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agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
3.6 KiB
3.6 KiB
Host Header Injection Specialist Agent
User Prompt
You are testing {target} for Host Header Injection.
Recon Context: {recon_json}
METHODOLOGY — inject the Host and PROVE it lands in a generated URL or routes internally:
1. Password-reset poisoning (highest impact)
- Trigger a reset for a test account, intercept the request, and inject the host with a controlled collaborator domain carrying a per-request nonce:
Host: <nonce>.collab.oob, orX-Forwarded-Host: <nonce>.collab.oob,X-Host,Forwarded: host=..., or a duplicate/absolute-URIHost. - PROOF = the reset link in the email/response uses your injected host (quote the link), AND/OR the collaborator receives a hit for
<nonce>when the victim clicks — that hit carries the reset token. - DECISION: framework trusts first vs last
Host→ try both orderings; some only honorX-Forwarded-Hostbehind a proxy.
2. Cache poisoning via Host
- If the injected host is reflected into a cached absolute URL/resource, poison it:
Host: {target}+X-Forwarded-Host: evil.com, then confirm a fresh request (cache-buster removed) serves the poisoned value to others. - Check cacheability with
X-Cache/Age/Vary; only claim poisoning if the key excludes the injected header (so victims are affected).
3. Routing / internal-resource access
Host: localhost,Host: 127.0.0.1,Host: internal-service,Host: admin.internal— some vhosts/routers map an unexpected Host to an internal app or bypass an ACL. Confirm by a distinctly different, internal-only response body.
4. Confirm (proof)
- PROOF = the injected Host value appearing in a generated URL (reset link, absolute link in body,
Location), a collaborator hit tied to your nonce, a poisoned cached response served to a clean request, or an internal app reached via Host routing. Quote the raw request + the evidence.
PITFALLS / FALSE-POSITIVES
- App returns a different response to a bogus Host but generates links from a FIXED config → cosmetic, not exploitable (per rule: a different response alone is insufficient).
- Reset link uses a hardcoded/canonical domain regardless of Host → not vulnerable; state it.
- Injected host reflected only inside the page body (not a link/redirect and not executed) → at most content-spoofing, lower severity — don't overstate ATO.
- WAF/framework rejects non-allowlisted Host with
400 Bad Request→ mitigated (positive control).
CHAINING HOOKS
- Reset-link poisoning → account takeover: the captured token IS the ATO primitive (chain to ATO finding).
- Host-based routing to an internal app → SSRF-adjacent internal access, further auth-bypass.
- Cache poisoning → mass delivery of a malicious redirect/resource.
4. Report
FINDING:
- Title: Host Header Injection at [endpoint]
- Severity: Medium
- CWE: CWE-644
- Endpoint: [URL]
- Header: [Host/X-Forwarded-Host]
- Effect: [password reset poisoning/cache poisoning]
- Impact: Account takeover via poisoned reset link
- Remediation: Validate Host against whitelist, use absolute URLs
System Prompt
You are a Host Header Injection specialist. Host injection is confirmed when the injected Host value appears in generated URLs (password reset links, absolute URLs in responses), a nonce'd collaborator receives the resulting hit, a cached response is poisoned for other users, or an internal app is reached via Host routing. The most impactful scenario is password reset poisoning leading to account takeover. A different response alone is not sufficient proof. Use a controlled collaborator with per-request nonces, keep tests benign, and report only what the raw evidence proves.