Files
CyberStrikeAI/internal/handler/vulnerability_retest.go
T
Sycun 6a67364947 feat: add vulnerability retest branches with an isolated evidence log
Retesting a finding creates an independent conversation branch that
snapshots the source history and model trace, so verification can run
multi-turn without writing to the original session.

- POST /api/vulnerabilities/:id/retest creates the branch and persists the
  prompt, so a lost response, navigation or refresh can resume it
- new update_vulnerability_status tool closes the loop; a retest branch may
  only read and update its own finding
- {{vulnerability_id}}, {{conversation_id}} and {{source_conversation_id}}
  resolve on send, in the first turn and in follow-ups
- evidence appends to a read-only vulnerabilities.retest_log column instead
  of retest_notes: that field is operator-authored and the edit form
  rewrites it wholesale, so a routine edit used to erase the retest trail
- the retest prompt is prefilled with the operator's retest_notes, which
  already states how to verify the fix
- copied messages are re-bound as time.Time. Scanning a DATETIME column into
  a string yields RFC3339Nano while AddMessage writes the driver's
  space-separated format, and messages sort on the raw created_at text, so a
  branch rendered its new turn above the inherited history
2026-10-10 07:21:20 +08:00

87 lines
3.8 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"net/http"
"strings"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/audit"
"cyberstrike-ai/internal/security"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"go.uber.org/zap"
)
// CreateRetest creates a sibling snapshot; the chat endpoint runs the new turn.
func (h *VulnerabilityHandler) CreateRetest(c *gin.Context) {
var req struct {
Prompt string `json:"prompt" binding:"required"`
}
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil || strings.TrimSpace(req.Prompt) == "" || len(req.Prompt) > 20000 {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "请输入复测提示词(最多 20000 字节)"})
return
}
if _, ok := security.CurrentSession(c); !ok {
c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "请先登录"})
return
}
v, err := h.db.GetVulnerability(c.Param("id"))
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "漏洞不存在"})
return
}
source, err := h.db.GetConversation(v.ConversationID)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusConflict, gin.H{"error": "原始对话已不存在,无法创建复测分支"})
return
}
if session, ok := security.CurrentSession(c); ok {
if !security.SessionHasPermission(c, "chat:read") || !security.SessionHasPermission(c, "chat:write") || !security.SessionHasPermission(c, "agent:execute") || !security.SessionHasPermission(c, "vulnerability:write") || !h.db.UserCanAccessResource(session.UserID, session.ScopeFor("vulnerability:write"), "vulnerability", v.ID) || !h.db.UserCanAccessResource(session.UserID, session.ScopeFor("chat:read"), "conversation", source.ID) || (source.ProjectID != "" && (!security.SessionHasPermission(c, "project:read") || !h.db.UserCanAccessResource(session.UserID, session.ScopeFor("project:read"), "project", source.ProjectID))) {
c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "无权创建或执行该漏洞的复测分支"})
return
}
}
if v.ProjectID != "" && v.ProjectID != source.ProjectID {
c.JSON(http.StatusConflict, gin.H{"error": "漏洞与原始对话所属项目不一致,请先检查项目归属"})
return
}
if h.taskState != nil {
if running, _ := h.taskState.ConversationTaskRuntimeState(source.ID); running {
c.JSON(http.StatusConflict, gin.H{"error": "原始对话仍在执行,请等待完成或停止后再复测"})
return
}
}
meta := audit.ConversationCreateMetaFromGin(c, "vulnerability_retest")
conv, err := h.db.CreateVulnerabilityRetest(v, meta)
if err != nil {
h.logger.Error("创建复测分支失败", zap.Error(err))
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "创建复测分支失败"})
return
}
if session, ok := security.CurrentSession(c); ok {
if err = h.db.SetResourceOwner("conversation", conv.ID, session.UserID); err == nil {
err = h.db.AssignResourceToUser(session.UserID, "conversation", conv.ID)
}
if err != nil {
_ = h.db.DeleteConversation(conv.ID)
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "设置分支权限失败"})
return
}
}
// Continue with the user's message unchanged apart from placeholder resolution.
// Branch linkage and tool authorization are maintained by the backend.
prompt, err := h.db.ResolveConversationPlaceholders(conv.ID, strings.TrimSpace(req.Prompt))
if err != nil {
_ = h.db.DeleteConversation(conv.ID)
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "解析复测提示词失败"})
return
}
if err = h.db.SetVulnerabilityRetestPrompt(conv.ID, prompt); err != nil {
_ = h.db.DeleteConversation(conv.ID)
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "保存复测提示词失败"})
return
}
if h.audit != nil {
h.audit.RecordOK(c, "vulnerability", "retest", "创建漏洞复测分支", "vulnerability", v.ID, map[string]interface{}{"conversation_id": conv.ID, "source_conversation_id": source.ID})
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"conversation": conv, "prompt": prompt, "vulnerability_id": v.ID, "source_conversation_id": source.ID})
}