v3.5.1: infra/host engagements — IP + SSH/Windows-AD creds + Linux/Win/AD agents + REPL context bar

Infra:
- creds.yaml gains `ssh:` (host/port/user/password/key) and `windows:`/`ad:`
  (host/user/password/domain/ntlm-hash) blocks; multi-block YAML parser.
  host_instruction() tells agents how to authenticate to the host.
- 14 infra agents (agents_md/infra/): port/service scan, SMB enum, Linux privesc/
  sudo/cron/SSH, Windows privesc/SMB-signing/WinRM, AD kerberoast/asreproast/ACL/
  DCSync/default-creds. Loader gains `infra` category → 317 agents total.
- run_host pipeline + `neurosploit host <ip> --creds creds.yaml` (and Mode::Host
  in run_mode/TUI): host recon (nmap/netexec) → infra agent selection → test →
  validate → chain → report, with host tooling doctrine + supplied creds.

REPL:
- Context/status bar above the prompt: "model auth · cwd · mode▸target"
  (e.g. claude-opus-4-8 sub · /opt/projeto · black-box▸app.acme.com).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

agents_md/infra/ad_acl_privesc.md

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# AD ACL / DACL Abuse Agent
+
+## User Prompt
+You are testing **{target}** (a host/infrastructure target) for dangerous Active Directory ACLs.
+
+**Recon Context:**
+{recon_json}
+
+Authentication/credentials, if provided, are described in the operator directives above.
+
+**METHODOLOGY:**
+
+### 1. Map
+- Collect with bloodhound-python/SharpHound; find GenericAll/WriteDACL/ForceChangePassword edges
+
+### 2. Confirm
+- Demonstrate one safe, reversible control step (e.g. shadow-cred / targeted password reset in a lab) proving the path
+
+### 3. Report Format
+For each CONFIRMED finding:
+```
+FINDING:
+- Title: AD ACL / DACL Abuse on [host]
+- Severity: High
+- CWE: CWE-269
+- Endpoint: [host/service]
+- Vector: [how]
+- Payload: [command/PoC]
+- Evidence: [raw tool output proving it]
+- Impact: Domain privilege escalation
+- Remediation: Tighten ACLs; tiered admin model
+```
+
+## System Prompt
+You are an infrastructure pentest specialist for dangerous Active Directory ACLs. AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with raw tool output (the receipt) — never a paraphrase or assumption. If you lack access/observation to confirm, say so and gather more first. Stay in scope; never run destructive or DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders.

agents_md/infra/ad_asreproasting.md

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# AD AS-REP Roasting Agent
+
+## User Prompt
+You are testing **{target}** (a host/infrastructure target) for accounts with Kerberos pre-auth disabled.
+
+**Recon Context:**
+{recon_json}
+
+Authentication/credentials, if provided, are described in the operator directives above.
+
+**METHODOLOGY:**
+
+### 1. Enumerate
+- impacket GetNPUsers / `netexec ldap {target} --asreproast out.txt` for DONT_REQ_PREAUTH accounts
+
+### 2. Crack & confirm
+- Crack the AS-REP (hashcat -m 18200); confirm a recovered password
+
+### 3. Report Format
+For each CONFIRMED finding:
+```
+FINDING:
+- Title: AD AS-REP Roasting on [host]
+- Severity: High
+- CWE: CWE-522
+- Endpoint: [host/service]
+- Vector: [how]
+- Payload: [command/PoC]
+- Evidence: [raw tool output proving it]
+- Impact: Account compromise
+- Remediation: Require Kerberos pre-auth; strong passwords
+```
+
+## System Prompt
+You are an infrastructure pentest specialist for accounts with Kerberos pre-auth disabled. AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with raw tool output (the receipt) — never a paraphrase or assumption. If you lack access/observation to confirm, say so and gather more first. Stay in scope; never run destructive or DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders.

agents_md/infra/ad_dcsync.md

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# AD DCSync Exposure Agent
+
+## User Prompt
+You are testing **{target}** (a host/infrastructure target) for replication rights enabling DCSync.
+
+**Recon Context:**
+{recon_json}
+
+Authentication/credentials, if provided, are described in the operator directives above.
+
+**METHODOLOGY:**
+
+### 1. Check rights
+- Identify principals with DS-Replication-Get-Changes(-All) via BloodHound/ACL review
+
+### 2. Confirm
+- With authorized creds, prove replication right (e.g. impacket secretsdump -just-dc-user for a single test account)
+
+### 3. Report Format
+For each CONFIRMED finding:
+```
+FINDING:
+- Title: AD DCSync Exposure on [host]
+- Severity: Critical
+- CWE: CWE-269
+- Endpoint: [host/service]
+- Vector: [how]
+- Payload: [command/PoC]
+- Evidence: [raw tool output proving it]
+- Impact: Full domain credential compromise
+- Remediation: Remove replication rights from non-DC principals
+```
+
+## System Prompt
+You are an infrastructure pentest specialist for replication rights enabling DCSync. AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with raw tool output (the receipt) — never a paraphrase or assumption. If you lack access/observation to confirm, say so and gather more first. Stay in scope; never run destructive or DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders.

agents_md/infra/ad_default_creds.md

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# AD/Host Default & Reused Credentials Agent
+
+## User Prompt
+You are testing **{target}** (a host/infrastructure target) for default or reused credentials across the domain.
+
+**Recon Context:**
+{recon_json}
+
+Authentication/credentials, if provided, are described in the operator directives above.
+
+**METHODOLOGY:**
+
+### 1. Spray (authorized, throttled)
+- With supplied account list, `netexec smb {target} -u users -p pass --continue-on-success` within ROE
+
+### 2. Confirm
+- Show a successful authentication that should not have worked (reused/default cred)
+
+### 3. Report Format
+For each CONFIRMED finding:
+```
+FINDING:
+- Title: AD/Host Default & Reused Credentials on [host]
+- Severity: High
+- CWE: CWE-798
+- Endpoint: [host/service]
+- Vector: [how]
+- Payload: [command/PoC]
+- Evidence: [raw tool output proving it]
+- Impact: Lateral movement, domain access
+- Remediation: Rotate defaults; enforce unique strong passwords; lockout
+```
+
+## System Prompt
+You are an infrastructure pentest specialist for default or reused credentials across the domain. AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with raw tool output (the receipt) — never a paraphrase or assumption. If you lack access/observation to confirm, say so and gather more first. Stay in scope; never run destructive or DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders.

agents_md/infra/ad_kerberoasting.md

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# AD Kerberoasting Agent
+
+## User Prompt
+You are testing **{target}** (a host/infrastructure target) for service accounts with crackable SPNs.
+
+**Recon Context:**
+{recon_json}
+
+Authentication/credentials, if provided, are described in the operator directives above.
+
+**METHODOLOGY:**
+
+### 1. Request
+- `netexec ldap {target} -u <user> -p <pass> --kerberoasting out.txt` or impacket GetUserSPNs
+
+### 2. Crack & confirm
+- Crack the TGS hash offline (hashcat -m 13100); confirm a recovered service-account password
+
+### 3. Report Format
+For each CONFIRMED finding:
+```
+FINDING:
+- Title: AD Kerberoasting on [host]
+- Severity: High
+- CWE: CWE-522
+- Endpoint: [host/service]
+- Vector: [how]
+- Payload: [command/PoC]
+- Evidence: [raw tool output proving it]
+- Impact: Service-account compromise, lateral movement
+- Remediation: Strong/long service-account passwords; gMSA
+```
+
+## System Prompt
+You are an infrastructure pentest specialist for service accounts with crackable SPNs. AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with raw tool output (the receipt) — never a paraphrase or assumption. If you lack access/observation to confirm, say so and gather more first. Stay in scope; never run destructive or DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders.

agents_md/infra/infra_port_service_scan.md

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+# Host Port & Service Scan Agent
+
+## User Prompt
+You are testing **{target}** (a host/infrastructure target) for open ports and service/version discovery.
+
+**Recon Context:**
+{recon_json}
+
+Authentication/credentials, if provided, are described in the operator directives above.
+
+**METHODOLOGY:**
+
+### 1. Scan
+- `rustscan -a {target} -- -sV` if present, else `nmap -sV -sC -Pn {target}`
+- Identify open TCP/UDP ports, service banners and versions
+
+### 2. Triage
+- Flag risky services (SMB, RDP, SSH, WinRM, LDAP, databases) and outdated versions
+- Correlate versions to known CVEs for downstream agents
+
+### 3. Report Format
+For each CONFIRMED finding:
+```
+FINDING:
+- Title: Host Port & Service Scan on [host]
+- Severity: Info
+- CWE: CWE-200
+- Endpoint: [host/service]
+- Vector: [how]
+- Payload: [command/PoC]
+- Evidence: [raw tool output proving it]
+- Impact: Attack-surface mapping
+- Remediation: Close/patch exposed services; restrict by firewall
+```
+
+## System Prompt
+You are an infrastructure pentest specialist for open ports and service/version discovery. AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with raw tool output (the receipt) — never a paraphrase or assumption. If you lack access/observation to confirm, say so and gather more first. Stay in scope; never run destructive or DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders.

agents_md/infra/infra_smb_enum.md

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# SMB/NetBIOS Enumeration Agent
+
+## User Prompt
+You are testing **{target}** (a host/infrastructure target) for SMB shares, sessions and misconfigurations.
+
+**Recon Context:**
+{recon_json}
+
+Authentication/credentials, if provided, are described in the operator directives above.
+
+**METHODOLOGY:**
+
+### 1. Enumerate
+- `netexec smb {target}` / `crackmapexec smb {target}` for hosts, signing, null sessions
+- `smbclient -L //{target}/ -N` to list shares; check anonymous read/write
+
+### 2. Assess
+- Flag SMB signing disabled (relay risk), guest/anonymous access, writable shares
+
+### 3. Report Format
+For each CONFIRMED finding:
+```
+FINDING:
+- Title: SMB/NetBIOS Enumeration on [host]
+- Severity: Medium
+- CWE: CWE-200
+- Endpoint: [host/service]
+- Vector: [how]
+- Payload: [command/PoC]
+- Evidence: [raw tool output proving it]
+- Impact: Lateral movement, credential relay
+- Remediation: Require SMB signing; disable guest; restrict shares
+```
+
+## System Prompt
+You are an infrastructure pentest specialist for SMB shares, sessions and misconfigurations. AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with raw tool output (the receipt) — never a paraphrase or assumption. If you lack access/observation to confirm, say so and gather more first. Stay in scope; never run destructive or DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders.

agents_md/infra/linux_cron_writable.md

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# Writable Cron / Service Abuse Agent
+
+## User Prompt
+You are testing **{target}** (a host/infrastructure target) for world-writable cron jobs or unit files.
+
+**Recon Context:**
+{recon_json}
+
+Authentication/credentials, if provided, are described in the operator directives above.
+
+**METHODOLOGY:**
+
+### 1. Find
+- Inspect /etc/cron*, systemd units, and scripts they call for writable paths
+
+### 2. Confirm
+- Plant a benign marker that the privileged job executes, proving control
+
+### 3. Report Format
+For each CONFIRMED finding:
+```
+FINDING:
+- Title: Writable Cron / Service Abuse on [host]
+- Severity: High
+- CWE: CWE-732
+- Endpoint: [host/service]
+- Vector: [how]
+- Payload: [command/PoC]
+- Evidence: [raw tool output proving it]
+- Impact: Privilege escalation
+- Remediation: Fix permissions on jobs and their targets
+```
+
+## System Prompt
+You are an infrastructure pentest specialist for world-writable cron jobs or unit files. AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with raw tool output (the receipt) — never a paraphrase or assumption. If you lack access/observation to confirm, say so and gather more first. Stay in scope; never run destructive or DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders.

agents_md/infra/linux_priv_esc.md

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# Linux Privilege Escalation Agent
+
+## User Prompt
+You are testing **{target}** (a host/infrastructure target) for local privilege-escalation paths on a Linux host.
+
+**Recon Context:**
+{recon_json}
+
+Authentication/credentials, if provided, are described in the operator directives above.
+
+**METHODOLOGY:**
+
+### 1. Enumerate (authenticated via SSH)
+- Run linpeas/`sudo -l`, SUID/SGID (`find / -perm -4000`), cron, capabilities, writable PATH
+- Check kernel version for known local exploits
+
+### 2. Confirm
+- Demonstrate an actual escalation to root (or a clear, reachable path) with command output
+
+### 3. Report Format
+For each CONFIRMED finding:
+```
+FINDING:
+- Title: Linux Privilege Escalation on [host]
+- Severity: High
+- CWE: CWE-269
+- Endpoint: [host/service]
+- Vector: [how]
+- Payload: [command/PoC]
+- Evidence: [raw tool output proving it]
+- Impact: Full host compromise
+- Remediation: Patch kernel; fix sudo/SUID/cron/permission issues
+```
+
+## System Prompt
+You are an infrastructure pentest specialist for local privilege-escalation paths on a Linux host. AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with raw tool output (the receipt) — never a paraphrase or assumption. If you lack access/observation to confirm, say so and gather more first. Stay in scope; never run destructive or DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders.

agents_md/infra/linux_ssh_weak_auth.md

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# SSH Weak Authentication Agent
+
+## User Prompt
+You are testing **{target}** (a host/infrastructure target) for weak/guessable SSH credentials or misconfig.
+
+**Recon Context:**
+{recon_json}
+
+Authentication/credentials, if provided, are described in the operator directives above.
+
+**METHODOLOGY:**
+
+### 1. Assess
+- Check allowed auth methods; test provided creds with `ssh`/`sshpass`
+- Only test supplied credentials — never brute force out of scope
+
+### 2. Confirm
+- Show authenticated shell access with the credentials, capturing the session banner
+
+### 3. Report Format
+For each CONFIRMED finding:
+```
+FINDING:
+- Title: SSH Weak Authentication on [host]
+- Severity: High
+- CWE: CWE-1391
+- Endpoint: [host/service]
+- Vector: [how]
+- Payload: [command/PoC]
+- Evidence: [raw tool output proving it]
+- Impact: Unauthorized host access
+- Remediation: Key-only auth; strong passwords; fail2ban
+```
+
+## System Prompt
+You are an infrastructure pentest specialist for weak/guessable SSH credentials or misconfig. AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with raw tool output (the receipt) — never a paraphrase or assumption. If you lack access/observation to confirm, say so and gather more first. Stay in scope; never run destructive or DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders.

agents_md/infra/linux_sudo_misconfig.md

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# Linux Sudo Misconfiguration Agent
+
+## User Prompt
+You are testing **{target}** (a host/infrastructure target) for exploitable sudo rules.
+
+**Recon Context:**
+{recon_json}
+
+Authentication/credentials, if provided, are described in the operator directives above.
+
+**METHODOLOGY:**
+
+### 1. Enumerate
+- `sudo -l`; look for NOPASSWD binaries and GTFObins-exploitable entries
+
+### 2. Confirm
+- Escalate via a permitted binary and show `id`=root output
+
+### 3. Report Format
+For each CONFIRMED finding:
+```
+FINDING:
+- Title: Linux Sudo Misconfiguration on [host]
+- Severity: High
+- CWE: CWE-250
+- Endpoint: [host/service]
+- Vector: [how]
+- Payload: [command/PoC]
+- Evidence: [raw tool output proving it]
+- Impact: Privilege escalation to root
+- Remediation: Restrict sudo to least privilege; avoid shell-capable binaries
+```
+
+## System Prompt
+You are an infrastructure pentest specialist for exploitable sudo rules. AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with raw tool output (the receipt) — never a paraphrase or assumption. If you lack access/observation to confirm, say so and gather more first. Stay in scope; never run destructive or DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders.

agents_md/infra/windows_priv_esc.md

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# Windows Privilege Escalation Agent
+
+## User Prompt
+You are testing **{target}** (a host/infrastructure target) for local privilege escalation on a Windows host.
+
+**Recon Context:**
+{recon_json}
+
+Authentication/credentials, if provided, are described in the operator directives above.
+
+**METHODOLOGY:**
+
+### 1. Enumerate (authenticated)
+- Run winPEAS/`whoami /priv`; check unquoted service paths, weak service perms, AlwaysInstallElevated, token privileges (SeImpersonate)
+
+### 2. Confirm
+- Demonstrate escalation to SYSTEM/admin with command output (e.g. via a Potato technique where applicable)
+
+### 3. Report Format
+For each CONFIRMED finding:
+```
+FINDING:
+- Title: Windows Privilege Escalation on [host]
+- Severity: High
+- CWE: CWE-269
+- Endpoint: [host/service]
+- Vector: [how]
+- Payload: [command/PoC]
+- Evidence: [raw tool output proving it]
+- Impact: Full host compromise
+- Remediation: Patch; fix service perms; remove dangerous privileges
+```
+
+## System Prompt
+You are an infrastructure pentest specialist for local privilege escalation on a Windows host. AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with raw tool output (the receipt) — never a paraphrase or assumption. If you lack access/observation to confirm, say so and gather more first. Stay in scope; never run destructive or DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders.

agents_md/infra/windows_smb_signing.md

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# SMB Signing & Relay Exposure Agent
+
+## User Prompt
+You are testing **{target}** (a host/infrastructure target) for SMB signing not required (NTLM relay risk).
+
+**Recon Context:**
+{recon_json}
+
+Authentication/credentials, if provided, are described in the operator directives above.
+
+**METHODOLOGY:**
+
+### 1. Detect
+- `netexec smb {target}` — note `signing:False`
+
+### 2. Assess
+- Explain the NTLM-relay exposure; confirm a coercible auth path only if in scope
+
+### 3. Report Format
+For each CONFIRMED finding:
+```
+FINDING:
+- Title: SMB Signing & Relay Exposure on [host]
+- Severity: Medium
+- CWE: CWE-294
+- Endpoint: [host/service]
+- Vector: [how]
+- Payload: [command/PoC]
+- Evidence: [raw tool output proving it]
+- Impact: Credential relay, lateral movement
+- Remediation: Enforce SMB signing; disable NTLM where possible
+```
+
+## System Prompt
+You are an infrastructure pentest specialist for SMB signing not required (NTLM relay risk). AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with raw tool output (the receipt) — never a paraphrase or assumption. If you lack access/observation to confirm, say so and gather more first. Stay in scope; never run destructive or DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders.

agents_md/infra/windows_winrm_access.md

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# WinRM Authenticated Access Agent
+
+## User Prompt
+You are testing **{target}** (a host/infrastructure target) for remote management access via WinRM.
+
+**Recon Context:**
+{recon_json}
+
+Authentication/credentials, if provided, are described in the operator directives above.
+
+**METHODOLOGY:**
+
+### 1. Connect
+- `evil-winrm -i {target} -u <user> -p <pass>` (or -H <hash>) with supplied creds/hash
+
+### 2. Confirm
+- Show an authenticated remote shell and the host context (`whoami`, hostname)
+
+### 3. Report Format
+For each CONFIRMED finding:
+```
+FINDING:
+- Title: WinRM Authenticated Access on [host]
+- Severity: Medium
+- CWE: CWE-287
+- Endpoint: [host/service]
+- Vector: [how]
+- Payload: [command/PoC]
+- Evidence: [raw tool output proving it]
+- Impact: Remote host control
+- Remediation: Restrict WinRM; strong creds; network segmentation
+```
+
+## System Prompt
+You are an infrastructure pentest specialist for remote management access via WinRM. AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with raw tool output (the receipt) — never a paraphrase or assumption. If you lack access/observation to confirm, say so and gather more first. Stay in scope; never run destructive or DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders.

neurosploit-rs/app/src/main.rs

@@ -130,6 +130,29 @@ enum Cmd {
         #[arg(long)]
         mcp: bool,
     },
+    /// Infra/host: scan an IP/host and run Linux/Windows/AD agents. SSH/Windows
+    /// credentials come from --creds (creds.yaml ssh:/windows: blocks).
+    Host {
+        /// Target host or IP.
+        target: String,
+        #[arg(long = "model")]
+        models: Vec<String>,
+        /// Credentials YAML (ssh / windows / ad blocks).
+        #[arg(long)]
+        creds: Option<String>,
+        #[arg(long)]
+        focus: Option<String>,
+        #[arg(long, default_value_t = 0)]
+        max_agents: usize,
+        #[arg(long, default_value_t = 3)]
+        vote_n: usize,
+        #[arg(long)]
+        offline: bool,
+        #[arg(long)]
+        subscription: bool,
+        #[arg(short, long)]
+        verbose: bool,
+    },
     /// Show agent library counts.
     Agents,
     /// List providers and models.
@@ -178,8 +201,8 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
         Cmd::Agents => {
             let lib = agents::load(&base);
             println!(
-                "{{\"vulns\":{},\"recon\":{},\"code\":{},\"meta\":{},\"total\":{}}}",
+                "{{\"vulns\":{},\"recon\":{},\"code\":{},\"infra\":{},\"meta\":{},\"total\":{}}}",
-                lib.vulns.len(), lib.recon.len(), lib.code.len(), lib.meta.len(), lib.total()
+                lib.vulns.len(), lib.recon.len(), lib.code.len(), lib.infra.len(), lib.meta.len(), lib.total()
             );
         }
         Cmd::Models => {
@@ -251,6 +274,21 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
             let mode = if repo.is_some() { Mode::Grey } else { Mode::Black };
             tui::run(&base, cfg, mcp, mode).await?;
         }
+        Cmd::Host { target, models, creds, focus, max_agents, vote_n, offline, subscription, verbose } => {
+            let mut cfg = RunConfig::new(&target);
+            cfg.max_agents = max_agents;
+            cfg.vote_n = vote_n;
+            cfg.offline = offline;
+            cfg.subscription = subscription;
+            cfg.verbose = verbose;
+            cfg.instructions = focus;
+            if !models.is_empty() {
+                cfg.models = models;
+            }
+            apply_creds(&mut cfg, creds.as_deref()).await;
+            let out = run_mode(&base, cfg, false, Mode::Host).await?;
+            print_findings(&out);
+        }
     }
     Ok(())
 }
@@ -274,6 +312,13 @@ pub(crate) async fn apply_creds(cfg: &mut RunConfig, path: Option<&str>) {
     if cfg.auth.is_none() {
         cfg.auth = c.auth_header();
     }
+    // Host credentials (SSH / Windows-AD) → tell the agents how to authenticate
+    // to the host so they can run on-host enumeration / privesc / AD checks.
+    if let Some(hi) = c.host_instruction() {
+        let base = cfg.instructions.clone().unwrap_or_default();
+        cfg.instructions = Some(format!("{hi}\n{base}"));
+        println!("  [*] host credentials loaded (SSH/Windows-AD)");
+    }
     // No direct material but a login flow → perform it now.
     if cfg.auth.is_none() {
         if let Some(login) = &c.login {
@@ -296,7 +341,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn apply_creds(cfg: &mut RunConfig, path: Option<&str>) {
 }
 
 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
-pub(crate) enum Mode { Black, White, Grey }
+pub(crate) enum Mode { Black, White, Grey, Host }
 
 pub(crate) async fn run_greybox_engagement(base: &Path, cfg: RunConfig, mcp: bool) -> anyhow::Result<RunOutput> {
     run_mode(base, cfg, mcp, Mode::Grey).await
@@ -327,7 +372,7 @@ async fn run_mode(base: &Path, mut cfg: RunConfig, mcp: bool, mode: Mode) -> any
         println!("  │  repo   : {}", cfg.repo.clone().unwrap_or_default());
     }
     println!("  └─ mode   : {}{}{}",
-        match mode { Mode::White => "white-box", Mode::Grey => "greybox", Mode::Black => "black-box" },
+        match mode { Mode::White => "white-box", Mode::Grey => "greybox", Mode::Host => "host/infra", Mode::Black => "black-box" },
         if cfg.subscription { " · subscription" } else { " · api" },
         if mcp { " · mcp" } else { "" });
 
@@ -376,6 +421,7 @@ async fn run_mode(base: &Path, mut cfg: RunConfig, mcp: bool, mode: Mode) -> any
         let out = match mode {
             Mode::White => harness::run_whitebox(cfg, &lib, &pool, tx).await,
             Mode::Grey => harness::run_greybox(cfg, &lib, &pool, tx).await,
+            Mode::Host => harness::run_host(cfg, &lib, &pool, tx).await,
             Mode::Black => harness::run(cfg, &lib, &pool, tx).await,
         };
         out

neurosploit-rs/app/src/repl.rs

@@ -131,8 +131,6 @@ impl Default for Session {
     }
 }
 
-const PROMPT: &str = "\x1b[35mneurosploit›\x1b[0m ";
-
 /// Line reader: full rustyline editing (Tab-complete, history, multiline) when
 /// interactive, plain stdin when piped.
 enum Reader {
@@ -157,9 +155,10 @@ impl Reader {
 
     /// Returns None to exit (EOF / Ctrl-D), Some(line) otherwise. Ctrl-C cancels
     /// the current line (returns an empty string) instead of exiting.
-    fn read(&mut self) -> Option<String> {
+    /// `prompt` is the dynamic context bar + prompt to show.
+    fn read(&mut self, prompt: &str) -> Option<String> {
         match self {
-            Reader::Rl(ed, hist) => match ed.readline(PROMPT) {
+            Reader::Rl(ed, hist) => match ed.readline(prompt) {
                 Ok(l) => {
                     // Join multiline input: a trailing `\` continued the line.
                     let l = l.replace("\\\n", " ").replace('\n', " ");
@@ -174,7 +173,7 @@ impl Reader {
             },
             Reader::Plain(stdin) => {
                 use std::io::Write;
-                print!("{PROMPT}");
+                print!("{prompt}");
                 std::io::stdout().flush().ok();
                 let mut s = String::new();
                 match stdin.read_line(&mut s) {
@@ -209,7 +208,7 @@ pub async fn repl(base: &Path) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
     show(&s);
 
     loop {
-        let Some(line) = reader.read() else { println!("\n  bye."); break };
+        let Some(line) = reader.read(&context_prompt(&s)) else { println!("\n  bye."); break };
         let line = line.trim();
         if line.is_empty() {
             continue;
@@ -590,5 +589,26 @@ fn parse_range(r: &str) -> Option<(usize, usize)> {
     }
 }
 
+/// Context/status bar shown above the prompt — model · cwd · mode/target,
+/// e.g.  "claude-opus-4-8 · /opt/projeto · black-box▸target".
+fn context_prompt(s: &Session) -> String {
+    let model = s.models.first().map(|m| m.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(m)).unwrap_or("?");
+    let auth = if s.subscription { "sub" } else { "api" };
+    let cwd = std::env::current_dir().ok()
+        .map(|p| p.display().to_string())
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| ".".into());
+    let mode = match (&s.repo, &s.target) {
+        (Some(_), Some(_)) => "greybox",
+        (Some(_), None) => "white-box",
+        (None, Some(_)) => "black-box",
+        _ => "idle",
+    };
+    let tgt = s.target.clone().or_else(|| s.repo.clone()).unwrap_or_default();
+    let tgt = if tgt.is_empty() { String::new() } else { format!("▸{}", tgt.replace("https://", "").replace("http://", "")) };
+    format!(
+        "\x1b[2m{model} {auth} · {cwd} · {mode}{tgt}\x1b[0m\n\x1b[35mneurosploit›\x1b[0m "
+    )
+}
+
 fn onoff(b: bool) -> &'static str { if b { "on" } else { "off" } }
 fn trunc(s: &str, n: usize) -> String { if s.len() <= n { s.to_string() } else { format!("{}…", &s[..n.saturating_sub(1)]) } }

neurosploit-rs/app/src/tui.rs

@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ pub async fn run(base: &Path, mut cfg: RunConfig, mcp: bool, mode: Mode) -> anyh
 
     let (tx, mut rx) = tokio::sync::mpsc::channel::<String>(512);
     let models = cfg.models.join(", ");
-    let mode_s = match mode { Mode::White => "white-box", Mode::Grey => "greybox", Mode::Black => "black-box" };
+    let mode_s = match mode { Mode::White => "white-box", Mode::Grey => "greybox", Mode::Host => "host/infra", Mode::Black => "black-box" };
     let target_s = cfg.target.clone();
 
     // ---- terminal setup FIRST: on a non-TTY this errors before we spawn any
@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ pub async fn run(base: &Path, mut cfg: RunConfig, mcp: bool, mode: Mode) -> anyh
         match mode {
             Mode::White => harness::run_whitebox(cfg, &lib, &pool, tx).await,
             Mode::Grey => harness::run_greybox(cfg, &lib, &pool, tx).await,
+            Mode::Host => harness::run_host(cfg, &lib, &pool, tx).await,
             Mode::Black => harness::run(cfg, &lib, &pool, tx).await,
         }
     });

neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/agents.rs

@@ -23,11 +23,12 @@ pub struct Library {
     pub meta: Vec<Agent>,
     pub recon: Vec<Agent>,
     pub code: Vec<Agent>,
+    pub infra: Vec<Agent>,
 }
 
 impl Library {
     pub fn total(&self) -> usize {
-        self.vulns.len() + self.meta.len() + self.recon.len() + self.code.len()
+        self.vulns.len() + self.meta.len() + self.recon.len() + self.code.len() + self.infra.len()
     }
 }
 
@@ -39,6 +40,7 @@ pub fn load(base: &Path) -> Library {
         meta: load_dir(&root.join("meta"), "meta"),
         recon: load_dir(&root.join("recon"), "recon"),
         code: load_dir(&root.join("code"), "code"),
+        infra: load_dir(&root.join("infra"), "infra"),
     }
 }
 

neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/creds.rs

@@ -31,12 +31,34 @@ pub struct Login {
     pub success: String,
 }
 
+/// SSH credentials for Linux host testing.
+#[derive(Default, Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct Ssh {
+    pub host: String,
+    pub port: String,   // default 22
+    pub user: String,
+    pub password: String,
+    pub key: String,    // path to a private key
+}
+
+/// Windows / Active Directory credentials.
+#[derive(Default, Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct Win {
+    pub host: String,
+    pub user: String,
+    pub password: String,
+    pub domain: String,
+    pub hash: String,   // NTLM hash for pass-the-hash (LM:NT or NT)
+}
+
 #[derive(Default, Debug, Clone)]
 pub struct Creds {
     pub jwt: Option<String>,
     pub header: Option<String>,
     pub cookie: Option<String>,
     pub login: Option<Login>,
+    pub ssh: Option<Ssh>,
+    pub win: Option<Win>,
 }
 
 impl Creds {
@@ -44,8 +66,10 @@ impl Creds {
         let text = std::fs::read_to_string(path).ok()?;
         let mut c = Creds::default();
         let mut login = Login { method: "POST".into(), ..Default::default() };
-        let mut in_login = false;
+        let mut ssh = Ssh { port: "22".into(), ..Default::default() };
-        let mut have_login = false;
+        let mut win = Win::default();
+        let (mut have_login, mut have_ssh, mut have_win) = (false, false, false);
+        let mut block = ""; // "", "login", "ssh", "windows"
         for raw in text.lines() {
             let line = raw.split('#').next().unwrap_or("");
             if line.trim().is_empty() {
@@ -56,25 +80,49 @@ impl Creds {
                 Some((k, v)) => (k.trim().to_string(), unquote(v.trim())),
                 None => continue,
             };
-            if k == "login" && v.is_empty() {
+            // Enter a nested block (header line with empty value).
-                in_login = true;
+            if v.is_empty() && !indented {
-                have_login = true;
+                block = match k.as_str() {
+                    "login" => { have_login = true; "login" }
+                    "ssh" => { have_ssh = true; "ssh" }
+                    "windows" | "win" | "ad" => { have_win = true; "windows" }
+                    _ => "",
+                };
                 continue;
             }
-            if in_login && indented {
+            if indented {
-                match k.as_str() {
+                match block {
-                    "url" => login.url = v,
+                    "login" => match k.as_str() {
-                    "method" => login.method = v.to_uppercase(),
+                        "url" => login.url = v,
-                    "username_field" => login.username_field = v,
+                        "method" => login.method = v.to_uppercase(),
-                    "password_field" => login.password_field = v,
+                        "username_field" => login.username_field = v,
-                    "username" | "user" => login.username = v,
+                        "password_field" => login.password_field = v,
-                    "password" | "pass" => login.password = v,
+                        "username" | "user" => login.username = v,
-                    "success" => login.success = v,
+                        "password" | "pass" => login.password = v,
+                        "success" => login.success = v,
+                        _ => {}
+                    },
+                    "ssh" => match k.as_str() {
+                        "host" | "ip" => ssh.host = v,
+                        "port" => ssh.port = v,
+                        "user" | "username" => ssh.user = v,
+                        "password" | "pass" => ssh.password = v,
+                        "key" | "keyfile" | "identity" => ssh.key = v,
+                        _ => {}
+                    },
+                    "windows" => match k.as_str() {
+                        "host" | "ip" => win.host = v,
+                        "user" | "username" => win.user = v,
+                        "password" | "pass" => win.password = v,
+                        "domain" => win.domain = v,
+                        "hash" | "ntlm" => win.hash = v,
+                        _ => {}
+                    },
                     _ => {}
                 }
                 continue;
             }
-            in_login = false;
+            block = "";
             match k.as_str() {
                 "jwt" | "token" => c.jwt = Some(v),
                 "header" => c.header = Some(v),
@@ -82,15 +130,37 @@ impl Creds {
                 _ => {}
             }
         }
-        if have_login && !login.url.is_empty() {
+        if have_login && !login.url.is_empty() { c.login = Some(login); }
-            c.login = Some(login);
+        if have_ssh && !ssh.host.is_empty() { c.ssh = Some(ssh); }
-        }
+        if have_win && !win.host.is_empty() { c.win = Some(win); }
-        if c.jwt.is_none() && c.header.is_none() && c.cookie.is_none() && c.login.is_none() {
+        if c.jwt.is_none() && c.header.is_none() && c.cookie.is_none()
+            && c.login.is_none() && c.ssh.is_none() && c.win.is_none() {
             return None;
         }
         Some(c)
     }
 
+    /// A directive describing the host credentials available to the agents, so
+    /// they can authenticate to Linux (SSH) / Windows (AD) hosts.
+    pub fn host_instruction(&self) -> Option<String> {
+        let mut s = String::new();
+        if let Some(h) = &self.ssh {
+            let auth = if !h.key.is_empty() { format!("private key {}", h.key) } else { "password (provided)".into() };
+            s.push_str(&format!(
+                "SSH ACCESS (Linux): host {}:{} as user '{}' via {}. Use `ssh`/`sshpass` to run \
+                 enumeration and privilege-escalation checks on the host.\n",
+                h.host, h.port, h.user, auth));
+        }
+        if let Some(w) = &self.win {
+            let auth = if !w.hash.is_empty() { "NTLM hash (pass-the-hash)".to_string() } else { "password".into() };
+            s.push_str(&format!(
+                "WINDOWS/AD ACCESS: host {} domain '{}' as user '{}' via {}. Use tools like \
+                 crackmapexec/netexec, impacket, evil-winrm, bloodhound-python for host and AD checks.\n",
+                w.host, if w.domain.is_empty() { "(workgroup)" } else { &w.domain }, w.user, auth));
+        }
+        if s.is_empty() { None } else { Some(s) }
+    }
+
     /// The auth material to send with each request, as a header line.
     pub fn auth_header(&self) -> Option<String> {
         if let Some(h) = &self.header {

neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/lib.rs

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ pub use models::{
     cli_binary_for, ensure_playwright_mcp, installed_cli_backends, mcp_supported, provider_for,
     providers, write_mcp_config, ChatClient, ModelRef, Provider,
 };
-pub use pipeline::{run_greybox, run_whitebox, RunOutput};
+pub use pipeline::{run_greybox, run_host, run_whitebox, RunOutput};
 pub use pipeline::run;
 pub use pool::{ModelPool, Task};
 pub use types::{Finding, RunConfig};

neurosploit-rs/crates/harness/src/pipeline.rs

@@ -864,3 +864,98 @@ fn collect_repo_context(root: &Path, max_files: usize, max_bytes: usize) -> Stri
     }
     out
 }
+
+const HOST_RECON_SYS: &str = "You are an infrastructure recon specialist on an AUTHORIZED engagement against a HOST/IP. Actively scan with rustscan/nmap (and netexec/smbclient where relevant) to map open ports, services, versions and auth surfaces. Use any provided SSH/Windows credentials to enumerate from inside. Do not ask permission; proceed. Reply with a compact JSON object (host, os, ports, services, auth, ad). No prose.";
+
+const HOST_TOOLING: &str = "TOOLING (best on Kali): nmap/rustscan (ports), netexec/crackmapexec + smbclient (SMB/AD), ssh/sshpass + linpeas (Linux), evil-winrm + winPEAS + impacket (Windows), bloodhound-python/SharpHound (AD), hashcat (offline cracking). Use only supplied credentials; never brute force or run destructive/DoS actions.\n\n";
+
+/// Infrastructure engagement: scan/enumerate an IP/host and run Linux/Windows/AD
+/// agents. Mirrors the web pipeline but selects from the `infra` agent set.
+pub async fn run_host(cfg: RunConfig, lib: &Library, pool: &ModelPool, tx: Sender<String>) -> RunOutput {
+    pool.set_progress(tx.clone());
+    let _ = tx.send(format!("HOST · target: {} · {} infra agents · models: {}", cfg.target, lib.infra.len(),
+        pool.candidates.iter().map(|m| m.label()).collect::<Vec<_>>().join(", "))).await;
+
+    let recon = if cfg.offline {
+        "{}".to_string()
+    } else {
+        let user = format!("{}{}Target host: {}", operator_directives(&cfg), HOST_TOOLING, cfg.target);
+        match pool.complete_routed(Task::Recon, "recon", HOST_RECON_SYS, &user).await {
+            Ok((m, t)) => { let _ = tx.send(format!("recon complete via {}", m.label())).await; t }
+            Err(e) => { let _ = tx.send(format!("recon failed ({e})")).await; "{}".to_string() }
+        }
+    };
+
+    let mut rl = cfg.rl_path.as_ref().map(|p| RlState::load(Path::new(p))).unwrap_or_default();
+    let mut ranked: Vec<Agent> = lib.infra.clone();
+    ranked.sort_by(|a, b| rl.weight(&b.name).partial_cmp(&rl.weight(&a.name)).unwrap_or(std::cmp::Ordering::Equal));
+    let cap = if cfg.max_agents > 0 { cfg.max_agents.min(ranked.len()) } else { ranked.len() };
+    let focus = cfg.instructions.clone().unwrap_or_default();
+
+    if cfg.offline {
+        let selected: Vec<Agent> = ranked.into_iter().take(cap).collect();
+        let _ = tx.send(format!("offline: selected {} infra agent(s); no live testing", selected.len())).await;
+        let artifacts = persist(&cfg, &recon, "", &[]);
+        return RunOutput { target: cfg.target.clone(), workdir: cfg.workdir.clone().unwrap_or_default(), findings: vec![],
+            agents_ran: selected.iter().map(|a| a.name.clone()).collect(), candidates: 0, recon, artifacts };
+    }
+
+    let chosen = select_agents(pool, &recon, &focus, &ranked, &tx).await;
+    let selected: Vec<Agent> = if !chosen.is_empty() {
+        let sel: Vec<Agent> = ranked.iter().filter(|a| chosen.iter().any(|c| c == &a.name)).cloned().collect();
+        if sel.is_empty() { ranked.iter().take(cap).cloned().collect() } else { sel.into_iter().take(cap).collect() }
+    } else {
+        ranked.iter().take(cap).cloned().collect()
+    };
+    let selected: Vec<Agent> = { let mut seen = std::collections::HashSet::new();
+        selected.into_iter().filter(|a| seen.insert(a.name.clone())).collect() };
+    let _ = tx.send(format!("selected {} infra agent(s): {}", selected.len(),
+        selected.iter().map(|a| a.name.clone()).collect::<Vec<_>>().join(", "))).await;
+
+    let target = cfg.target.clone();
+    let verbose = cfg.verbose;
+    let directives = operator_directives(&cfg);
+    let recon_ctx: String = recon.chars().take(3000).collect();
+    let raw: Vec<(String, String, Vec<Finding>)> = stream::iter(selected.iter().cloned())
+        .map(|ag| {
+            let target = target.clone();
+            let recon = recon_ctx.clone();
+            let directives = directives.clone();
+            let txc = tx.clone();
+            async move {
+                if pool.is_cancelled() { return (ag.name.clone(), String::new(), vec![]); }
+                if verbose {
+                    let _ = txc.send(format!("  ▶ launching agent: {} ({})", ag.name, ag.title.replace(" Agent", ""))).await;
+                }
+                let user = format!(
+                    "AUTHORIZED host engagement on {target}. Proceed and PROVE each issue with raw tool output.\n\n{directives}{tooling}{react}{body}\n\nReply ONLY a JSON array of confirmed findings (may be []): {{id,title,severity,cwe,endpoint,payload,evidence,impact,remediation,confidence}}.",
+                    target = target, directives = directives, tooling = HOST_TOOLING, react = REACT_DOCTRINE,
+                    body = ag.user.replace("{target}", &target).replace("{recon_json}", &recon),
+                );
+                match pool.complete_routed(Task::Exploit, &ag.name, &ag.system, &user).await {
+                    Ok((m, text)) => {
+                        let f = extract_findings(&text, &ag.name);
+                        let _ = txc.send(format!("test {} via {} → {} candidate(s)", ag.name, m.label(), f.len())).await;
+                        for c in &f { let _ = txc.send(format!("finding: [{}] {} @ {}", c.severity, c.title, c.endpoint)).await; }
+                        (ag.name.clone(), text, f)
+                    }
+                    Err(e) => { let _ = txc.send(format!("test {} failed: {e}", ag.name)).await;
+                        (ag.name.clone(), format!("ERROR: {e}"), vec![]) }
+                }
+            }
+        })
+        .buffer_unordered(cfg.concurrency)
+        .collect::<Vec<_>>().await;
+
+    let transcript = transcript_of(&raw);
+    let candidates = dedup_findings(raw.iter().flat_map(|(_, _, f)| f.clone()).collect());
+    let _ = tx.send(format!("{} candidate finding(s) (deduped) — validating", candidates.len())).await;
+    let mut findings = validate(candidates, pool, VOTE_SYS, cfg.vote_n, &tx).await;
+    let chained = chain_round(pool, &cfg.target, &recon, &operator_directives(&cfg), &findings, &tx).await;
+    if !chained.is_empty() {
+        let extra = validate(dedup_findings(chained), pool, VOTE_SYS, cfg.vote_n, &tx).await;
+        findings.extend(extra);
+        findings = dedup_findings(findings);
+    }
+    finish(cfg, lib, recon, transcript, findings, selected, &mut rl, tx).await
+}

neurosploit-rs/creds.example.yaml

@@ -20,3 +20,18 @@ login:
   username: admin
   password: password
   success: Logout        # text that appears on a successful login
+
+# --- infra/host credentials (used by `neurosploit host <ip> --creds creds.yaml`) ---
+ssh:
+  host: 10.0.0.5
+  port: 22
+  user: ubuntu
+  password: s3cret        # or:
+  key: /home/op/id_ed25519
+
+windows:                  # also used for Active Directory
+  host: 10.0.0.10
+  domain: CORP
+  user: jdoe
+  password: Winter2026!   # or pass-the-hash:
+  hash: aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:NThashhere

scripts/build_infra_agents.py

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+NeuroSploit v3.5.1 — infrastructure host agents (Linux / Windows / Active Directory).
+Writes agents_md/infra/*.md. Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders.
+"""
+import os
+ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+OUT = os.path.join(ROOT, "agents_md", "infra")
+
+
+def render(a):
+    L = [f"# {a['title']} Agent\n", "## User Prompt",
+         f"You are testing **{{target}}** (a host/infrastructure target) for {a['for']}.\n",
+         "**Recon Context:**\n{recon_json}\n",
+         "Authentication/credentials, if provided, are described in the operator directives above.\n",
+         "**METHODOLOGY:**\n"]
+    for i, (s, bs) in enumerate(a["steps"], 1):
+        L.append(f"### {i}. {s}")
+        L += [f"- {b}" for b in bs]
+        L.append("")
+    n = len(a["steps"]) + 1
+    L += [f"### {n}. Report Format", "For each CONFIRMED finding:", "```", "FINDING:",
+          f"- Title: {a['title']} on [host]", f"- Severity: {a['sev']}", f"- CWE: {a['cwe']}",
+          "- Endpoint: [host/service]", "- Vector: [how]", "- Payload: [command/PoC]",
+          "- Evidence: [raw tool output proving it]", f"- Impact: {a['impact']}",
+          f"- Remediation: {a['fix']}", "```\n",
+          "## System Prompt", a["system"]]
+    return "\n".join(L) + "\n"
+
+
+def A(name, title, vc, cwe, sev, steps, fix, impact):
+    return {"name": name, "title": title, "for": vc, "sev": sev, "cwe": cwe, "impact": impact,
+            "fix": fix, "steps": steps,
+            "system": f"You are an infrastructure pentest specialist for {vc}. AUTHORIZED engagement. "
+                      "Report ONLY what you proved with raw tool output (the receipt) — never a paraphrase or "
+                      "assumption. If you lack access/observation to confirm, say so and gather more first. "
+                      "Stay in scope; never run destructive or DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders."}
+
+
+INFRA = [
+ # ---- recon / network ----
+ A("infra_port_service_scan", "Host Port & Service Scan", "open ports and service/version discovery", "CWE-200", "Info",
+   [("Scan", ["`rustscan -a {target} -- -sV` if present, else `nmap -sV -sC -Pn {target}`",
+              "Identify open TCP/UDP ports, service banners and versions"]),
+    ("Triage", ["Flag risky services (SMB, RDP, SSH, WinRM, LDAP, databases) and outdated versions",
+                "Correlate versions to known CVEs for downstream agents"])],
+   "Close/patch exposed services; restrict by firewall", "Attack-surface mapping"),
+ A("infra_smb_enum", "SMB/NetBIOS Enumeration", "SMB shares, sessions and misconfigurations", "CWE-200", "Medium",
+   [("Enumerate", ["`netexec smb {target}` / `crackmapexec smb {target}` for hosts, signing, null sessions",
+                   "`smbclient -L //{target}/ -N` to list shares; check anonymous read/write"]),
+    ("Assess", ["Flag SMB signing disabled (relay risk), guest/anonymous access, writable shares"])],
+   "Require SMB signing; disable guest; restrict shares", "Lateral movement, credential relay"),
+ # ---- linux ----
+ A("linux_priv_esc", "Linux Privilege Escalation", "local privilege-escalation paths on a Linux host", "CWE-269", "High",
+   [("Enumerate (authenticated via SSH)", ["Run linpeas/`sudo -l`, SUID/SGID (`find / -perm -4000`), cron, capabilities, writable PATH",
+                                            "Check kernel version for known local exploits"]),
+    ("Confirm", ["Demonstrate an actual escalation to root (or a clear, reachable path) with command output"])],
+   "Patch kernel; fix sudo/SUID/cron/permission issues", "Full host compromise"),
+ A("linux_ssh_weak_auth", "SSH Weak Authentication", "weak/guessable SSH credentials or misconfig", "CWE-1391", "High",
+   [("Assess", ["Check allowed auth methods; test provided creds with `ssh`/`sshpass`",
+                "Only test supplied credentials — never brute force out of scope"]),
+    ("Confirm", ["Show authenticated shell access with the credentials, capturing the session banner"])],
+   "Key-only auth; strong passwords; fail2ban", "Unauthorized host access"),
+ A("linux_sudo_misconfig", "Linux Sudo Misconfiguration", "exploitable sudo rules", "CWE-250", "High",
+   [("Enumerate", ["`sudo -l`; look for NOPASSWD binaries and GTFObins-exploitable entries"]),
+    ("Confirm", ["Escalate via a permitted binary and show `id`=root output"])],
+   "Restrict sudo to least privilege; avoid shell-capable binaries", "Privilege escalation to root"),
+ A("linux_cron_writable", "Writable Cron / Service Abuse", "world-writable cron jobs or unit files", "CWE-732", "High",
+   [("Find", ["Inspect /etc/cron*, systemd units, and scripts they call for writable paths"]),
+    ("Confirm", ["Plant a benign marker that the privileged job executes, proving control"])],
+   "Fix permissions on jobs and their targets", "Privilege escalation"),
+ # ---- windows ----
+ A("windows_priv_esc", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "local privilege escalation on a Windows host", "CWE-269", "High",
+   [("Enumerate (authenticated)", ["Run winPEAS/`whoami /priv`; check unquoted service paths, weak service perms, AlwaysInstallElevated, token privileges (SeImpersonate)"]),
+    ("Confirm", ["Demonstrate escalation to SYSTEM/admin with command output (e.g. via a Potato technique where applicable)"])],
+   "Patch; fix service perms; remove dangerous privileges", "Full host compromise"),
+ A("windows_smb_signing", "SMB Signing & Relay Exposure", "SMB signing not required (NTLM relay risk)", "CWE-294", "Medium",
+   [("Detect", ["`netexec smb {target}` — note `signing:False`"]),
+    ("Assess", ["Explain the NTLM-relay exposure; confirm a coercible auth path only if in scope"])],
+   "Enforce SMB signing; disable NTLM where possible", "Credential relay, lateral movement"),
+ A("windows_winrm_access", "WinRM Authenticated Access", "remote management access via WinRM", "CWE-287", "Medium",
+   [("Connect", ["`evil-winrm -i {target} -u <user> -p <pass>` (or -H <hash>) with supplied creds/hash"]),
+    ("Confirm", ["Show an authenticated remote shell and the host context (`whoami`, hostname)"])],
+   "Restrict WinRM; strong creds; network segmentation", "Remote host control"),
+ # ---- active directory ----
+ A("ad_kerberoasting", "AD Kerberoasting", "service accounts with crackable SPNs", "CWE-522", "High",
+   [("Request", ["`netexec ldap {target} -u <user> -p <pass> --kerberoasting out.txt` or impacket GetUserSPNs"]),
+    ("Crack & confirm", ["Crack the TGS hash offline (hashcat -m 13100); confirm a recovered service-account password"])],
+   "Strong/long service-account passwords; gMSA", "Service-account compromise, lateral movement"),
+ A("ad_asreproasting", "AD AS-REP Roasting", "accounts with Kerberos pre-auth disabled", "CWE-522", "High",
+   [("Enumerate", ["impacket GetNPUsers / `netexec ldap {target} --asreproast out.txt` for DONT_REQ_PREAUTH accounts"]),
+    ("Crack & confirm", ["Crack the AS-REP (hashcat -m 18200); confirm a recovered password"])],
+   "Require Kerberos pre-auth; strong passwords", "Account compromise"),
+ A("ad_acl_privesc", "AD ACL / DACL Abuse", "dangerous Active Directory ACLs", "CWE-269", "High",
+   [("Map", ["Collect with bloodhound-python/SharpHound; find GenericAll/WriteDACL/ForceChangePassword edges"]),
+    ("Confirm", ["Demonstrate one safe, reversible control step (e.g. shadow-cred / targeted password reset in a lab) proving the path"])],
+   "Tighten ACLs; tiered admin model", "Domain privilege escalation"),
+ A("ad_dcsync", "AD DCSync Exposure", "replication rights enabling DCSync", "CWE-269", "Critical",
+   [("Check rights", ["Identify principals with DS-Replication-Get-Changes(-All) via BloodHound/ACL review"]),
+    ("Confirm", ["With authorized creds, prove replication right (e.g. impacket secretsdump -just-dc-user for a single test account)"])],
+   "Remove replication rights from non-DC principals", "Full domain credential compromise"),
+ A("ad_default_creds", "AD/Host Default & Reused Credentials", "default or reused credentials across the domain", "CWE-798", "High",
+   [("Spray (authorized, throttled)", ["With supplied account list, `netexec smb {target} -u users -p pass --continue-on-success` within ROE"]),
+    ("Confirm", ["Show a successful authentication that should not have worked (reused/default cred)"])],
+   "Rotate defaults; enforce unique strong passwords; lockout", "Lateral movement, domain access"),
+]
+
+
+def main():
+    os.makedirs(OUT, exist_ok=True)
+    for a in INFRA:
+        open(os.path.join(OUT, a["name"] + ".md"), "w").write(render(a))
+    print(f"wrote {len(INFRA)} infra agents to {OUT}")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()