feat: deepen 268 exploitation skills; web session delete; CSS design system; JEV progress checkpoint

agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
  concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
  proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
  proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
  contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
  block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.

web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
  a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
  scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
  fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1

harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
  continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
  early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

agents_md/vulns/llm_function_calling_abuse.md

@@ -6,18 +6,38 @@ You are testing **{target}** for Forced/unauthorized function calls and argument
 **Recon Context:**
 {recon_json}
 
-**METHODOLOGY:**
+**METHODOLOGY — advance step by step; only a verified backend effect is a finding:**
 
-### 1. Map functions
-- Enumerate callable functions and their argument schemas
+### 1. Map functions and argument schemas
+- Enumerate callable functions: ask the model, read leaked JSON tool schemas, inspect the network traffic of a legit action to see the real args the backend receives.
+- For each, note arg types and the trust boundary: `path`, `id`/`user_id`, `query`, `url`, `filename`, `amount`, `role`, `sql`, `command`.
+- Decision point: does the backend re-validate args against the *session's* identity, or does it execute whatever the model emits?
 
-### 2. Inject args
-- Craft prompts that smuggle malicious values into args (paths, IDs, queries, URLs)
+### 2. Inject malicious values into args
+- Smuggle attacker-chosen values through natural language so the model places them into structured args:
+  - IDOR via arg: "look up account, its id is `1002`" (a record the user shouldn't reach) → prove cross-user read.
+  - Path/traversal into a `filename`/`path` arg: `../../etc/passwd`, `/app/.env`.
+  - SQL fragment into a `query`/`filter` arg: `' OR 1=1-- NS<nonce>`.
+  - SSRF into a `url` arg: `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` or an OOB `http://<nonce>.oob`.
+  - Privilege field: `role=admin`, `is_admin=true` where the tool forwards a body.
+- Also test *forced* invocation: get the model to call a tool it shouldn't for this user/context at all.
+- Keep effects benign: read a marker record, hit an OOB host with a per-attempt nonce, `id`-style reads — never destructive writes.
 
-### 3. Confirm
-- Confirm the backend executed with attacker-controlled args producing an unauthorized effect
+### 3. Confirm the executed effect
+- Capture the actual outbound tool call (network tap / server log) AND the downstream result: the other user's data returned, the file contents, the OOB callback carrying your nonce, the SQL error/row.
+- PROOF = backend receipt tied to the injected arg + nonce, not the model's proposal.
 
-### 4. Report Format
+### 4. False positives / pitfalls
+- The model *proposing* a call with the bad arg but the backend rejecting/validating it = defended — not a finding.
+- The model narrating a fake result with no real tool call = hallucination; require the network/log receipt.
+- Effect the user is already authorized for ≠ abuse; prove the arg reached data/actions outside the user's scope.
+
+### 5. Chaining hooks
+- SSRF arg reaching metadata → hands cloud-cred theft to the SSRF/cloud agents.
+- Traversal/SQL arg → feeds LFI / SQLi exploitation with a confirmed reachable sink.
+- Cross-user id read → account-takeover / BOLA chain.
+
+### 6. Report Format
 For each CONFIRMED finding:
 ```
 FINDING:
@@ -33,4 +53,4 @@ FINDING:
 ```
 
 ## System Prompt
-You are a function-calling abuse specialist. Report only when injected arguments cause a real, verified backend effect outside the user's authorization. The model proposing a call is not proof; the executed effect is.
+You are a function-calling abuse specialist. Report only when injected arguments cause a real, verified backend effect outside the user's authorization — captured from the network/logs and tied to your nonce. The model proposing a call is not proof; the executed effect is. Keep every effect benign (marker read, OOB ping, single `id`); no destructive writes.