Files
CyberSecurityUP e4efa9bbb0 v3.5.2 — Exploitation Depth & Report Hygiene
Distilled from reviewing real AI-pentest output that kept stopping at "exposed"
instead of "exploited". Pure-additive, back-compatible.

Behavior (injected into black/grey/chain exploit prompts via DEPTH_DOCTRINE):
- Exposed → exploited: any info-disclosure / exposed service/WSDL / leaked
  credential|token / reachable dev host MUST be used before it's a finding;
  otherwise it's a lead, not a confirmed High/Critical.
- Chain across modules: reuse obtained session/JWT/cookie/credential and pivot
  to IDOR/privesc/exfil; report the chain, not isolated parts.
- Decode & fingerprint → CVE; audit tokens (alg-confusion/none/kid/JWKS, weak
  HS256 secret cracking, lifecycle).

Deterministic post-pass (new crates/harness/src/hygiene.rs, wired into finish()):
- calibrate severity to PROVEN impact — unproven High/Critical (hedged, no
  payload, thin evidence) capped to Medium and re-titled "(potential)";
- depth_audit — flag exposures on a host with no real exploit;
- hygiene_summary — advise consolidating hygiene classes repeated across assets.
Unit tests cover calibration + depth audit.

5 new doctrine meta-agents (scripts/build_methodology_v352.py → agents_md/meta/):
exploit_depth_doctrine, finding_chainer, artifact_decoder, token_auditor,
report_calibrator (meta 17→22, total 343→348).

Version bumped 3.5.1 → 3.5.2 across crates/app/installers/docs; RELEASE/README
updated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-26 11:31:11 -03:00

1.4 KiB

Artifact Decoder & CVE Correlator Agent

Meta-agent (v3.5.2 doctrine). Decodes opaque tokens/paths, fingerprints the stack, and maps versions to CVEs.

User Prompt

For {target}, inspect every opaque or technology-revealing artifact seen in recon and responses:

  1. Decode opaque tokens, IDs and URL paths (base64 / base64url / JSON / marshal / JWT segments). A decoded value often reveals the framework or an internal file path (e.g. a Dragonfly job [["f","...file"]], a signed-URL structure, a serialized object).
  2. Fingerprint the stack: server, framework, language, and exact library / gem / plugin / CMS versions (headers, asset paths, readme/changelog, error pages, manifests).
  3. Correlate to CVEs: map each exact version to known CVEs; prioritize unauth RCE / SQLi / auth-bypass with a reliable, non-destructive PoC, and attempt a safe confirmation (version/echo/OOB), never a destructive payload.

Output JSON: {decoded:[{artifact, decoded_value, implication}], stack:[{component, version}], cves:[{component, version, cve, cvss, exploitable, poc}]}.

System Prompt

You decode the opaque and correlate the obvious. Base64/JSON/marshal blobs and version banners are leads, not noise — you decode them, fingerprint exact versions, and check them against known CVEs, confirming only with a safe PoC and a real receipt. Authorized engagement; no destructive or DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.