mirror of
https://github.com/CyberSecurityUP/NeuroSploit.git
synced 2026-09-29 20:41:51 +02:00
CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 5
3456c32f4d
Four pieces that together answer "may this action happen, under whose authority, and can we prove afterwards what we did". policy.rs — effective_risk per action, exactly as specified: (action_risk + asset_criticality + protocol_risk + privilege_level + blast_radius) × environment_multiplier Every term is named and kept on the result, so the number can be explained rather than argued with. Three policies sit on it: SafetyPolicy (ceilings, approval thresholds, hard prohibitions), ReasoningPolicy (baseline before payload, bounded hypotheses, evidence before escalation, explicit stop conditions) and ProofOfImpactPolicy (what a severity must carry before it may be that severity). OT/ICS/SCADA is treated as its own regime, not web testing on odd ports. Industrial protocols authenticate nothing — a Modbus write is the protocol working as intended, addressed to a device that may be holding a valve — and scanners crash PLCs by sending unexpected data at line rate. So the OT profile blocks writes, disruptive actions, fuzzing and exploit payloads outright, caps the rate at ~1 req/s, and refuses the function codes that stop a CPU (Modbus 5/6/8/15/16/22/23/43, S7 start/stop, DNP3 restart/stop). Safety instrumented systems are off limits in every profile. A test caught a calibration error worth keeping: a plain READ of a critical PLC scores 3.6 on this formula, so the obvious tight ceiling would have refused exactly the observation OT findings come from. In an industrial environment it is the KIND of action that is forbidden, not the arithmetic — the ceiling catches extremes and the low approval threshold makes anything past trivial observation a human's decision. capability.rs — HMAC-signed grants: who authorized what, against which hosts, in which environment, until when. The harness verifies the signature before reading a single claim (a well-formed token from the wrong key must never get to influence what the harness believes), refuses expired and not-yet-valid tokens, and treats the grant as a CEILING: constrain() intersects it with local configuration, so config can narrow authorization and never widen it. Tokens carry no secrets — the payload is readable by anyone holding it. audit.rs — one structured record per action, in the specified shape (timestamp, agent, hypothesis, action, target, policy_decision, operator, tool, result, evidence_hash, capability_token). Two things make it worth having: it is hash-chained, so removing or editing an entry breaks every hash that follows and verify() says which one; and it records REFUSALS, because a trail containing only what happened cannot demonstrate restraint. Only the grant's id is recorded, never the token — the trail gets shared. Hard kill conditions end a run outright: target unresponsive after our traffic, sustained 5xx, out-of-scope request, forbidden industrial function code, safety system addressed, capability expired mid-run, repeated policy violations, budget exhausted, operator stop. Failures BEFORE the target ever answered do not count — nothing listening is not the same as knocked over. The OT switch trips far sooner: a PLC missing two requests already warrants stopping. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
23 lines
392 B
TOML
23 lines
392 B
TOML
[package]
|
|
name = "neurosploit-harness"
|
|
version.workspace = true
|
|
edition.workspace = true
|
|
license.workspace = true
|
|
|
|
[lib]
|
|
name = "harness"
|
|
path = "src/lib.rs"
|
|
|
|
[dependencies]
|
|
serde.workspace = true
|
|
serde_json.workspace = true
|
|
tokio.workspace = true
|
|
reqwest.workspace = true
|
|
anyhow.workspace = true
|
|
futures.workspace = true
|
|
walkdir = "2"
|
|
sha2 = "0.10"
|
|
hmac = "0.12"
|
|
base64 = "0.22"
|
|
regex = "1"
|