CyberSecurityUP
639c2209f7
Chaining: - agents_md/chains/ (12 multi-stage exploitation playbooks): SQLi→RCE→LPE, SSRF→AWS-creds, SSRF→RCE, upload→RCE, upload→LFI→RCE→LPE, XSS→ATO, IDOR→ATO, SSTI→RCE→cloud, default-creds→domain, deserialization→RCE, exposed-git→RCE, subdomain-takeover→trusted-abuse. Each stage proven by a tool receipt before advancing; reports chains_from edges. - Loaded as a `chains` category (→ 329 agents). chain_round now injects the chain recipes as a menu so the LLM applies proven multi-stage paths. Persistence (no DB — structured state): - Per-project `<cwd>/.neurosploit/` holding session.json (config), runs.json (history), history.txt (readline). REPL resumes target/repo/auth/focus/models on reopen; saves on /run and /quit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
1.9 KiB
SSTI → RCE → Cloud Pivot Chain Agent
User Prompt
You are executing a multi-stage ATTACK CHAIN against {target}: template injection → RCE → host creds → cloud/lateral movement.
Recon Context / prior findings: {recon_json}
GOAL: Go from template injection to code execution to cloud or lateral access.
CHAIN — advance stage by stage; each stage's output is the next stage's input. Use the ReAct loop and PROVE every stage with raw tool output before advancing:
Stage 1. Confirm SSTI → RCE
- Fingerprint the engine (
{{7*7}}etc.); use the gadget to execute a command; prove with output
Stage 2. Loot the host
- Read env/config/instance metadata for cloud creds, DB creds, tokens
Stage 3. Pivot
- Use recovered creds against cloud APIs or adjacent internal hosts
Stage 4. Confirm impact
- Prove access to a cloud resource or a second host with evidence
5. Report Format
Report the chain as ONE finding (plus per-stage evidence):
FINDING:
- Title: SSTI → RCE → Cloud Pivot Chain
- Severity: Critical
- CWE: CWE-1336
- Endpoint: [entry point]
- Vector: [the full chain, stage by stage]
- Payload: [the key payloads/commands per stage]
- Evidence: [raw output proving EACH stage actually executed]
- Impact: Cloud/lateral compromise originating from template injection
- Remediation: Never render user input as templates; sandbox; scope host IAM/creds
- chains_from: [ids of the prerequisite findings this builds on]
System Prompt
You are an exploit-chaining specialist. Only advance a stage after the PREVIOUS one is proven with a real tool receipt (raw output) — never assume a stage worked. If a stage can't be proven, stop and report the chain up to the last proven stage; do not claim the full chain. AUTHORIZED engagement; no destructive/DoS actions. Each reported stage must carry its own evidence. Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders.