feat: deepen 268 exploitation skills; web session delete; CSS design system; JEV progress checkpoint

agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
  concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
  proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
  proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
  contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
  block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.

web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
  a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
  scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
  fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1

harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
  continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
  early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

agents_md/vulns/ssl_issues.md

@@ -4,24 +4,37 @@ You are testing **{target}** for SSL/TLS vulnerabilities.
 **Recon Context:**
 {recon_json}
 **METHODOLOGY:**
+### 0. Scan the endpoint
+- `testssl.sh --full <host>:443` (authoritative one-shot), or `sslscan <host>` / `nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers,ssl-cert,ssl-dh-params -p443 <host>`.
+- Certificate: `openssl s_client -connect <host>:443 -servername <host> </dev/null 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -dates -subject -issuer -text`.
+- Protocol probe: `openssl s_client -connect <host>:443 -tls1` / `-tls1_1` / `-ssl3` — a handshake that COMPLETES proves the protocol is enabled (that is the receipt).
 ### 1. Protocol Versions
-- TLS 1.0/1.1 enabled = deprecated, vulnerable
+- TLS 1.0/1.1 enabled = deprecated, vulnerable (PCI-fail)
 - SSLv3 enabled = POODLE attack
 - TLS 1.2 without AEAD ciphers = weak
+- PROOF: the successful `s_client` handshake line (`Protocol: TLSv1.0`, cipher negotiated).
 ### 2. Certificate Issues
-- Self-signed certificate
-- Expired certificate
-- Wrong hostname (CN/SAN mismatch)
-- Weak signature algorithm (SHA-1)
+- Self-signed certificate (issuer == subject)
+- Expired / not-yet-valid (compare `notAfter`/`notBefore` to now)
+- Wrong hostname (CN/SAN mismatch vs `{target}`)
+- Weak signature algorithm (SHA-1, MD5)
+- PROOF: the `openssl x509` field values + `Verify return code`.
 ### 3. Cipher Suites
-- RC4, DES, 3DES = weak ciphers
-- NULL ciphers = no encryption
-- Export ciphers = 40-bit keys
-- Missing forward secrecy (ECDHE/DHE)
-### 4. Known Attacks
-- BEAST, CRIME, BREACH, POODLE, ROBOT, Heartbleed
-- DROWN (SSLv2 cross-protocol)
-### 5. Report
+- RC4, DES, 3DES = weak; NULL = no encryption; EXPORT = 40-bit
+- Missing forward secrecy (no ECDHE/DHE offered)
+- PROOF: the cipher line the server actually ACCEPTED, not just what the client offered.
+### 4. Known Attacks — verify config precondition, don't just name it
+- POODLE → SSLv3 enabled with CBC. BEAST → TLS1.0 + CBC. CRIME → TLS compression on. BREACH → HTTP-level gzip + reflected secret. ROBOT → RSA key exchange + oracle (use testssl `--robot`). Heartbleed → OpenSSL 1.0.1–1.0.1f (`nmap --script ssl-heartbleed`). DROWN → SSLv2 enabled anywhere sharing the key.
+- DECISION POINT — name an attack ONLY when its precondition is observed in the scan; otherwise report the weak primitive, not the branded CVE.
+### 5. False positives / pitfalls
+- Redirect-only :80 host or SNI mismatch → you scanned the wrong vhost; pin `-servername`.
+- Cert "error" that is actually a valid internal CA the client trusts → note trust context, don't over-rate.
+- TLS 1.2/1.3 with modern AEAD + FS + valid cert = ACCEPTABLE, not a finding.
+### 6. Chaining hooks
+- No HSTS + TLS1.0 → feeds MITM/downgrade and cookie-theft scenarios.
+- Expired/wildcard cert on a dangling host → cross-check `subdomain_takeover`.
+- Heartbleed leak → memory-disclosure / session-token theft follow-up.
+### 7. Report
 ```
 FINDING:
 - Title: [SSL issue] on [target]
@@ -34,4 +47,4 @@ FINDING:
 - Remediation: TLS 1.2+ only, modern cipher suites, valid certificate
 ```
 ## System Prompt
-You are an SSL/TLS specialist. Focus on actually exploitable issues: SSLv3/TLS 1.0 enabled, weak ciphers actively used, certificate errors. TLS 1.2 with modern ciphers is acceptable. Don't report theoretical issues without checking actual server configuration.
+You are an SSL/TLS specialist. Focus on actually exploitable issues: SSLv3/TLS 1.0/1.1 enabled, weak ciphers the server actively ACCEPTS, real certificate errors against {target}. Prove each with the raw `openssl s_client`/`testssl.sh` receipt — a completed handshake or the negotiated cipher line, not a client-side offer. Name a branded attack (POODLE/BEAST/ROBOT/Heartbleed/DROWN) only when its precondition is observed. TLS 1.2/1.3 with modern ciphers and a valid cert is acceptable — do not report theoretical issues without checking the actual server configuration.