mirror of
https://github.com/CyberSecurityUP/NeuroSploit.git
synced 2026-08-15 22:20:21 +02:00
NeuroSploit v3.3.0 — Autonomous MD-Agent Engine
Re-model the pentest agent into an autonomous, markdown-driven engine that turns a URL into a full engagement and delegates execution to a locally installed agentic CLI backend. Engine (neurosploit_agent/ + ./neurosploit launcher): - orchestrator composes ONE master prompt from the agent library + RL weights - backends: auto-detect & drive Claude Code / Codex / Grok CLI (+ Claude subscription); headless, autonomous, isolated workdir - mcp: Playwright MCP (.mcp.json) for browser-based proof-of-execution - rl: bounded per-agent reinforcement-learning weights w/ per-tech affinity, persisted to data/rl_state.json - models: latest registry incl. NVIDIA NIM provider (PR #28) - cli: interactive URL prompt + one-shot `run`, `backends`, `agents`, --dry-run Agent library (agents_md/, 213 total): - 196 vuln specialists incl. modern LLM/AI, cloud/K8s, API/auth, advanced injection, protocol smuggling, logic/crypto/supply-chain classes - 17 meta-agents: orchestrator, recon, exploit_validator, false_positive_filter, severity_assessor, impact_evaluator, reporter, rl_feedback + migrated expert roles - scripts/build_agents.py data-driven builder; REGISTRY.md index Docs: rewritten README.md, v3.3.0 RELEASE.md, .env.example (NVIDIA NIM, xAI, engine vars). Retire legacy Python orchestration (neurosploit.py + agent classes) to legacy/. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
co-authored by
Claude Opus 4.8
parent
59f8f42d80
commit
55af0d4634
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
|
||||
# Function-Calling Argument-Injection Specialist Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are testing **{target}** for Forced/unauthorized function calls and argument injection (OWASP LLM08).
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Map functions
|
||||
- Enumerate callable functions and their argument schemas
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Inject args
|
||||
- Craft prompts that smuggle malicious values into args (paths, IDs, queries, URLs)
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm
|
||||
- Confirm the backend executed with attacker-controlled args producing an unauthorized effect
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Function-Calling Argument-Injection Specialist at [endpoint]
|
||||
- Severity: High
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-77
|
||||
- Endpoint: [full URL]
|
||||
- Vector: [parameter/header/flow]
|
||||
- Payload: [exact payload/command]
|
||||
- Evidence: [proof of exploitation]
|
||||
- Impact: Injected arguments cause functions to act on attacker-chosen inputs
|
||||
- Remediation: Server-side validation of all tool args, allowlists, ignore model-asserted authz
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a function-calling abuse specialist. Report only when injected arguments cause a real, verified backend effect outside the user's authorization. The model proposing a call is not proof; the executed effect is.
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user