# RFC-003: Chromium Encryption **Author**: moonD4rk **Status**: Living Document **Created**: 2026-04-05 ## 1. Overview Chromium encrypts sensitive fields in three data categories: passwords (`password_value`), cookies (`encrypted_value`), and credit cards (`card_number_encrypted`). The encryption algorithm varies by platform -- macOS and Linux use AES-128-CBC with a PBKDF2-derived key, while Windows uses AES-256-GCM with a DPAPI-protected key. Non-sensitive categories (history, bookmarks, downloads, extensions, storage) are stored in plaintext and do not require decryption. ## 2. Cipher Version Detection Every encrypted value begins with a 3-byte prefix that identifies the cipher version: | Prefix | Version | Meaning | |--------|---------|---------| | `v10` | CipherV10 | Chrome 80+ standard encryption (AES-GCM on Windows, AES-CBC on macOS/Linux) | | `v11` | CipherV11 | Linux-only: AES-CBC variant where the key comes from libsecret / kwallet. Same algorithm and parameters as `v10` — only the key source differs | | `v20` | CipherV20 | Chrome 127+ App-Bound Encryption | | (none) | CipherDPAPI | Pre-Chrome 80 raw DPAPI encryption (Windows only, no prefix) | If the ciphertext is shorter than 3 bytes or the prefix is unrecognized, it is treated as legacy DPAPI. ## 3. macOS Encryption Chromium on macOS stores a per-browser secret in the macOS Keychain (e.g. "Chrome Safe Storage", "Brave Safe Storage"). The master key is derived from this secret via PBKDF2: | Parameter | Value | |-----------|-------| | Hash | SHA-1 | | Salt | `saltysalt` | | Iterations | 1003 | | Key length | 16 bytes (AES-128) | Decryption uses AES-128-CBC with a fixed IV of 16 space bytes (`0x20`). The ciphertext layout: ``` | v10 | AES-CBC ciphertext (PKCS5 padded) | |-------|-------------------------------------| | 3B | remaining bytes | ``` There are three retrieval strategies, tried in order: (1) gcoredump exploit for securityd process memory, (2) direct keychain unlock with user's login password, (3) `security` CLI command (may trigger a GUI prompt). See [RFC-006](006-key-retrieval-mechanisms.md) for details. ## 4. Windows Encryption Chromium on Windows stores a base64-encoded encrypted key in `Local State` at `os_crypt.encrypted_key`. The key recovery process is: 1. Base64-decode the `encrypted_key` value 2. Strip the 5-byte `DPAPI` ASCII prefix 3. Decrypt via Windows `CryptUnprotectData` (DPAPI) to obtain the 256-bit master key With the master key, each encrypted value is decrypted as AES-256-GCM: ``` | v10 | nonce | ciphertext + auth tag (16B) | |-------|--------|-----------------------------| | 3B | 12B | remaining bytes | ``` **Legacy DPAPI** — values without a `v10`/`v20` prefix (pre-Chrome 80) are passed directly to `CryptUnprotectData`: ``` | DPAPI blob (no prefix) | |-------------------------------------| | variable length | ``` ## 5. Linux Encryption Chromium on Linux has two obfuscation prefixes that share the same AES-128-CBC algorithm and PBKDF2 parameters — only the key source differs: - **`v10`** — the PBKDF2 password is the hardcoded string `peanuts`. Chromium writes this prefix when no keyring backend is available (headless sessions, `--password-store=basic`, LXQt, etc.). - **`v11`** — the PBKDF2 password is a random string read from D-Bus Secret Service (GNOME Keyring or KDE Wallet). The libsecret/kwallet item label matches the browser's storage name (e.g. "Chrome Safe Storage", "Brave Safe Storage"). Chromium writes this prefix whenever a keyring backend is available at encrypt time. On first run, Chromium generates and stores the random password automatically. Both prefixes are derived through the same PBKDF2 parameters: | Parameter | Value | |-----------|-------| | Hash | SHA-1 | | Salt | `saltysalt` | | Iterations | 1 | | Key length | 16 bytes (AES-128) | Decryption uses AES-128-CBC with a fixed IV of 16 space bytes (`0x20`) and PKCS5 padding — identical to macOS except for the PBKDF2 iteration count. **Mixed v10/v11 in the same profile.** Because Chromium selects the prefix at encrypt time, a single profile may contain both versions if the keyring backend availability changed between sessions. Chromium decrypts each record independently by inspecting its prefix. **kEmptyKey legacy retry.** Chromium's `DecryptString` retries any failed v10/v11 decryption with a second key, `kEmptyKey = PBKDF2("", "saltysalt", 1, 16, sha1)`. This exists to recover data corrupted by a KWallet initialization race in Chrome ~89 (see `crbug.com/40055416`), where some records were written with this zero-derived key. Chromium never uses `kEmptyKey` for encryption — it is decrypt-only. HackBrowserData mirrors this retry for parity. ## 6. v20 App-Bound Encryption (Chrome 127+) Chrome 127 introduced App-Bound Encryption on Windows, identified by the `v20` prefix. This scheme binds the encryption key to the Chrome application identity, making it harder for external tools to decrypt. After decryption, the payload contains a 32-byte application header before the actual plaintext: ``` | v20 | nonce | AES-GCM payload | |-------|--------|-------------------------------------| | 3B | 12B | remaining bytes | After decryption: | app-bound header | plaintext | |------------------|------------------------------------| | 32B | remaining bytes | ``` **Current status**: v20 decryption is not yet implemented. Encountering a `v20`-prefixed value returns an error. This primarily affects recent Chrome installations on Windows. ## 7. Decryption Flow The high-level decryption path for any encrypted Chromium value: 1. **Detect version** -- inspect the first 3 bytes of the ciphertext 2. **Route by version**: - `v10` / `v11` -- strip prefix, call platform-specific decryption (AES-CBC on macOS/Linux, AES-GCM on Windows). On Linux, a failed decryption retries once with `kEmptyKey` to recover legacy crbug.com/40055416 data - `v20` -- not yet supported, return error - DPAPI (no prefix) -- call Windows `CryptUnprotectData` directly (Windows only; returns error on other platforms) 3. **Return plaintext** -- the decrypted bytes are interpreted as a UTF-8 string Each record is decrypted independently. A failure to decrypt one value does not prevent extraction of other records in the same database. ## Related RFCs | RFC | Topic | |-----|-------| | [RFC-002](002-chromium-data-storage.md) | Chromium data file locations and storage formats | | [RFC-006](006-key-retrieval-mechanisms.md) | Platform-specific master key retrieval |