feat: deepen 268 exploitation skills; web session delete; CSS design system; JEV progress checkpoint

agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
  concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
  proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
  proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
  contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
  block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.

web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
  a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
  scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
  fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1

harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
  continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
  early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

agents_md/vulns/reverse_proxy_path_confusion.md

@@ -1,23 +1,39 @@
 # Reverse-Proxy Path Confusion Specialist Agent
 
 ## User Prompt
-You are testing **{target}** for Proxy path normalization confusion / ACL bypass.
+You are testing **{target}** for proxy path-normalization confusion / ACL bypass — where the proxy and the origin disagree on what a path means, so a request the proxy thinks is allowed reaches a resource it meant to block.
 
 **Recon Context:**
 {recon_json}
 
-**METHODOLOGY:**
+**METHODOLOGY — find a restricted path first, then make the proxy resolve it differently from the origin. Prove access to something a clean request is denied.**
 
-### 1. Probe normalization
-- Test `..;/`, `%2e%2e/`, `//`, `/admin/..%2f`, trailing-dot, semicolon params across proxy
+### 1. Fingerprint the proxy + origin split
+- Identify the front proxy from headers (`Server:`, `Via:`, `X-Cache`, `CF-RAY`, `X-Amz-Cf-Id`) and the app framework behind it (from recon_json).
+- Establish the BASELINE: pick a path the proxy blocks with a clean request — `curl -sI {target}/admin` → 401/403. That 403 is your control; the bypass must turn it into 200/302 with real content.
 
-### 2. Bypass ACL
-- Reach an origin path the proxy intends to block via a normalization mismatch
+### 2. Probe normalization mismatches (front-vs-back decode)
+- Dot-segment / encoded traversal: `/admin/..%2f`, `/%2e%2e/admin`, `/..%2f..%2fadmin`, `/public/..%2fadmin`.
+- Path-parameter (Tomcat/Jetty) confusion: `/admin;/`, `/admin/..;/`, `/..;/admin`, `/;/admin`.
+- Double / over-encoding: `/%252e%252e/admin`, `/%2561dmin`, mixed-case `/%2E%2E/`.
+- Slash tricks: `//admin`, `/./admin`, `/admin%00`, `/admin%09`, trailing `/admin/.`, backslash `/..\admin` (IIS/.NET).
+- Nginx `alias`/`location` traversal: `/static../admin`, `/assets../` where a location lacks a trailing slash.
+- Tooling: drive systematically with `ffuf`/Burp Intruder over a normalization wordlist, or `nuclei -t http/misconfiguration` templates; diff each response length/code against the baseline.
 
-### 3. Confirm
-- Show access to a restricted resource, evidenced by its response
+### 3. Confirm the bypass reaches the RESTRICTED resource
+- The bypassed request must return the protected content (admin page markup, internal API JSON, an actuator/metrics body) — not merely a different error.
+- DECISION: 200 but identical body to the public root = the origin re-normalized and served the root, NOT a bypass. Compare bodies, not just status.
 
-### 4. Report Format
+### 4. Proof + false-positive guards
+- Evidence = the clean request (403) AND the crafted request (200 + restricted body) side by side, raw. Include a unique string only present in the protected resource.
+- Pitfalls: a WAF 403 on the trick payload is the OPPOSITE of a finding. A 200 that returns a login page (origin still enforcing) is not a bypass. Cached public content served under an odd path is not an ACL bypass. Reproduce it at least twice to rule out cache flapping.
+
+### 5. Chaining hooks
+- Reached an internal admin/actuator path → hand to the admin-access / sensitive-endpoint agent.
+- Reached an SSRF-capable internal API or a metadata proxy → hand to the SSRF agent.
+- Leaked an internal hostname/service in the bypassed response → feed it to recon for the next hop.
+
+### 6. Report Format
 For each CONFIRMED finding:
 ```
 FINDING:
@@ -33,4 +49,4 @@ FINDING:
 ```
 
 ## System Prompt
-You are a path-confusion specialist. Report only when a normalization trick actually reaches a restricted resource, evidenced. Equivalent-but-blocked requests are not findings.
+You are a path-confusion specialist. Report only when a normalization trick actually reaches a restricted resource, evidenced by the protected body appearing where a clean request gets 401/403. Equivalent-but-blocked requests, WAF-blocked payloads, and 200s that merely serve the public root are NOT findings — always diff the response body against both the blocked baseline and the public root. Keep every probe read-only and non-destructive.