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v3.5.1: attack-chain agents (12) + per-project .neurosploit/ persistence & resume
Chaining: - agents_md/chains/ (12 multi-stage exploitation playbooks): SQLi→RCE→LPE, SSRF→AWS-creds, SSRF→RCE, upload→RCE, upload→LFI→RCE→LPE, XSS→ATO, IDOR→ATO, SSTI→RCE→cloud, default-creds→domain, deserialization→RCE, exposed-git→RCE, subdomain-takeover→trusted-abuse. Each stage proven by a tool receipt before advancing; reports chains_from edges. - Loaded as a `chains` category (→ 329 agents). chain_round now injects the chain recipes as a menu so the LLM applies proven multi-stage paths. Persistence (no DB — structured state): - Per-project `<cwd>/.neurosploit/` holding session.json (config), runs.json (history), history.txt (readline). REPL resumes target/repo/auth/focus/models on reopen; saves on /run and /quit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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CyberSecurityUP
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""
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NeuroSploit v3.5.1 — attack-chain agents.
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Each agent is a multi-stage exploitation-chaining playbook: take a confirmed
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entry-point weakness and escalate it through concrete stages to deeper impact
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(e.g. SQLi → RCE → local privilege escalation). Writes agents_md/chains/*.md.
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Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders.
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"""
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import os
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ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
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OUT = os.path.join(ROOT, "agents_md", "chains")
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def render(a):
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L = [f"# {a['title']} Agent\n", "## User Prompt",
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f"You are executing a multi-stage ATTACK CHAIN against **{{target}}**: {a['chain']}.\n",
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"**Recon Context / prior findings:**\n{recon_json}\n",
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f"**GOAL:** {a['goal']}\n",
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"**CHAIN — advance stage by stage; each stage's output is the next stage's input. "
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"Use the ReAct loop and PROVE every stage with raw tool output before advancing:**\n"]
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for i, (stage, bs) in enumerate(a["stages"], 1):
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L.append(f"### Stage {i}. {stage}")
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L += [f"- {b}" for b in bs]
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L.append("")
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n = len(a["stages"]) + 1
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L += [f"### {n}. Report Format",
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"Report the chain as ONE finding (plus per-stage evidence):", "```", "FINDING:",
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f"- Title: {a['title']}", f"- Severity: {a['sev']}", f"- CWE: {a['cwe']}",
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"- Endpoint: [entry point]", "- Vector: [the full chain, stage by stage]",
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"- Payload: [the key payloads/commands per stage]",
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"- Evidence: [raw output proving EACH stage actually executed]",
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f"- Impact: {a['impact']}", f"- Remediation: {a['fix']}",
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"- chains_from: [ids of the prerequisite findings this builds on]", "```\n",
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"## System Prompt", a["system"]]
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return "\n".join(L) + "\n"
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def A(name, title, chain, goal, cwe, sev, impact, fix, stages):
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return {"name": name, "title": title, "chain": chain, "goal": goal, "cwe": cwe,
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"sev": sev, "impact": impact, "fix": fix, "stages": stages,
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"system": ("You are an exploit-chaining specialist. Only advance a stage after the PREVIOUS one is "
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"proven with a real tool receipt (raw output) — never assume a stage worked. If a stage "
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"can't be proven, stop and report the chain up to the last proven stage; do not claim the "
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"full chain. AUTHORIZED engagement; no destructive/DoS actions. Each reported stage must "
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"carry its own evidence. Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders.")}
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CHAINS = [
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A("chain_sqli_to_rce_to_lpe",
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"SQLi → RCE → Local PrivEsc Chain",
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"SQL injection → command execution → local privilege escalation",
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"Turn a database-layer injection into root/SYSTEM on the host.",
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"CWE-89", "Critical",
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"Full host compromise originating from a web injection",
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"Parameterize queries; least-privilege DB account; harden host; patch local vectors",
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[("Exploit the SQL injection", ["Confirm injection (error/boolean/time); identify DBMS and privileges",
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"Enumerate whether stacked queries / FILE / xp_cmdshell / INTO OUTFILE are available"]),
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("Pivot SQLi → RCE", ["MSSQL: enable & use `xp_cmdshell`; MySQL: `INTO OUTFILE` a webshell to a known web path; PostgreSQL: `COPY ... PROGRAM`",
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"Confirm OS command execution with `id`/`whoami` output"]),
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("Establish a foothold", ["Drop/upgrade to a stable shell as the web/db service user"]),
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("Local privilege escalation", ["Enumerate SUID/sudo/cron/kernel (Linux) or token/service/unquoted-path (Windows)",
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"Escalate to root/SYSTEM and prove with a privileged command output"])]),
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A("chain_ssrf_to_aws_compromise",
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"SSRF → AWS Credential Compromise Chain",
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"SSRF → cloud metadata → IAM credentials → cloud account access",
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"Convert a server-side request forgery into valid AWS credentials and account access.",
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"CWE-918", "Critical",
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"Cloud account compromise via stolen IAM role credentials",
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"Enforce IMDSv2 hop-limit=1; egress allowlists; SSRF input validation; scoped IAM roles",
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[("Confirm the SSRF primitive", ["Find a server-side fetch you control (url/webhook/import/pdf/image param)",
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"Prove it reaches an attacker-controlled / internal host"]),
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("Reach the metadata service", ["IMDSv2: PUT `/latest/api/token` then GET with the token header; else IMDSv1 GET",
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"Retrieve `/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role>`"]),
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("Harvest IAM credentials", ["Capture AccessKeyId/SecretAccessKey/Token from the metadata response"]),
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("Use the credentials (in scope)", ["`aws sts get-caller-identity` to confirm; enumerate permitted actions read-only",
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"Prove access to at least one resource the role can reach"])]),
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A("chain_ssrf_to_rce",
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"SSRF → RCE Chain",
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"SSRF → internal service abuse → remote code execution",
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"Escalate an SSRF into code execution via a reachable internal service.",
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"CWE-918", "Critical",
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"Remote code execution pivoted through an internal service",
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"Egress controls; authenticate internal services; SSRF allowlists",
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[("Confirm SSRF + map internals", ["Prove the SSRF; port-scan internal hosts through it (gopher/http)",
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"Identify exploitable internal services (Redis, unauth admin, CI, internal API)"]),
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("Weaponize the internal service", ["e.g. Redis → write SSH key/cron/module; internal Jenkins/Actuator → job/exec; gopher:// to craft raw protocol payloads"]),
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("Achieve RCE", ["Trigger command execution on the internal/back-end host"]),
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("Confirm", ["Prove execution with an OOB callback or command output tied to a unique marker"])]),
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A("chain_upload_to_rce",
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"File Upload → RCE Chain",
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"insecure file upload → webshell → remote code execution",
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"Turn an unrestricted/insecure upload into code execution.",
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"CWE-434", "Critical",
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"Remote code execution via uploaded executable content",
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"Validate type by content; randomize names; store outside webroot; non-exec storage",
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[("Probe the upload", ["Map accepted types/extensions, storage path, and how files are served",
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"Test bypasses: double extension, content-type spoof, magic-byte prefix, null byte, .htaccess/.phar"]),
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("Upload a payload", ["Place a minimal webshell/handler in a web-served, executable location"]),
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("Locate & trigger", ["Find the served URL of the upload; request it to execute"]),
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("Confirm RCE", ["Run `id`/`whoami`; capture output proving execution"])]),
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A("chain_upload_lfi_rce_lpe",
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"Upload → LFI → RCE → LPE Chain",
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"file upload + local file inclusion → log/session poisoning → RCE → privilege escalation",
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"Chain a benign upload and an LFI into code execution and then root.",
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"CWE-98", "Critical",
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"Host compromise from a non-executable upload chained through LFI",
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"Fix LFI (allowlist includes); validate uploads; harden host",
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[("Confirm the LFI", ["Prove local file inclusion (read /etc/passwd or app config); identify wrappers (php://, data://, zip://)"]),
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("Plant controllable content via upload", ["Upload a file whose path/content you can later include (image with PHP, zip for zip:// , or use the LFI to read your uploaded file)"]),
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("LFI → RCE", ["Include the planted file, or poison logs/session/`/proc/self/environ` then include it to execute code"]),
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("Confirm RCE then escalate", ["Prove command execution; then enumerate and perform local privilege escalation to root/SYSTEM"])]),
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A("chain_xss_to_account_takeover",
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"XSS → Session/Account Takeover Chain",
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"stored/reflected XSS → session or token theft → account takeover",
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"Escalate XSS into full takeover of a victim (incl. admin) account.",
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"CWE-79", "High",
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"Account takeover (incl. privileged) via client-side execution",
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"Output encoding + CSP; HttpOnly/SameSite cookies; rotate tokens",
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[("Prove execution", ["Confirm the payload executes in the victim's browser context (Playwright: alert/DOM), not just reflects"]),
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("Steal the session", ["Exfiltrate the session cookie/JWT/CSRF token to a collaborator, or perform actions in-context if HttpOnly"]),
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("Take over the account", ["Replay the stolen session, or change email/password/MFA via in-context requests"]),
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("Confirm + escalate", ["Prove control of the victim account; target an admin for privilege escalation"])]),
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A("chain_idor_to_takeover",
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"IDOR → Mass Account Takeover Chain",
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"IDOR → cross-account data → credential/role manipulation → takeover",
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"Chain object-level authz failure into taking over arbitrary accounts.",
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"CWE-639", "High",
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"Mass account takeover via broken object-level authorization",
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"Enforce per-object ownership on every endpoint; indirect references",
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[("Confirm the IDOR", ["Access another user's object with your session, proven by their data"]),
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("Find a state-changing IDOR", ["Locate IDOR on email/password/role/API-key endpoints"]),
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("Manipulate the victim account", ["Change a victim's email or reset token / elevate role via the IDOR"]),
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("Confirm takeover", ["Log in as / act as the victim; demonstrate control"])]),
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A("chain_ssti_to_rce_to_cloud",
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"SSTI → RCE → Cloud Pivot Chain",
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"template injection → RCE → host creds → cloud/lateral movement",
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"Go from template injection to code execution to cloud or lateral access.",
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"CWE-1336", "Critical",
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"Cloud/lateral compromise originating from template injection",
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"Never render user input as templates; sandbox; scope host IAM/creds",
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[("Confirm SSTI → RCE", ["Fingerprint the engine (`{{7*7}}` etc.); use the gadget to execute a command; prove with output"]),
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("Loot the host", ["Read env/config/instance metadata for cloud creds, DB creds, tokens"]),
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("Pivot", ["Use recovered creds against cloud APIs or adjacent internal hosts"]),
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("Confirm impact", ["Prove access to a cloud resource or a second host with evidence"])]),
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A("chain_default_creds_to_domain",
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"Default Creds → Foothold → Domain Compromise Chain",
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"default/weak creds → host foothold → AD escalation → domain dominance",
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"Chain an exposed credential into Active Directory domain compromise.",
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"CWE-798", "Critical",
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"Domain compromise from a single weak/default credential",
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"Rotate defaults; unique strong passwords; tiered admin; monitor",
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[("Get the foothold", ["Authenticate with the default/weak/reused credential (SSH/WinRM/SMB/web)"]),
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("Enumerate AD", ["From the foothold, run BloodHound/netexec; map attack paths, roastable accounts, ACLs"]),
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("Escalate in AD", ["Kerberoast/AS-REP-roast, abuse an ACL edge, or relay — recover higher-priv creds"]),
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("Reach domain dominance", ["Demonstrate DCSync or DA-equivalent access (single test account) proving the path"])]),
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A("chain_deserialization_to_rce",
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"Insecure Deserialization → RCE Chain",
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"untrusted deserialization → gadget chain → remote code execution",
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"Turn a deserialization sink into reliable code execution.",
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"CWE-502", "Critical",
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"Remote code execution via unsafe object deserialization",
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"Never deserialize untrusted data; allowlist types; safe formats",
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[("Locate the sink", ["Identify where attacker data is deserialized (cookie/param/file/RPC); fingerprint the format/library"]),
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("Build the gadget", ["Select a working gadget chain (ysoserial/ysoserial.net/PyYAML/pickle) for the target stack"]),
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("Execute", ["Deliver the payload to the sink"]),
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("Confirm", ["Prove execution via OOB callback or command output with a unique marker"])]),
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A("chain_exposed_git_to_rce",
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"Exposed .git/.env → Secret → RCE Chain",
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"exposed source/secrets → recovered credentials → authenticated RCE",
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"Chain leaked source/secrets into authenticated code execution.",
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"CWE-527", "High",
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"Code execution using credentials recovered from exposed source/secrets",
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"Block dotfiles from web; rotate leaked secrets; vault storage",
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[("Recover the source/secrets", ["Dump exposed `.git` (git-dumper) or read `.env`/config; extract keys/creds/tokens"]),
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("Validate the secrets", ["Confirm a recovered credential/key is live (admin panel, cloud, DB, CI)"]),
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("Gain execution", ["Use the access to deploy code / run a CI job / write a webshell / exec via admin feature"]),
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("Confirm RCE", ["Prove command execution with output"])]),
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A("chain_subdomain_takeover_to_phishing",
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"Subdomain Takeover → Trusted Phishing/Cookie Chain",
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"dangling DNS → subdomain takeover → trusted-origin abuse",
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"Chain a dangling record into hosting attacker content on a trusted subdomain.",
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"CWE-350", "High",
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"Trusted-origin abuse (cookie theft / phishing / OAuth) via a taken-over subdomain",
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"Remove dangling DNS; monitor; scope cookies/CSP per-host",
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[("Find the dangling record", ["Identify a CNAME/A pointing to an unclaimed provider resource"]),
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("Claim it", ["Register the resource so the subdomain serves your content (benign PoC)"]),
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("Abuse the trust", ["Show impact: wildcard-cookie capture, OAuth redirect trust, or CSP allowlist bypass"]),
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("Confirm", ["Demonstrate the concrete trusted-origin abuse with evidence"])]),
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]
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def main():
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os.makedirs(OUT, exist_ok=True)
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for a in CHAINS:
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open(os.path.join(OUT, a["name"] + ".md"), "w").write(render(a))
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print(f"wrote {len(CHAINS)} chain agents to {OUT}")
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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main()
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