mirror of
https://github.com/Ed1s0nZ/CyberStrikeAI.git
synced 2026-09-12 04:39:00 +02:00
292 lines
8.8 KiB
Go
292 lines
8.8 KiB
Go
// Package toolguard applies configurable blocking rules before tool execution.
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// It inspects tool names and arguments, including JSON string values and common
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// percent escapes. It does not resolve hosts or inspect redirects, files, or
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// arbitrary encoded payloads, and is not an exhaustive target authorization check.
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package toolguard
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"regexp"
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"sort"
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"strings"
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"sync/atomic"
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)
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const (
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MaxRules = 100
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MaxIDLength = 128
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MaxNameLength = 200
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MaxPatternLength = 4096
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MaxMessageLength = 4096
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// The named group keeps surrounding boundary punctuation out of the reminder.
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governmentDomainPattern = `(?i)(?:^|[^\p{L}\p{M}\p{N}_.-])(?P<match>(?:(?:[\p{L}\p{M}\p{N}_*-]+\.)+gov(?:\.[\p{L}\p{M}\p{N}_*-]+)*|gov(?:\.[\p{L}\p{M}\p{N}_*-]+)+|\.gov(?:\.[\p{L}\p{M}\p{N}_*-]+)*)\.?)(?:$|[^\p{L}\p{M}\p{N}_.-])`
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defaultMessage = "识别到 {match},工具调用已被安全规则「{rule}」拦截,请检查目标与授权范围后再试。"
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)
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type Config struct {
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Enabled bool `json:"enabled" yaml:"enabled"`
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Rules []Rule `json:"rules" yaml:"rules"`
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}
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type Rule struct {
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ID string `json:"id" yaml:"id"`
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Name string `json:"name" yaml:"name"`
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Enabled bool `json:"enabled" yaml:"enabled"`
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Pattern string `json:"pattern" yaml:"pattern"`
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Message string `json:"message" yaml:"message"`
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}
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type Match struct {
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RuleID string `json:"ruleId"`
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RuleName string `json:"ruleName"`
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MatchedText string `json:"matchedText"`
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Message string `json:"message"`
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}
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type compiledRule struct {
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rule Rule
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pattern *regexp.Regexp
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matchGroup int
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}
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// Policy is an immutable snapshot safe for concurrent checks.
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type Policy struct {
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config Config
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rules []compiledRule
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}
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// DefaultConfig enables a conservative government-domain rule, including .gov,
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// .gov.cn and wildcard forms such as *.gov.*. Additional rules can be configured.
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func DefaultConfig() Config {
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return Config{
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Enabled: true,
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Rules: []Rule{{
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ID: "government-domains",
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Name: "政府网站保护",
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Enabled: true,
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Pattern: governmentDomainPattern,
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Message: "识别到 {match},禁止攻击政府网站。请检查目标与授权范围,并更换为已获授权的非政府目标。",
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}},
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}
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}
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// Compile validates every rule, including disabled ones. Limits are byte counts.
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// Rule order determines precedence. An optional named (?P<match>...) group selects
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// the text inserted into {match}; otherwise the entire regex match is used.
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func Compile(config Config) (*Policy, error) {
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if len(config.Rules) > MaxRules {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("tool guard: at most %d rules are allowed", MaxRules)
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}
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policy := &Policy{config: cloneConfig(config)}
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ids := make(map[string]struct{}, len(config.Rules))
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for i, rule := range policy.config.Rules {
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prefix := fmt.Sprintf("tool guard rule %d", i+1)
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if strings.TrimSpace(rule.ID) == "" || len(rule.ID) > MaxIDLength {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: id must be nonempty and at most %d bytes", prefix, MaxIDLength)
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}
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if rule.ID != strings.TrimSpace(rule.ID) {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: id must not have surrounding whitespace", prefix)
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}
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if _, exists := ids[rule.ID]; exists {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: duplicate id %q", prefix, rule.ID)
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}
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ids[rule.ID] = struct{}{}
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if strings.TrimSpace(rule.Name) == "" || len(rule.Name) > MaxNameLength {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: name must be nonempty and at most %d bytes", prefix, MaxNameLength)
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}
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if strings.TrimSpace(rule.Pattern) == "" || len(rule.Pattern) > MaxPatternLength {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: pattern must be nonempty and at most %d bytes", prefix, MaxPatternLength)
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}
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if len(rule.Message) > MaxMessageLength {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: message must be at most %d bytes", prefix, MaxMessageLength)
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}
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pattern, err := regexp.Compile(rule.Pattern)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s (%s): invalid regular expression: %w", prefix, rule.ID, err)
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}
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if rule.Enabled {
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policy.rules = append(policy.rules, compiledRule{rule: rule, pattern: pattern, matchGroup: pattern.SubexpIndex("match")})
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}
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}
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return policy, nil
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}
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// Check returns the first blocking rule, or nil when the call is allowed. Args
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// should be JSON-compatible and must not be mutated while Check is running.
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func (p *Policy) Check(toolName string, args map[string]interface{}) *Match {
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if p == nil || !p.config.Enabled || len(p.rules) == 0 {
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return nil
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}
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candidates := candidateTexts(toolName, args)
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for _, rule := range p.rules {
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for _, candidate := range candidates {
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indices := rule.pattern.FindStringSubmatchIndex(candidate)
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if indices == nil {
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continue
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}
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start, end := indices[0], indices[1]
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if group := rule.matchGroup; group > 0 && indices[group*2] >= 0 {
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start, end = indices[group*2], indices[group*2+1]
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}
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matched := candidate[start:end]
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message := rule.rule.Message
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if strings.TrimSpace(message) == "" {
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message = defaultMessage
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}
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// A single replacement pass prevents matched text from introducing
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// additional template substitutions.
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message = strings.NewReplacer("{match}", matched, "{tool}", toolName, "{rule}", rule.rule.Name).Replace(message)
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return &Match{RuleID: rule.rule.ID, RuleName: rule.rule.Name, MatchedText: matched, Message: message}
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Manager atomically replaces validated policy snapshots for live settings.
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type Manager struct {
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policy atomic.Pointer[Policy]
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}
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func NewManager(config Config) (*Manager, error) {
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m := &Manager{}
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if err := m.Update(config); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return m, nil
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}
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// Update retains the active policy if validation fails.
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func (m *Manager) Update(config Config) error {
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policy, err := Compile(config)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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m.policy.Store(policy)
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return nil
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}
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func (m *Manager) Config() Config {
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if m == nil {
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return Config{}
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}
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if policy := m.policy.Load(); policy != nil {
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return cloneConfig(policy.config)
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}
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return Config{}
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}
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func (m *Manager) Check(toolName string, args map[string]interface{}) *Match {
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if m == nil {
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return nil
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}
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return m.policy.Load().Check(toolName, args)
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}
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func cloneConfig(config Config) Config {
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if config.Rules != nil {
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rules := make([]Rule, len(config.Rules))
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copy(rules, config.Rules)
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config.Rules = rules
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}
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return config
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}
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func candidateTexts(toolName string, args map[string]interface{}) []string {
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var candidates []string
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seen := make(map[string]struct{})
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add := func(value string) {
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// Decode at most three rounds to cover common nested URL escaping
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// without claiming support for arbitrarily encoded tool inputs.
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for round := 0; round <= 3; round++ {
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if _, exists := seen[value]; !exists {
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seen[value] = struct{}{}
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candidates = append(candidates, value)
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}
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decoded := decodePercentEscapes(value)
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if decoded == value {
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break
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}
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value = decoded
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}
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}
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add(toolName)
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var walk func(interface{}, int)
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walk = func(value interface{}, remainingDepth int) {
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if remainingDepth == 0 {
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return
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}
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switch value := value.(type) {
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case string:
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add(value)
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case map[string]interface{}:
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keys := make([]string, 0, len(value))
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for key := range value {
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keys = append(keys, key)
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}
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sort.Strings(keys)
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for _, key := range keys {
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add(key)
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walk(value[key], remainingDepth-1)
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}
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case []interface{}:
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for _, item := range value {
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walk(item, remainingDepth-1)
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}
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}
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}
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// Unmarshaling also normalizes typed slices/maps, json.RawMessage and
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// escaped JSON keys/values into the recursive representation above.
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if raw, err := json.Marshal(args); err == nil {
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var value interface{}
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if json.Unmarshal(raw, &value) == nil {
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// encoding/json accepts at most 10,000 nesting levels. The decoded
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// tree is acyclic, so inspect every accepted string/key at that depth.
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walk(value, 10001)
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}
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add(string(raw))
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} else {
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// MCP rejects invalid JSON arguments independently; still inspect the
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// ordinary values if a caller supplies a non-JSON value alongside them.
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walk(args, 128)
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}
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return candidates
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}
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// Decode valid percent triplets even if another part of the string has a stray
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// percent sign. Whole-string URL unescaping otherwise misses such mixed inputs.
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func decodePercentEscapes(value string) string {
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if !strings.Contains(value, "%") {
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return value
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}
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var out strings.Builder
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out.Grow(len(value))
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for i := 0; i < len(value); i++ {
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if value[i] == '%' && i+2 < len(value) {
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hi, okHi := hexValue(value[i+1])
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lo, okLo := hexValue(value[i+2])
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if okHi && okLo {
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out.WriteByte(hi<<4 | lo)
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i += 2
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continue
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}
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}
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out.WriteByte(value[i])
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}
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return out.String()
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}
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func hexValue(value byte) (byte, bool) {
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switch {
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case value >= '0' && value <= '9':
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return value - '0', true
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case value >= 'a' && value <= 'f':
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return value - 'a' + 10, true
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case value >= 'A' && value <= 'F':
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return value - 'A' + 10, true
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default:
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return 0, false
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}
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}
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