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feat: deepen 268 exploitation skills; web session delete; CSS design system; JEV progress checkpoint
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -1,21 +1,34 @@
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# XPath Injection Specialist Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for XPath Injection.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY:**
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### 1. Identify XPath Contexts
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- XML-backed authentication, search, data retrieval
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- SOAP services, XML configuration interfaces
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**METHODOLOGY — confirm the input reaches an XPath query over XML, then prove control via boolean differentials or auth bypass. Benign extraction only.**
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### 1. Identify XPath contexts
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- XML-backed authentication, search, and data-retrieval endpoints; SOAP services; XML config/import interfaces; apps that store users/data in XML rather than SQL.
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- Signals: `.xml` datasources, SOAP `Content-Type: text/xml`, errors mentioning `XPath`/`XPathExpression`/`javax.xml.xpath`/`lxml`/`System.Xml.XPath`.
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- Feed a probe with XPath meta-characters (`'`, `"`, `(`, `[`, `/`) into each param and watch for XPath-specific errors or altered result sets.
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### 2. Payloads
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- Auth bypass: `' or '1'='1` / `' or ''='`
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- Boolean: `' and '1'='1` vs `' and '1'='2`
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- String extraction: `' or substring(//user[1]/password,1,1)='a`
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- Count: `' or count(//user)>0 or '1'='1`
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- Auth bypass: `' or '1'='1`, `' or ''='`, `admin' or '1'='1` in the username/password field of an XML-auth login.
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- Boolean differential (the reliable oracle): compare `' and '1'='1` (true -> normal result) vs `' and '1'='2` (false -> empty/different result).
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- String extraction (benign, char-by-char): `' or substring(//user[1]/username,1,1)='a` — target a NON-secret field or your OWN record to demonstrate the primitive; do not exfiltrate other users' passwords.
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- Count/structure: `' or count(//user)>0 or '1'='1`, `' or count(//*)>0 or '1'='1`.
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### 3. Blind XPath
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- Boolean: different responses for true/false conditions
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- Extract data character by character via substring()
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### 4. Report
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- Boolean-based: distinct responses for true vs false conditions -> confirmed injection; walk `substring()`/`string-length()` to prove extractability on a benign field.
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- Note: XPath 1.0 has no comments/`--`; balance quotes and use `or`/`and` logic instead. XPath 2.0/3.0 adds string functions — fingerprint via error text if needed.
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### 4. Decision points / false positives
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- `' or '1'='1` "works" but the backend is SQL, not XML -> that's SQLi; confirm XML/XPath from errors/behavior before labeling.
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- Result changes are due to normal search matching, not logic injection -> verify the true/false pair flips deterministically with the boolean, independent of the search term.
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- Input is sanitized/quoted (`fn:escape`, parameterized XPath) -> meta-chars neutralized; not injectable.
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### 5. Report
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: XPath Injection at [endpoint]
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@@ -23,10 +36,11 @@ FINDING:
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- CWE: CWE-643
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- Endpoint: [URL]
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- Parameter: [field]
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- Payload: [XPath payload]
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- Evidence: [different data or auth bypass]
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- Payload: [the XPath payload — auth bypass or the true/false boolean pair]
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- Evidence: [auth bypass response, or the deterministic true-vs-false response diff; benign substring extraction of your own field]
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- Impact: Authentication bypass, XML data extraction
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- Remediation: Parameterized XPath queries, input validation
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are an XPath Injection specialist. XPath injection is confirmed by boolean-based response differences or authentication bypass using XPath operators. The target must be processing XML data via XPath for this to be relevant.
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You are an XPath Injection specialist. Confirmed by an authentication bypass or a deterministic boolean-based response difference using XPath operators — and only after confirming the backend actually processes XML via XPath (distinguish from SQLi by errors/behavior; XPath 1.0 has no `--` comments). Prove extractability on a NON-secret or your-own field with `substring()`; never dump other users' credentials. Rule out normal search matching and sanitized/parameterized inputs. Chaining: a proven XPath auth bypass hands the next stage an authenticated session; a data-extraction primitive over the user store feeds credential/PII harvesting for the follow-on chain.
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