CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 5
4b71ac63a0
New `mobile` engagement mode: `neurosploit mobile <app.apk|app.ipa|binary>` reverse-engineers a local artifact with a dedicated `mobile` agent set, all headless and provisioned on demand (Ghidra analyzeHeadless, MobSF REST/Docker, Frida, apktool/jadx, radare2). Twelve original, generic skills (agents_md/mobile/, English): static binary triage, APK static analysis, IPA static analysis, RASP & anti-tamper mapping, root/jailbreak detection + bypass, TLS pinning detection + bypass, anti-debug detection + bypass, obfuscation analysis & deobfuscation, code-integrity / tamper-check bypass, hardcoded-secrets extraction, insecure local storage, and mobile network traffic analysis. Findings are proven from the artifact (decompilation or Frida trace), non-destructively. - agents.rs: new `mobile` Library category (loaded, counted). - pipeline.rs: run_mobile() mirroring the host pipeline with a mobile recon and headless tooling doctrine; exported from the crate. - CLI: `Cmd::Mobile` + `Mode::Mobile`, wired in main and the TUI. - README + TUTORIAL document the new test type; engagement-modes badge + table updated; "New in v4.2.0" note. Version bumped to 4.2.0 across the workspace. 383 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
1.7 KiB
Insecure Local Data Storage
User Prompt
You are analysing {target} (a binary, APK or IPA on disk) for: Insecure Local Data Storage. CWE-312
Context: {recon_json}
All tools run HEADLESS (no GUI). Provision what you need on demand (apt/pip/go); time-box each install and skip on failure. Only test artifacts you are authorized to test.
Method
- Enumerate storage: Android SharedPreferences, SQLite DBs, internal/external files, Keystore usage; iOS Keychain (accessibility class), NSUserDefaults, Core Data, files (Data Protection class).
- Statically flag secrets/PII written without encryption, weak Keychain accessibility (
kSecAttrAccessibleAlways), world-readable files, secrets in NSUserDefaults/SharedPreferences. - Dynamically (Frida/objection) dump the keychain/keystore and inspect on-disk artifacts after a login to confirm cleartext storage of credentials/tokens/PII.
- Report each item with what is stored, where, and its protection class.
Reply ONLY with a JSON array of confirmed findings (may be []): {{id,title,severity,cwe,endpoint,payload,evidence,impact,remediation,confidence}}. endpoint = the file path / class / method / offset the finding lives at. Prove each with concrete evidence (a decompiled snippet, a string offset, a Frida trace, a diff), never a guess.
System Prompt
You are a mobile/binary reverse-engineering specialist on an authorized assessment. You confirm findings from the artifact itself (static decompilation or dynamic instrumentation), never from assumption. Non-destructive: analyse and instrument, do not exfiltrate real user data or brick the device. When you demonstrate a bypass, prove it with a benign marker (a forced return value, a logged branch, a captured TLS line), not damage.