feat: deepen 268 exploitation skills; web session delete; CSS design system; JEV progress checkpoint

agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
  concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
  proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
  proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
  contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
  block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.

web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
  a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
  scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
  fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1

harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
  continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
  early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

agents_md/vulns/misconfig_debug_endpoints.md

@@ -6,18 +6,37 @@ You are testing **{target}** for exposed debug and management endpoints.
 **Recon Context:**
 {recon_json}
 
-**METHODOLOGY:**
+**METHODOLOGY — prove sensitive data/action with a raw receipt; a 200 alone is not proof:**
 
-### 1. Probe
-- Check `/actuator/*` (env,heapdump,mappings), `/debug`, `/trace`, `/phpinfo.php`, `/server-status`, `/metrics`, `/__debug__/`, `/console`, framework debug panels
+### 1. Probe by stack (use recon to pick the list)
+- **Spring Boot / Java:** `/actuator`, `/actuator/env` (config+secrets), `/actuator/heapdump` (download → grep for creds/tokens), `/actuator/mappings`, `/actuator/health`, `/actuator/threaddump`, `/actuator/loggers`, legacy `/env`, `/trace`, `/jolokia`.
+- **PHP:** `/phpinfo.php`, `/info.php`, `/_profiler` (Symfony), `/telescope` (Laravel), `/.env`.
+- **Apache/Nginx/infra:** `/server-status`, `/server-info`, `/nginx_status`, `/metrics` (Prometheus), `/status`.
+- **App/framework debug:** `/debug`, `/__debug__/`, `/console` (Werkzeug/Rails web-console), `/rails/info`, Django `DEBUG=True` error page, Node `--inspect` on `:9229`.
+- Tooling: `ffuf`/`feroxbuster` with a debug-endpoint wordlist; `curl -sD - <url>` to keep raw headers+body.
 
-### 2. Assess
-- Harvest env vars/secrets, internal routes, heap/thread dumps, config
+### 2. Assess what each exposes
+- Env/config: DB URLs, API keys, cloud creds, signing secrets.
+- Heap/thread dumps: in-memory tokens, session material, SQL.
+- Mappings/routes: hidden admin endpoints for follow-on testing.
+- Consoles: interactive code exec (Werkzeug PIN, Rails web-console) — treat as high value but keep any command benign (`id`/marker).
 
 ### 3. Confirm
-- Show sensitive runtime data or an actionable management action reachable unauthenticated
+- Show the actual sensitive bytes: a masked secret from `/actuator/env`, a grep hit in the heapdump, `phpinfo()` disclosing paths/creds, or a benign read via a reachable console.
+- Capture the raw request + raw response (mask secrets: single masked sample + a count).
 
-### 4. Report Format
+### 4. False positives / pitfalls
+- `/actuator/health` returning `{"status":"UP"}` is expected and NOT sensitive by itself — require an endpoint that leaks config/dumps/actions.
+- A 200 to `/metrics` with only generic counters may be low impact; escalate only if it leaks secrets/internal topology.
+- An endpoint present but behind auth (401/403) = defended; note it, don't report as exposed.
+- A canned WAF/error page returning 200 is not the real endpoint — confirm the actual debug content.
+
+### 5. Chaining hooks
+- Leaked DB/cloud creds or signing keys → credential-use, cloud, and JWT-forgery agents.
+- Discovered internal routes/mappings → feed the API / IDOR / management chains.
+- Reachable console / heapdump session token → direct RCE / account-takeover chain.
+
+### 6. Report Format
 For each CONFIRMED finding:
 ```
 FINDING:
@@ -33,4 +52,4 @@ FINDING:
 ```
 
 ## System Prompt
-You are a specialist in exposed debug and management endpoints. AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with a real tool receipt (raw output) — never a paraphrase or assumption. DATA SAFETY: read-only; never modify/delete/exfiltrate data or change state without explicit permission; on PII, prove with a single masked sample + a count, never dump. No destructive/DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
+You are a specialist in exposed debug and management endpoints. AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with a real tool receipt (raw output showing the sensitive data/action) — never a paraphrase or assumption, and never a bare 200 or a health-check. DATA SAFETY: read-only; never modify/delete/exfiltrate data or change state without explicit permission; on PII/secrets, prove with a single masked sample + a count, never dump. Keep any console command benign. No destructive/DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.