New harness module `integrations` (+ app commands) wiring NeuroSploit into the
SDLC. Config persists per-project to .neurosploit/integrations.json; secrets are
NEVER stored — only the env-var name is saved, values read from the environment.
GitHub:
- private-repo clone (token injected into the clone URL for whitebox/greybox/tui)
- `neurosploit pr <owner/repo> <n>`: clone the PR head (refs/pull/N/head),
white-box review, optional `--comment` (PR summary) and `--jira` (cards)
- `neurosploit watch <owner/repo> --branch --interval`: re-review on each new commit
GitLab:
- private-repo clone (oauth2 token) for whitebox/greybox (gitlab.com or self-hosted)
Jira:
- `--jira` on any engagement opens one card per finding (REST /issue, basic auth)
Control:
- `/integrations` (REPL): show · enable/disable · setup jira|gitlab|github
- `neurosploit integrations [show|enable|disable] [github|gitlab|jira]` (CLI)
Docs: README "Integrations" section + new TUTORIAL-INTEGRATION.md (per-tool setup,
scopes, recipes, troubleshooting). Version bumped 3.5.2 → 3.5.3.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Distilled from reviewing real AI-pentest output that kept stopping at "exposed"
instead of "exploited". Pure-additive, back-compatible.
Behavior (injected into black/grey/chain exploit prompts via DEPTH_DOCTRINE):
- Exposed → exploited: any info-disclosure / exposed service/WSDL / leaked
credential|token / reachable dev host MUST be used before it's a finding;
otherwise it's a lead, not a confirmed High/Critical.
- Chain across modules: reuse obtained session/JWT/cookie/credential and pivot
to IDOR/privesc/exfil; report the chain, not isolated parts.
- Decode & fingerprint → CVE; audit tokens (alg-confusion/none/kid/JWKS, weak
HS256 secret cracking, lifecycle).
Deterministic post-pass (new crates/harness/src/hygiene.rs, wired into finish()):
- calibrate severity to PROVEN impact — unproven High/Critical (hedged, no
payload, thin evidence) capped to Medium and re-titled "(potential)";
- depth_audit — flag exposures on a host with no real exploit;
- hygiene_summary — advise consolidating hygiene classes repeated across assets.
Unit tests cover calibration + depth audit.
5 new doctrine meta-agents (scripts/build_methodology_v352.py → agents_md/meta/):
exploit_depth_doctrine, finding_chainer, artifact_decoder, token_auditor,
report_calibrator (meta 17→22, total 343→348).
Version bumped 3.5.1 → 3.5.2 across crates/app/installers/docs; RELEASE/README
updated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Partial observability is now first-class:
- belief.rs — property-graph world model; nodes (host/service/vuln/exploit/cred)
carry a probability, not a boolean. Bayesian observation updates; per-node
Shannon entropy; mean-uncertainty + recon-frontier. Black-box = diffuse priors
that sharpen with observation; white-box collapses toward deterministic (MDP).
- pomdp.rs — value_of_information(), decide() (recon vs exploit falls out of
belief entropy), and may_assert() — the mathematical anti-hallucination gate:
no exploitability claim while the belief is diffuse (high entropy) → observe first.
- grounding.rs — verification engine, hard rule "no claim without a tool receipt":
empirical grounding for black-box (raw HTTP/OOB/error markers), symbolic for
white-box (file:line into reviewed source). Ungrounded claims demoted + flagged
receipt_missing (feeds future reward shaping).
- pipeline.finish(): grounding gate before reporting + belief-uncertainty readout.
- bump 3.5.0 → 3.5.1; README documents the v3.5.1 belief/grounding architecture
and the infra/bandit/reward roadmap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- New persistent interactive session (app/src/repl.rs), launched when run with no args:
banner, model selection, API-key config (/key) or subscription (/sub), then a live
session to set /target, /repo, /auth, and free-text /focus instructions (or just type
them) that STEER which agents run and how.
- Slash-commands: /model /providers /key /sub /target /repo /auth /focus /mcp /votes
/agents /show /run /quit (+ bare text = focus).
- RunConfig gains `instructions` and `auth`:
* instructions bias both LLM agent-selection and the heuristic (focus keywords →
injection/access-control/etc. agents get a strong boost)
* operator directives (focus + auth) injected into recon and exploit prompts so agents
test as an authenticated user and prioritise the requested vuln classes
- bump 3.4.1 → 3.5.0 (CLI, harness, reports, credits)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
CyberSecurityUP