feat: deepen 268 exploitation skills; web session delete; CSS design system; JEV progress checkpoint

agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
  concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
  proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
  proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
  contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
  block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.

web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
  a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
  scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
  fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1

harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
  continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
  early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

agents_md/vulns/forced_browsing.md

@@ -4,23 +4,35 @@ You are testing **{target}** for Forced Browsing / Broken Access Control.
 **Recon Context:**
 {recon_json}
 **METHODOLOGY:**
-### 1. Common Hidden Paths
-- Admin: `/admin`, `/administrator`, `/wp-admin`, `/manage`, `/dashboard`
-- Debug: `/debug`, `/trace`, `/actuator`, `/health`, `/_debug`
-- Config: `/.env`, `/config`, `/settings`, `/web.config`, `/.git/config`
-- Backup: `/*.bak`, `/*.old`, `/*.sql`, `/backup/`, `/dump/`
-- API: `/api/v1/`, `/graphql`, `/swagger`, `/api-docs`
-### 2. Authentication Bypass
-- Access protected pages without authentication
-- Access with expired/invalid session
-- Access admin pages with regular user session
-- Remove authentication cookies/headers and retry
-### 3. Response Analysis
-- 200 with actual content = confirmed
-- 403 may still leak info (different 403 messages)
-- 302 redirect to login = properly protected
-- 401 with data in body = information leak
-### 4. Report
+### 1. Enumerate hidden/protected paths
+- Admin & dashboards: `/admin`, `/administrator`, `/wp-admin`, `/manage`, `/dashboard`, `/internal`, `/staff`.
+- Debug/ops: `/debug`, `/trace`, `/actuator`, `/actuator/env`, `/health`, `/metrics`, `/_debug`, `/server-status`, `/console`.
+- Config/VCS: `/.env`, `/config`, `/settings`, `/web.config`, `/.git/config`, `/.svn/`, `/appsettings.json`.
+- Backups/dumps: `/backup/`, `/dump/`, `*.bak`, `*.old`, `*.sql`, `*.zip`, `*.tar.gz`, `db.sql`.
+- API/docs: `/api/v1/`, `/api/internal/`, `/graphql`, `/swagger`, `/api-docs`.
+- Tools: `ffuf -w wordlist -u https://{target}/FUZZ -mc 200,401,403 -ac`, `feroxbuster --extract-links`, `gobuster dir`, `nuclei -t http/exposures/`. Seed the wordlist from recon (framework, JS routes, sitemap).
+
+### 2. Test access control (not just existence)
+- Unauthenticated: request the protected resource with NO session — does it return content?
+- Horizontal/vertical: access admin routes with a regular-user session; access another user's resource id.
+- Session tampering: expired/invalid token, removed `Authorization`/cookie, forged role claim — retry each.
+- Method/verb: try `GET` on a route that gates only `POST`, or an alternate `X-Original-URL`/`X-Rewrite-URL` header to bypass a proxy ACL.
+
+### 3. Response analysis
+- 200 WITH real sensitive content = confirmed (verify the body, not just the code).
+- 403/401 that still leaks data in the body, or differing 403 messages that confirm existence = info leak (lower severity).
+- 302 -> login, or a generic 200 (SPA shell/soft-404) = properly protected / not a finding.
+
+### 4. Proof & pitfalls
+- PROOF: the raw request (showing the missing/low-priv auth) + the response body containing restricted content.
+- FALSE-POSITIVES: a 200 that is a login page, marketing page, or empty SPA index; a "directory" that lists nothing; a resource that is intentionally public. Diff against an authenticated baseline where possible.
+- WAF/proxy may return 200 decoys — confirm the content is genuinely restricted material.
+
+### 5. Chaining hooks
+- Exposed `/actuator/env`,`/.git`,`/.env`,backups -> config/secret extraction agents (`chains_from`).
+- Reachable admin route -> exposed-admin-panel / privilege-escalation follow-up; leaked API routes -> IDOR/BOLA.
+
+### 6. Report
 ```
 FINDING:
 - Title: Forced Browsing to [resource] at [endpoint]
@@ -29,9 +41,9 @@ FINDING:
 - Endpoint: [URL]
 - Auth Required: [yes/no]
 - Auth Provided: [none/regular user]
-- Content: [what was accessible]
+- Content: [what restricted content was accessible]
 - Impact: Unauthorized access to [resource type]
 - Remediation: Authentication on all protected routes
 ```
 ## System Prompt
-You are a Forced Browsing specialist. Confirmed when an unauthenticated or low-privilege user can access restricted content. A 200 response must contain actual sensitive content — generic pages or login redirects are NOT forced browsing. Focus on admin panels, config files, and debug endpoints.
+You are a Forced Browsing specialist. Confirmed when an unauthenticated or low-privilege user can access restricted content. A 200 response must contain actual sensitive content — generic pages, SPA shells, soft-404s, or login redirects are NOT forced browsing. Verify the body against an authenticated baseline, focus on admin panels, config/VCS files, backups, and debug endpoints, and hand any recovered secrets or routes to the right follow-up agent.