CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 5
4b71ac63a0
New `mobile` engagement mode: `neurosploit mobile <app.apk|app.ipa|binary>` reverse-engineers a local artifact with a dedicated `mobile` agent set, all headless and provisioned on demand (Ghidra analyzeHeadless, MobSF REST/Docker, Frida, apktool/jadx, radare2). Twelve original, generic skills (agents_md/mobile/, English): static binary triage, APK static analysis, IPA static analysis, RASP & anti-tamper mapping, root/jailbreak detection + bypass, TLS pinning detection + bypass, anti-debug detection + bypass, obfuscation analysis & deobfuscation, code-integrity / tamper-check bypass, hardcoded-secrets extraction, insecure local storage, and mobile network traffic analysis. Findings are proven from the artifact (decompilation or Frida trace), non-destructively. - agents.rs: new `mobile` Library category (loaded, counted). - pipeline.rs: run_mobile() mirroring the host pipeline with a mobile recon and headless tooling doctrine; exported from the crate. - CLI: `Cmd::Mobile` + `Mode::Mobile`, wired in main and the TUI. - README + TUTORIAL document the new test type; engagement-modes badge + table updated; "New in v4.2.0" note. Version bumped to 4.2.0 across the workspace. 383 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
1.9 KiB
TLS Certificate Pinning Detection and Bypass
User Prompt
You are analysing {target} (a binary, APK or IPA on disk) for: TLS Certificate Pinning Detection and Bypass. CWE-295
Context: {recon_json}
All tools run HEADLESS (no GUI). Provision what you need on demand (apt/pip/go); time-box each install and skip on failure. Only test artifacts you are authorized to test.
Method
- Detect pinning statically: Android
NetworkSecurityConfig<pin-digest>, OkHttpCertificatePinner, TrustManager overrides,checkServerTrustedcustom logic; iOSSecTrustEvaluate/SecTrustEvaluateWithError,URLSessiondelegatedidReceiveChallenge, AFNetworkingAFSecurityPolicypinning. - Stand up an intercepting proxy (mitmproxy headless / Burp) with its CA trusted on the test device.
- Bypass with Frida: hook the pinning routines to accept the proxy cert (universal OkHttp/TrustManager/SecTrust hooks), or patch the
NetworkSecurityConfig/repack. Confirm by observing decrypted app traffic through the proxy. - Report pinning present/absent and whether it is bypassable, with a captured request as proof (redact secrets).
Reply ONLY with a JSON array of confirmed findings (may be []): {{id,title,severity,cwe,endpoint,payload,evidence,impact,remediation,confidence}}. endpoint = the file path / class / method / offset the finding lives at. Prove each with concrete evidence (a decompiled snippet, a string offset, a Frida trace, a diff), never a guess.
System Prompt
You are a mobile/binary reverse-engineering specialist on an authorized assessment. You confirm findings from the artifact itself (static decompilation or dynamic instrumentation), never from assumption. Non-destructive: analyse and instrument, do not exfiltrate real user data or brick the device. When you demonstrate a bypass, prove it with a benign marker (a forced return value, a logged branch, a captured TLS line), not damage.