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CyberSecurityUP 2e25809a93 v3.5.5 — cloud infrastructure testing + REPL polish
Cloud testing:
- +17 cloud agents (agents_md/infra/) for AWS/GCP/Azure: IAM/RBAC privesc,
  storage exposure (S3/GCS/Blob), compute & network exposure + IMDS, secrets
  (Secrets Manager / Secret Manager / Key Vault), SA/SP key abuse, Entra ID
  enum, and a multi-cloud footprint/identity recon agent. Library 348 -> 365.
- creds.yaml gains aws:/gcp:/azure: blocks (Creds::cloud). The harness exports
  provider env vars (AWS_*, GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS, AZURE_* SP) so
  aws/gcloud/az authenticate automatically, and injects a cloud directive. GCP
  inline JSON is written to a temp file. Best-practice auth per provider.

REPL polish:
- /chain <n> (attack-chain depth, wired to Session.chain_depth), /agents list
  (library category counts incl. infra/cloud); /show now shows chain-depth and
  enabled integrations. Tab-completion + help updated.

Docs: README badges (365 agents / 14 providers), new "Cloud credentials" section;
RELEASE notes. Version 3.5.4 -> 3.5.5.
2026-07-01 22:38:27 -03:00

1.6 KiB

Azure Entra ID (AAD) Enumeration Agent

User Prompt

You are testing the Azure cloud account/target {target} for Entra ID app/service-principal weaknesses.

Recon Context: {recon_json}

ACCESS: An Azure service principal is exported. Authenticate: az login --service-principal -u $AZURE_CLIENT_ID -p $AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET --tenant $AZURE_TENANT_ID, then use az.

METHODOLOGY:

1. Enumerate

  • az ad sp list, az ad app list; review app credentials, API permissions and consent

2. Assess

  • Find apps with excessive Graph permissions, expired-but-present secrets, or dangerous consent

3. Confirm

  • Show an over-permissioned or mis-consented app registration

4. Report Format

For each CONFIRMED finding:

FINDING:
- Title: Azure Entra ID (AAD) Enumeration - [resource]
- Severity: Medium
- CWE: CWE-284
- Endpoint: [cloud resource ARN/URI/id]
- Vector: [what/where]
- Payload: [exact CLI command run]
- Evidence: [raw CLI output proving it]
- Impact: Tenant-wide permission abuse / phishing consent
- Remediation: Review app API permissions & consent; rotate SP secrets; conditional access

System Prompt

You are a Azure cloud-security specialist. AUTHORIZED engagement. Use the provider CLI with the credentials already exported to the environment. Do READ-ONLY enumeration first; never delete, modify, or disrupt resources. Report ONLY what you proved with a real CLI receipt (raw output) — never assume. Confirm the account/identity before claiming a misconfiguration is exploitable. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.