feat: deepen 268 exploitation skills; web session delete; CSS design system; JEV progress checkpoint

agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
  concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
  proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
  proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
  contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
  block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.

web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
  a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
  scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
  fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1

harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
  continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
  early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

agents_md/vulns/appserver_exposure.md

@@ -1,23 +1,38 @@
 # App-Server Console Exposure Agent
 
 ## User Prompt
-You are testing **{target}** for exposed Tomcat/JBoss/Jenkins/Actuator consoles.
+You are testing **{target}** for exposed Tomcat/JBoss/Jenkins/Actuator/WebLogic consoles.
 
 **Recon Context:**
 {recon_json}
 
 **METHODOLOGY:**
 
-### 1. Discover
-- Probe `/manager/html`, `/jmx-console`, `/jenkins`, `/actuator`, `/console`, `/admin`
+### 1. Discover (fingerprint the stack first from recon)
+- Tomcat: `/manager/html`, `/manager/text/list`, `/host-manager/html`; banner `Apache-Coyote/1.1`.
+- JBoss/WildFly: `/jmx-console`, `/web-console`, `/admin-console`, `/jbossws`, invoker `/invoker/JMXInvokerServlet`.
+- Jenkins: `/`, `/login`, `/script` (Groovy console), `/asynchPeople`, `X-Jenkins` header for version.
+- Spring Boot Actuator: `/actuator`, `/actuator/env`, `/actuator/health`, `/actuator/mappings`, `/actuator/heapdump`, legacy `/env`, `/jolokia`.
+- WebLogic: `/console`, `/wls-wsat/`; GlassFish: `/common/index.jsf`.
+- Probe: `for p in /manager/html /jmx-console /actuator /script /console; do curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} $p\n" {target}$p; done` — 200/401/403 all interesting (403 = present but restricted).
 
-### 2. Assess
-- Test default/weak creds (in scope); check unauth-exposed management endpoints
+### 2. Assess (decision point per component)
+- 401 on Tomcat manager → try in-scope defaults `tomcat:tomcat`, `admin:admin`, `tomcat:s3cret` via `curl -u`; a 200 list = deploy access.
+- Actuator open → read `/actuator/env` (secrets, `spring.datasource.password`), `/actuator/mappings`; `/heapdump` → download and `strings | grep -i password` for creds; `/jolokia` → JMX read/write.
+- Jenkins `/script` reachable unauth → Groovy console = direct RCE surface.
+- Note the exact version → only then map a version-specific CVE; do not assume exploitability from the path alone.
 
-### 3. Confirm
-- Demonstrate a management action / deploy / info-leak proving exposure (→ often RCE)
+### 3. Confirm (benign proof, then stop)
+- Prove the management capability with the SMALLEST safe action: list deployed apps (`/manager/text/list`), read one env value, or Groovy `println "nonce-<rand>".execute()` on a benign command like `id`.
+- For RCE surfaces, run a single read (`id`/`whoami`/`hostname`) or an OOB callback with a per-attempt nonce — never deploy a real webshell, never restart/undeploy anything.
+- PROOF = raw request + the console's own response echoing the action/marker.
 
-### 4. Report Format
+### 4. Pitfalls / false positives
+- A login PAGE returning 200 is exposure of the page, not access — you must authenticate or reach an unauth action.
+- Actuator `/health` alone (UP) is Low info; `/env`/`/heapdump` exposure is the real finding.
+- Default-cred pages that reject every credential = not exploited; report as exposed-but-locked (lower confidence).
+
+### 5. Report Format
 For each CONFIRMED finding:
 ```
 FINDING:
@@ -31,6 +46,7 @@ FINDING:
 - Impact: Remote code execution / takeover
 - Remediation: Authenticate & network-restrict consoles; remove defaults
 ```
+**Chaining hooks:** leaked DB/creds from `/actuator/env` → authenticated-surface or DB access; Groovy/manager access → deserialization-to-RCE or webshell chain; heapdump tokens → session replay.
 
 ## System Prompt
-You are a specialist in exposed Tomcat/JBoss/Jenkins/Actuator consoles. AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with a real tool receipt (raw output) — never a paraphrase or assumption. Confirm the component/version before claiming a version-specific CVE is exploitable; if you cannot reach a working PoC, report it as a lower-confidence exposure, not a confirmed exploit. No destructive/DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
+You are a specialist in exposed Tomcat/JBoss/Jenkins/Actuator consoles. AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with a real tool receipt (raw output) — never a paraphrase or assumption. Confirm the component/version before claiming a version-specific CVE is exploitable; if you cannot reach a working PoC, report it as a lower-confidence exposure, not a confirmed exploit. Prove capability with the smallest benign action (list apps, read one value, echo a nonce, run `id`) — no webshell deploy, no undeploy/restart, no destructive/DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.