Harness
- graph_memory: typed attack graph (web + internal network) with Neo4j sync
over the HTTP API. Graph checkpoints run after recon, validation, each
chaining round and at the end. They direct agent selection and feed the
live chains, next moves and dependency todolist into every prompt.
- wire: every reported exchange is checked against recorded flows and
re-sent through the scope-guarded replay engine. A contradiction means the
finding cannot stand as confirmed.
- traces: each agent's transcript is shared with the others as a fenced,
structured digest (endpoints, params, error signatures, versions).
- authz_matrix: role x route authorization matrix validator, with
identity tiers in creds.
- deliverables: evidence custody, exploit-as-test (honest oracles only),
detection content and personas, with no credential leakage.
- redact: credentials quoted by agents become $SECRET_n in every
human-facing report (md/html/json/sarif/typ, findings.md). findings.json
and the vault keep raw values for re-testing.
- compliance: GDPR replaces LGPD.
- New agents: authorization_matrix, session_lifecycle, api_token_structure,
exposed_datastore, postgres_superuser_rce, meta/graph_reasoning.
Web console
- New tabs, mounted in both the detail and live views: Attack graph
(replaces Generative Attack Path Chaining), Chains, Dependencies,
Traffic, Traces, Deliverables.
- Wire/Status columns, KPIs, CSV export.
- Graph recompute / Neo4j push / Re-test actions, all through the CLI.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015v24fuCWxkanS31HDmaDB6
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The 13-target benchmark left 3 misses. Root-caused and fixed the two that were
coverage gaps (the third was single-run variance, already handled by the
session-limit fix):
- CRLF header injection (web_crlf_header_go): the agent confirmed the open
redirect on /go?url= and stopped; the CRLF payload was never generated. The
open_redirect skill now tests %0d%0a header injection on the SAME param, and
CHAIN_DOCTRINE says a param landing in a Location header must also be tested
for response splitting. chain.rs: CWE-113/93/644 now provide capabilities;
attack_graph maps their kill-chain stage.
- Second-order SQLi (web_sqli_second_order): the sink was behind /admin, which
the customer account could not reach. CHAIN_DOCTRINE now teaches the
precondition pattern (store the payload, trigger from every identity, escalate
first if the trigger page needs a role you lack, else report as a chained
lead). chain.rs: CWE-564 requires PrivilegedContext so it chains after privesc.
BENCHMARK.md: added the TypeSafe calibrated-adjudication row; dropped the
"genuinely ahead" prose (the table is the summary); condensed the rest
188 -> 89 lines; refreshed scale (27 validators, 47 modules, 383 tests).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Written against what disclosed bug-bounty reports and public write-ups actually
turn up, and chosen by diffing the existing 245 skills rather than restating
them. Each one is built around the same discipline the harness now enforces:
the client-side discovery is a lead, and the finding is what the SERVER did.
Browser instrumentation and client trust:
- browser_runtime_hooking — hook fetch/XHR/postMessage/storage/WebCrypto at
document_start to find what the client is trusted to decide, then prove the
server accepts the tampered value with an independent read-back.
- prototype_pollution_gadget_hunt — pollution is a precondition, not a finding.
Hunt the gadget with a getter on Object.prototype that breaks into the
debugger, quote it as file:line from the bundle, and prove the end effect.
- js_source_deep_analysis — recover original sources from source maps, extract
the API surface the UI never shows, and pair every client-side discovery with
the server request that confirms or refutes it.
- client_side_path_traversal — the evidence is which URL left the browser, and
it is Low until chained to something otherwise unreachable.
Authentication:
- webauthn_passkey_downgrade — passkeys as a system: the usual finding is a
weaker factor nobody removed, or enrollment needing only a session.
- email_verification_bypass — the gate is normally on the login screen, not the
API; address normalisation is where pre-account-takeover lives.
- jwt_jku_x5u_injection — whether the token gets to choose its own verifier.
Server-side reach and money:
- ssrf_render_pipeline — PDF/screenshot/unfurl renderers browse on the server's
behalf, usually with no egress restrictions and often with JS enabled; the
returned document is the exfiltration channel.
- payment_webhook_forgery — prove the ORDER changed state, not that the
endpoint returned 200; idempotency failures are their own finding.
- presigned_url_abuse — the bug is what the API is willing to SIGN, which is an
IDOR with a cloud signature on top.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- New agent account_registration_and_forms (+1 → 430): analyzes the app's forms
and self-registers a benign test account (curl or Playwright) to reach the
authenticated surface when no creds are given.
- Probe extracts form details (action/method/fields/kind/CSRF) so form analysis is
grounded; shown in the probe summary and recon JSON.
- Hard anti-flood guardrail in SAFETY_DOCTRINE + the agent: at most 2 accounts per
engagement, never loop/script/batch the register endpoint or flood the DB; reuse
the account made; a test needing many sign-ups is a lead, not mass-creation.
- Credential vault: engagement_ops directive tells agents to append created
accounts to <run-dir>/vault.jsonl; finish() consolidates to vault.json, masks
secrets in the report, and adds a 'Test accounts created (DELETE after)' cleanup
finding listing each account and how it was created.
- Finding tagging: new auth_context (authenticated/unauthenticated) and account
fields, rendered per-finding in the HTML report.
- Opt-in disposable email (off by default): /tempmail on + RunConfig.temp_email;
agents may use the free mail.tm API to read a registration confirmation code.
- Tests: parse_forms unit tests; docs updated (README/TUTORIAL/RELEASE), counts 430.
- DECISION_DOCTRINE injected into exploit/grey/chain prompts: analyse responses to
pick the technique; map & connect routes (endpoint output → next endpoint input);
hunt sensitive flows; mine parameters (incl. hidden from JS/source maps) and test
per-param; mock realistic (non-PII) data to reach deeper logic; exploit the
authenticated surface after login and compare roles; build PoCs when a proof
needs an artifact; bypass 401/403/redirect controls.
- REPL /auth now supports multiple named identities (/auth admin <hdr>, /auth user
<hdr>; bare token → Bearer). With >=2 roles the run gets the access-control
directive (IDOR/BOLA/BFLA/privesc, authorized-vs-unauthorized) and tests both.
- +6 decision agents (library 389): param_miner, endpoint_flow_linker,
authenticated_surface_exploit, clickjacking_poc (HTML PoC), csrf_poc (HTML PoC),
access_control_bypass.
- Docs: counts 383->389, RELEASE + /auth help updated.
- tool_doctrine: agents now actively DRIVE the browser on JS/SPA targets — use
the Playwright MCP (render, read live DOM, click client-side routes, watch the
network to find the real API, screenshot proof); when no MCP, use the Playwright
CLI (write+run a small script / npx playwright screenshot) to render and capture
XHR/fetch traffic — complementing curl (which only sees the empty shell).
- probe: detect SPAs (<app-root>, ng-version, near-empty body + linked scripts →
Angular/React/Vue/SPA) and note in recon that the browser is required, so the
SPA agents get selected.
- +8 SPA/API agents (library 383): spa_api_discovery, spa_hidden_admin,
login_sqli_bypass, dom_xss_spa, api_bola_numeric_ids,
register_privilege_mass_assign, jwt_forgery_spa, spa_business_logic.
- Docs: README/RELEASE/TUTORIAL counts + notes.
