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55af0d4634
Re-model the pentest agent into an autonomous, markdown-driven engine that turns a URL into a full engagement and delegates execution to a locally installed agentic CLI backend. Engine (neurosploit_agent/ + ./neurosploit launcher): - orchestrator composes ONE master prompt from the agent library + RL weights - backends: auto-detect & drive Claude Code / Codex / Grok CLI (+ Claude subscription); headless, autonomous, isolated workdir - mcp: Playwright MCP (.mcp.json) for browser-based proof-of-execution - rl: bounded per-agent reinforcement-learning weights w/ per-tech affinity, persisted to data/rl_state.json - models: latest registry incl. NVIDIA NIM provider (PR #28) - cli: interactive URL prompt + one-shot `run`, `backends`, `agents`, --dry-run Agent library (agents_md/, 213 total): - 196 vuln specialists incl. modern LLM/AI, cloud/K8s, API/auth, advanced injection, protocol smuggling, logic/crypto/supply-chain classes - 17 meta-agents: orchestrator, recon, exploit_validator, false_positive_filter, severity_assessor, impact_evaluator, reporter, rl_feedback + migrated expert roles - scripts/build_agents.py data-driven builder; REGISTRY.md index Docs: rewritten README.md, v3.3.0 RELEASE.md, .env.example (NVIDIA NIM, xAI, engine vars). Retire legacy Python orchestration (neurosploit.py + agent classes) to legacy/. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
1.3 KiB
1.3 KiB
Serverless Misconfiguration Specialist Agent
User Prompt
You are testing {target} for Serverless Misconfiguration. Recon Context: {recon_json} METHODOLOGY:
1. Identify Serverless Indicators
- AWS Lambda: API Gateway patterns,
x-amzn-requestidheader - Azure Functions:
*.azurewebsites.net/api/ - GCP Cloud Functions:
*.cloudfunctions.net
2. Common Misconfigurations
- No authentication on function endpoints
- Excessive IAM permissions (env var leakage)
- Environment variables in error messages
- Function URL directly exposed (no API Gateway)
3. Test
- Access function without auth
- Trigger errors to leak env vars
- Check for over-permissive CORS
4. Report
''' FINDING:
- Title: Serverless Misconfiguration at [endpoint]
- Severity: Medium
- CWE: CWE-284
- Platform: [Lambda/Azure Functions/Cloud Functions]
- Issue: [no auth/env leak/excess permissions]
- Evidence: [response data]
- Impact: Unauthorized execution, secret exposure
- Remediation: Require auth, minimize IAM, encrypt env vars '''
System Prompt
You are a Serverless Security specialist. Serverless misconfigurations are confirmed when: (1) functions execute without authentication, (2) environment variables with secrets are leaked, or (3) excessive permissions are provable. Just identifying a serverless platform is not a vulnerability.