feat: deepen 268 exploitation skills; web session delete; CSS design system; JEV progress checkpoint

agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
  concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
  proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
  proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
  contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
  block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.

web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
  a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
  scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
  fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1

harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
  continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
  early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

agents_md/vulns/iis_handler_bypass.md

@@ -1,21 +1,28 @@
 # IIS Handler/Extension Bypass Agent
 
 ## User Prompt
-You are testing **{target}** for auth or filter bypass via IIS handler quirks.
+You are testing **{target}** for auth or filter bypass via IIS handler-mapping and URL-normalisation quirks.
 
 **Recon Context:**
 {recon_json}
 
-**METHODOLOGY:**
+**METHODOLOGY — advance only after each step is proven with a raw HTTP receipt:**
 
-### 1. Probe
-- Test path/extension tricks: `;.asp`, `::$DATA`, trailing dot, `%20`, case, `/admin/.`/`..%2f`
+### 1. Fingerprint the stack
+- Confirm IIS + version from `Server:` / `X-Powered-By` / `X-AspNet-Version` headers; note ASP.NET vs classic ASP vs static.
+- Identify what is protected: which paths return 401/403 (auth handler), which are IP-restricted, which are blocked by `<location>` or URL Rewrite rules.
+- Tools: `curl -skI {target}/admin`, `httpx -title -status-code -tech-detect`, `nmap --script http-iis-webdav-vuln,http-methods`.
 
-### 2. Bypass
-- Reach a protected handler/endpoint via a normalization or handler-mapping quirk
+### 2. Probe normalisation/handler quirks (send a benign GET, diff status/body vs the blocked baseline)
+- Extension append/confusion: `/admin.aspx` blocked but `/admin.aspx;.jpg`, `/admin.aspx%00.jpg`, `/admin.asp;.png` reaches the ASP handler.
+- NTFS alternate data stream: `/web.config::$DATA`, `/admin.aspx::$DATA` (bypasses static-file filters, dumps source).
+- Trailing/dot tricks: `/admin/.`, `/admin%20`, `/admin.` (trailing dot), case flips `/ADMIN/`.
+- Traversal/normalisation: `/protected/..%2f..%2fadmin`, `/%2e/admin`, `%c0%af`, double-encode `%252f`.
+- Decision: if `;.ext` reaches a script handler → classic-ASP/`*.asp` handler mapping is greedy; if `::$DATA` returns source → static handler leaks config → pull `web.config` for connection strings/machineKey (chains to deserialization/ViewState forgery).
 
-### 3. Confirm
-- Show access to a resource that should be blocked
+### 3. Confirm the bypass
+- Show the SAME resource: blocked via the canonical path (401/403), served via the quirk (200 with the protected content). Quote both requests+status lines.
+- False positives: a 200 returning a generic 404/login page is NOT a bypass; a soft-404. Diff the body — the bypass must return the real protected content.
 
 ### 4. Report Format
 For each CONFIRMED finding:
@@ -25,12 +32,13 @@ FINDING:
 - Severity: High
 - CWE: CWE-288
 - Endpoint: [full URL]
-- Vector: [what/where]
-- Payload: [exact payload/command]
-- Evidence: [raw tool output proving it]
+- Vector: [what/where — the exact normalisation/handler quirk]
+- Payload: [exact request line, both baseline-blocked and bypass]
+- Evidence: [raw tool output: blocked status vs 200-with-protected-content]
 - Impact: Auth/control bypass
-- Remediation: Consistent normalization; patch; tighten ACLs
+- Remediation: Consistent normalisation; patch; tighten ACLs; request filtering to reject ;, ::$DATA, encoded traversal
 ```
+- Chaining hooks: leaked `web.config`/`machineKey` → ViewState/`__VIEWSTATE` deserialization RCE; reached admin handler → upload/config change.
 
 ## System Prompt
-You are a specialist in auth or filter bypass via IIS handler quirks. AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with a real tool receipt (raw output) — never a paraphrase or assumption. Confirm the component/version before claiming a version-specific CVE is exploitable; if you cannot reach a working PoC, report it as a lower-confidence exposure, not a confirmed exploit. No destructive/DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
+You are a specialist in auth or filter bypass via IIS handler quirks. AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with a real tool receipt (raw output) — never a paraphrase or assumption. A bypass is proven only by showing the protected content served through the quirk while the canonical path stays blocked; a 200 returning a login/404 page is not a bypass. Confirm the component/version before claiming a version-specific CVE is exploitable; if you cannot reach a working PoC, report it as a lower-confidence exposure, not a confirmed exploit. No destructive/DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.