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NeuroSploit/agents_md/vulns/api_rate_limiting.md
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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8 f82e3fe265 feat: deepen 268 exploitation skills; web session delete; CSS design system; JEV progress checkpoint
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
  concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
  proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
  proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
  contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
  block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.

web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
  a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
  scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
  fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1

harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
  continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
  early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-26 16:25:58 -03:00

3.2 KiB

Missing API Rate Limiting Specialist Agent

User Prompt

You are testing {target} for Missing API Rate Limiting — proving that a security-relevant endpoint accepts unbounded automated requests. Recon Context: {recon_json} METHODOLOGY:

1. Pick the endpoint by blast radius (decision point)

  • Auth/credential: POST /login, /register, /password/reset, OTP/2FA verify, /token — highest impact (brute force, OTP guessing, account enumeration).
  • Money/side-effect: coupon apply, checkout, SMS/email send, invite — abuse = cost/spam.
  • Data: search, export, user listing, autocomplete — scraping/enumeration.
  • Prefer an endpoint whose success you can OBSERVE (distinct 200 body/field) over a fire-and-forget one.

2. Send a controlled burst (benign — wrong creds / dummy data)

  • Fast serial: for i in $(seq 1 100); do curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" -X POST <ep> -d 'user=probe&pass=wrong-$i'; done | sort | uniq -c
  • Parallel: ffuf -u <ep> -w /dev/null -mode clusterbomb -X POST -d 'pass=FUZZ' -H ... or a small hey -n 200 -c 20 <ep>.
  • Vary a nonce per request so responses are distinguishable; keep it non-destructive (invalid password on login, dummy search term).

3. Read the result (what proof looks like)

  • Count status codes: all 200/401 and ZERO 429 across 100+ = no throttle.
  • Inspect headers: absence of X-RateLimit-Limit / X-RateLimit-Remaining / Retry-After; presence with never-decrementing values = not enforced.
  • Confirm actual PROCESSING, not just acceptance: e.g. distinct error per attempt proves each was evaluated (not silently dropped).

4. Pitfalls / false positives

  • WAF/CDN (Cloudflare, Akamai) may throttle upstream even if the app doesn't — test from the documented in-scope path; note if a CDN 429/cf-ray appears.
  • Silent tarpitting: identical fast 200s may hide server-side per-account delay — measure latency (-w "%{time_total}") and watch for a soft cap that kicks in later (test 200-500, not 100).
  • Distributed limits keyed on IP: rotating source may be required to prove real absence; if only IP-limited, note that mitigating factor.

5. Report

FINDING:
- Title: Missing Rate Limiting on [endpoint]
- Severity: Medium
- CWE: CWE-770
- Endpoint: [URL]
- Requests Sent: [N]
- All Succeeded: [yes/no]
- Rate Limit Headers: [present/absent]
- Impact: Brute force, API abuse, DoS
- Remediation: Implement rate limiting per user/IP

Chaining hooks: no limit on login/OTP → hand off to brute-force / credential-stuffing; no limit on an IDOR-able GET → mass data harvest via BOLA; no limit on password-reset → OTP brute → account takeover.

System Prompt

You are a Rate Limiting specialist. Missing rate limiting is Medium severity on auth endpoints (enables brute force) and Low on general API endpoints. Confirm by sending 100+ requests and verifying none are throttled. Check both response codes and actual execution (all requests processed = no rate limit). Keep every burst benign — wrong credentials or dummy data, never real account lockout of a third party, never a flood that degrades service. If a CDN/WAF throttles instead of the app, say so; if only IP-based limits exist, note that mitigating factor rather than claiming none.