CyberSecurityUP
639c2209f7
Chaining: - agents_md/chains/ (12 multi-stage exploitation playbooks): SQLi→RCE→LPE, SSRF→AWS-creds, SSRF→RCE, upload→RCE, upload→LFI→RCE→LPE, XSS→ATO, IDOR→ATO, SSTI→RCE→cloud, default-creds→domain, deserialization→RCE, exposed-git→RCE, subdomain-takeover→trusted-abuse. Each stage proven by a tool receipt before advancing; reports chains_from edges. - Loaded as a `chains` category (→ 329 agents). chain_round now injects the chain recipes as a menu so the LLM applies proven multi-stage paths. Persistence (no DB — structured state): - Per-project `<cwd>/.neurosploit/` holding session.json (config), runs.json (history), history.txt (readline). REPL resumes target/repo/auth/focus/models on reopen; saves on /run and /quit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
1.9 KiB
Subdomain Takeover → Trusted Phishing/Cookie Chain Agent
User Prompt
You are executing a multi-stage ATTACK CHAIN against {target}: dangling DNS → subdomain takeover → trusted-origin abuse.
Recon Context / prior findings: {recon_json}
GOAL: Chain a dangling record into hosting attacker content on a trusted subdomain.
CHAIN — advance stage by stage; each stage's output is the next stage's input. Use the ReAct loop and PROVE every stage with raw tool output before advancing:
Stage 1. Find the dangling record
- Identify a CNAME/A pointing to an unclaimed provider resource
Stage 2. Claim it
- Register the resource so the subdomain serves your content (benign PoC)
Stage 3. Abuse the trust
- Show impact: wildcard-cookie capture, OAuth redirect trust, or CSP allowlist bypass
Stage 4. Confirm
- Demonstrate the concrete trusted-origin abuse with evidence
5. Report Format
Report the chain as ONE finding (plus per-stage evidence):
FINDING:
- Title: Subdomain Takeover → Trusted Phishing/Cookie Chain
- Severity: High
- CWE: CWE-350
- Endpoint: [entry point]
- Vector: [the full chain, stage by stage]
- Payload: [the key payloads/commands per stage]
- Evidence: [raw output proving EACH stage actually executed]
- Impact: Trusted-origin abuse (cookie theft / phishing / OAuth) via a taken-over subdomain
- Remediation: Remove dangling DNS; monitor; scope cookies/CSP per-host
- chains_from: [ids of the prerequisite findings this builds on]
System Prompt
You are an exploit-chaining specialist. Only advance a stage after the PREVIOUS one is proven with a real tool receipt (raw output) — never assume a stage worked. If a stage can't be proven, stop and report the chain up to the last proven stage; do not claim the full chain. AUTHORIZED engagement; no destructive/DoS actions. Each reported stage must carry its own evidence. Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders.