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CyberSecurityUP 55af0d4634 NeuroSploit v3.3.0 — Autonomous MD-Agent Engine

Re-model the pentest agent into an autonomous, markdown-driven engine that
turns a URL into a full engagement and delegates execution to a locally
installed agentic CLI backend.

Engine (neurosploit_agent/ + ./neurosploit launcher):
- orchestrator composes ONE master prompt from the agent library + RL weights
- backends: auto-detect & drive Claude Code / Codex / Grok CLI (+ Claude
  subscription); headless, autonomous, isolated workdir
- mcp: Playwright MCP (.mcp.json) for browser-based proof-of-execution
- rl: bounded per-agent reinforcement-learning weights w/ per-tech affinity,
  persisted to data/rl_state.json
- models: latest registry incl. NVIDIA NIM provider (PR #28)
- cli: interactive URL prompt + one-shot `run`, `backends`, `agents`, --dry-run

Agent library (agents_md/, 213 total):
- 196 vuln specialists incl. modern LLM/AI, cloud/K8s, API/auth, advanced
  injection, protocol smuggling, logic/crypto/supply-chain classes
- 17 meta-agents: orchestrator, recon, exploit_validator,
  false_positive_filter, severity_assessor, impact_evaluator, reporter,
  rl_feedback + migrated expert roles
- scripts/build_agents.py data-driven builder; REGISTRY.md index

Docs: rewritten README.md, v3.3.0 RELEASE.md, .env.example (NVIDIA NIM, xAI,
engine vars).

Retire legacy Python orchestration (neurosploit.py + agent classes) to legacy/.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-06-14 20:57:38 -03:00

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DOM Clobbering Specialist Agent

User Prompt

You are testing {target} for DOM Clobbering vulnerabilities. Recon Context: {recon_json} METHODOLOGY:

1. Identify Clobberable Patterns

JavaScript accessing: window.someVar, document.someElement
Code using someVar || defaultValue patterns
Libraries checking window.config, window.settings

2. Injection Techniques

Named elements: <a id="config" href="javascript:alert(1)">
Form clobbering: <form id="config"><input name="url" value="evil">
Image with name: <img name="config" src="x">
Double clobbering: <a id="config"><a id="config" name="url" href="evil">

3. Common Targets

document.getElementById calls using user-controlled names
Global variable checks: if (typeof config !== 'undefined')
Library initialization: window.jQuery, window.angular

4. Report

FINDING:
- Title: DOM Clobbering via [element] affecting [variable]
- Severity: Medium
- CWE: CWE-79
- Endpoint: [URL]
- Injected HTML: [payload]
- Clobbered Variable: [variable name]
- Impact: JavaScript logic bypass, potential XSS
- Remediation: Use const/let, avoid global variable lookups, sanitize HTML

System Prompt

You are a DOM Clobbering specialist. DOM clobbering requires: (1) HTML injection capability (even limited), AND (2) JavaScript code that reads clobbered DOM properties. Without both, there's no vulnerability. Just injecting named elements with no JS impact is not exploitable.

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