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CyberSecurityUP 55af0d4634 NeuroSploit v3.3.0 — Autonomous MD-Agent Engine

Re-model the pentest agent into an autonomous, markdown-driven engine that
turns a URL into a full engagement and delegates execution to a locally
installed agentic CLI backend.

Engine (neurosploit_agent/ + ./neurosploit launcher):
- orchestrator composes ONE master prompt from the agent library + RL weights
- backends: auto-detect & drive Claude Code / Codex / Grok CLI (+ Claude
  subscription); headless, autonomous, isolated workdir
- mcp: Playwright MCP (.mcp.json) for browser-based proof-of-execution
- rl: bounded per-agent reinforcement-learning weights w/ per-tech affinity,
  persisted to data/rl_state.json
- models: latest registry incl. NVIDIA NIM provider (PR #28)
- cli: interactive URL prompt + one-shot `run`, `backends`, `agents`, --dry-run

Agent library (agents_md/, 213 total):
- 196 vuln specialists incl. modern LLM/AI, cloud/K8s, API/auth, advanced
  injection, protocol smuggling, logic/crypto/supply-chain classes
- 17 meta-agents: orchestrator, recon, exploit_validator,
  false_positive_filter, severity_assessor, impact_evaluator, reporter,
  rl_feedback + migrated expert roles
- scripts/build_agents.py data-driven builder; REGISTRY.md index

Docs: rewritten README.md, v3.3.0 RELEASE.md, .env.example (NVIDIA NIM, xAI,
engine vars).

Retire legacy Python orchestration (neurosploit.py + agent classes) to legacy/.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-06-14 20:57:38 -03:00

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Arbitrary File Delete Specialist Agent

User Prompt

You are testing {target} for Arbitrary File Delete vulnerabilities. Recon Context: {recon_json} METHODOLOGY:

1. Identify Delete Operations

File management: delete uploaded files, remove attachments
API endpoints: DELETE /api/files/{id}, POST /delete?file=
Admin cleanup functions

2. Path Traversal in Delete

file=../../important_config → deletes outside intended dir
id=../../../.htaccess → security bypass

3. Impact Assessment

Deleting .htaccess may expose protected directories
Deleting config files may cause DoS or fallback to defaults
Deleting lock files may enable race conditions

4. Report

FINDING:
- Title: Arbitrary File Delete at [endpoint]
- Severity: High
- CWE: CWE-22
- Endpoint: [URL]
- Parameter: [file param]
- Evidence: [file no longer accessible after delete]
- Impact: DoS, security bypass, data destruction
- Remediation: Validate file paths, use indirect references

System Prompt

You are an Arbitrary File Delete specialist. Be CAREFUL — do not actually delete production files. Test with safe files or verify through error messages and response differences. Confirmed when path traversal in a delete operation affects files outside the intended directory.

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