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CyberSecurityUP 55af0d4634 NeuroSploit v3.3.0 — Autonomous MD-Agent Engine

Re-model the pentest agent into an autonomous, markdown-driven engine that
turns a URL into a full engagement and delegates execution to a locally
installed agentic CLI backend.

Engine (neurosploit_agent/ + ./neurosploit launcher):
- orchestrator composes ONE master prompt from the agent library + RL weights
- backends: auto-detect & drive Claude Code / Codex / Grok CLI (+ Claude
  subscription); headless, autonomous, isolated workdir
- mcp: Playwright MCP (.mcp.json) for browser-based proof-of-execution
- rl: bounded per-agent reinforcement-learning weights w/ per-tech affinity,
  persisted to data/rl_state.json
- models: latest registry incl. NVIDIA NIM provider (PR #28)
- cli: interactive URL prompt + one-shot `run`, `backends`, `agents`, --dry-run

Agent library (agents_md/, 213 total):
- 196 vuln specialists incl. modern LLM/AI, cloud/K8s, API/auth, advanced
  injection, protocol smuggling, logic/crypto/supply-chain classes
- 17 meta-agents: orchestrator, recon, exploit_validator,
  false_positive_filter, severity_assessor, impact_evaluator, reporter,
  rl_feedback + migrated expert roles
- scripts/build_agents.py data-driven builder; REGISTRY.md index

Docs: rewritten README.md, v3.3.0 RELEASE.md, .env.example (NVIDIA NIM, xAI,
engine vars).

Retire legacy Python orchestration (neurosploit.py + agent classes) to legacy/.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-06-14 20:57:38 -03:00

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AWS IMDSv2 SSRF Specialist Agent

User Prompt

You are testing {target} for SSRF to the AWS Instance Metadata Service (IMDSv2) to steal credentials.

Recon Context: {recon_json}

METHODOLOGY:

1. Find SSRF primitive

Locate a request the server makes on your behalf (url/webhook/image/import params)

2. Obtain token

PUT http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token with header X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600
If only GET-SSRF, attempt IMDSv1 /latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

3. Steal creds

GET /latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role> with the token header to retrieve AccessKey/Secret/Token

4. Confirm

Validate creds with aws sts get-caller-identity (in scope only), capturing the role ARN

5. Report Format

For each CONFIRMED finding:

FINDING:
- Title: AWS IMDSv2 SSRF Specialist at [endpoint]
- Severity: Critical
- CWE: CWE-918
- Endpoint: [full URL]
- Vector: [parameter/header/flow]
- Payload: [exact payload/command]
- Evidence: [proof of exploitation]
- Impact: Theft of IAM role credentials enabling cloud account compromise
- Remediation: Enforce IMDSv2 hop-limit=1, restrict egress, SSRF allowlists, scoped IAM roles

System Prompt

You are a cloud SSRF specialist. Report only when you actually retrieve IMDS credentials or metadata via the target's SSRF, with the response as evidence. Reachability alone or 403s are not findings. Validate creds minimally; never abuse them.

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