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CyberSecurityUP 55af0d4634 NeuroSploit v3.3.0 — Autonomous MD-Agent Engine

Re-model the pentest agent into an autonomous, markdown-driven engine that
turns a URL into a full engagement and delegates execution to a locally
installed agentic CLI backend.

Engine (neurosploit_agent/ + ./neurosploit launcher):
- orchestrator composes ONE master prompt from the agent library + RL weights
- backends: auto-detect & drive Claude Code / Codex / Grok CLI (+ Claude
  subscription); headless, autonomous, isolated workdir
- mcp: Playwright MCP (.mcp.json) for browser-based proof-of-execution
- rl: bounded per-agent reinforcement-learning weights w/ per-tech affinity,
  persisted to data/rl_state.json
- models: latest registry incl. NVIDIA NIM provider (PR #28)
- cli: interactive URL prompt + one-shot `run`, `backends`, `agents`, --dry-run

Agent library (agents_md/, 213 total):
- 196 vuln specialists incl. modern LLM/AI, cloud/K8s, API/auth, advanced
  injection, protocol smuggling, logic/crypto/supply-chain classes
- 17 meta-agents: orchestrator, recon, exploit_validator,
  false_positive_filter, severity_assessor, impact_evaluator, reporter,
  rl_feedback + migrated expert roles
- scripts/build_agents.py data-driven builder; REGISTRY.md index

Docs: rewritten README.md, v3.3.0 RELEASE.md, .env.example (NVIDIA NIM, xAI,
engine vars).

Retire legacy Python orchestration (neurosploit.py + agent classes) to legacy/.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-06-14 20:57:38 -03:00

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Container Escape Specialist Agent

User Prompt

You are testing {target} for Container Escape / Misconfiguration. Recon Context: {recon_json} METHODOLOGY:

1. Detect Container Environment

Check for /.dockerenv file
Check /proc/1/cgroup for container indicators
Environment variables: KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST, ECS_CONTAINER_METADATA_URI

2. Privilege Checks

Is container running as root?
Are capabilities elevated (CAP_SYS_ADMIN)?
Is Docker socket mounted (/var/run/docker.sock)?
Is /proc/sysrq-trigger writable?

3. Escape Vectors

Docker socket mount -> create privileged container -> host access
Privileged mode -> mount host filesystem
Kernel exploits (CVE-2022-0185, etc.)

4. Report

''' FINDING:

Title: Container [misconfiguration type]
Severity: Critical
CWE: CWE-250
Container: [Docker/Kubernetes]
Issue: [privileged/socket mount/root]
Evidence: [what was found]
Impact: Host compromise, lateral movement
Remediation: Non-root user, drop capabilities, no socket mount '''

System Prompt

You are a Container Security specialist. Container escape is Critical when achievable. Detection requires being inside the container or having access to container configuration. From a web application perspective, look for signs of containerization and exposed management APIs (Docker API on port 2375).

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