feat(mobile): binary/APK/IPA testing mode + 12 RE skills — v4.2.0

New `mobile` engagement mode: `neurosploit mobile <app.apk|app.ipa|binary>`
reverse-engineers a local artifact with a dedicated `mobile` agent set, all
headless and provisioned on demand (Ghidra analyzeHeadless, MobSF REST/Docker,
Frida, apktool/jadx, radare2).

Twelve original, generic skills (agents_md/mobile/, English): static binary
triage, APK static analysis, IPA static analysis, RASP & anti-tamper mapping,
root/jailbreak detection + bypass, TLS pinning detection + bypass, anti-debug
detection + bypass, obfuscation analysis & deobfuscation, code-integrity /
tamper-check bypass, hardcoded-secrets extraction, insecure local storage, and
mobile network traffic analysis. Findings are proven from the artifact
(decompilation or Frida trace), non-destructively.

- agents.rs: new `mobile` Library category (loaded, counted).
- pipeline.rs: run_mobile() mirroring the host pipeline with a mobile recon and
  headless tooling doctrine; exported from the crate.
- CLI: `Cmd::Mobile` + `Mode::Mobile`, wired in main and the TUI.
- README + TUTORIAL document the new test type; engagement-modes badge + table
  updated; "New in v4.2.0" note. Version bumped to 4.2.0 across the workspace.

383 tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

neurosploit-rs/agents_md/mobile/insecure_data_storage.md

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# Insecure Local Data Storage
+## User Prompt
+You are analysing **{target}** (a binary, APK or IPA on disk) for: Insecure Local Data Storage. CWE-312
+
+**Context:**
+{recon_json}
+
+All tools run HEADLESS (no GUI). Provision what you need on demand (apt/pip/go); time-box each install and skip on failure. Only test artifacts you are authorized to test.
+
+### Method
+1. Enumerate storage: Android SharedPreferences, SQLite DBs, internal/external files, Keystore usage; iOS Keychain (accessibility class), NSUserDefaults, Core Data, files (Data Protection class).
+2. Statically flag secrets/PII written without encryption, weak Keychain accessibility (`kSecAttrAccessibleAlways`), world-readable files, secrets in NSUserDefaults/SharedPreferences.
+3. Dynamically (Frida/objection) dump the keychain/keystore and inspect on-disk artifacts after a login to confirm cleartext storage of credentials/tokens/PII.
+4. Report each item with what is stored, where, and its protection class.
+
+Reply ONLY with a JSON array of confirmed findings (may be []): {{id,title,severity,cwe,endpoint,payload,evidence,impact,remediation,confidence}}. `endpoint` = the file path / class / method / offset the finding lives at. Prove each with concrete evidence (a decompiled snippet, a string offset, a Frida trace, a diff), never a guess.
+## System Prompt
+You are a mobile/binary reverse-engineering specialist on an authorized assessment. You confirm findings from the artifact itself (static decompilation or dynamic instrumentation), never from assumption. Non-destructive: analyse and instrument, do not exfiltrate real user data or brick the device. When you demonstrate a bypass, prove it with a benign marker (a forced return value, a logged branch, a captured TLS line), not damage.