diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 81c8f0a..b409f43 100755
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-π§ NeuroSploit v3.5.1
+π§ NeuroSploit v3.5.2
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
- 
+ 
@@ -24,6 +24,13 @@
>
> π **New here? Read the [full Tutorial & User Guide β](TUTORIAL.md)** β every mode, flag, config and example explained.
+> π **New in v3.5.2 β Exploitation Depth & Report Hygiene:** a **DEPTH doctrine**
+> makes the engine *use* what it finds (exposed β exploited), **chain** findings
+> across modules, decode/fingerprint artifacts β CVEs, and **audit tokens** (JWT
+> alg-confusion / weak HS256 secrets). A deterministic post-pass **calibrates
+> severity to proven impact** and **consolidates duplicated hygiene** findings.
+> See [RELEASE.md](RELEASE.md).
+
---
**NeuroSploit** turns a URL, a source repository, a running app, or a host/IP into
diff --git a/RELEASE.md b/RELEASE.md
index a1037d9..ba5600f 100644
--- a/RELEASE.md
+++ b/RELEASE.md
@@ -1,3 +1,63 @@
+# NeuroSploit v3.5.2 β Release Notes
+
+**Release Date:** June 2026
+**Codename:** Exploitation Depth & Report Hygiene
+**License:** MIT
+**Credits:** Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders
+
+---
+
+## TL;DR
+
+v3.5.2 hard-codes the discipline that separates a great pentest from a noisy
+one β distilled from reviewing real AI-pentest output that kept stopping at
+*"exposed"* instead of *"exploited"*. The engine now pushes every exposure to
+demonstrated impact, **chains** findings, decodes/fingerprints artifacts and
+correlates CVEs, audits tokens, and keeps the final report honest (deduplicated
+and severity-calibrated).
+
+## Highlights
+
+- **DEPTH doctrine (exploit, don't just expose).** A new doctrine is injected
+ into every exploitation prompt (black/grey/chain): any info-disclosure,
+ exposed service/catalog/WSDL, leaked credential/token, or reachable dev host
+ **must be USED** before it can be a finding β call it, decode it, log in, hit
+ the dev host. If it was only observed, it's reported as a **lead**, not a
+ confirmed High/Critical.
+- **Finding chaining.** Reuse any session/JWT/cookie/credential obtained in one
+ step across all other modules; pivot access into IDOR/privesc/exfil and report
+ the **chain**, not isolated parts (e.g. captcha-bypassβadmin JWTβauthenticated
+ surface; enum + no-rate-limitβpassword spraying).
+- **Decode & fingerprint β CVE.** Decode opaque tokens/paths (base64/JSON/marshal)
+ and pin exact library/gem/plugin/CMS versions, then correlate to known CVEs and
+ attempt a safe PoC.
+- **Token auditor.** JWT alg-confusion (RSβHS), `alg:none`, kid/jku injection,
+ real signature verification, **weak HS256 secret cracking**, and token
+ lifecycle (logout/expiry/refresh).
+- **Report-hygiene & depth pass (deterministic, in the harness).** After
+ validation the run now:
+ - **calibrates severity to proven impact** β an unproven High/Critical
+ (hedged language, no payload, thin evidence) is capped to Medium and
+ re-titled "(potential)";
+ - flags **"exposed β exploited" gaps** β exposures on a host with no actual
+ exploit get an advisory to go use them;
+ - advises **consolidating hygiene** classes (headers/cookies/TLS/HSTS/
+ clickjacking/disclosure) repeated across many assets into ONE finding with
+ an affected-asset table, instead of inflating the count one-per-host.
+- **5 new doctrine meta-agents** (`agents_md/meta/`): `exploit_depth_doctrine`,
+ `finding_chainer`, `artifact_decoder`, `token_auditor`, `report_calibrator`
+ (meta agents 17 β 22; total library 343 β 348).
+
+## Notes
+
+- Pure-additive and back-compatible: existing modes, REPL, TUI, pause/continue,
+ crash-recovery and reports are unchanged. The hygiene pass only annotates and
+ down-calibrates unproven severities β it never invents or drops findings.
+- New unit tests cover the calibration and depth-audit logic
+ (`harness::hygiene`).
+
+---
+
# NeuroSploit v3.5.1 β Release Notes
**Release Date:** June 2026
diff --git a/TUTORIAL.md b/TUTORIAL.md
index 4989c60..1e9e758 100644
--- a/TUTORIAL.md
+++ b/TUTORIAL.md
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# NeuroSploit β Tutorial & User Guide (v3.5.1)
+# NeuroSploit β Tutorial & User Guide (v3.5.2)
A complete, hands-on guide to installing, configuring and running NeuroSploit β
the autonomous, multi-model penetration-testing harness.
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ Agents **degrade gracefully**: if `rustscan` is absent they use `nmap`; if neith
### Verify
```bash
-neurosploit --version # neurosploit 3.5.1
+neurosploit --version # neurosploit 3.5.2
neurosploit agents # {"vulns":196,...,"chains":12,"total":329}
neurosploit models # all providers & models
```
diff --git a/agents_md/meta/artifact_decoder.md b/agents_md/meta/artifact_decoder.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5064978
--- /dev/null
+++ b/agents_md/meta/artifact_decoder.md
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# Artifact Decoder & CVE Correlator Agent
+
+> Meta-agent (v3.5.2 doctrine). Decodes opaque tokens/paths, fingerprints the stack, and maps versions to CVEs.
+
+## User Prompt
+For **{target}**, inspect every opaque or technology-revealing artifact seen in
+recon and responses:
+
+1. **Decode** opaque tokens, IDs and URL paths (base64 / base64url / JSON /
+ marshal / JWT segments). A decoded value often reveals the framework or an
+ internal file path (e.g. a Dragonfly job `[["f","...file"]]`, a signed-URL
+ structure, a serialized object).
+2. **Fingerprint** the stack: server, framework, language, and exact library /
+ gem / plugin / CMS versions (headers, asset paths, readme/changelog, error
+ pages, manifests).
+3. **Correlate to CVEs**: map each exact version to known CVEs; prioritize
+ unauth RCE / SQLi / auth-bypass with a reliable, non-destructive PoC, and
+ attempt a safe confirmation (version/echo/OOB), never a destructive payload.
+
+Output JSON: {decoded:[{artifact, decoded_value, implication}],
+stack:[{component, version}], cves:[{component, version, cve, cvss, exploitable, poc}]}.
+
+## System Prompt
+You decode the opaque and correlate the obvious. Base64/JSON/marshal blobs and
+version banners are leads, not noise β you decode them, fingerprint exact
+versions, and check them against known CVEs, confirming only with a safe PoC and
+a real receipt. Authorized engagement; no destructive or DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
diff --git a/agents_md/meta/exploit_depth_doctrine.md b/agents_md/meta/exploit_depth_doctrine.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dede0dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/agents_md/meta/exploit_depth_doctrine.md
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# Exploitation Depth Doctrine Agent
+
+> Meta-agent (v3.5.2 doctrine). Turns every exposure into an exploitation attempt before it becomes a finding.
+
+## User Prompt
+You are reviewing the candidate findings and live transcript for **{target}**.
+
+For EACH candidate that merely *exposes* something (information disclosure,
+exposed service/catalog/WSDL, leaked credential or token, reachable dev/staging
+host, permissive CORS, open .git), drive it one step further BEFORE it is
+reported:
+
+1. **Use what was exposed.** Call the exposed endpoint, decode the leaked
+ artifact, log in with the leaked credential, hit the dev host, send the
+ cross-origin request. Capture the real request/response.
+2. **Decide honestly.** If using it proved impact β keep/raise severity with the
+ new evidence. If it could not be used β down-rate to a LEAD (low confidence),
+ never a confirmed High/Critical.
+3. **Report the gap.** List any exposure you could not yet exploit, with the
+ exact next command to try, so the next round (or the human) can finish it.
+
+Output JSON: {"escalations":[{id, action_taken, new_evidence, new_severity}],
+"leads":[{id, why_not_proven, next_command}]}.
+
+## System Prompt
+You are a senior exploitation lead. Detection is not a finding β impact is. You
+never let an info-disclosure, exposed service, leaked secret or reachable
+non-prod host be reported as confirmed without an attempt to actually use it,
+backed by a real tool receipt. Unproven impact is a lead, not a High. Authorized
+engagement; no destructive or DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
diff --git a/agents_md/meta/finding_chainer.md b/agents_md/meta/finding_chainer.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..10330ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/agents_md/meta/finding_chainer.md
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# Finding Chainer Agent
+
+> Meta-agent (v3.5.2 doctrine). Reuses obtained access across modules and reports the chain, not the parts.
+
+## User Prompt
+Given the confirmed findings and any sessions/tokens/credentials obtained during
+the engagement on **{target}**, build exploitation CHAINS:
+
+- Reuse every session/JWT/cookie/credential from one step against ALL other
+ modules and hosts in scope (a captcha/login bypass that yields a token unlocks
+ the entire authenticated surface β use it).
+- Pivot access into higher impact: IDOR/BOLA, horizontal/vertical privesc, mass
+ assignment, data exfiltration, account takeover.
+- Combine separate weaknesses (e.g. user-enumeration + missing rate-limit =
+ password spraying; token-in-URL + no throttle = mass exfil).
+
+For each chain output: {chain_id, steps:[{finding_id, action}], combined_impact,
+combined_severity, evidence}. Prefer ONE well-evidenced chain over several
+isolated low-severity items.
+
+## System Prompt
+You are an exploit-chaining specialist. Isolated findings understate risk; the
+real story is the chain. You always try to reuse obtained access across the
+whole scope and escalate to business impact, reporting the combined chain with
+concrete evidence. Authorized engagement; no destructive or DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
diff --git a/agents_md/meta/report_calibrator.md b/agents_md/meta/report_calibrator.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a6c96f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/agents_md/meta/report_calibrator.md
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# Report Calibrator Agent
+
+> Meta-agent (v3.5.2 doctrine). Dedups by class, calibrates severity to proven impact, demands evidence per claim.
+
+## User Prompt
+Before the final report for **{target}**, clean and calibrate the findings:
+
+1. **Consolidate hygiene by class.** Merge repeated hygiene findings (missing
+ security headers, clickjacking, cookie flags, weak TLS, HSTS, version/banner
+ disclosure) into ONE finding per class with an affected-asset TABLE β do not
+ inflate the count one-per-host.
+2. **Calibrate severity to PROVEN impact.** High/Critical requires demonstrated
+ impact with evidence. Unproven DoS/abuse, "could/may/potential" language, or a
+ finding with no concrete payload/PoC β cap to Low/Medium or mark
+ "(potential)". Recompute the CVSS vector to match the proven impact.
+3. **Evidence per claim.** Every finding β and every item in the "tests
+ performed" log β must carry a concrete request/response receipt; flag any
+ claim that has none, and any contradiction between the test log and the
+ findings.
+
+Output JSON: {merged:[{class, severity, assets:[...]}],
+recalibrated:[{id, old_severity, new_severity, reason}],
+unevidenced:[{id_or_test, missing}]}.
+
+## System Prompt
+You are a meticulous report editor. You group hygiene by class with an
+asset table, calibrate every severity to demonstrated impact (no inflated
+High/Critical, no padding the count with duplicates), and require a real
+receipt behind every claim β including each line of the tests-performed log.
+Honest, deduplicated, evidence-backed reporting only. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
diff --git a/agents_md/meta/token_auditor.md b/agents_md/meta/token_auditor.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..22bb718
--- /dev/null
+++ b/agents_md/meta/token_auditor.md
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# Token & JWT Auditor Agent
+
+> Meta-agent (v3.5.2 doctrine). Attacks tokens: alg-confusion, none, kid/jku, signature checks, weak HS256 secrets.
+
+## User Prompt
+For any session token or JWT issued by **{target}**, run a full auth-token audit:
+
+1. **Decode** the header/payload; note alg (HS*/RS*/none), kid, jku, exp, claims.
+2. **Algorithm attacks**: try `alg:none`, RSβHS confusion (sign with the public
+ key as HMAC secret), and kid/jku injection. Confirm whether the server
+ actually verifies the signature (tamper a claim and replay).
+3. **Weak secret**: for HS256, attempt to crack the signing secret offline
+ (wordlist/rules); a static or guessable shared secret (e.g. an `x-auth-*`
+ header value) is a strong lead β if cracked, forge a token for any user.
+4. **Lifecycle**: test reuse after logout, expiry enforcement, and refresh-token
+ revocation.
+
+Output JSON: {token_type, alg, verified:true|false,
+attacks:[{name, result, evidence}], forged_token_possible:true|false}.
+
+## System Prompt
+You are a token-security specialist. Every JWT/session token gets audited for
+algorithm confusion, none, kid/jku injection, real signature verification, weak
+HS256 secrets, and lifecycle (logout/expiry/refresh). A forged or replayable
+token is account takeover β you prove it with a real receipt. Authorized
+engagement; no destructive or DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
diff --git a/install.ps1 b/install.ps1
index d3b1757..df20fb4 100644
--- a/install.ps1
+++ b/install.ps1
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ function Ok ($m) { Write-Host " + $m" -ForegroundColor Green }
function Warn($m){ Write-Host " ! $m" -ForegroundColor Yellow }
Write-Host ""
-Write-Host " NeuroSploit installer (Windows) β v3.5.1" -ForegroundColor Cyan
+Write-Host " NeuroSploit installer (Windows) β v3.5.2" -ForegroundColor Cyan
$arch = $env:PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE
Say "Platform: Windows / $arch"
diff --git a/neurosploit-rs/Cargo.lock b/neurosploit-rs/Cargo.lock
index fcb0566..540372c 100644
--- a/neurosploit-rs/Cargo.lock
+++ b/neurosploit-rs/Cargo.lock
@@ -871,7 +871,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "neurosploit"
-version = "3.5.1"
+version = "3.5.2"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"clap",
@@ -888,7 +888,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "neurosploit-harness"
-version = "3.5.1"
+version = "3.5.2"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"futures",
diff --git a/neurosploit-rs/Cargo.toml b/neurosploit-rs/Cargo.toml
index 691b392..26e6873 100644
--- a/neurosploit-rs/Cargo.toml
+++ b/neurosploit-rs/Cargo.toml
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ members = ["crates/harness", "app"]
resolver = "2"
[workspace.package]
-version = "3.5.1"
+version = "3.5.2"
edition = "2021"
license = "MIT"
repository = "https://github.com/JoasASantos/NeuroSploit"
diff --git a/neurosploit-rs/app/src/main.rs b/neurosploit-rs/app/src/main.rs
index 9156de4..b030412 100644
--- a/neurosploit-rs/app/src/main.rs
+++ b/neurosploit-rs/app/src/main.rs
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-//! NeuroSploit v3.5.1 β interactive harness + CLI (`run` / `whitebox` / `agents` / `models`).
+//! NeuroSploit v3.5.2 β interactive harness + CLI (`run` / `whitebox` / `agents` / `models`).
mod repl;
mod tui;
@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
#[command(
name = "neurosploit",
version,
- about = "NeuroSploit v3.5.1 β multi-model autonomous pentest harness",
- long_about = "NeuroSploit v3.5.1 β a Rust multi-model harness that drives a pool of LLMs \
+ about = "NeuroSploit v3.5.2 β multi-model autonomous pentest harness",
+ long_about = "NeuroSploit v3.5.2 β a Rust multi-model harness that drives a pool of LLMs \
(API key or local subscription: Claude/Codex/Gemini/Grok) to autonomously test a target. \
After recon it INTELLIGENTLY selects only the agents matching the discovered surface, runs \
them in parallel, then validates every finding by cross-model voting before reporting.\n\n\
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ pub(crate) fn spawn_engagement(base: &Path, mut cfg: RunConfig, mcp: bool, mode:
cfg.rl_path = Some(base.join("data").join("rl_state_rs.json").display().to_string());
write_status(&workdir, "running", &format!("\"target\":{:?}", cfg.target));
- println!(" ββ NeuroSploit v3.5.1 Β· by Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders");
+ println!(" ββ NeuroSploit v3.5.2 Β· by Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders");
println!(" β run id : {run_id}");
println!(" β target : {}", cfg.target);
println!(" β models : {}", cfg.models.join(", "));
diff --git a/neurosploit-rs/app/src/repl.rs b/neurosploit-rs/app/src/repl.rs
index 6ecc8ef..070a614 100644
--- a/neurosploit-rs/app/src/repl.rs
+++ b/neurosploit-rs/app/src/repl.rs
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-//! NeuroSploit v3.5.1 β interactive session (Claude-Code / Codex / Cursor-CLI style).
+//! NeuroSploit v3.5.2 β interactive session (Claude-Code / Codex / Cursor-CLI style).
//!
//! Launched when `neurosploit` runs with no subcommand. A persistent REPL with
//! real line editing (arrow-key history recall, Ctrl-A/E/K, paste), model
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ pub async fn repl(base: &Path) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let backends = harness::installed_cli_backends();
println!("\x1b[1m");
println!(" ββββ ββββββββββββββ ββββββββββ βββββββ");
- println!(" βββββ ββββββββββββββ ββββββββββββββββββββ NeuroSploit v3.5.1");
+ println!(" βββββ ββββββββββββββ ββββββββββββββββββββ NeuroSploit v3.5.2");
println!(" ββββββ βββββββββ βββ ββββββββββββββ βββ interactive harness");
println!(" ββββββββββββββββ βββ ββββββββββββββ βββ by Joas A Santos");
println!(" βββ ββββββββββββββββββββββββββ ββββββββββββ & Red Team Leaders");
diff --git a/neurosploit-rs/app/src/tui.rs b/neurosploit-rs/app/src/tui.rs
index 97b1315..e297d58 100644
--- a/neurosploit-rs/app/src/tui.rs
+++ b/neurosploit-rs/app/src/tui.rs
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-//! NeuroSploit v3.5.1 β TUI "Mission Control" mode.
+//! NeuroSploit v3.5.2 β TUI "Mission Control" mode.
//!
//! Concurrent panels that update live while the engagement runs in the
//! background, with a composer input that stays active during execution:
diff --git a/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/belief.rs b/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/belief.rs
index 5772350..af12d31 100644
--- a/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/belief.rs
+++ b/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/belief.rs
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-//! POMDP belief-state world model (v3.5.1).
+//! POMDP belief-state world model (v3.5.2).
//!
//! The target is only partially observable, so we don't track booleans β we
//! track a **belief**: a property graph whose nodes (host / service / vuln /
diff --git a/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/grounding.rs b/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/grounding.rs
index a550c3e..c607f55 100644
--- a/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/grounding.rs
+++ b/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/grounding.rs
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-//! Verification / grounding engine (v3.5.1).
+//! Verification / grounding engine (v3.5.2).
//!
//! Hard rule: **no claim enters the world model without a tool receipt** β raw
//! tool output, not the LLM's paraphrase. This is the empirical anti-hallucination
diff --git a/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/hygiene.rs b/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/hygiene.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3dde5fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/hygiene.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+//! Report-hygiene & exploitation-depth pass (v3.5.2).
+//!
+//! Encodes the post-engagement discipline learned from reviewing real
+//! AI-pentest output, applied deterministically after validation:
+//! 1. **Calibrate severity to PROVEN impact** β an unproven High/Critical
+//! (hedged language, no payload, thin evidence) is capped to Medium and
+//! re-titled "(potential)". No inflated severities.
+//! 2. **Exposed β exploited** β flag info-disclosure / exposed-service /
+//! leaked-credential findings on a host that has no actual exploit, so the
+//! operator knows to *use* what was exposed (or down-rate it to a lead).
+//! 3. **Consolidate hygiene** β when the same hygiene class (missing headers,
+//! clickjacking, cookie flags, TLS, info-disclosureβ¦) repeats across many
+//! assets, advise merging into ONE finding with an affected-asset table,
+//! instead of inflating the count one-per-host.
+//!
+//! All functions are pure/deterministic; only `calibrate` mutates findings
+//! (severity/title/confidence). The rest return advisory strings streamed to
+//! the operator and recorded with the run.
+use crate::types::Finding;
+
+fn host_of(endpoint: &str) -> String {
+ let s = endpoint.trim();
+ let s = s.split("://").last().unwrap_or(s);
+ let s = s.split('/').next().unwrap_or(s);
+ s.split('?').next().unwrap_or(s).to_lowercase()
+}
+
+fn sev_rank(s: &str) -> u8 {
+ match s.to_lowercase().as_str() {
+ x if x.starts_with("crit") => 4,
+ x if x.starts_with("high") => 3,
+ x if x.starts_with("med") => 2,
+ x if x.starts_with("low") => 1,
+ _ => 0,
+ }
+}
+
+fn short(s: &str) -> String {
+ s.chars().take(64).collect()
+}
+
+/// Hedging words that signal an impact was described but not demonstrated
+/// (English + Portuguese, since engagements are bilingual).
+const WEASEL: &[&str] = &[
+ "could ", "may ", "might ", "potential", "possible", "possibly", "teΓ³ric", "theoret",
+ "poderia", "possΓv", "potencial", "if the ", "caso o", "caso a", "would allow", "permitiria",
+];
+
+/// A finding that *exposes* something (recon/disclosure) rather than being an
+/// exploit with demonstrated impact.
+fn is_exposure(f: &Finding) -> bool {
+ let cwe = f.cwe.to_lowercase();
+ let t = f.title.to_lowercase();
+ ["200", "527", "538", "942", "497", "209", "548", "16"].iter().any(|c| cwe.contains(c))
+ || [
+ "disclosure", "exposed", "exposi", "exposure", "catalog", "catΓ‘logo", "cors",
+ "banner", "version", "versão", "header", "cabeçalho", ".git", "enumerat",
+ "fingerprint", "wsdl", "swagger", "missing security", "outdated", "eol",
+ ]
+ .iter()
+ .any(|k| t.contains(k))
+}
+
+/// Reads as unproven: hedged or thin evidence AND no concrete payload.
+fn looks_unproven(f: &Finding) -> bool {
+ let blob = format!("{} {} {}", f.title, f.impact, f.evidence).to_lowercase();
+ let hedged = WEASEL.iter().any(|w| blob.contains(w));
+ let weak_ev = f.evidence.trim().chars().count() < 40;
+ let no_payload = f.payload.trim().is_empty();
+ (hedged || weak_ev) && no_payload
+}
+
+/// Normalized hygiene class, for consolidation advice.
+fn class_of(f: &Finding) -> &'static str {
+ let t = f.title.to_lowercase();
+ if t.contains("header") || t.contains("cabeçalho") { "missing-security-headers" }
+ else if t.contains("clickjack") || t.contains("frame") { "clickjacking" }
+ else if t.contains("hsts") || t.contains("strict-transport") { "missing-hsts" }
+ else if t.contains("cookie") { "cookie-flags" }
+ else if t.contains("tls") || t.contains("ssl") { "weak-tls" }
+ else if t.contains("cors") { "cors-misconfig" }
+ else if t.contains("version") || t.contains("versΓ£o") || t.contains("banner") || t.contains("eol") || t.contains("outdated") { "version-disclosure" }
+ else { "information-disclosure" }
+}
+
+/// Cap inflated, unproven High/Critical findings to Medium. Returns advisories.
+pub fn calibrate(findings: &mut [Finding]) -> Vec {
+ let mut notes = Vec::new();
+ for f in findings.iter_mut() {
+ if sev_rank(&f.severity) >= 3 && looks_unproven(f) {
+ let old = f.severity.clone();
+ f.severity = "Medium".into();
+ f.confidence = f.confidence.min(0.5);
+ let low = f.title.to_lowercase();
+ if !low.contains("potential") && !low.contains("potencial") {
+ f.title = format!("{} (potential β impact not demonstrated)", f.title);
+ }
+ notes.push(format!(
+ "severity calibrated: \"{}\" {old} β Medium (impact not demonstrated)",
+ short(&f.title)
+ ));
+ }
+ }
+ notes
+}
+
+/// "Exposed β exploited": exposures on a host with no real exploit get flagged.
+pub fn depth_audit(findings: &[Finding]) -> Vec {
+ let exploited: std::collections::HashSet = findings
+ .iter()
+ .filter(|f| !is_exposure(f) && sev_rank(&f.severity) >= 2)
+ .map(|f| host_of(&f.endpoint))
+ .collect();
+ let mut notes = Vec::new();
+ for f in findings.iter().filter(|f| is_exposure(f)) {
+ if !exploited.contains(&host_of(&f.endpoint)) {
+ notes.push(format!(
+ "depth gap: \"{}\" exposed but not exploited β USE it (call the endpoint / decode the artifact / log in / hit the dev host) to prove impact, or down-rate to a lead",
+ short(&f.title)
+ ));
+ }
+ }
+ notes.truncate(8);
+ notes
+}
+
+/// Advise consolidating hygiene classes that repeat across multiple assets.
+pub fn hygiene_summary(findings: &[Finding]) -> Vec {
+ use std::collections::{BTreeMap, BTreeSet};
+ let mut groups: BTreeMap<&'static str, BTreeSet> = BTreeMap::new();
+ for f in findings.iter().filter(|f| is_exposure(f)) {
+ groups.entry(class_of(f)).or_default().insert(host_of(&f.endpoint));
+ }
+ let mut notes = Vec::new();
+ for (class, hosts) in groups {
+ if hosts.len() > 1 {
+ notes.push(format!(
+ "hygiene: '{class}' affects {} assets β consolidate into ONE finding with an affected-asset table (don't inflate the count one-per-host)",
+ hosts.len()
+ ));
+ }
+ }
+ notes
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ use super::*;
+ fn f(title: &str, sev: &str, cwe: &str, ep: &str, ev: &str, payload: &str) -> Finding {
+ let mut x = Finding::default();
+ x.title = title.into(); x.severity = sev.into(); x.cwe = cwe.into();
+ x.endpoint = ep.into(); x.evidence = ev.into(); x.payload = payload.into();
+ x
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn unproven_high_is_capped() {
+ let mut v = vec![f("Flooding DoS", "High", "CWE-770", "https://a/x", "could overload", "")];
+ let notes = calibrate(&mut v);
+ assert_eq!(v[0].severity, "Medium");
+ assert_eq!(notes.len(), 1);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn proven_high_is_kept() {
+ let mut v = vec![f("SQLi", "High", "CWE-89", "https://a/x",
+ "id=1' UNION SELECT version()-- returned 8.0.32 in the response body, proving injection", "1' OR '1'='1")];
+ calibrate(&mut v);
+ assert_eq!(v[0].severity, "High");
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn exposure_without_exploit_flagged() {
+ let v = vec![f("Information Disclosure - .git exposed", "Low", "CWE-527", "https://a/.git", "leaked", "")];
+ assert_eq!(depth_audit(&v).len(), 1);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn exposure_with_exploit_on_same_host_not_flagged() {
+ let v = vec![
+ f("Information Disclosure - banner", "Low", "CWE-200", "https://a/x", "Server: IIS", ""),
+ f("SQL Injection", "High", "CWE-89", "https://a/login", "dumped users", "1'--"),
+ ];
+ assert!(depth_audit(&v).is_empty());
+ }
+}
diff --git a/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/lib.rs b/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/lib.rs
index 42e0f15..9debcba 100644
--- a/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/lib.rs
+++ b/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/lib.rs
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-//! NeuroSploit v3.5.1 harness β a robust multi-model runtime for the
+//! NeuroSploit v3.5.2 harness β a robust multi-model runtime for the
//! markdown-driven autonomous pentest engine.
//!
//! The harness loads the `agents_md/` library, drives a *pool* of LLM models
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ pub mod attack_graph;
pub mod belief;
pub mod creds;
pub mod grounding;
+pub mod hygiene;
pub mod pomdp;
pub mod models;
pub mod pipeline;
diff --git a/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/pipeline.rs b/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/pipeline.rs
index 95244c6..32898ae 100644
--- a/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/pipeline.rs
+++ b/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/pipeline.rs
@@ -69,6 +69,16 @@ const REACT_DOCTRINE: &str = "METHOD (ReAct): work in explicit Thought β Actio
Each Action runs ONE concrete tool command (e.g. a curl request); read its real Observation before the next Thought. \
Base every claim on an actual observed response β never assume. Stop when you've either proven an issue or exhausted reasonable checks. Be token-efficient: no filler, no repetition.\n\n";
+/// DEPTH doctrine (v3.5.2): push past detection to demonstrated impact, and
+/// chain. Distilled from reviewing real AI-pentest output that kept stopping at
+/// "exposed" instead of "exploited".
+const DEPTH_DOCTRINE: &str = "DEPTH (exploit, don't just expose):\n\
+- Exposed β exploited: any info-disclosure, exposed service/catalog/WSDL, leaked credential/token, or non-prod (dev/staging) host you find MUST be USED before you report it β call the exposed endpoint, decode the leaked artifact, log in with the leaked credential, hit the dev host. If you only observed it but never used it, report it as a LEAD (low confidence), not a confirmed finding.\n\
+- Chain across steps: reuse any session/JWT/cookie/credential you obtain in one step against every other module; if one bug yields access, pivot it into IDOR/privesc/data-exfil and report the CHAIN, not isolated parts.\n\
+- Decode & fingerprint β CVE: decode opaque tokens/paths (base64/JSON/marshal) and fingerprint the stack (server, framework, library/gem/plugin versions); map exact versions to known CVEs and attempt a safe, non-destructive PoC.\n\
+- Audit tokens: for any JWT, check alg-confusion (RSβHS), alg:none, kid/jku injection, whether the signature is actually verified, and weak/guessable HS256 secrets.\n\
+- Calibrate honestly: claim High/Critical ONLY when impact is DEMONSTRATED; unproven DoS/abuse is Low/Info or a lead, never inflated.\n\n";
+
/// Black-box web engagement: recon β parallel exploit β N-model vote β report.
pub async fn run(cfg: RunConfig, lib: &Library, pool: &ModelPool, tx: Sender) -> RunOutput {
pool.set_progress(tx.clone());
@@ -168,12 +178,13 @@ pub async fn run(cfg: RunConfig, lib: &Library, pool: &ModelPool, tx: Sender {
@@ -623,6 +634,20 @@ async fn finish(cfg: RunConfig, _lib: &Library, recon: String, transcript: Strin
let _ = tx.send(format!("grounding gate: demoted {demoted}/{before} ungrounded claim(s) (no tool receipt)")).await;
}
+ // --- v3.5.2 report-hygiene & exploitation-depth pass ---
+ // Calibrate inflated/unproven High-Critical to Medium, flag exposures that
+ // were never exploited ("exposed β exploited"), and advise consolidating
+ // hygiene findings duplicated across many assets.
+ for n in crate::hygiene::calibrate(&mut findings) {
+ let _ = tx.send(format!("calibrate: {n}")).await;
+ }
+ for n in crate::hygiene::depth_audit(&findings) {
+ let _ = tx.send(format!("notify: {n}")).await;
+ }
+ for n in crate::hygiene::hygiene_summary(&findings) {
+ let _ = tx.send(format!("notify: {n}")).await;
+ }
+
// --- POMDP belief: build from grounded findings, report residual uncertainty ---
let mut wm = crate::belief::WorldModel::new();
wm.deterministic = whitebox;
diff --git a/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/pomdp.rs b/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/pomdp.rs
index a95768a..6e77d3b 100644
--- a/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/pomdp.rs
+++ b/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/pomdp.rs
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-//! POMDP decision layer (v3.5.1): value-of-information planning + the
+//! POMDP decision layer (v3.5.2): value-of-information planning + the
//! anti-hallucination gate.
//!
//! The choice "scan more vs exploit now" is **not** a heuristic here β it falls
diff --git a/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/report.rs b/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/report.rs
index 49d396e..145f2ae 100644
--- a/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/report.rs
+++ b/neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/report.rs
@@ -97,9 +97,9 @@ pub fn html(target: &str, findings: &[Finding]) -> String {
h4{{margin:12px 0 3px;font-size:12px;text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:.5px;color:#8b5cf6}}\
.b{{color:#8b5cf6;font-weight:800}}\
NeuroSploit Penetration Test Report
\
- Target: {t} Β· v3.5.1 Rust harness Β· multi-model validated
\
+ Target: {t} Β· v3.5.2 Rust harness Β· multi-model validated
\
{chips}
{graph_block}Findings ({n})
{body}\
- Authorized testing only. Findings confirmed by multi-model adversarial voting.
NeuroSploit v3.5.1 Β· by Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders