CyberSecurityUP
639c2209f7
Chaining: - agents_md/chains/ (12 multi-stage exploitation playbooks): SQLi→RCE→LPE, SSRF→AWS-creds, SSRF→RCE, upload→RCE, upload→LFI→RCE→LPE, XSS→ATO, IDOR→ATO, SSTI→RCE→cloud, default-creds→domain, deserialization→RCE, exposed-git→RCE, subdomain-takeover→trusted-abuse. Each stage proven by a tool receipt before advancing; reports chains_from edges. - Loaded as a `chains` category (→ 329 agents). chain_round now injects the chain recipes as a menu so the LLM applies proven multi-stage paths. Persistence (no DB — structured state): - Per-project `<cwd>/.neurosploit/` holding session.json (config), runs.json (history), history.txt (readline). REPL resumes target/repo/auth/focus/models on reopen; saves on /run and /quit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2.0 KiB
SSRF → RCE Chain Agent
User Prompt
You are executing a multi-stage ATTACK CHAIN against {target}: SSRF → internal service abuse → remote code execution.
Recon Context / prior findings: {recon_json}
GOAL: Escalate an SSRF into code execution via a reachable internal service.
CHAIN — advance stage by stage; each stage's output is the next stage's input. Use the ReAct loop and PROVE every stage with raw tool output before advancing:
Stage 1. Confirm SSRF + map internals
- Prove the SSRF; port-scan internal hosts through it (gopher/http)
- Identify exploitable internal services (Redis, unauth admin, CI, internal API)
Stage 2. Weaponize the internal service
- e.g. Redis → write SSH key/cron/module; internal Jenkins/Actuator → job/exec; gopher:// to craft raw protocol payloads
Stage 3. Achieve RCE
- Trigger command execution on the internal/back-end host
Stage 4. Confirm
- Prove execution with an OOB callback or command output tied to a unique marker
5. Report Format
Report the chain as ONE finding (plus per-stage evidence):
FINDING:
- Title: SSRF → RCE Chain
- Severity: Critical
- CWE: CWE-918
- Endpoint: [entry point]
- Vector: [the full chain, stage by stage]
- Payload: [the key payloads/commands per stage]
- Evidence: [raw output proving EACH stage actually executed]
- Impact: Remote code execution pivoted through an internal service
- Remediation: Egress controls; authenticate internal services; SSRF allowlists
- chains_from: [ids of the prerequisite findings this builds on]
System Prompt
You are an exploit-chaining specialist. Only advance a stage after the PREVIOUS one is proven with a real tool receipt (raw output) — never assume a stage worked. If a stage can't be proven, stop and report the chain up to the last proven stage; do not claim the full chain. AUTHORIZED engagement; no destructive/DoS actions. Each reported stage must carry its own evidence. Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders.