feat: importable scope configs + /scope-file REPL command; Rockstar & NASA templates

- /scope-file <path> (aliases /scopefile, /import-scope): import a ready scope
  config (hard allowlist + exclusions + guardrails) in the REPL — one step to
  "scope set correctly", instead of typing /inscope repeatedly. Pins the scope.
- scope_pinned: once scope is set explicitly (scope-file / /inscope / capability),
  /target no longer re-derives the scope from the target, so an imported
  allowlist is not clobbered by picking a target.
- examples/scopes/rockstargames.yaml and examples/scopes/nasa.yaml — ready
  TEMPLATES scoped to *.rockstargames.com / *.nasa.gov with conservative,
  bounty/VDP-safe guardrails (no destructive verbs, no mass accounts, low rate,
  forbidden payloads) and a clear "verify the program's current in/out-of-scope
  before running" banner. Both parse and enforce; subdomain enumeration happens
  inside the wildcard boundary.

422 tests passing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

examples/scopes/nasa.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+# ===========================================================================
+# NeuroSploit scope config — NASA (TEMPLATE)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# ⚠ BEFORE YOU RUN: confirm this matches NASA's CURRENT VDP scope.
+#   NASA Vulnerability Disclosure Policy: https://www.nasa.gov/nasa-vulnerability-disclosure-policy/
+#   (coordinated via https://bugcrowd.com/nasa-vdp). Open the policy/program
+#   page and align `hard` / `exclude` with the EXACT in- and out-of-scope assets
+#   it lists today. A VDP is for good-faith disclosure — follow its rules.
+#
+# `*.nasa.gov` authorizes the apex AND every subdomain, so NeuroSploit's recon
+# will enumerate subdomains and test within this boundary. NASA runs MANY
+# subdomains/mission sites; several are explicitly out of scope and some are
+# third-party hosted — verify before testing.
+#
+# Import it:
+#   neurosploit run "*.nasa.gov" --scope-file examples/scopes/nasa.yaml --subscription
+# or in the REPL:
+#   /scope-file examples/scopes/nasa.yaml
+#   /authorization https://www.nasa.gov/nasa-vulnerability-disclosure-policy/
+#   /target *.nasa.gov
+#   /run
+# ===========================================================================
+
+# --- HARD: the allowlist. Only these are testable. ------------------------
+hard:
+  - "*.nasa.gov"                     # apex + every subdomain (VERIFY against the VDP)
+  - nasa.gov
+
+# --- EXCLUDE: carve-outs that always beat the allowlist. ------------------
+# Fill from the VDP's OUT-OF-SCOPE list. Typical for a large gov org: auth/SSO
+# providers, third-party-hosted services, APIs with their own terms, and any
+# system the policy names as excluded. Examples are PLACEHOLDERS — verify.
+exclude:
+  # - auth.launchpad.nasa.gov
+  # - "*.ndc.nasa.gov"
+  # - api.nasa.gov            # has its own API terms / key system — check first
+
+# --- SOFT: guardrails inside the boundary (VDP-safe, conservative) ---------
+soft:
+  observe_only: []
+
+  # No state-mutating verbs, no account creation — a government VDP expects
+  # minimal-impact, good-faith testing.
+  allow_destructive_methods: false
+  allow_account_creation: false
+  max_accounts: 0
+
+  # Low rate: these are production government systems.
+  max_requests_per_minute: 60
+
+  forbidden_payloads:
+    - "drop table"
+    - "truncate table"
+    - "delete from"
+    - "rm -rf /"
+    - "shutdown"
+    - "while(true)"
+
+  notes:
+    - "Authorized under NASA's Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (good-faith research only)."
+    - "No DoS, no social engineering, no physical testing, no disruption of operations or spacecraft/mission systems."
+    - "Access only the minimum data needed to demonstrate a vulnerability; never exfiltrate or retain PII/ITAR/sensitive data; stop and report if you encounter it."
+    - "Verify in/out-of-scope on the VDP page before each run — scope changes."

examples/scopes/rockstargames.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+# ===========================================================================
+# NeuroSploit scope config — Rockstar Games (TEMPLATE)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# ⚠ BEFORE YOU RUN: confirm this matches the program's CURRENT scope.
+#   Rockstar Games bug bounty: https://hackerone.com/rockstargames
+#   Open the program page and align the `hard` allowlist and `exclude` list
+#   below with the EXACT in-scope / out-of-scope assets it lists today. Scope
+#   on a bounty program changes; this file is a starting point, not authority.
+#
+# HARD scope is enforced in code: a request whose host is not covered by `hard`
+# (or hit by `exclude`) is REFUSED before it leaves. `*.rockstargames.com`
+# authorizes the apex AND every subdomain, so NeuroSploit's recon will
+# enumerate subdomains and test them within this boundary.
+#
+# Import it:
+#   neurosploit run "*.rockstargames.com" --scope-file examples/scopes/rockstargames.yaml --subscription
+# or in the REPL:
+#   /scope-file examples/scopes/rockstargames.yaml
+#   /authorization https://hackerone.com/rockstargames
+#   /target *.rockstargames.com
+#   /run
+# ===========================================================================
+
+# --- HARD: the allowlist. Only these are testable. ------------------------
+# Start with the apex + all subdomains the user named. ADD the specific extra
+# roots the program lists (and REMOVE this wildcard if the program only allows
+# named subdomains — check first).
+hard:
+  - "*.rockstargames.com"            # apex + every subdomain
+  - rockstargames.com                # the apex itself
+
+# --- EXCLUDE: carve-outs that always beat the allowlist. ------------------
+# Fill these in from the program's OUT-OF-SCOPE list. Common exclusions on a
+# gaming publisher: live game servers, payment/billing, support/helpdesk,
+# status pages, third-party-hosted marketing. Examples below are PLACEHOLDERS —
+# verify the real ones on the program page before relying on them.
+exclude:
+  # - support.rockstargames.com
+  # - "*.status.rockstargames.com"
+  # - https://www.rockstargames.com/billing
+
+# --- SOFT: guardrails inside the boundary (bounty-safe defaults) -----------
+soft:
+  # Hosts you may LOOK at but never send payloads to.
+  observe_only: []
+
+  # State-mutating verbs (DELETE/PUT/PATCH) stay OFF — a scan must not change
+  # the target's state to "prove" a bug on someone's production.
+  allow_destructive_methods: false
+
+  # No account creation by default. Most programs forbid mass registration;
+  # flip to true only if the program allows it AND keep it to a couple accounts.
+  allow_account_creation: false
+  max_accounts: 0
+
+  # Conservative rate: a bounty target is production. Raise only within the
+  # program's stated limit.
+  max_requests_per_minute: 120
+
+  # Classes that damage production rather than demonstrate a bug — never run.
+  forbidden_payloads:
+    - "drop table"
+    - "truncate table"
+    - "delete from"
+    - "rm -rf /"
+    - "shutdown"
+    - "while(true)"
+
+  # Free-text context for the agents (NOT enforced — prose, not a control).
+  notes:
+    - "Authorized under the Rockstar Games bug bounty program (https://hackerone.com/rockstargames)."
+    - "Stay within the program's rules of engagement: no DoS, no social engineering, no spam/mass-account creation, no disruption of live game services."
+    - "Prove data access with a benign canary, never pull real player PII."
+    - "Verify in/out-of-scope on the program page before each run — scope changes."

neurosploit-rs/app/src/repl.rs

@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ pub(crate) const ACCEPTED: &[&str] = &[
     "/context", "/continue", "/creds", "/diff", "/exclude", "/exit", "/expand", "/feed",
     "/finding", "/findings", "/focus", "/forget", "/full", "/go", "/goal", "/graph", "/guardrail", "/guardrails", "/help",
     "/history", "/idle", "/inscope", "/instructions", "/integration", "/integrations", "/key", "/log",
-    "/authorization", "/authz", "/program", "/logs", "/mcp", "/memory", "/model", "/models", "/objective", "/objectives", "/observe",
+    "/scope-file", "/scopefile", "/import-scope", "/authorization", "/authz", "/program", "/logs", "/mcp", "/memory", "/model", "/models", "/objective", "/objectives", "/observe",
     "/observe-only", "/offline",
     "/onboard", "/only", "/oos", "/outofscope", "/policy", "/providers", "/proxy", "/class", "/classes", "/focus-class", "/research", "/quick", "/economy", "/eco", "/q", "/quit", "/recon",
     "/pause", "/repo", "/report", "/results", "/resume", "/retest", "/revalidate", "/run", "/runs",
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ pub(crate) const ACCEPTED: &[&str] = &[
 /// All slash-commands, for Tab completion.
 const COMMANDS: &[&str] = &[
     "/help", "/onboard", "/show", "/config", "/providers", "/model", "/key", "/sub", "/target",
-    "/authorization", "/class",     "/repo", "/auth", "/creds", "/focus", "/objective", "/scope-out", "/attach", "/context", "/mcp", "/offline",
+    "/scope-file",     "/authorization", "/class",     "/repo", "/auth", "/creds", "/focus", "/objective", "/scope-out", "/attach", "/context", "/mcp", "/offline",
     "/class", "/research", "/quick", "/economy", "/eco", "/votes", "/chain", "/recon", "/tempmail", "/timeout", "/proxy", "/burp", "/ua", "/agents", "/only", "/theme", "/clear", "/run", "/stop", "/pause", "/continue", "/runs", "/results", "/report",
     "/status", "/logs", "/diff", "/retest", "/validate", "/finding", "/expand", "/integrations",
     "/memory", "/forget", "/graph", "/inscope", "/observe", "/guardrail", "/policy",
@@ -289,6 +289,10 @@ struct Session {
     /// Engagement objective / rules-of-engagement context (why + what matters).
     objective: Option<String>,
     authorization: Option<String>,
+    /// Set once the operator defines scope explicitly (scope-file, /inscope, or
+    /// a capability). While pinned, `/target` stops re-deriving the scope from
+    /// the target, so an imported allowlist is not clobbered by picking a target.
+    scope_pinned: bool,
     /// Explicit out-of-scope exclusions the agents must not touch.
     out_of_scope: Option<String>,
     /// Authorization boundary + guardrails, enforced by the harness.
@@ -336,6 +340,7 @@ impl Default for Session {
             instructions: None,
             objective: None,
             authorization: None,
+            scope_pinned: false,
             out_of_scope: None,
             policy: Default::default(),
             capability: None,
@@ -720,7 +725,11 @@ pub async fn repl(base: &Path, auth: SessionAuth) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
                     // no capability, the target the operator picks IS the grant
                     // (same model as `neurosploit run <url>`); explicit excludes
                     // and guardrails are preserved.
-                    if s.capability.is_none() {
+                    // Only re-derive when scope was NOT set explicitly (no
+                    // imported scope-file, no /inscope, no capability) — otherwise
+                    // picking a target would clobber the operator's allowlist.
+                    let rederive = s.capability.is_none() && !s.scope_pinned;
+                    if rederive {
                         let keep_exclude = s.policy.exclude.clone();
                         let keep_soft = s.policy.soft.clone();
                         let mut np = harness::scope::ScopePolicy::for_target(&seeds[0]);
@@ -736,7 +745,9 @@ pub async fn repl(base: &Path, auth: SessionAuth) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
                     }
                     if ts.len() > 1 { println!("  targets ({}): {}", ts.len(), seeds.join(", ")); println!("  \x1b[2m/run tests them sequentially, one report each\x1b[0m"); }
                     else { println!("  target: {}", seeds.first().cloned().unwrap_or_default()); }
-                    if let Some(d) = &wildcard_domain {
+                    if s.scope_pinned {
+                        println!("  \x1b[2mscope: using the imported scope ({}) — target must fall inside it\x1b[0m", s.policy.summary());
+                    } else if let Some(d) = &wildcard_domain {
                         println!("  \x1b[2mscope: *.{d} — apex + all subdomains authorized; recon will enumerate subdomains\x1b[0m");
                         // Nudge recon toward active subdomain discovery for a domain-wide engagement.
                         if s.recon_intensity < 3 { s.recon_intensity = 3; }
@@ -832,6 +843,28 @@ pub async fn repl(base: &Path, auth: SessionAuth) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
                 s.objective = Some(arg.to_string());
                 println!("  objective set — steers what agents prioritise and what counts as impact");
             }
+            "/scope-file" | "/scopefile" | "/import-scope" => {
+                let path = arg.trim().trim_start_matches('@');
+                if path.is_empty() {
+                    println!("  import a scope config (hard allowlist + exclusions + guardrails):");
+                    println!("    /scope-file examples/scopes/rockstargames.yaml");
+                    println!("  current scope: {}", s.policy.summary());
+                    continue;
+                }
+                match harness::scope::ScopePolicy::from_file(std::path::Path::new(path)) {
+                    Ok(sp) => {
+                        if sp.hard.is_empty() {
+                            println!("  \x1b[33m⚠ {path} sets no hard scope — nothing would be authorized; not applied.\x1b[0m");
+                        } else {
+                            s.scope_pinned = true;
+                            s.policy = sp;
+                            println!("  \x1b[32m📋 scope imported\x1b[0m from {path} — {}", s.policy.summary());
+                            println!("  \x1b[2m/target a host inside this scope, then /run. Add /authorization <program-url> to record the authorization.\x1b[0m");
+                        }
+                    }
+                    Err(e) => println!("  \x1b[31m⛔ could not read {path}: {e}\x1b[0m"),
+                }
+            }
             "/authorization" | "/authz" | "/program" => {
                 if arg == "clear" { s.authorization = None; println!("  authorization reference cleared"); continue; }
                 if arg.is_empty() {
@@ -1263,6 +1296,7 @@ pub async fn repl(base: &Path, auth: SessionAuth) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
                     // dropped it is the same lie the ceiling exists to prevent.
                     let before = s.policy.hard.len();
                     s.policy.allow(arg);
+                    s.scope_pinned = true;
                     let refused = reapply_grant(&mut s);
                     if !refused.is_empty() {
                         println!("  \x1b[33m⛔ outside the capability grant, not authorized:\x1b[0m {}", refused.join(", "));
@@ -2387,6 +2421,7 @@ fn help() {
     h("/chain <n>",         "attack-chain depth (post-exploitation pivots; 0 = off)");
     h("/recon <1-4>",       "recon intensity: 1 quick · 2 standard · 3 deep · 4 exhaustive (installs tools)");
     h("/class <a,b>",       "focus a run on vuln classes (idor,sqli,xss,ssrf,…) — pins the matching agents");
+    h("/scope-file <path>",  "import a ready scope config (hard allowlist + exclusions + guardrails) — e.g. examples/scopes/rockstargames.yaml");
     h("/authorization <url>", "declare the program/authorization (e.g. a bug-bounty URL) — recorded; does NOT widen scope");
     h("/research",          "whitebox/greybox: hunt a NOVEL, CVE-reportable bug (known-CVE dedup + patch-diff variant analysis)");
     h("/quick",             "economy preset: short, low-cost run (1 voter · 1 chain round · light recon · ≤6 agents)");