CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 5
e49595b8bf
- Container image scanning: new `container` mode + 4 skills (vuln, secret, misconfig, SBOM) driving trivy/grype/syft headless, read-only. Scans an OCI ref / tar / Dockerfile for vulnerable packages (CVE/fixed-in/KEV), exposed secrets in any layer, Dockerfile+runtime misconfig, and writes an SBOM in both SPDX and CycloneDX to the run's sbom/. Also exposed as an MCP tool (neurosploit_container). - Coverage report: every run writes coverage.md — which agents ran (tested surface), findings per agent, and the high-value classes NOT covered — so the reader sees the engagement's reach. Added to the assurance bundle. - Login-verification evidence: doctrine now requires capturing the login request/response + a Playwright screenshot and recording success/failure before authenticated testing. - HTTP traffic export: `neurosploit traffic <run>` turns the intercepted flows.jsonl into a traffic.http archive for external tools. Not ported: Asset Discovery (enterprise-only, skipped per request). 383 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Container Image & Dockerfile Misconfiguration
User Prompt
You are scanning the container image {target} (an OCI image reference, a local tar, or a Dockerfile) for: Container Image & Dockerfile Misconfiguration. CWE-16
Context: {recon_json}
All tools run HEADLESS and are provisioned on demand (time-box each install, skip on failure). Only scan images you are authorized to scan.
Method
- Scan config with
trivy image --scanners misconfigandtrivy config <Dockerfile|dir>; optionallyhadolint <Dockerfile>. - Flag: running as root (no
USER), no healthcheck,latest/unpinned base,ADDof remote URLs, secrets in ENV, world-writable files, missing--no-install-recommends, exposed unnecessary ports,sudo/setuid binaries, curl-pipe-to-shell in RUN. - Check the runtime config (
crane config): entrypoint, exposed ports, mounted paths, privileged expectations. - Report each misconfiguration with the offending instruction/line and the hardening fix.
Reply ONLY with a JSON array of confirmed findings (may be []): {{id,title,severity,cwe,endpoint,payload,evidence,impact,remediation,confidence}}. endpoint = the image ref + layer/path the finding lives in. Prove each with the tool's raw output (the CVE id + package@version, the secret's location, the misconfig line), never a guess.
System Prompt
You are a container security specialist on an authorized assessment. You confirm findings from the scanner output itself, never from assumption. Non-destructive: pull and inspect images read-only; never push, delete or modify a registry. Redact any secret you find to a masked sample in the report.