Deployment Guide

中文

CyberStrikeAI can run as a local testing tool, an internal team service, or a production red-team platform. Treat it as a high-privilege security system: it can execute commands, call MCP tools, manage WebShell connections, and optionally run C2 listeners.

Prerequisites

Go for source runs and binary builds.
Python for some MCP servers and tool scripts.
SQLite files under data/; no external DB is required by default.
Actual security tools installed in PATH. YAML files under tools/ only describe commands.
An OpenAI-compatible model endpoint, or openai.provider: claude for the Claude bridge.

Important persistent paths:

config.yaml
data/
tools/
roles/
skills/
agents/
knowledge_base/
chat_uploads/

Back these up before upgrades.

Startup Modes

Local quick start:

chmod +x run.sh && ./run.sh

run.sh is the most common startup path for local use, development, small temporary internal deployments, and quick post-upgrade verification.

For long-running service, boot-time startup, managed logs, and crash recovery, prefer a binary managed by systemd.

Source run:

go run ./cmd/server --config config.yaml

Binary build:

go build -o cyberstrike-ai ./cmd/server
./cyberstrike-ai --config config.yaml

The binary still needs web/templates, web/static, and the runtime resource directories.

HTTPS and Reverse Proxy

For local testing, self-signed HTTPS is acceptable:

server:
  tls_enabled: true
  tls_auto_self_sign: true

For production, use real certificates or terminate TLS at a reverse proxy. If the proxy terminates TLS and forwards HTTP to the app, avoid enabling app-side TLS on the same upstream unless proxy_pass uses HTTPS.

Nginx must not buffer SSE:

proxy_buffering off;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
proxy_set_header Connection "upgrade";

Deployment Decision Table

Scenario	Recommended setup	Key settings	Avoid
Personal testing	`./run.sh` + self-signed HTTPS	`tls_auto_self_sign: true`	Public exposure
Internal team	Binary + systemd + internal HTTPS	strong password, audit, backup, IP restrictions	Shared weak password
Production red-team platform	Reverse proxy + dedicated OS user + log collection	real certs, proxy auth, C2 only when needed	Direct public admin UI
Chat/KB only	Disable C2 and unnecessary MCP	`c2.enabled: false`	All tools enabled by default
Tool automation	Isolated workspace + HITL	`workspace_root_dir`, `hitl`, `monitor`	Shell tools globally allowlisted

Acceptance Checklist

After startup:

Open / and verify no HTTP/HTTPS redirect loop.
Login and validate /api/auth/validate.
Run model test in settings.
Check tool list and schemas.
If KB is enabled, check index status.
If external MCP is enabled, verify connection and tool visibility.
If C2 is enabled, start and stop a test listener only in an authorized network.
Check audit logs for login and config activity.

Runtime File Layers

Replaceable: binary, web/, default docs/resources.
Preserve: config.yaml, data/, custom tools/roles/skills/agents, knowledge_base, uploads.
Cleanup candidates: checkpoints, temporary workspaces, stale payloads, old tool execution records.

Source Anchors

App wiring and routes: internal/app/app.go
TLS bootstrap: internal/app/main_server_tls.go
HTTP to HTTPS redirect: internal/app/main_server_http_redirect.go
Config structs: internal/config/config.go
Config apply: internal/handler/config.go

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