v3.6.5: LLM red-teaming (jailbreaks & prompt injection) + Opus 5 / Sonnet 5 / Kimi K3

- Add 12 technique/scenario LLM red-team agents (AI category 18 → 30, total 429):
  jailbreaks — AdvPrefix, PAIR, TAP, Crescendo, many-shot, persona/DAN,
  encoding/obfuscation, refusal-suppression; prompt-injection scenarios — direct,
  indirect (RAG/web/email/tool output), goal hijacking, tool/function-call abuse,
  system-prompt/secret exfiltration. Each runs an attacker→LLM-judge loop
  (baseline refusal → technique across variants → verdict), proving the bypass
  with a benign, redacted receipt. Generated by scripts/build_llm_redteam_v365.py.
- Add REDTEAM_DOCTRINE and inject it into run_ai so every AI test follows the
  baseline→technique→judge method across scenarios.
- Models: add Claude Opus 5 and Sonnet 5 (Anthropic) and a new Moonshot AI (Kimi)
  provider with Kimi K3/K2 (moonshot:kimi-k3, MOONSHOT_API_KEY) — 15 providers.
- Docs: README/TUTORIAL/RELEASE — new AI/LLM red-team engagement mode + section,
  model/env-key tables, agent-library counts (429), badges.

Also includes the v3.6.4 grounding fix (#33) landing on main.
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# NeuroSploit v3.6.4 — Release Notes
# NeuroSploit v3.6.5 — Release Notes
**Release Date:** July 2026
**Codename:** Symbolic Grounding
**Codename:** LLM Red Team
**License:** MIT
**Credits:** Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders
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## Highlights
- **LLM red-teaming — jailbreaks & prompt injection across scenarios.** 12 new AI
agents (AI category 18 → **30**; total 417 → **429**) that adversarially test a
live AI system (LLM app / AI agent / MCP server) the way
[hackagent.dev](https://hackagent.dev)-style tooling does. Each agent runs an
**attacker → LLM-judge loop**: capture the baseline refusal, apply the technique
across several scenarios/variants, then judge with an explicit criterion whether
the guardrail was *actually* bypassed — proving it with a **benign, redacted**
prompt+response receipt (never real harm).
- **Jailbreak techniques:** `AdvPrefix` (adversarial prefix/suffix), `PAIR`
(automated iterative refinement), `TAP` (tree-of-attacks with pruning),
`Crescendo` (multi-turn escalation), many-shot, persona/DAN roleplay,
encoding/obfuscation (base64/ROT13/zero-width/low-resource-language),
refusal-suppression / prefix injection.
- **Prompt-injection & hijacking scenarios:** direct injection, **indirect**
injection via RAG doc / web page / email / tool output, **goal hijacking**,
agentic **tool/function-call abuse**, and **system-prompt / secret
exfiltration**.
- Runs via `neurosploit aitest <ai-url>` (or the REPL **AI Agents & LLMs**
onboarding scope). A new `REDTEAM_DOCTRINE` steers every AI test through the
baseline→technique→judge loop. Complements the existing OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025),
MCP and Skills/n8n agents. Authorized, non-destructive.
- **New models.** Added **Claude Opus 5** and **Claude Sonnet 5** (Anthropic),
and a new **Moonshot AI (Kimi)** provider with **Kimi K3** / K2 (`moonshot:kimi-k3`,
`MOONSHOT_API_KEY`, OpenAI-compatible) — **15 providers** total. Use any of them
as a finder or in the validator voting panel, e.g.
`--model anthropic:claude-opus-5 --model moonshot:kimi-k3`.
## Previously in v3.6.4
- **Fix ([#33](https://github.com/JoasASantos/NeuroSploit/issues/33)): white-box
findings were silently dropped from the report.** The grounding gate — the
anti-hallucination step that demotes any claim lacking a receipt — was running