)
+	if ownerUserID == "" {
+		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("authenticated robot principal is required")
+	}
+	if !principal.HasPermission("agent:execute") || !principal.HasPermission("chat:read") || !principal.HasPermission("chat:write") {
+		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("机器人账号缺少 agent:execute、chat:read 或 chat:write 权限")
+	}
+	ctx = authctx.WithPrincipal(ctx, principal)
 	if conversationID == "" {
 		title := safeTruncateString(message, 50)
 		src := "robot"
@@ -736,13 +747,17 @@ func (h *AgentHandler) ProcessMessageForRobot(ctx context.Context, platform, con
 		}
 		meta := audit.ConversationCreateMeta(src)
 		meta.ProjectID = effectiveProjectID(h.config, "")
+		if meta.ProjectID != "" && (!principal.HasPermission("project:read") || !h.db.UserCanAccessResource(ownerUserID, principal.ScopeFor("project:read"), "project", meta.ProjectID)) {
+			meta.ProjectID = ""
+		}
 		conv, createErr := h.db.CreateConversation(title, meta)
 		if createErr != nil {
 			return "", "", fmt.Errorf("创建对话失败: %w", createErr)
 		}
 		conversationID = conv.ID
+		_ = h.db.SetResourceOwner("conversation", conversationID, ownerUserID)
 	} else {
-		if _, getErr := h.db.GetConversation(conversationID); getErr != nil {
+		if _, getErr := h.db.GetConversation(conversationID); getErr != nil || !h.db.UserCanAccessResource(ownerUserID, principal.ScopeFor("chat:write"), "conversation", conversationID) {
 			return "", "", fmt.Errorf("对话不存在")
 		}
 	}
@@ -800,18 +815,14 @@ func (h *AgentHandler) ProcessMessageForRobot(ctx context.Context, platform, con
 	}
 	progressCallback := h.createProgressCallback(taskCtx, cancelWithCause, conversationID, assistantMessageID, nil)
 
-	robotMode := "eino_single"
+	robotMode := config.NormalizeAgentMode(agentMode)
-	if h.config != nil {
-		robotMode = config.NormalizeRobotAgentMode(h.config.MultiAgent)
-	}
 	switch robotMode {
 	case "eino_single":
 		return h.runRobotEinoSingleWithRetry(taskCtx, conversationID, finalMessage, agentHistoryMessages, roleTools, progressCallback, assistantMessageID, &taskStatus)
 	case "deep", "plan_execute", "supervisor":
 		if h.config == nil || !h.config.MultiAgent.Enabled {
-			h.logger.Warn("机器人配置为多代理模式但未启用 multi_agent，回退 Eino 单代理",
+			taskStatus = "failed"
-				zap.String("robot_mode", robotMode))
+			return "", conversationID, fmt.Errorf("机器人对话模式 %s 需要启用 Eino 多代理", robotMode)
-			return h.runRobotEinoSingleWithRetry(taskCtx, conversationID, finalMessage, agentHistoryMessages, roleTools, progressCallback, assistantMessageID, &taskStatus)
 		}
 		return h.runRobotMultiAgentWithRetry(taskCtx, conversationID, finalMessage, robotMode, agentHistoryMessages, roleTools, progressCallback, assistantMessageID, &taskStatus)
 	}
@@ -844,6 +855,36 @@ func (h *AgentHandler) publishProgressToTaskEventBus(conversationID, eventType,
 	h.taskEventBus.Publish(conversationID, sseLine)
 }
 
+// enrichProgressEventData 为 SSE / taskEventBus 事件补齐 conversationId、messageId，便于前端懒加载过程详情。
+func enrichProgressEventData(data interface{}, conversationID, assistantMessageID string) interface{} {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(conversationID) == "" && strings.TrimSpace(assistantMessageID) == "" {
+		return data
+	}
+	var m map[string]interface{}
+	switch v := data.(type) {
+	case map[string]interface{}:
+		m = make(map[string]interface{}, len(v)+2)
+		for k, val := range v {
+			m[k] = val
+		}
+	case nil:
+		m = make(map[string]interface{}, 2)
+	default:
+		m = map[string]interface{}{"payload": data}
+	}
+	if id := strings.TrimSpace(assistantMessageID); id != "" {
+		if existing, ok := m["messageId"]; !ok || strings.TrimSpace(fmt.Sprint(existing)) == "" {
+			m["messageId"] = id
+		}
+	}
+	if id := strings.TrimSpace(conversationID); id != "" {
+		if existing, ok := m["conversationId"]; !ok || strings.TrimSpace(fmt.Sprint(existing)) == "" {
+			m["conversationId"] = id
+		}
+	}
+	return m
+}
+
 // createProgressCallback 创建进度回调函数，用于保存processDetails
 // sendEventFunc: 可选的流式事件发送函数，如果为nil则不发送流式事件
 func (h *AgentHandler) createProgressCallback(runCtx context.Context, cancelRun context.CancelCauseFunc, conversationID, assistantMessageID string, sendEventFunc func(eventType, message string, data interface{})) agent.ProgressCallback {
@@ -988,11 +1029,21 @@ func (h *AgentHandler) createProgressCallback(runCtx context.Context, cancelRun
 			}
 		}
 
-		// 流式：写 HTTP SSE；非流式（机器人等）：镜像到 taskEventBus 供 Web 订阅
+		// 工具输出片段不在详情区实时展示；完整结果由 tool_result 落库后按需拉取。
-		if sendEventFunc != nil {
+		if eventType == "tool_result_delta" {
-			sendEventFunc(eventType, message, data)
+			return
-		} else {
+		}
-			h.publishProgressToTaskEventBus(conversationID, eventType, message, data)
+
+		deferToolProgressSend := eventType == "tool_call" || eventType == "tool_result"
+		// 流式：写 HTTP SSE；非流式（机器人等）：镜像到 taskEventBus 供 Web 订阅。
+		// 工具事件需先落库拿 processDetailId，再向前端发送摘要，避免大 payload 默认进入浏览器。
+		if !deferToolProgressSend {
+			clientData := enrichProgressEventData(data, conversationID, assistantMessageID)
+			if sendEventFunc != nil {
+				sendEventFunc(eventType, message, clientData)
+			} else {
+				h.publishProgressToTaskEventBus(conversationID, eventType, message, clientData)
+			}
 		}
 
 		// 保存tool_call事件中的参数
@@ -1360,9 +1411,28 @@ func (h *AgentHandler) createProgressCallback(runCtx context.Context, cancelRun
 			// 在关键过程事件落库前，先把「规划中」与聚合中的 thinking / reasoning_chain 流落库
 			flushResponsePlan()
 			flushThinkingStreams()
-			if err := h.db.AddProcessDetail(assistantMessageID, conversationID, eventType, message, data); err != nil {
+			processDetailID, err := h.db.AddProcessDetailWithID(assistantMessageID, conversationID, eventType, message, data)
+			if err != nil {
 				h.logger.Warn("保存过程详情失败", zap.Error(err), zap.String("eventType", eventType))
 			}
+			if deferToolProgressSend {
+				clientData := enrichProgressEventData(summarizeProcessDetailData(eventType, data), conversationID, assistantMessageID)
+				if m, ok := clientData.(map[string]interface{}); ok {
+					m["processDetailId"] = processDetailID
+				}
+				if sendEventFunc != nil {
+					sendEventFunc(eventType, message, clientData)
+				} else {
+					h.publishProgressToTaskEventBus(conversationID, eventType, message, clientData)
+				}
+			}
+		} else if deferToolProgressSend {
+			clientData := enrichProgressEventData(summarizeProcessDetailData(eventType, data), conversationID, assistantMessageID)
+			if sendEventFunc != nil {
+				sendEventFunc(eventType, message, clientData)
+			} else {
+				h.publishProgressToTaskEventBus(conversationID, eventType, message, clientData)
+			}
 		}
 	}
 }
@@ -1429,6 +1499,10 @@ func (h *AgentHandler) CancelAgentLoop(c *gin.Context) {
 		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
 		return
 	}
+	if !h.agentConversationAllowed(c, req.ConversationID) {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "无权访问该资源"})
+		return
+	}
 
 	if req.ContinueAfter {
 		if h.tasks.GetTask(req.ConversationID) == nil {
@@ -1480,7 +1554,7 @@ func (h *AgentHandler) CancelAgentLoop(c *gin.Context) {
 
 	var cause error = ErrTaskCancelled
 	msg := "已提交取消请求，任务将在当前步骤完成后停止。"
-	h.cancelActiveMCPToolForConversation(req.ConversationID)
+	h.cancelRunningMCPToolsForConversation(req.ConversationID)
 	h.tasks.AbortActiveEinoExecute(req.ConversationID, "")
 	ok, err := h.tasks.CancelTask(req.ConversationID, cause)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -1495,10 +1569,10 @@ func (h *AgentHandler) CancelAgentLoop(c *gin.Context) {
 	}
 
 	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
-		"status":           "cancelling",
+		"status":            "cancelling",
-		"conversationId": req.ConversationID,
+		"conversationId":    req.ConversationID,
-		"message":          msg,
+		"message":           msg,
-		"continueAfter":    false,
+		"continueAfter":     false,
 		"interruptWithNote": false,
 	})
 }
@@ -1510,6 +1584,10 @@ func (h *AgentHandler) SubscribeAgentTaskEvents(c *gin.Context) {
 		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "conversationId is required"})
 		return
 	}
+	if !h.agentConversationAllowed(c, conversationID) {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "无权访问该资源"})
+		return
+	}
 	if h.tasks.GetTask(conversationID) == nil {
 		c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "no active task for this conversation"})
 		return
@@ -1530,9 +1608,8 @@ func (h *AgentHandler) SubscribeAgentTaskEvents(c *gin.Context) {
 	flusher, _ := c.Writer.(http.Flusher)
 	ctx := c.Request.Context()
 	var writeMu sync.Mutex
-	stopKeepalive := make(chan struct{})
+	stopKeepalive := runSSEKeepalive(c, &writeMu)
-	go sseKeepalive(c, stopKeepalive, &writeMu)
+	defer stopKeepalive()
-	defer close(stopKeepalive)
 
 	for {
 		select {
@@ -1588,6 +1665,9 @@ func (h *AgentHandler) enrichCompletedTasksWithConversationTitles(tasks []*Compl
 // ListAgentTasks 列出所有运行中的任务
 func (h *AgentHandler) ListAgentTasks(c *gin.Context) {
 	tasks := h.tasks.GetActiveTasks()
+	tasks = filterSlice(tasks, func(task *AgentTask) bool {
+		return task != nil && h.agentConversationAllowed(c, task.ConversationID)
+	})
 	h.enrichAgentTasksWithConversationTitles(tasks)
 	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
 		"tasks": tasks,
@@ -1597,12 +1677,30 @@ func (h *AgentHandler) ListAgentTasks(c *gin.Context) {
 // ListCompletedTasks 列出最近完成的任务历史
 func (h *AgentHandler) ListCompletedTasks(c *gin.Context) {
 	tasks := h.tasks.GetCompletedTasks()
+	tasks = filterSlice(tasks, func(task *CompletedTask) bool {
+		return task != nil && h.agentConversationAllowed(c, task.ConversationID)
+	})
 	h.enrichCompletedTasksWithConversationTitles(tasks)
 	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
 		"tasks": tasks,
 	})
 }
 
+func (h *AgentHandler) agentConversationAllowed(c *gin.Context, conversationID string) bool {
+	session, ok := security.CurrentSession(c)
+	return ok && h.db != nil && h.db.UserCanAccessResource(session.UserID, session.Scope, "conversation", strings.TrimSpace(conversationID))
+}
+
+func filterSlice[T any](items []T, keep func(T) bool) []T {
+	out := make([]T, 0, len(items))
+	for _, item := range items {
+		if keep(item) {
+			out = append(out, item)
+		}
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
 // BatchTaskRequest 批量任务请求
 type BatchTaskRequest struct {
 	Title        string   `json:"title"`                    // 任务标题（可选）
@@ -1654,6 +1752,12 @@ func (h *AgentHandler) CreateBatchQueue(c *gin.Context) {
 		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "没有有效的任务"})
 		return
 	}
+	if session, ok := security.CurrentSession(c); ok && h.db != nil && session.Scope != database.RBACScopeAll && strings.TrimSpace(req.ProjectID) != "" {
+		if !h.db.UserCanAccessResource(session.UserID, session.Scope, "project", strings.TrimSpace(req.ProjectID)) {
+			c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "无权在该项目下创建批量任务"})
+			return
+		}
+	}
 
 	agentMode := config.NormalizeAgentMode(req.AgentMode)
 	scheduleMode := normalizeBatchQueueScheduleMode(req.ScheduleMode)
@@ -1678,6 +1782,10 @@ func (h *AgentHandler) CreateBatchQueue(c *gin.Context) {
 		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": createErr.Error()})
 		return
 	}
+	if session, ok := security.CurrentSession(c); ok && h.db != nil {
+		_ = h.db.SetResourceOwner("batch_task", queue.ID, session.UserID)
+		_ = h.db.AssignResourceToUser(session.UserID, "batch_task", queue.ID)
+	}
 	started := false
 	if req.ExecuteNow {
 		ok, err := h.startBatchQueueExecution(queue.ID, false)
@@ -1765,7 +1873,8 @@ func (h *AgentHandler) ListBatchQueues(c *gin.Context) {
 	}
 
 	// 获取队列列表和总数
-	queues, total, err := h.batchTaskManager.ListQueues(limit, offset, status, keyword)
+	session, _ := security.CurrentSession(c)
+	queues, total, err := h.batchTaskManager.ListQueuesForAccess(limit, offset, status, keyword, session.UserID, session.Scope)
 	if err != nil {
 		h.logger.Error("获取批量任务队列列表失败", zap.Error(err))
 		c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
@@ -2233,6 +2342,7 @@ func (h *AgentHandler) loadHistoryFromAgentTrace(conversationID string) ([]agent
 	}
 
 	messageCount := len(messagesArray)
+	modelFacingTrace := agent.IsModelFacingTraceJSON(traceInputJSON)
 
 	h.logger.Info("使用保存的代理轨迹恢复历史上下文",
 		zap.String("conversationId", conversationID),
@@ -2247,6 +2357,7 @@ func (h *AgentHandler) loadHistoryFromAgentTrace(conversationID string) ([]agent
 	agentMessages := make([]agent.ChatMessage, 0, len(messagesArray))
 	for _, msgMap := range messagesArray {
 		msg := agent.ChatMessage{}
+		msg.ModelFacingTrace = modelFacingTrace
 
 		// 解析role
 		if role, ok := msgMap["role"].(string); ok {

internal/handler/agent_progress_callback_test.go

@@ -97,3 +97,26 @@ func TestCreateProgressCallback_FlushesReasoningOnDone(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("expected reasoning_chain persisted on done, got %+v", details)
 	}
 }
+
+func TestEnrichProgressEventData(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("fills ids", func(t *testing.T) {
+		out := enrichProgressEventData(map[string]interface{}{"source": "eino"}, "conv-1", "msg-1")
+		m, ok := out.(map[string]interface{})
+		if !ok {
+			t.Fatalf("expected map, got %T", out)
+		}
+		if m["conversationId"] != "conv-1" || m["messageId"] != "msg-1" {
+			t.Fatalf("unexpected enrichment: %+v", m)
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("preserves existing ids", func(t *testing.T) {
+		out := enrichProgressEventData(map[string]interface{}{
+			"conversationId": "keep-conv",
+			"messageId":      "keep-msg",
+		}, "conv-1", "msg-1")
+		m := out.(map[string]interface{})
+		if m["conversationId"] != "keep-conv" || m["messageId"] != "keep-msg" {
+			t.Fatalf("should not overwrite existing ids: %+v", m)
+		}
+	})
+}

internal/handler/asset.go

@@ -0,0 +1,540 @@
+package handler
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/database"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/security"
+	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+	"go.uber.org/zap"
+)
+
+type AssetHandler struct {
+	db     *database.DB
+	logger *zap.Logger
+}
+
+const (
+	maxAssetImportBatch    = 100000
+	maxAssetOperationBatch = 10000
+)
+
+func NewAssetHandler(db *database.DB, logger *zap.Logger) *AssetHandler {
+	return &AssetHandler{db: db, logger: logger}
+}
+
+func assetAccess(c *gin.Context) database.RBACListAccess {
+	if session, ok := security.CurrentSession(c); ok {
+		return database.RBACListAccess{UserID: session.UserID, Scope: session.Scope}
+	}
+	return database.RBACListAccess{}
+}
+
+func assetAccessForPermission(c *gin.Context, permission string) database.RBACListAccess {
+	if session, ok := security.CurrentSession(c); ok {
+		return database.RBACListAccess{UserID: session.UserID, Scope: session.ScopeFor(permission)}
+	}
+	return database.RBACListAccess{}
+}
+
+type importAssetsRequest struct {
+	Assets      []*database.Asset `json:"assets" binding:"required"`
+	Source      string            `json:"source"`
+	SourceQuery string            `json:"source_query"`
+}
+
+type assetScanLink struct {
+	AssetID        string `json:"asset_id" binding:"required"`
+	ConversationID string `json:"conversation_id"`
+	QueueID        string `json:"queue_id"`
+	TaskID         string `json:"task_id"`
+}
+
+type recordAssetScansRequest struct {
+	Scans []assetScanLink `json:"scans" binding:"required"`
+}
+
+type updateAssetsProjectRequest struct {
+	AssetIDs  []string `json:"asset_ids" binding:"required"`
+	ProjectID string   `json:"project_id"`
+}
+
+type bulkUpdateAssetsRequest struct {
+	AssetIDs          []string `json:"asset_ids" binding:"required"`
+	Status            *string  `json:"status"`
+	ResponsiblePerson *string  `json:"responsible_person"`
+	Department        *string  `json:"department"`
+	BusinessSystem    *string  `json:"business_system"`
+	Environment       *string  `json:"environment"`
+	Criticality       *string  `json:"criticality"`
+	AddTags           []string `json:"add_tags"`
+	RemoveTags        []string `json:"remove_tags"`
+}
+
+type assetIDsRequest struct {
+	AssetIDs []string `json:"asset_ids" binding:"required"`
+}
+
+type mergeAssetsRequest struct {
+	AssetIDs  []string `json:"asset_ids" binding:"required"`
+	PrimaryID string   `json:"primary_id"`
+}
+
+func (h *AssetHandler) Import(c *gin.Context) {
+	var req importAssetsRequest
+	if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
+		return
+	}
+	if len(req.Assets) == 0 || len(req.Assets) > maxAssetImportBatch {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "assets 数量必须在 1-100000 之间"})
+		return
+	}
+	owner := ""
+	allowGlobal := false
+	if session, ok := security.CurrentSession(c); ok {
+		owner = session.UserID
+		allowGlobal = session.Scope == database.RBACScopeAll
+	}
+	for _, asset := range req.Assets {
+		if asset == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		if strings.TrimSpace(asset.ProjectID) != "" {
+			if session, ok := security.CurrentSession(c); ok && !h.db.UserCanAccessResource(session.UserID, session.Scope, "project", strings.TrimSpace(asset.ProjectID)) {
+				c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "无权绑定该项目"})
+				return
+			}
+		}
+		if strings.TrimSpace(asset.Source) == "" {
+			asset.Source = strings.TrimSpace(req.Source)
+		}
+		if strings.TrimSpace(asset.SourceQuery) == "" {
+			asset.SourceQuery = strings.TrimSpace(req.SourceQuery)
+		}
+	}
+	result, err := h.db.UpsertAssets(req.Assets, owner, allowGlobal)
+	if err != nil {
+		var validationErr *database.AssetValidationError
+		if errors.As(err, &validationErr) {
+			c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
+			return
+		}
+		h.logger.Error("导入资产失败", zap.Error(err))
+		c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
+		return
+	}
+	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, result)
+}
+
+func (h *AssetHandler) List(c *gin.Context) {
+	page, _ := strconv.Atoi(c.DefaultQuery("page", "1"))
+	pageSize, _ := strconv.Atoi(c.DefaultQuery("page_size", "20"))
+	if page < 1 {
+		page = 1
+	}
+	if pageSize < 1 || pageSize > 100 {
+		pageSize = 20
+	}
+	filter, err := assetListFilterFromQuery(c)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
+		return
+	}
+	assets, total, err := h.db.ListAssets(pageSize, (page-1)*pageSize, filter, assetAccess(c))
+	if err != nil {
+		h.logger.Error("加载资产失败", zap.Error(err))
+		c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
+		return
+	}
+	totalPages := (total + pageSize - 1) / pageSize
+	if totalPages < 1 {
+		totalPages = 1
+	}
+	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"assets": assets, "total": total, "page": page, "page_size": pageSize, "total_pages": totalPages})
+}
+
+func assetListFilterFromQuery(c *gin.Context) (database.AssetListFilter, error) {
+	filter := database.AssetListFilter{
+		Search: strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("q")), Status: strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("status"))),
+		Protocol: strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("protocol"))), ProjectID: strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("project_id")),
+		Source: strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("source")), Tag: strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("tag")), Host: strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("host")),
+		IP: strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("ip")), Domain: strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("domain")), ScanState: strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("scan_state"))),
+		SortBy: strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("sort_by"))), SortOrder: strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("sort_order"))),
+		RiskLevel: strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("risk_level"))),
+		Country:   strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("country")), Province: strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("province")), City: strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("city")),
+		ResponsiblePerson: strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("responsible_person")), Department: strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("department")),
+		BusinessSystem: strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("business_system")), Environment: strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("environment"))),
+		Criticality: strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("criticality"))),
+	}
+	if raw := strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("port")); raw != "" {
+		port, err := strconv.Atoi(raw)
+		if err != nil || port < 0 || port > 65535 {
+			return filter, &assetQueryError{field: "port", value: raw}
+		}
+		filter.Port = &port
+	}
+	for field, target := range map[string]**int{
+		"min_vulnerabilities": &filter.MinVulnerabilities,
+		"max_vulnerabilities": &filter.MaxVulnerabilities,
+		"scan_overdue_days":   &filter.ScanOverdueDays,
+	} {
+		raw := strings.TrimSpace(c.Query(field))
+		if raw == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		value, err := strconv.Atoi(raw)
+		if err != nil || value < 0 || (field == "scan_overdue_days" && value == 0) {
+			return filter, &assetQueryError{field: field, value: raw}
+		}
+		*target = &value
+	}
+	var err error
+	if filter.LastScanBefore, err = parseAssetQueryTime("last_scan_before", c.Query("last_scan_before")); err != nil {
+		return filter, err
+	}
+	if filter.LastScanAfter, err = parseAssetQueryTime("last_scan_after", c.Query("last_scan_after")); err != nil {
+		return filter, err
+	}
+	if filter.FirstSeenBefore, err = parseAssetQueryTime("first_seen_before", c.Query("first_seen_before")); err != nil {
+		return filter, err
+	}
+	if filter.FirstSeenAfter, err = parseAssetQueryTime("first_seen_after", c.Query("first_seen_after")); err != nil {
+		return filter, err
+	}
+	if filter.LastSeenBefore, err = parseAssetQueryTime("last_seen_before", c.Query("last_seen_before")); err != nil {
+		return filter, err
+	}
+	if filter.LastSeenAfter, err = parseAssetQueryTime("last_seen_after", c.Query("last_seen_after")); err != nil {
+		return filter, err
+	}
+	return filter, nil
+}
+
+// Selection resolves all assets matching the current filter for cross-page actions.
+func (h *AssetHandler) Selection(c *gin.Context) {
+	filter, err := assetListFilterFromQuery(c)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
+		return
+	}
+	assets, total, err := h.db.ListAssetsForOperation(maxAssetOperationBatch, filter, assetAccess(c))
+	if err != nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error(), "total": total})
+		return
+	}
+	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"assets": assets, "total": total})
+}
+
+type assetQueryError struct{ field, value string }
+
+func (e *assetQueryError) Error() string {
+	return e.field + " 参数无效: " + e.value
+}
+
+func parseAssetQueryTime(field, value string) (*time.Time, error) {
+	value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
+	if value == "" {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	for _, layout := range []string{time.RFC3339, "2006-01-02"} {
+		if parsed, err := time.Parse(layout, value); err == nil {
+			return &parsed, nil
+		}
+	}
+	return nil, &assetQueryError{field: field, value: value}
+}
+
+func (h *AssetHandler) Stats(c *gin.Context) {
+	days := 30
+	if raw := strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("days")); raw != "" {
+		parsed, err := strconv.Atoi(raw)
+		if err != nil || (parsed != 7 && parsed != 30 && parsed != 90) {
+			c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "days 仅支持 7、30 或 90"})
+			return
+		}
+		days = parsed
+	}
+	stats, err := h.db.GetAssetStats(assetAccess(c), days)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
+		return
+	}
+	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, stats)
+}
+
+// RecordScans stores the execution link created by the asset-library scan action.
+func (h *AssetHandler) RecordScans(c *gin.Context) {
+	var req recordAssetScansRequest
+	if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
+		return
+	}
+	if len(req.Scans) == 0 || len(req.Scans) > maxAssetOperationBatch {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "scans 数量必须在 1-10000 之间"})
+		return
+	}
+	access := assetAccess(c)
+	for _, scan := range req.Scans {
+		conversationID := strings.TrimSpace(scan.ConversationID)
+		queueID := strings.TrimSpace(scan.QueueID)
+		taskID := strings.TrimSpace(scan.TaskID)
+		if conversationID == "" && taskID == "" {
+			c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "conversation_id 或 task_id 至少需要一个"})
+			return
+		}
+		if taskID != "" && (queueID == "" || !h.db.BatchTaskBelongsToQueue(taskID, queueID)) {
+			c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "任务不属于指定队列"})
+			return
+		}
+		if _, err := h.db.GetAsset(strings.TrimSpace(scan.AssetID), access); err != nil {
+			c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "资产不存在或无权扫描"})
+			return
+		}
+		if session, ok := security.CurrentSession(c); ok {
+			if id := conversationID; id != "" && !h.db.UserCanAccessResource(session.UserID, session.Scope, "conversation", id) {
+				c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "无权关联该对话"})
+				return
+			}
+			if id := queueID; id != "" && !h.db.UserCanAccessResource(session.UserID, session.Scope, "batch_task", id) {
+				c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "无权关联该任务队列"})
+				return
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	for _, scan := range req.Scans {
+		if err := h.db.MarkAssetScanned(scan.AssetID, scan.ConversationID, scan.QueueID, scan.TaskID, access); err != nil {
+			h.logger.Error("记录资产扫描失败", zap.String("asset_id", scan.AssetID), zap.Error(err))
+			c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
+			return
+		}
+	}
+	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"updated": len(req.Scans)})
+}
+
+func (h *AssetHandler) Update(c *gin.Context) {
+	var asset database.Asset
+	if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&asset); err != nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
+		return
+	}
+	if asset.ProjectID != "" {
+		if session, ok := security.CurrentSession(c); ok && !h.db.UserCanAccessResource(session.UserID, session.Scope, "project", asset.ProjectID) {
+			c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "无权绑定该项目"})
+			return
+		}
+	}
+	if err := h.db.UpdateAsset(c.Param("id"), &asset, assetAccess(c)); err != nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
+		return
+	}
+	updated, err := h.db.GetAsset(c.Param("id"), assetAccess(c))
+	if err != nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "资产不存在"})
+		return
+	}
+	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, updated)
+}
+
+// UpdateProjectBinding replaces the project binding for a selected asset set.
+func (h *AssetHandler) UpdateProjectBinding(c *gin.Context) {
+	var req updateAssetsProjectRequest
+	if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
+		return
+	}
+	if len(req.AssetIDs) == 0 || len(req.AssetIDs) > maxAssetOperationBatch {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "asset_ids 数量必须在 1-10000 之间"})
+		return
+	}
+	req.ProjectID = strings.TrimSpace(req.ProjectID)
+	if req.ProjectID != "" {
+		if _, err := h.db.GetProject(req.ProjectID); err != nil {
+			c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "项目不存在"})
+			return
+		}
+		if session, ok := security.CurrentSession(c); ok && !h.db.UserCanAccessResource(session.UserID, session.Scope, "project", req.ProjectID) {
+			c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "无权绑定该项目"})
+			return
+		}
+	}
+	updated, err := h.db.UpdateAssetsProject(req.AssetIDs, req.ProjectID, assetAccess(c))
+	if err != nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
+		return
+	}
+	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"updated": updated, "project_id": req.ProjectID})
+}
+
+func (h *AssetHandler) BulkUpdate(c *gin.Context) {
+	var req bulkUpdateAssetsRequest
+	if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
+		return
+	}
+	if len(req.AssetIDs) == 0 || len(req.AssetIDs) > maxAssetOperationBatch {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "asset_ids 数量必须在 1-10000 之间"})
+		return
+	}
+	updated, err := h.db.UpdateAssetsBulk(req.AssetIDs, database.AssetBulkPatch{
+		Status: req.Status, ResponsiblePerson: req.ResponsiblePerson, Department: req.Department,
+		BusinessSystem: req.BusinessSystem, Environment: req.Environment, Criticality: req.Criticality,
+		AddTags: req.AddTags, RemoveTags: req.RemoveTags,
+	}, assetAccess(c))
+	if err != nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
+		return
+	}
+	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"updated": updated})
+}
+
+func (h *AssetHandler) BatchDelete(c *gin.Context) {
+	var req assetIDsRequest
+	if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
+		return
+	}
+	if len(req.AssetIDs) == 0 || len(req.AssetIDs) > maxAssetOperationBatch {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "asset_ids 数量必须在 1-10000 之间"})
+		return
+	}
+	deleted, err := h.db.DeleteAssets(req.AssetIDs, assetAccess(c))
+	if err != nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
+		return
+	}
+	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"deleted": deleted})
+}
+
+func assetIdentityKeys(asset *database.Asset) map[string]struct{} {
+	keys := map[string]struct{}{}
+	if value := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(asset.Domain)); value != "" {
+		keys["domain:"+value] = struct{}{}
+	}
+	if value := strings.ToLower(strings.Trim(strings.TrimSpace(asset.IP), "[]")); value != "" {
+		keys["ip:"+value] = struct{}{}
+	}
+	if value := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(asset.Host)); value != "" {
+		keys["host:"+value] = struct{}{}
+	}
+	return keys
+}
+
+func shareAssetIdentity(left, right *database.Asset) bool {
+	for key := range assetIdentityKeys(left) {
+		if _, ok := assetIdentityKeys(right)[key]; ok {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// Merge keeps the selected primary asset and safely combines compatible duplicate metadata.
+func (h *AssetHandler) Merge(c *gin.Context) {
+	var req mergeAssetsRequest
+	if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
+		return
+	}
+	if len(req.AssetIDs) < 2 || len(req.AssetIDs) > 100 {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "合并资产数量必须在 2-100 之间"})
+		return
+	}
+	writeAccess := assetAccessForPermission(c, "asset:write")
+	deleteAccess := assetAccessForPermission(c, "asset:delete")
+	primaryID := strings.TrimSpace(req.PrimaryID)
+	if primaryID == "" {
+		primaryID = strings.TrimSpace(req.AssetIDs[0])
+	}
+	primary, err := h.db.GetAsset(primaryID, writeAccess)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "主资产不存在或无权访问"})
+		return
+	}
+	others := make([]*database.Asset, 0, len(req.AssetIDs)-1)
+	seen := map[string]struct{}{primaryID: {}}
+	for _, id := range req.AssetIDs {
+		id = strings.TrimSpace(id)
+		if id == "" || id == primaryID {
+			continue
+		}
+		if _, ok := seen[id]; ok {
+			continue
+		}
+		seen[id] = struct{}{}
+		item, err := h.db.GetAsset(id, writeAccess)
+		if err != nil {
+			c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "部分资产不存在或无权访问"})
+			return
+		}
+		if !shareAssetIdentity(primary, item) {
+			c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "所选资产没有共同域名、IP 或 Host，不能判定为重复资产"})
+			return
+		}
+		others = append(others, item)
+	}
+	if len(others) == 0 {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "至少需要两个不同资产"})
+		return
+	}
+	mergeText := func(dst *string, src string) {
+		if strings.TrimSpace(*dst) == "" && strings.TrimSpace(src) != "" {
+			*dst = src
+		}
+	}
+	tagSet := map[string]struct{}{}
+	for _, tag := range primary.Tags {
+		tagSet[tag] = struct{}{}
+	}
+	for _, item := range others {
+		mergeText(&primary.ProjectID, item.ProjectID)
+		mergeText(&primary.Host, item.Host)
+		mergeText(&primary.IP, item.IP)
+		mergeText(&primary.Domain, item.Domain)
+		mergeText(&primary.Protocol, item.Protocol)
+		mergeText(&primary.Title, item.Title)
+		mergeText(&primary.Server, item.Server)
+		mergeText(&primary.Country, item.Country)
+		mergeText(&primary.Province, item.Province)
+		mergeText(&primary.City, item.City)
+		mergeText(&primary.ResponsiblePerson, item.ResponsiblePerson)
+		mergeText(&primary.Department, item.Department)
+		mergeText(&primary.BusinessSystem, item.BusinessSystem)
+		mergeText(&primary.Environment, item.Environment)
+		mergeText(&primary.Criticality, item.Criticality)
+		for _, tag := range item.Tags {
+			tagSet[tag] = struct{}{}
+		}
+	}
+	primary.Tags = primary.Tags[:0]
+	for tag := range tagSet {
+		primary.Tags = append(primary.Tags, tag)
+	}
+	if len(primary.Tags) > 30 {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "合并后标签超过 30 个"})
+		return
+	}
+	ids := make([]string, 0, len(others))
+	for _, item := range others {
+		ids = append(ids, item.ID)
+	}
+	merged, err := h.db.MergeAssets(primary, ids, writeAccess, deleteAccess)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
+		return
+	}
+	updated, _ := h.db.GetAsset(primary.ID, writeAccess)
+	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"merged": merged, "asset": updated})
+}
+
+func (h *AssetHandler) Delete(c *gin.Context) {
+	if err := h.db.DeleteAsset(c.Param("id"), assetAccess(c)); err != nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "资产不存在或无权删除"})
+		return
+	}
+	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"success": true})
+}

internal/handler/asset_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+package handler
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/database"
+	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+	"go.uber.org/zap"
+)
+
+func TestAssetListPaginatesWithinProject(t *testing.T) {
+	gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
+	db, err := database.NewDB(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "asset-list-pagination.db"), zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+
+	project, err := db.CreateProject(&database.Project{Name: "Paged Project", Status: "active"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	otherProject, err := db.CreateProject(&database.Project{Name: "Other Project", Status: "active"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	assets := make([]*database.Asset, 0, 8)
+	for i := 1; i <= 7; i++ {
+		assets = append(assets, &database.Asset{
+			ProjectID: project.ID,
+			IP:        fmt.Sprintf("192.0.2.%d", i),
+			Port:      80,
+			Protocol:  "http",
+		})
+	}
+	assets = append(assets, &database.Asset{
+		ProjectID: otherProject.ID,
+		IP:        "198.51.100.1",
+		Port:      443,
+		Protocol:  "https",
+	})
+	if _, err := db.UpsertAssets(assets, "", true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	router := gin.New()
+	router.GET("/api/assets", NewAssetHandler(db, zap.NewNop()).List)
+	request := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/assets?project_id="+project.ID+"&page=2&page_size=3", nil)
+	response := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	router.ServeHTTP(response, request)
+
+	if response.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected status %d: %s", response.Code, response.Body.String())
+	}
+	var payload struct {
+		Assets     []*database.Asset `json:"assets"`
+		Total      int               `json:"total"`
+		Page       int               `json:"page"`
+		PageSize   int               `json:"page_size"`
+		TotalPages int               `json:"total_pages"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(response.Body.Bytes(), &payload); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if payload.Total != 7 || payload.Page != 2 || payload.PageSize != 3 || payload.TotalPages != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected pagination: total=%d page=%d page_size=%d total_pages=%d",
+			payload.Total, payload.Page, payload.PageSize, payload.TotalPages)
+	}
+	if len(payload.Assets) != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 3 assets on page 2, got %d", len(payload.Assets))
+	}
+	for _, asset := range payload.Assets {
+		if asset.ProjectID != project.ID {
+			t.Fatalf("asset from another project leaked into page: %#v", asset)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/handler/audit.go

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
 
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/audit"
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/database"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/security"
 
 	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
 	"go.uber.org/zap"
@@ -32,8 +33,8 @@ func (h *AuditHandler) Meta(c *gin.Context) {
 		retentionDays = h.audit.RetentionDays()
 	}
 	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
-		"enabled":        enabled,
+		"enabled":           enabled,
-		"retention_days": retentionDays,
+		"retention_days":    retentionDays,
 		"default_page_size": 20,
 		"max_page_size":     100,
 		"max_export":        5000,
@@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ func (h *AuditHandler) Summary(c *gin.Context) {
 		c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "database unavailable"})
 		return
 	}
-	base := auditFilterFromQuery(c)
+	base := auditFilterForAccess(c, auditFilterFromQuery(c))
 	total, err := h.db.CountAuditLogs(base)
 	if err != nil {
 		c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
@@ -68,9 +69,9 @@ func (h *AuditHandler) Summary(c *gin.Context) {
 		return
 	}
 	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
-		"total":       total,
+		"total":     total,
-		"failures":    failures,
+		"failures":  failures,
-		"recent_7d":   recent7d,
+		"recent_7d": recent7d,
 		"has_filters": c.Query("category") != "" || c.Query("action") != "" || c.Query("result") != "" ||
 			c.Query("q") != "" || c.Query("since") != "" || c.Query("until") != "",
 	})
@@ -82,7 +83,7 @@ func (h *AuditHandler) ListLogs(c *gin.Context) {
 		c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "database unavailable"})
 		return
 	}
-	filter := auditFilterFromQuery(c)
+	filter := auditFilterForAccess(c, auditFilterFromQuery(c))
 	page, pageSize := auditPaginationFromQuery(c)
 	filter.Limit = pageSize
 	filter.Offset = (page - 1) * pageSize
@@ -116,6 +117,10 @@ func (h *AuditHandler) GetLog(c *gin.Context) {
 		c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "审计记录不存在"})
 		return
 	}
+	if session, ok := security.CurrentSession(c); !ok || (session.Scope != database.RBACScopeAll && row.Actor != session.Username) {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "无权访问该资源"})
+		return
+	}
 	audit.ApplyResourceAvailability(h.db, row)
 	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"log": row})
 }
@@ -126,7 +131,7 @@ func (h *AuditHandler) ExportLogs(c *gin.Context) {
 		c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "database unavailable"})
 		return
 	}
-	filter := auditFilterFromQuery(c)
+	filter := auditFilterForAccess(c, auditFilterFromQuery(c))
 	filter.Limit = 5000
 	filter.Offset = 0
 
@@ -145,3 +150,10 @@ func (h *AuditHandler) ExportLogs(c *gin.Context) {
 		"logs":        logs,
 	})
 }
+
+func auditFilterForAccess(c *gin.Context, filter database.ListAuditLogsFilter) database.ListAuditLogsFilter {
+	if session, ok := security.CurrentSession(c); ok && session.Scope != database.RBACScopeAll {
+		filter.Actor = session.Username
+	}
+	return filter
+}

internal/handler/audit_query.go

@@ -10,13 +10,15 @@ import (
 
 func auditFilterFromQuery(c *gin.Context) database.ListAuditLogsFilter {
 	filter := database.ListAuditLogsFilter{
-		Level:        c.Query("level"),
+		Actor:         c.Query("actor"),
-		Category:     c.Query("category"),
+		Level:         c.Query("level"),
-		Action:       c.Query("action"),
+		Category:      c.Query("category"),
-		Result:       c.Query("result"),
+		Action:        c.Query("action"),
-		Query:        c.Query("q"),
+		Result:        c.Query("result"),
-		ResourceType: c.Query("resource_type"),
+		Query:         c.Query("q"),
-		ResourceID:   c.Query("resource_id"),
+		ResourceType:  c.Query("resource_type"),
+		ResourceID:    c.Query("resource_id"),
+		RelatedUserID: c.Query("related_user_id"),
 	}
 	if since := c.Query("since"); since != "" {
 		if t, err := database.ParseRFC3339Time(since); err == nil {

internal/handler/audit_query_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+package handler
+
+import (
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+)
+
+func TestAuditFilterFromQueryIncludesActorAndMemberFilters(t *testing.T) {
+	gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
+	context, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(httptest.NewRecorder())
+	context.Request = httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/audit/logs?actor=operator-user&action=assign_resource&resource_type=conversation&related_user_id=user-1", nil)
+
+	filter := auditFilterFromQuery(context)
+	if filter.Actor != "operator-user" || filter.Action != "assign_resource" || filter.ResourceType != "conversation" || filter.RelatedUserID != "user-1" {
+		t.Fatalf("filter = %#v", filter)
+	}
+}

internal/handler/auth.go

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ func NewAuthHandler(manager *security.AuthManager, cfg *config.Config, configPat
 }
 
 type loginRequest struct {
+	Username string `json:"username"`
 	Password string `json:"password" binding:"required"`
 }
 
@@ -54,7 +55,7 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) Login(c *gin.Context) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	token, expiresAt, err := h.manager.Authenticate(req.Password)
+	token, expiresAt, err := h.manager.Authenticate(req.Username, req.Password)
 	if err != nil {
 		if h.audit != nil {
 			h.audit.Record(c, audit.Entry{
@@ -63,11 +64,13 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) Login(c *gin.Context) {
 				Action:   "login",
 				Result:   "failure",
 				Message:  "登录失败：密码错误",
+				Actor:    strings.TrimSpace(req.Username),
 			})
 		}
 		c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "密码错误"})
 		return
 	}
+	session, _ := h.manager.ValidateToken(token)
 
 	if h.audit != nil {
 		h.audit.Record(c, audit.Entry{
@@ -76,6 +79,7 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) Login(c *gin.Context) {
 			Result:      "success",
 			SessionHint: audit.HintFromToken(token),
 			Message:     "登录成功",
+			Actor:       session.Username,
 			Detail: map[string]interface{}{
 				"expires_at": expiresAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
 			},
@@ -86,6 +90,15 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) Login(c *gin.Context) {
 		"token":               token,
 		"expires_at":          expiresAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
 		"session_duration_hr": h.manager.SessionDurationHours(),
+		"user": gin.H{
+			"id":           session.UserID,
+			"username":     session.Username,
+			"display_name": session.DisplayName,
+		},
+		"roles":             session.Roles,
+		"permissions":       permissionKeys(session.Permissions),
+		"permission_scopes": session.PermissionScopes,
+		"scope":             session.Scope,
 	})
 }
 
@@ -139,7 +152,11 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) ChangePassword(c *gin.Context) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	if !h.manager.CheckPassword(oldPassword) {
+	session, _ := security.CurrentSession(c)
+	if session.Username == "" {
+		session.Username = "admin"
+	}
+	if !h.manager.CheckUserPassword(session.Username, oldPassword) {
 		if h.audit != nil {
 			h.audit.Record(c, audit.Entry{
 				Level:    "warn",
@@ -153,27 +170,17 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) ChangePassword(c *gin.Context) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	if err := config.PersistAuthPassword(h.configPath, newPassword); err != nil {
+	if session.UserID == "" {
+		session.UserID = "admin"
+	}
+	if err := h.manager.UpdateUserPassword(session.UserID, newPassword); err != nil {
 		if h.logger != nil {
-			h.logger.Error("保存新密码失败", zap.Error(err))
+			h.logger.Error("更新用户密码失败", zap.Error(err))
 		}
-		c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "保存新密码失败，请重试"})
+		c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "更新用户密码失败"})
 		return
 	}
 
-	if err := h.manager.UpdateConfig(newPassword, h.config.Auth.SessionDurationHours); err != nil {
-		if h.logger != nil {
-			h.logger.Error("更新认证配置失败", zap.Error(err))
-		}
-		c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "更新认证配置失败"})
-		return
-	}
-
-	h.config.Auth.Password = newPassword
-	h.config.Auth.GeneratedPassword = ""
-	h.config.Auth.GeneratedPasswordPersisted = false
-	h.config.Auth.GeneratedPasswordPersistErr = ""
-
 	if h.logger != nil {
 		h.logger.Info("登录密码已更新，所有会话已失效")
 	}
@@ -207,5 +214,24 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) Validate(c *gin.Context) {
 	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
 		"token":      session.Token,
 		"expires_at": session.ExpiresAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
+		"user": gin.H{
+			"id":           session.UserID,
+			"username":     session.Username,
+			"display_name": session.DisplayName,
+		},
+		"roles":             session.Roles,
+		"permissions":       permissionKeys(session.Permissions),
+		"permission_scopes": session.PermissionScopes,
+		"scope":             session.Scope,
 	})
 }
+
+func permissionKeys(perms map[string]bool) []string {
+	keys := make([]string, 0, len(perms))
+	for key, ok := range perms {
+		if ok {
+			keys = append(keys, key)
+		}
+	}
+	return keys
+}

internal/handler/batch_queue_executor.go

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
 
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/agent"
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/audit"
+	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/authctx"
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/config"
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/mcp"
 	"cyberstrike-ai/internal/multiagent"
@@ -109,6 +110,13 @@ func (h *AgentHandler) tryFinalizeBatchQueue(queueID string) {
 
 // executeOneBatchSubTask 执行单条批量子任务（各自独立会话）。
 func (h *AgentHandler) executeOneBatchSubTask(queueID string, queue *BatchTaskQueue, task *BatchTask) {
+	ownerUserID := h.db.GetResourceOwner("batch_task", queueID)
+	access, accessErr := h.db.ResolveRBACAccess(ownerUserID)
+	if accessErr != nil || access == nil || !access.User.Enabled {
+		h.batchTaskManager.UpdateTaskStatus(queueID, task.ID, BatchTaskStatusFailed, "", "队列所有者不存在或已禁用")
+		return
+	}
+	principal := authctx.NewPrincipalWithScopes(access.User.ID, access.User.Username, access.Scope, access.Permissions, access.PermissionScopes)
 	title := safeTruncateString(task.Message, 50)
 	batchMeta := audit.ConversationCreateMeta("batch_task")
 	batchMeta.ProjectID = effectiveProjectID(h.config, queue.ProjectID)
@@ -119,6 +127,8 @@ func (h *AgentHandler) executeOneBatchSubTask(queueID string, queue *BatchTaskQu
 		return
 	}
 	conversationID := conv.ID
+	_ = h.db.SetResourceOwner("conversation", conversationID, access.User.ID)
+	_ = h.db.AssignResourceToUser(access.User.ID, "conversation", conversationID)
 
 	h.batchTaskManager.UpdateTaskStatusWithConversationID(queueID, task.ID, BatchTaskStatusRunning, "", "", conversationID)
 
@@ -156,7 +166,8 @@ func (h *AgentHandler) executeOneBatchSubTask(queueID string, queue *BatchTaskQu
 
 	h.logger.Info("执行批量任务", zap.String("queueId", queueID), zap.String("taskId", task.ID), zap.String("message", task.Message), zap.String("role", queue.Role), zap.String("conversationId", conversationID))
 
-	baseCtx, cancelWithCause := context.WithCancelCause(context.Background())
+	principalCtx := authctx.WithPrincipal(context.Background(), principal)
+	baseCtx, cancelWithCause := context.WithCancelCause(principalCtx)
 	taskCtx, timeoutCancel := context.WithTimeout(baseCtx, 6*time.Hour)
 
 	registered := false