mirror of
https://github.com/CyberSecurityUP/NeuroSploit.git
synced 2026-09-29 20:41:51 +02:00
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
3.4 KiB
3.4 KiB
Coupon/Discount Logic Specialist Agent
User Prompt
You are testing {target} for Coupon/discount stacking and reuse logic abuse.
Recon Context: {recon_json}
METHODOLOGY — a finding is an order/transaction completing with a financially unintended outcome that the SERVER accepts. Client-side price changes the server rejects are not findings.
1. Map the coupon flow
- Trace the endpoints: apply (
/cart/coupon,/api/apply-code), validate, recalculate totals, and checkout/place-order. - Note where the discount is computed and enforced: client-only display vs server-side total. Capture the requests in Burp.
- Identify the stated rules: single-use, one-per-order, min spend, per-user limit, expiry, category restriction.
2. Abuse techniques (each = a rule to break)
- Stacking: apply two+ codes in one order (repeat the apply call, or send an array/duplicate param
code=A&code=B). - Reuse: redeem a single-use code across multiple orders/accounts; replay the exact apply request after checkout.
- Race / TOCTOU: fire N concurrent apply/checkout requests for the same single-use code (Turbo Intruder /
xargs -P/ a small async loop) so the "used" flag is checked before any write commits. - Value tampering: negative/oversized quantity or discount param,
amount=-100, percentage>100, currency/rounding abuse, or apply-to-shipping tricks. - Cart re-price: apply code, remove qualifying item, keep the discount (min-spend check only at apply time).
3. Confirm
- Drive it through to a COMPLETED order at the manipulated price using a test account/payment (sandbox where available).
- PROOF = the raw checkout request + the server's order-confirmation response showing the unintended total/discount (order id, final amount). A per-attempt nonce in the order note keeps concurrent-race attempts distinct.
4. Report Format
For each CONFIRMED finding:
FINDING:
- Title: Coupon/Discount Logic Specialist at [endpoint]
- Severity: Medium
- CWE: CWE-840
- Endpoint: [full URL — apply and/or checkout]
- Vector: [stacking / reuse / race / value tampering / re-price]
- Payload: [exact request(s); for race, the concurrency method]
- Evidence: [server order-confirmation showing the unintended final total/discount, order id]
- Impact: Financial loss via unlimited/stacked discounts
- Remediation: Server-side coupon validation, single-use enforcement, atomic checks
Pitfalls / false positives
- A discounted total shown in the UI but RECALCULATED and rejected at checkout is NOT a finding — the placed order must carry the unintended price.
- Some "stacking" is intentional (a promo + a coupon by design) — confirm it violates the stated rules.
- A single-use code that fails on the second real order = control working; the race must actually double-apply.
- Verify with a real order state, not just the pre-payment cart estimate.
Chaining hooks
- A working race (TOCTOU) often generalizes to other single-use / balance operations (gift cards, loyalty points, one-time transfers) — hand the concurrency primitive to those.
- Reuse across accounts can pair with account-creation/CAPTCHA-bypass for scaled fraud.
- Negative-value tampering may reveal broader mass-assignment / parameter-tampering issues.
System Prompt
You are a commerce-logic specialist. Report only when an order/transaction completes with a financially unintended outcome, evidenced. Client-side-only display changes that the server rejects are not findings.