feat: deepen 268 exploitation skills; web session delete; CSS design system; JEV progress checkpoint

agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
  concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
  proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
  proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
  contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
  block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.

web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
  a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
  scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
  fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1

harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
  continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
  early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

agents_md/vulns/grpc_reflection_exposure.md

@@ -6,16 +6,32 @@ You are testing **{target}** for Exposed gRPC server reflection enabling enumera
 **Recon Context:**
 {recon_json}
 
-**METHODOLOGY:**
+**METHODOLOGY — enumerate via reflection, then test for a real unauthenticated call; PROVE with raw grpcurl output:**
 
-### 1. List services
-- `grpcurl -plaintext host:port list` and describe methods
+### 1. Confirm the endpoint & list services
+- Plaintext: `grpcurl -plaintext {host}:{port} list`. TLS: `grpcurl {host}:{port} list`. Behind h2 proxy: add `-authority` / `-servername`.
+- Describe everything: `grpcurl -plaintext {host}:{port} describe` and per-service `grpcurl -plaintext {host}:{port} describe <pkg.Service>`.
+- Alt tools: `grpc_cli ls {host}:{port}`, `evans -r repl -p {port}`, `buf curl`.
+- DECISION: `list` returns services other than `grpc.reflection.*` → reflection is exposed; enumerate methods and their request/response message shapes.
 
-### 2. Probe methods
-- Invoke unauthenticated methods discovered via reflection
+### 2. Probe methods for missing auth
+- Pick low-risk, read-shaped methods (`Get*`, `List*`, `Health/Check`, `*Status`). Invoke UNAUTHENTICATED (no metadata token):
+  `grpcurl -plaintext -d '{"id":"1"}' {host}:{port} pkg.Service/GetItem`.
+- Compare to a call WITH a token to see if auth is even enforced. Keep args benign (test/known IDs); avoid mutating RPCs (`Delete*`, `Update*`, `Transfer*`) except with no-op/invalid inputs to check the authz gate (expect `Unauthenticated`/`PermissionDenied`).
 
-### 3. Confirm
-- Show reflection enabled and/or an unauthenticated method returning data
+### 3. Confirm (proof)
+- Reflection-only: quote the `grpcurl list`/`describe` output showing the full service/method surface (Low).
+- Escalated: quote a raw `grpcurl` response where an unauthenticated method returned real data or performed a privileged action — that's the higher-impact evidence.
+
+### PITFALLS / FALSE-POSITIVES
+- Reflection enabled but every method returns `Unauthenticated`/`PermissionDenied` without a token → exposure is informational (Low), no data leak.
+- A gRPC-Web/Envoy front end may answer `list` while the real backend enforces auth — verify you're hitting the actual service, not a stub.
+- `Unimplemented` for reflection means it's OFF — not a finding; note it as a positive control.
+- TLS/ALPN mismatch causing connection errors is not "no reflection" — fix transport flags and retry.
+
+### CHAINING HOOKS
+- The enumerated `.proto` surface (methods, message fields) feeds targeted authz-bypass / mass-assignment testing and fuzzing of specific RPCs.
+- An unauthenticated data-returning method → direct info disclosure / IDOR pivot; a discovered admin service → privilege-escalation target.
 
 ### 4. Report Format
 For each CONFIRMED finding:
@@ -25,12 +41,12 @@ FINDING:
 - Severity: Low
 - CWE: CWE-200
 - Endpoint: [full URL]
-- Vector: [parameter/header/flow]
-- Payload: [exact payload/command]
-- Evidence: [proof of exploitation]
+- Vector: [parameter/header/flow — reflection list/describe; which method if escalated]
+- Payload: [exact payload/command — grpcurl list / describe / invoke]
+- Evidence: [proof of exploitation — raw grpcurl list/describe or an unauth method response]
 - Impact: Full service/method discovery aiding targeted abuse
 - Remediation: Disable server reflection in production, require auth on all methods
 ```
 
 ## System Prompt
-You are a gRPC specialist. Report reflection exposure as Low unless it leads to an unauthenticated sensitive method call, which you must evidence.
+You are a gRPC specialist. Report reflection exposure as Low unless it leads to an unauthenticated sensitive method call, which you must evidence with the raw grpcurl response. Keep invocations benign (read-shaped or no-op args), never fire mutating RPCs with real destructive inputs. Confirm you're hitting the real backend, not a proxy stub, before claiming missing auth. Report only what the raw output proves.