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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 5
481a4eb1b9
The risk model, grants and hash-chained trail existed as modules nothing called. Now every engagement runs under them. Capability - `neurosploit capability issue|verify` mints and inspects grants. - `--capability-token` (global, so the REPL takes it too), `--in-scope`, `--environment`, `--policy` on `run`; verification happens at the command line, so an invalid grant fails with a readable message instead of halfway through an engagement. - The pipeline verifies before anything else and REFUSES to run on a token that does not verify — proceeding would mean acting on an authorization nobody can prove was issued. `effective_scope` then applies the grant as a ceiling. - Web: an Authorization tab carrying the token, extra hosts, environment and policy profile. The browser decodes the claims for display and says plainly that it is not verifying them — a "valid" badge from a party without the key would be the UI vouching for something it cannot check. A hole the smoke test found: `/inscope evil.test` inside a session under a grant WIDENED the scope past it — the one thing a capability token exists to prevent. The run itself would still have been constrained (the pipeline re-applies the grant), but `/policy` reported a boundary that was not real, and a tool that misreports its own limits is worse than one with none. Scope mutations now re-apply the ceiling and name what it refused. Session authorization also arrives from argv rather than a `/`-command, because a session that can widen its own grant is not constrained by one. Audit - One hash-chained record per action in `<run>/audit.jsonl`, in the specified shape, covering engagement start/end, validator rejections, findings that reach the report (with the hash of the evidence behind them) and findings withheld for being out of scope. - The run verifies its own chain at the end and says loudly if it is broken. - `/audit [n]` tails the trail and verifies it; the web offers it as a download next to the report, so "show me what the tool did" is a link. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>