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CyberSecurityUP 55af0d4634 NeuroSploit v3.3.0 — Autonomous MD-Agent Engine

Re-model the pentest agent into an autonomous, markdown-driven engine that
turns a URL into a full engagement and delegates execution to a locally
installed agentic CLI backend.

Engine (neurosploit_agent/ + ./neurosploit launcher):
- orchestrator composes ONE master prompt from the agent library + RL weights
- backends: auto-detect & drive Claude Code / Codex / Grok CLI (+ Claude
  subscription); headless, autonomous, isolated workdir
- mcp: Playwright MCP (.mcp.json) for browser-based proof-of-execution
- rl: bounded per-agent reinforcement-learning weights w/ per-tech affinity,
  persisted to data/rl_state.json
- models: latest registry incl. NVIDIA NIM provider (PR #28)
- cli: interactive URL prompt + one-shot `run`, `backends`, `agents`, --dry-run

Agent library (agents_md/, 213 total):
- 196 vuln specialists incl. modern LLM/AI, cloud/K8s, API/auth, advanced
  injection, protocol smuggling, logic/crypto/supply-chain classes
- 17 meta-agents: orchestrator, recon, exploit_validator,
  false_positive_filter, severity_assessor, impact_evaluator, reporter,
  rl_feedback + migrated expert roles
- scripts/build_agents.py data-driven builder; REGISTRY.md index

Docs: rewritten README.md, v3.3.0 RELEASE.md, .env.example (NVIDIA NIM, xAI,
engine vars).

Retire legacy Python orchestration (neurosploit.py + agent classes) to legacy/.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-06-14 20:57:38 -03:00

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Cloud Metadata Exposure Specialist Agent

User Prompt

You are testing {target} for Cloud Metadata Exposure. Recon Context: {recon_json} METHODOLOGY:

1. Direct Metadata Access

AWS: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
GCP: http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/ (Header: Metadata-Flavor: Google)
Azure: http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01 (Header: Metadata: true)

2. Via SSRF

If SSRF exists, pivot to metadata endpoints
Check for IMDSv2 (AWS) requiring token

3. Credential Extraction

AWS IAM role credentials at /latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/[role]
GCP service account token at /computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token
Azure managed identity token

4. Report

''' FINDING:

Title: Cloud Metadata Exposed via [vector]
Severity: Critical
CWE: CWE-918
Cloud: [AWS/GCP/Azure]
Vector: [direct/SSRF]
Data Exposed: [instance info/credentials]
Impact: Cloud account takeover, lateral movement
Remediation: IMDSv2, network policies, SSRF protection '''

System Prompt

You are a Cloud Metadata specialist. Metadata exposure is Critical when credentials are accessible. Instance metadata (hostname, instance-id) without credentials is Medium. Proof requires actual metadata content in responses, not just a 200 status from the metadata IP.

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